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Introduction
Reconsidering Some Dogmas about Desires
Federico Lauria
Julien A. Deonna
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0001
Abstract and Keywords
Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of 
mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of 
this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. 
The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts 
with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there 
are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-
to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the “guise of the 
good”), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the “death of desire” 
principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward system is the key to 
understanding desire. The second part of the introduction summarizes the 
contributions to this volume. The hope is to contribute to the emergence of a 
fruitful debate on this neglected, albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.
Keywords:   desire, motivational conception, evaluative conception, direction of fit, guise of the good, 
death of desire, deontic conception, reward system
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OUR LIFE IS imbued with desire. While some people desire to see the ocean, 
others want to live in New York. While some people want to understand the laws 
of the universe, Juliet simply aspires to kiss Romeo. Some desires are stronger 
than others. Some last longer than others. Sometimes we are happy because one 
of our desires is gratified; on another occasion, we may cry due to the 
frustration of a desire. These are among the many platitudes of the life of desire. 
One may wonder: What is this thing called ‘desire’? What is the essence of 
desire? This is the main question addressed in this volume.
Desires play an important role in our lives. Yet contemporary philosophy has 
neglected the issue of the nature of desire as compared with investigations of 
perception, belief, emotion, intention, and other types of mental states. Although 
there are some notable exceptions to this neglect (Marks 1986; Stampe 1986,
1987; Schroeder 2004; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007; Friedrich 2012; Arpaly 
and Schroeder 2013), it is fair to say that no live debate on the nature of desire 
is presently taking place (see Schroeder 2015 for a similar diagnosis). The aim of 
this volume is to redress this imbalance by bringing together scholars who adopt 
different perspectives on the subject. The volume aspires to draw a taxonomy of 
the main conceptions of desire and to create a fruitful debate about this 
underexplored topic. But why is it important to understand desire, and what 
does the philosophy of desire consist of? In what follows, this question is 
answered from three distinct angles.
 (p.2) Beyond the Dogma of the Motivational Conception of Desire
The lack of a real debate about desire is perplexing. The central explanation for 
this fact is, we believe, that one intuitive view of desire is often taken for 
granted in the philosophical literature. It is, we conjecture, the main dogma of 
desire. Since Hume, most philosophers have assumed that desire is essentially a 
motivational state (Armstrong 1968; Stampe 1986; Stalnaker 1984 Smith 1994;
Dretske 1988; Dancy 2000; Millikan 2005). In this “hydraulic” view of desire 
(McDowell’s 1998 expression), desire is the spring of action par excellence. To 
desire, for example to listen to a symphony, is nothing but being inclined to do so
—end of story. The motivational conception of desire is rarely defended in detail, 
but it is presupposed in numerous debates. Most interpretations of the notion of 
direction of fit rely on it; functionalist accounts of desire often mention it in 
passing; standard views of action and decision making in philosophy and 
economics build on it; and disagreements about whether desires can be reasons 
for acting often revolve around it. From this perspective, action and motivation 
are key to understanding desire. But is motivation all there is to desiring?
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There are reasons to doubt it. To start with, our folk concept of desire appears 
much richer. When we acknowledge our desires, are we merely talking about our 
motivations to act? Intuitively, professing my desire to see Juliet seems to go 
beyond conveying the motivation to act so as to see her; it seems to express 
something deeper. Furthermore, looking at the history of philosophy or the 
contemporary literature, there is another approach to desire that deserves 
special attention. On this conception, to desire something is to evaluate it in a 
positive light. Desiring to swim in the river is to represent this state as good in 
some way or other. According to this evaluative conception, which can be traced 
back to Aristotle at least and which has found new advocates recently, goodness 
is the crux around which desire revolves.1 Given their historical pedigree, we 
shall call the motivational and evaluative conceptions the “classical views of 
desire.” On the face of it, they seem very different. The evaluative view is 
centered on goodness, while the motivational view concentrates on motivation. 
Now, goodness and motivation seem to be distinct concepts despite the intimate 
relations that exist between them. As the debate on moral motivation has taught 
us, it might be that one could positively evaluate a state of affairs without being 
motivated to realize it. It is thus fair to ask which one of the two conceptions 
captures desire best. Is desire essentially a motivational  (p.3) state? Is it a 
positive evaluation? Is it both? Or is it neither? Most of the essays in this 
collection explore the classical views of desire. This is one way of going beyond 
the dogma that desiring is the state of being motivated and of adopting a more 
critical stance on the nature of desire.
Revisiting Other Philosophical and Empirical Dogmas of Desire
The philosophy of desire touches on many other issues, however. A survey of the 
philosophical literature reveals that several principles about desire are often 
taken for granted and are rarely put into doubt. In other words, there are other 
dogmas of desire. This book aims to discuss these dogmas too, covering more 
minutiae than is usually the case, from the perspective of the nature of desire. A 
brief presentation of these dogmas is thus in order.
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Desires are often contrasted with beliefs in terms of their direction of fit. 
According to this metaphor or figurative way of talking, beliefs are supposed to 
fit the world, while the world is supposed to fit our desires.2 In the case of a 
mismatch between the world and our beliefs, our beliefs should change—not the 
world. Changing the world so as to fit a belief would be inappropriate. 
Consequently, beliefs have the mind-to-world direction of fit: they aim at truth. In 
contrast, when the world does not correspond to some desire, the world should 
change. Changing a desire simply because it is frustrated would be wrong. 
Desires thus have the world-to-mind direction of fit: they aim at satisfaction. 
There is an important debate about the meaning of this notion (see Smith 1994; 
Humberstone 1992; Zangwill 1998; Gregory 2012; Archer 2015). Despite these 
controversies, the standard interpretation of the world-to-mind direction of fit of 
desire is motivational in spirit: in the case of a mismatch between desire and the 
world, subjects should act to bring about the satisfaction of the desire. This 
common interpretation fits well the motivational view of desire. Is it correct? 
Does the world-to-mind direction of fit reveal that desires are essentially 
motivations (see Gregory, Lauria, Railton this volume; for detractors of the 
metaphor, see Sobel and Copp 2001; Milliken 2008; Frost 2014)?
In addition to aiming toward satisfaction in the way explained, desires are often 
said to aim at the good, just as beliefs aim at the truth (De Sousa 1974; Velleman 
2000; Hazlett unpublished). One way of understanding this slogan is to interpret 
it as follows: one cannot desire something without “seeing” some good in it. Call 
this the “guise of the good” thesis. The  (p.4) “guise of the good” thesis has an 
important historical pedigree: it can be traced back to at least Plato, was at the 
heart of the scholastic conception of desire in the Middle Ages, and is often 
referred to in the contemporary literature.3 Although friends of the evaluative 
conception of desire naturally embrace this thesis, other views are compatible 
with it: that desiring involves a positive evaluation does not imply that it is a 
positive evaluation. Can we not desire something without seeing any good in it? 
If so, what does this teach us about desire (see Oddie, Massin this volume; for 
detractors of this thesis, see Stocker 1979; Velleman 1992; Döring and Eker this 
volume)?
Another dogma that is less often examined concerns a form of impossibility in 
desire. Since Plato, it is common to think that one cannot desire what one 
already has. Consider that I want to climb Mount Etna. The intuition is that as 
long as I have a desire to climb Mount Etna, I have not climbed it. As soon as I 
have, my desire extinguishes itself. Desires are for absences, or, less 
metaphorically, they are about what is not actual.4 Although some scholars 
disagree about the formulation of the principle (see Boghossian 2003; Oddie 
2005; Lauria this volume), some version of the principle is often taken for 
granted. What does this reveal about desire (see Oddie, Lauria, Massin this 
volume)? And is it true (for detractors, see Heathwood 2007; Oddie this volume)?
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Finally, leaving armchair philosophy, it is uncontroversial in the neurosciences 
that desires are strongly implicated in the reward system and are closely 
connected to the neurotransmitter dopamine (Schultz 1997; Schultz, Tremblay 
and Hollerman 1998; Schroeder 2004). According to the standard 
neuroscientific picture, desire involves the anticipation of reward and the 
encoding of prediction errors: in desiring something, one anticipates some 
reward (say, a banana) and then compares the expected reward with the actual 
obtaining of the reward. In this way, desires are crucial for learning in the sense 
of adapting one’s behavior to one’s environment. How can this help us 
understand the nature of desire (see Schroeder, Railton, Lauria this volume)? 
Examining these four dogmas is another way of questioning the received wisdom 
about desire and has the potential to shed new light on its essence.
Beyond the Philosophy of Desire
The issue of the nature of desire is important per se, but it can also illuminate 
other philosophical puzzles—controversies in which desires are  (p.5) frequently 
mentioned and their role examined without sufficient attention being paid to 
what they are. In the absence of a clear conception of desire, these debates are 
on shaky ground. This is especially so given that the motivational view of desire 
is often simply assumed. Let us present three examples of important debates 
featuring desires in, respectively, philosophy of mind, ethics, and meta-ethics, 
which could benefit from a deeper understanding of what they are. This will 
reveal the wider philosophical significance of this book.
The direction of fit of desire is often considered an essential feature of desire, 
but it has broader ramifications in the philosophy of mind and of language 
(Searle 1983). In the philosophy of mind, it is used as a tool to contrast 
conations or states meant to modify the world (e.g. desires, intentions, needs) 
from cognitions or states meant to represent the world (beliefs, perceptions, 
etc.). This Humean picture of the mind is at the heart of traditional philosophical 
accounts of agency and the main models of decision making in economics. If our 
exploration into the nature of desire can elucidate the metaphor of direction of 
fit, it will eo ipso clarify the general issue of the taxonomy of the mental and of 
other types of representations suggested by the metaphor. This has far-ranging 
implications, since it can help to put in perspective traditional accounts of 
agency in philosophy and economics (see Railton this volume).
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In ethics the most significant line of research about desire concerns its role in 
the explanation and justification of action. Can desires be reasons for acting in a 
certain way? If they can, are they motivating reasons, normative ones, or both? 
Although scholars disagree on how to answer these questions, they often rely on 
implicit and varying conceptions of desire—most of the time presupposing that 
desiring is nothing but the motivation to act. Addressing the issue of the nature 
of desire should thus help to solve the puzzle of their practical role. How can one 
determine whether desires are reasons for acting without knowing what they 
are? Four contributions in this volume attest to the fact that one’s stance on the 
nature of desire has relevant implications for this investigation (Döring and Eker,
Alvarez, Friedrich, Gregory this volume).
Finally, in meta-ethics desires appear in the debate about the very nature and 
definition of value. According to the mainstream fitting attitude analysis of 
value, what is good is just what is worth desiring (Broad 1930). Prima facie, this 
debate seems disconnected from the question of desire’s essence and seems to 
rest on an intuitive grasp of what counts as a desire. Yet, as Oddie’s essay 
reveals, the question of the nature of desire can contribute to this meta-ethical 
puzzle as well.
 (p.6) A more detailed examination of what desires are can thus lead to a better 
understanding of important and various philosophical concerns. We have 
focused here on established controversies where desires surface, but it goes 
without saying that more neglected issues will also benefit from this inquiry (see 
the second part of this volume).
With these clarifications in mind, the aim of this volume can be further specified 
as follows. In addition to examining the classical views of desire, this collection 
of essays purports to explore the dogmas about desire one finds in the literature. 
And it does so with an eye to the implications the nature of desire has with 
regard to wider controversies.
The book is divided into two parts. The first tackles directly the question of the 
essence of desire; the second addresses unexplored issues in the philosophical 
literature that bear on conceptions of desire. In the remainder of this 
introduction, we summarize each contribution and raise questions that connect 
each with other essays in the volume. This should convince the reader that a 
fruitful and rich debate about the nature of desire has begun.
I. Conceptions of Desire
Are desires positive evaluations? Are they motivations? Are there alternative 
conceptions? What does the empirical evidence suggest about the nature of 
desire?
This section is divided into four subsections corresponding to each question 
raised.
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Evaluative Views: Desire and the Good
Is goodness the key for understanding desire? In their contributions, Oddie and 
Friedrich, elaborating on previous work, answer this question affirmatively. To 
desire, they argue, is to be struck by the goodness of certain things. Imagine a 
person who is disposed to switch on any radio she encounters (Quinn 1993). She 
is not doing this because she enjoys it or thinks there is something good about 
turning on radios (e.g. she considers it a means to listen to music). Rather she 
does not see any good whatsoever in the action she is performing. Does she 
desire to turn on radios? Quinn’s (1993) intuition, which is shared by Oddie and 
Friedrich, is that this person does not desire to switch on radios precisely 
because she does not see any good in it. Hence a desire should involve a positive 
evaluation. Ultimately it might be that desire is essentially a positive evaluation. 
Which type of evaluation? Both contributors agree  (p.7) that the evaluation 
that is crucial to desire does not amount to desires being evaluative judgments.
In his contribution “Desire and the Good: In Search of the Right Fit,” Oddie 
defends the “value appearance view.” In this conception, to desire something is 
for this thing to appear good. Juliet’s longing for Kyoto is the same thing as 
Kyoto appearing good to her. More specifically, Oddie expounds on the idea that 
desire and goodness fit like hand in glove, defends the view against objections, 
and presents a new argument in its favor. If we conceive of desires as value 
appearances, we may hope to fruitfully address issues surrounding the nature of 
values. The argument proposed concerns chiefly the fitting-attitude analysis of 
value: the thought that goodness is what is fitting to favor, in particular, what is 
fitting to desire. This analysis has been criticized on the grounds that it cannot 
account for “the wrong kind of reasons” to favor something (Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004) and for the existence of “solitary goods” (Bykvist 
2009). Oddie elegantly specifies desiderata for the positive attitude that is part 
of the analysis so as to make it immune from these problems and to find the 
right fit between goodness and desire. The positive attitude should be a 
representation of a value and should neither entail a belief about goodness nor 
the presence of this value outside the mind of the favorer. Moreover, Oddie 
stresses that value judgments should stem from an experiential source that is 
not an evaluative belief and that entails desire. Desires, he argues, can fit this 
bill provided they are value seemings, i.e. representations of values. As the 
experiential source of value, they imply neither beliefs about goodness nor the 
existence of the value represented. And they entail desires.
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Friedrich defends another variant of the evaluative conception in his “Desire, 
Mental Force and Desirous Experience.” His approach is original in that he 
addresses the issue by means of the distinction between mental force and 
mental content. Consider the contrast between asserting p and ordering p. 
Intuitively, both representations involve the same content, p, but they differ in 
their linguistic force. Friedrich’s proposal is that desires are positive evaluations 
in the sense that they involve a mental force that is evaluative in nature. 
Desiring is thus the representing of a state of affairs with the mental force of 
goodness. In this picture, desire differs from evaluative beliefs and value 
appearances: it is not a cognitive state but consists in a sui generis evaluation. 
What is this evaluation and evaluative mental force? Building on a similar 
proposal for the case of pleasure, Friedrich proposes to account for evaluative 
mental force in phenomenal terms. Desiring, in this view, involves a distinctive 
feeling—the ‘desirous  (p.8) experience’—consisting of the feeling of felt need. 
When desiring a cup of coffee, one represents having coffee as good, in that one 
feels the need for coffee and that one must have it. This captures the 
phenomenal tone of desire and can in turn explain desire’s special motivational 
power.
The intuition that desires are evaluative representations is compelling. The 
authors do a great job of exploring it and rebutting several objections to the 
evaluative conception. Still, some questions remain and other contributions in 
the volume help to frame them.
Is it enough to represent a state of affairs in a positive way to desire that state of 
affairs? There are reasons to doubt it. For instance, one might positively 
evaluate that Mozart lived a longer life yet not desire this: one would rather wish
that he lived longer (Döring and Eker this volume). Similarly, one can evaluate 
positively the fact that Obama was elected without desiring so, as one is aware 
that this state of affairs has obtained (Döring and Eker this volume). And, having 
lost hope, Pollyanna could believe that being in jail is after all a good thing 
without desiring to be there (Döring and Eker this volume). Or consider that 
Othello is clinically depressed: he represents Desdemona’s well-being as a good 
thing but, because of his depression, fails to desire that she fare well (Lauria this 
volume). Aren’t these possible scenarios? Strictly speaking, the evaluative 
conception does not entail that all positive evaluations are desires; some might 
be other phenomena such as emotions or long-standing affective states that 
involve desires only indirectly (see Oddie this volume). But isn’t, then, the 
evaluative conception too modest as an account of desire? The appeal to the 
feeling of felt need might be helpful, since it seems to go beyond mere positive 
evaluation. But does this not amount to giving up on an evaluative account of 
desire and switching to a deontic approach like the one explored by Lauria and 
Massin in this volume?
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The second question that we can raise about the evaluative conception of desire 
is more dramatic: Do all desires involve a positive evaluation? Do we desire 
everything under the “guise of the good”? This question is answered negatively 
by Döring and Eker, who open the exploration of the motivational conceptions of 
desire.
Motivational Views: Desire and Action
Desires bear a special relation to action and are usually thought of as explaining 
intentional actions. The fact that you are reading this book, say, can be explained 
by your desire to do so. This explanatory role is often understood in terms of two 
further features of desire. The first is that desires explain intentional actions in 
virtue of being dispositional states.  (p.9) The second is that they explain 
intentional action because they involve an evaluative component. In their 
respective contributions, Döring and Eker and Alvarez examine this explanatory 
role of desire and, in particular, the two facets just mentioned.
In “Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want,” Döring and 
Eker approach the issue of desire’s role in the explanation of actions by 
questioning the guise of the good thesis. They retrace the motivation for 
thinking that we desire only what seems good to us to the intuition that desires 
explain action through the evaluative component they involve, as Radioman-type 
scenarios are meant to reveal. However, in an original manner, they argue that 
Radioman’s scenario does not support the evaluative view. Indeed, Radioman’s 
behavior is not made more intelligible by appealing to his positive evaluation of 
switching on radios; quite the reverse. For such an evaluation is puzzling in 
itself. And this seriously undermines the main motivation for the evaluative 
picture. More generally, the authors argue that the evaluative conception, 
whether in its doxastic or appearance version, is inadequate. As has already 
been pointed out, evaluation might not be sufficient for desiring. The authors go 
as far as to argue that evaluation is not a necessary feature of desire: one might 
desire to tell a joke despite being aware that it is a bad thing, desire to go to the 
kitchen to have a drink without any positive representation of this state taking 
place, or want to watch a movie without having made up one’s mind about its 
value. Desires thus do not involve the guise of the good. This is not to say that 
they are just dispositions to act, however. The authors propose a more holistic 
motivational conception of desire: desires might involve wider agential 
dispositions, such as the disposition to form long-term plans or agential policies. 
This, they suggest, is absent in Radioman’s case while he undergoes an urge to 
switch on radios. Agential dispositions might thus suffice to make sense of his 
behavior without reference to the “guise of the good.”
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Döring and Eker’s contribution is very challenging, as it casts doubt on one of 
the main dogmas of desire and does so by disputing the classical lesson drawn 
from Radioman’s scenario. They rightly point out that appealing to evaluation 
would not help make Radioman’s behavior less bizarre. Yet doesn’t a desire 
provide pro tanto justification for some action, irrespective of how strange the 
desire is (see Oddie this volume)? Consider that Radiowoman desires to switch 
on radios because she represents this action as good. Would it not be irrational 
to refrain from turning on radios given her state of mind? Isn’t the oddness of an 
action distinct from its justification? And would the appeal to a policy of 
switching on radios make  (p.10) Radiowoman’s behavior less puzzling? This 
touches on the vexed question of whether desires justify actions and how they 
could do so.
In her contribution, “Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action,” 
Alvarez tackles this issue from an unexplored angle. She agrees that desires 
figure into action explanation in virtue of being dispositions. She thus proposes 
to explore the role of desire in action explanation by investigating the 
dispositional nature of desire. Dispositions can exist at some point in time 
without being manifested at that time: a sugar cube can be soluble even if it 
does not dissolve now. Similarly, I can desire something, at some point in time, 
even if I do not manifest my desire at this time. Desires are thus dispositions. 
But to what are they dispositions? In other words, how are we to characterize 
their manifestation? The traditional answer to this question is that desires are 
dispositions to act. By contrast, Alvarez argues that the manifestations of desire 
constitute a much richer set: it encompasses behaviors (e.g. actions), 
expressions (e.g. linguistic acts), and inner mental states (e.g. anticipated 
pleasure). By exploring the variety of desire’s manifestations, Alvarez proposes 
an integrative approach to desire that reconciles rival accounts of desire (e.g. 
the hedonic and the motivational conceptions of desire). In addition, 
investigating further the relation between desires and their manifestations sheds 
new light on how desires explain action. Desires differ from physical dispositions 
such as fragility and solubility. A glass is still fragile even if it never breaks or 
manifests its fragility in some way; what is needed is that it would do so in some 
circumstances. Desires are not like this: one cannot desire something without 
manifesting the disposition in some way or other, i.e. being disposed to act or 
expect some pleasure, etc., as is attested by the fact that we do not attribute a 
desire for holidays to a person who never thinks about holidays, never expects 
pleasure from a holiday, or never considers taking one. It appears that desires 
are dispositions that cannot exist without at least one of their manifestations 
taking place. This invites us to think about the way desire explains action in a 
more holistic fashion than is usually the case.
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At this junction we may wonder how the dispositional profile of desire relates to 
the classical views of desire. For instance, does the fact that desires are 
dispositions admitting of various manifestations go against the thought that they 
are essentially evaluations? Is the evaluative nature of desire not one way of 
unifying their manifold manifestations? We begin to appreciate how complex the 
relations between the different conceptions of desires and the various 
perspectives we may have on them can become.
Another question concerns the intuitive distinction between dispositional or 
standing desires, on the one hand, and occurrent or episodic ones,  (p.11) on 
the other (see Döring and Eker this volume). Some desires, like Romeo’s desire 
that Juliet fares well, are dispositional or standing: they typically last longer than 
others (Romeo desires this his whole life long); they still exist when they are not 
conscious (e.g. when Romeo is sleeping); and they admit future manifestations 
(every time Juliet is suffering, Romeo’s desire that she fare well manifests itself). 
Other desires, like Sam’s desire to smoke a cigarette right now, are episodic or 
occurrent: they are short-lived, typically conscious, and do not admit of 
reiterated manifestations. How does this distinction connect with the thought 
that desires are essentially dispositions? Isn’t there a tension between the view 
that desires are dispositions and the distinction between episodic and 
dispositional desires that is standard in the literature? Are there two senses of 
dispositionality involved here? This important ontological question will be left 
open here.
The Deontic Alternative: Desires, Norms, and Reasons
So far we have concentrated our attention on the classical views of desire and 
have briefly presented more holistic conceptions that build on them. Very 
recently an alternative perspective on desire has emerged: the appeal to deontic 
entities such as norms or reasons as opposed to values and motivation.
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In his contribution “The ‘Guise of the Ought to Be’: A Deontic View of the 
Intentionality of Desire,” Lauria criticizes the classical pictures of desire and 
proposes the deontic view. In this conception, which can be traced back to 
Meinong (1917), to desire a state of affairs is to represent it as what ought to be
or as what should be. Desiring to see the ocean is representing this state as what 
ought to be. Desires involve a specific manner of representing content: a deontic
mode. Lauria provides three arguments for this picture, which correspond to the 
dimensions of desire that the classical views cannot accommodate: the 
arguments of direction of fit, of death of desire, and of explanatory relations. 
This is not to say that there is no grain of truth in the classical conceptions. 
Lauria suggests that desires are grounded in evaluations and, in turn, ground 
motivations. In other words, it makes sense to explain my desire to see the ocean 
by my positive evaluation of such a landscape. And desiring to see the ocean can 
explain why I am disposed to do so. This explanatory profile of desire is 
illuminated by the deontic view as follows. Some states of affairs (say, that 
people don’t die of cancer) ought to be because they are good, and subjects 
ought to bring them about because these states of affairs ought to be. If desires 
are deontic representations, it is not surprising that they are explained by 
evaluations and, in turn, explain motivations. For this is the  (p.12) mental 
counterpart of the meta-ethical explanatory relations already mentioned. The 
deontic view can thus accommodate the intuitions that drive classical views of 
desire. Yet as far as desire is concerned, these conceptions slightly miss their 
target.
Lauria’s contribution brings a new perspective to the classical views. One line of 
criticism raised by other contributors to this volume concerns the “death of 
desire” principle—one of the dogmas of desire. Lauria assumes that a desire 
ceases to exist when one represents that its content obtains. And he argues that 
this is satisfactorily explained by the deontic view, because norms cease to exist 
when they are satisfied: a state of affairs, say, that it rains, cannot be such that it 
ought to obtain and is obtaining at the same time. Yet both the explanandum and 
the explanans are questionable. Consider that Hillary wants to be the first 
female president of the United States and that at some point she becomes 
president (Oddie’s example in this volume). Can she not still desire to be the first 
female president of the United States despite knowing that she has won the 
election? Moreover, can she not believe that things are exactly how they should 
be and rightly so (Massin this volume)?
Another question concerns the degree of sophistication that desires end up 
having in the deontic view. It seems that babies and non-human animals have 
desires. Do they really represent things as what ought to be? Prima facie, this 
seems a quite complex representation compared to evaluations or motivations. 
This worry is reminiscent of the objection often raised against doxastic views of 
desire (see Friedrich, Döring and Eker this volume) and examined by some 
contributor (see Gregory’s reply).
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Adopting a similar approach in his “Desire, Values and Norms,” Massin argues 
that the formal object of desire is better construed as being deontic than 
evaluative. In other words, desiring something implies representing it under the 
guise of the ought-to-be or of the ought-to-do (the “guise of the ought” thesis). 
Unlike Lauria, Massin appeals to norms in general, not only norms of the ought-
to-be type. Moreover, he considers that the “guise of the ought” thesis is 
necessary but not sufficient to desire. The argument he proposes focuses on the 
polarity of desire. Aversion is the polar opposite of desire, as hate is the polar 
opposite of love. Still, the two pairs of opposites differ. The opposition between 
desire and aversion, argues Massin, is best understood in deontic rather than 
evaluative terms, and this contrasts with love and hate. A detour in deontic logic 
reveals why. Logic teaches us that obligation and interdiction are interdefinable: 
they define each other with the help of negation. Something is forbidden (say, 
stealing) if, and only if, it is obligatory that this thing does not happen (it is 
obligatory not  (p.13) to steal); something is obligatory (say, stopping at the red 
traffic light) if, and only if, it is forbidden that this thing does not happen. 
Goodness and badness, however, aren’t interdefinable in the same way. A state’s 
being good is not equivalent to its negation being bad. It might be elegant to 
wear a hat, but this does not mean that not wearing it is bad: not wearing it 
might be neutral. Now, Massin argues, desires and aversions are interdefinable, 
just as obligation and interdiction are. Desiring something is equivalent to being 
averse to its negation, and being averse to something is to desire it not to 
happen. Desiring to wear a hat is equivalent to being averse to not wearing it: it 
is incompatible with being indifferent to not wearing it. In contrast, liking 
something is not equivalent to disliking its negation: liking cheesecake is 
compatible with indifference toward not eating cheesecake. Therefore, desire is 
to aversion what obligation is to interdiction, and love is to hate what goodness 
is to badness. The “guise of the ought” thesis thus fares better than the “guise of 
the good.”
Massin’s approach sheds light on the polar opposition characteristic of desire by 
appealing to polarity in meta-ethics, two issues that are rarely discussed. It can 
be put in perspective with the help of two questions.
The first concerns the restriction to obligation. Does a desire for something 
involve representing this thing as being obligatory? The other deontic accounts 
defended in this volume appeal to deontic entities like what ought to be (Lauria) 
or reasons (Gregory) without putting an emphasis on obligation. How are we to 
capture the deontic entity that is relevant for understanding desire?
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The second issue concerns the relation between the polarity of desire and the 
essential features of desire. As observed, one might divorce the two features: 
that the polar opposition of desire is best understood in deontic terms is prima 
facie neutral with regard to desires being essentially deontic representations. 
This, however, contrasts with what other of our contributors assume. From the 
perspective of the evaluative view, it is natural to think that the polar opposite of 
desire, i.e. aversion, is a negative evaluation precisely because desiring is a 
positive one (Oddie, Railton this volume). What is the relation between polarity 
and the essence of desire?
In his contribution “Might Desires Be Beliefs about Normative Reasons for 
Action?,” Gregory defends another type of deontic view: the desire-as-belief 
view. He argues that desires are beliefs about reasons to act. Desiring to drink 
coffee is to believe that one has a normative, defeasible reason to do so. This 
claim differs importantly from all others, since desire is understood as a kind of 
belief rather than an appearance (Oddie this volume) or a non-cognitive attitude 
(e.g., Friedrich, Döring and Eker, Lauria  (p.14) this volume). As mentioned 
earlier, there are some difficulties in accounting for desire in terms of beliefs. 
Gregory’s contribution goes a long way toward rebutting a number of objections. 
He considers worries concerning desires’ direction of fit, appetites, and 
objections about the sufficiency and necessity of the view. Let us mention two 
examples that tightly connect with other key issues in the volume. We already 
mentioned that desires differ from beliefs in terms of direction of fit. How, then, 
could a desire be a belief? Gregory argues that desires have both directions of fit 
and that the same is true of beliefs about practical reasons. More importantly, it 
is common to think that desires cannot be assimilated to beliefs on the grounds 
that non-human animals have desires but lack beliefs (Friedrich, Döring and 
Eker this volume). Against this objection, Gregory considers the possibility that 
non-human animals have a minimal grasp of reasons to act and thus, in a sense, 
have normative beliefs. Alternatively, it might be that non-human animals have 
drives rather than desires. Finally, Gregory argues that his account is superior to 
the appearance view, i.e. the idea that desires are appearances of the good 
(Oddie this volume) or of reasons (Scanlon 2000). Appearances, he argues, are 
unlike desires in that they fall outside our rational control.
Gregory does a great job at undermining the main difficulties associated with 
the desire-as-belief account. The objections examined are reminiscent of the 
ones that have been raised against the view that desires are evaluative beliefs 
and that have often been used to dismiss it without being carefully examined. 
This similitude raises the following question: Should desires be understood in 
terms of beliefs about reasons rather than in terms of beliefs about values or 
other normative entities such as norms? Are we to identify values with reasons, 
in which case the two proposals would boil down to the same thing? This is 
where the philosophy of desire meets vexed meta-ethical issues.
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From another perspective, one might wonder whether identifying desire with 
belief is supported by empirical evidence. Lewis famously argued that reducing 
desire to belief cannot accommodate the regulation of desire and belief 
predicted by Bayesian models of decision making, which is the main empirical 
model in economics (Lewis 1988). It is also an open question whether reducing 
desire to belief is compatible with neuroscientific studies in this area. The next 
section touches on these questions.
Empirical Perspectives: Desire, the Reward System, and Learning
The nature of desire can also be approached with the help of the empirical 
evidence on the subject, in particular through the lens of neuroscientific  (p.15) 
findings on the reward system and models of decision making in economics. 
Given the importance of these perspectives, an exploration of the nature of 
desire would be incomplete without taking this literature into consideration.
Drawing on previous work, Schroeder’s contribution, entitled “Empirical 
Evidence against a Cognitivist Theory of Desire and Action,” is mainly inspired 
by neuroscientific findings on desire, motivation, and action. His aim is to assess 
Scanlon’s (2000) view of desire and motivation by confronting it with the 
neuroscientific evidence. Scanlon claims that motivation stems from judgments 
about reasons for action and that desires, in the wide sense of the term, are 
judgments about reasons for actions. Scanlon’s proposal shares interesting 
connections with that of Gregory. More generally, let us call “cognitivism” the 
view that some judgment or cognition about reasons or values is the source of 
motivation. Schroeder’s question is whether cognitivism is in line with the 
available empirical evidence. The relevant literature in neurobiology, he argues, 
suggests a negative answer. Importantly, it appears that the neural structures 
relevant for motivation are distinct from the ones involved in cognitions like 
perception, memory, and belief. Cognitivism is thus in serious tension with the 
empirical evidence. And none of the ways that cognitivism may try to 
accommodate the empirical evidence, Schroeder argues, is likely to succeed. 
These attempts to reconcile cognitivism with the empirical findings might 
explain alienated actions, like Tourette syndrome, or habitual actions. Yet they 
cannot be the whole story about motivation and action. Schroeder then warns 
against philosophical analysis that lacks proper empirical guidance.
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In a similar spirit, in “Learning as an Inherent Dynamic of Belief and Desire,” 
Railton builds on neuropsychological findings about desire and affect as well as 
on models of human behavior to be found in economics. As observed, it is 
common in philosophy and economics to think of belief and desire as the main 
determinants of human behavior. This Humean picture is partly motivated by the 
directions of fit of belief and desire. But is it compatible with learning in the 
realm of desire, i.e. the thought that we can improve our desires as we can 
improve our beliefs and cognitions? Learning comes with tracking facts. The 
direction of fit metaphor suggests that learning is the purpose of belief only, 
since beliefs aim to represent the world, unlike desires. Against this skepticism, 
Railton offers a model of learning for desire that is inspired by the way beliefs 
are regulated and, ironically, exploits Hume’s account of belief as a feeling. In a 
nutshell, the thought is that learning in belief is made possible by the 
expectations and feelings of confidence that come with believing. Subjects learn 
what  (p.16) to believe by confronting their expectations and feelings of 
confidence with the facts that are presented to them. Similarly, desires are 
regulated by means of comparisons between the positive anticipation they are 
associated with (the “liking” aspect of desire) and the actual satisfaction of the 
desire. When desiring something, unlike when experiencing an urge, one is not 
merely disposed to act in a certain way: one sees the thing in a positive light. 
Studies on the reward system, at least for non-pathological cases, reveal that 
desires involve positive anticipation of reward. Now, this provides room for 
learning in desire as the positive anticipation can be compared with one’s actual 
experience of desire satisfaction. With the help of feedback afforded by 
experience, one will learn what to desire, as one does for belief, by reducing 
discrepancy and by testing one’s expectations and positive evaluations in the 
arena of life.
These findings and the philosophical considerations they elicit provide important 
insights for understanding desire. They raise ontological and metaphysical 
issues that are particularly relevant for the theories of desire explored in this 
volume.
For example, we may wonder whether Railton’s proposal implies that desires are 
motivational states grounded in evaluation, in which case the proposal would be 
a variant of the motivational conception. Alternatively, we may think that the 
picture favors a compound view, in which desire is a whole made of evaluation 
and motivation or, more simply, that desires are multitrack dispositions, as one 
contribution in this volume suggests. This touches on the important ontological 
question of how types of mental states should be individuated.
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Similarly, one question that is relevant to Schroeder’s essay concerns the 
commonsense interpretation of the idea that desires are representations of 
rewards. Does it favor the evaluative view of desire or the motivational 
conception? Does it provide support for an alternative account of desire? In 
previous work (Schroeder 2004) and in his present contribution, Schroeder 
argues that the literature on the reward system does not favor the hedonic, 
evaluative, or motivational pictures of desire. How, then, are we to translate 
these findings into folk psychological terms?
II. Desiderative Puzzles
As outlined earlier, a better understanding of the nature of desire has wide-
ranging significance. In the second part of this volume, three puzzles pertaining 
to practical rationality are addressed and approached from the perspective of 
the nature of desire. They concern, respectively, the  (p.17) philosophy of mind, 
ethics, and epistemology. These issues are analogous to hotly debated questions 
on theoretical rationality. Yet the practical side of the inquiry is often left 
untouched. The first topic examined is desire inconsistency. Some desires are 
inconsistent. Is this to be understood along the same lines as inconsistency 
between beliefs? Does it teach us something about desire? The second issue is 
the direct practical analogue of theoretical reasoning. Desires, it is commonly 
thought, figure into the process of deliberating about what to do. They are 
commonly viewed as the first premise of practical reasoning. How are we to 
understand this feature? What should desires be to play such a role? The last 
puzzle concerns self-knowledge. Self-knowledge has been widely discussed in 
the case of belief. How are we to understand self-knowledge of one’s desires? 
What does it reveal about the nature of desire? The last contributions aim to fill 
these lacunas in the philosophical literature. Let us briefly summarize how.
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Juliet desires to be faithful to her partner while also desiring to have an affair. 
Something is wrong with this combination. Why is it so? This is the main 
question addressed by Wall’s contribution, “Desiderative Inconsistency, Moore’s 
Paradox, and Norms of Desire.” More specifically, Wall discusses Marino’s 
contention that there is nothing especially or necessarily problematic with 
desiderative inconsistency (e.g. Marino 2009). What goes wrong pertains to the 
subject’s well-being—one of her desires is not satisfied—and thus has no special 
connection to desire inconsistency. Moreover, desiderative inconsistency is not 
necessarily bad, since some desires are better not satisfied. By contrast, Wall 
argues that there is something especially and necessarily wrong in having 
inconsistent desires: the subject violates a constitutive norm for desire. It is 
common to think that beliefs are constituted by the norm of believing the truth. 
Wall extends this approach to the case of desire so as to shed light on 
desiderative inconsistency. To do so he makes use of Moore’s Paradox, the well-
known puzzle of belief. Asserting “p and I do not believe that p” or believing that 
p and I do not believe that p is an odd thing to say or to believe (Moore’s 
Paradox). This can be explained by the violation of the norm of belief: one should 
believe the truth. Mutatis mutandis, this norm explains what is wrong with 
inconsistent beliefs. If a similar paradox for desire can be found, it will reveal 
the existence of a constitutive norm for desire. Elaborating on previous work 
(Wall 2012), Wall proposes that the desire that p and I do not desire that p is 
such a case. The oddness of this desire suggests that desires are constituted by 
the norm of avoiding frustration. Having inconsistent desires violates this norm 
and is thus  (p.18) necessarily wrong irrespective of the subject’s well-being or 
other considerations. This is analogous to the case of belief.
Wall’s use of constitutive norms in approaching the issue of the nature of desire 
is promising. Yet proponents of the evaluative conception of desire have argued 
that desires are constituted by the norm of the good and have thus proposed 
cases of Moore’s Paradox along evaluative lines, for instance, “I desire that p 
and p does not seem good to me” (Stampe 1987; see Oddie 2005 for another 
proposal). How does Wall’s candidates for Moore’s Paradox and norms of desire 
connect with the ones inspired by the conceptions of desire examined in this 
volume? Is the norm of avoiding frustration compatible with them, or is it to be 
preferred over them? This is where the normative approach of the mental that 
appeals to constitutive norms meets the approach of the mind adopted so far in 
this volume, which focuses on the intentionality or functional role of desire 
understood in descriptive terms.
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Desire seems to play an important role in practical deliberation. According to 
the traditional understanding, desires appear as the first premise of the 
reasoning. Discussions on the nature of deliberation are often focused on the 
result of the deliberative process. In “Deliberation and Desire,” Schueler’s 
pioneering approach aims to question the role of desire in such a process and, 
by doing so, to shed light on the nature of desire. We do not deliberate about 
everything we desire. For instance, I do not deliberate about my whim of seeing 
my neighbor’s front lawn filled with wildflowers even if I favor this state of 
affairs. Consequently, it would appear that the ‘favoring’ view does not 
accommodate the role of desire in practical deliberation. That is why Schueler 
argues that desires can play this role only if they are conceived as being 
representations of aims or purposes. But do desires qua representations of aims 
actually figure in the first premise of practical deliberation, as the traditional 
picture has it? Since practical deliberation is a kind of reasoning, the first 
premise must be understood as being a belief about one’s desire. Now, this belief 
can be false: Othello can believe that he desires something, when in fact he does 
not. It thus appears that one can deliberate from a desire that one does not 
have, and so, contrary to received wisdom, desires do not play a significant role 
in practical reasoning. This being said, subjects who intentionally did something 
resulting from a process of deliberation eo ipso wanted to do so. For intentionally 
bringing about something entails having this thing as an aim, i.e. desiring it. 
This is puzzling. On the one hand, it appears that deliberation doesn’t involve 
actual desire; on the other hand, desire is necessarily involved in deliberation 
when the latter results in intentional  (p.19) action. How are we to disentangle 
this puzzle? Schueler proposes distinguishing between two kinds of practical 
reasoning. We sometimes reason from our beliefs about what we desire and 
determine the action that suits their satisfaction. In this case, desire can be 
absent from the process, since the belief about desire does not imply the 
presence of the desire. But we sometimes deliberate differently, starting with 
our intentions. As soon as I have formed the intention to go for coffee, I might 
deliberate about the best means of doing so and settle on the appropriate 
actions. In this case, the starting point is the intention itself—not a belief. This is 
what happens when we act out of deliberation. The goal of an intention is 
something we want, so it appears that this type of deliberation requires a desire. 
Desires, however, do not figure into the content of this sort of deliberation: they 
are constituted by the actions based on deliberation. The puzzle is thus 
dissolved.
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At least two issues that connect with other pieces in this volume are worth 
noting. Schueler argues that we do not deliberate from our desires when the 
latter are understood as states of favoring. Is it to say that desires cannot be the 
starting point of deliberation insofar as they are understood as evaluations? 
Turning to the case of Radioman, one might be inclined to think that the 
evaluative nature of desires is what provides them with the power to explain 
action. Is it not the case, then, that the evaluative dimension of desires is also 
the key for understanding their contribution to deliberation?
The second issue concerns the extent to which intentions are immune to the type 
of error desires are liable to. Can’t we be wrong in our beliefs that we have some 
intentions (even when we act on them), in the same way that we can falsely 
believe that we desire something? This raises the issue of self-knowledge that is 
the focus of the final contribution.
In “Introspection and the Nature of Desire,” Ashwell explores desire from the 
viewpoint of self-knowledge. We can know other people’s desires by observing 
their behavior. In contrast, we have direct access to our own desires: we do not 
need to observe them; we can introspect them. While the question of how we 
know our own beliefs is familiar, its desiderative counterpart is more rarely 
investigated. The originality of Ashwell’s contribution lies in the way her account 
of desire introspection is informed by various views of desire. She argues that 
desires are not evaluations but are better viewed as motivations. Indeed, we 
commonly attribute to ourselves evaluative beliefs without attributing 
corresponding desires. For instance, in the case of weakness of will, I can 
introspect my belief that going to the gym would be a good thing while being 
aware that  (p.20) I do not desire to go to the gym. If that is the case, desires 
cannot be evaluative beliefs, as the self-attribution of the latter can be rightly 
separated from that of the former. The appearance view of desire—that desires 
are seemings of value—fares better in this respect, however. In being weak-
willed, going to the gym might not appear good to me, hence I neither desire to 
go nor do I introspect this desire. This being said, the appearance view does not 
provide the right phenomenological picture of desire. While experiencing my 
desire to have another glass of wine, I do not only experience this state of affairs 
as good; I am also aware that I am drawn to act in a certain way. These feelings 
of motivation are an integral part of desire and the basis on which we introspect 
them. The weak-willed person does not introspect any feelings of motivation and 
hence does not attribute to herself a desire. Consequently, one condition for a 
reliable introspective access to our desires is that desires be motivational rather 
than evaluative states.
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Comparing Ashwell’s picture to other contributions in the volume brings them 
into sharper focus. Her argument relies on the assumption that weakness of will 
comes with absence of desire. But is it so? Gregory argues that weakness of will 
involves a failure of motivation rather than a failure of desire: one lacks the 
motivation to realize a desire that one has. How best to capture the nature of 
weakness of will, then?
This in turn touches on the question of whether feelings of motivation are 
necessary features of desire and thus of desire introspection. Famously 
Strawson has argued that we can conceive of creatures having desires without 
any motivation: Weather Watchers desire sunshine without being motivated to 
act in any way (Strawson 2009). Leaving this thought experiment to one side, 
some contributors to this volume discuss actual cases of desiring subjects who 
are not motivated to act. Being weak-willed, in one description, is such a case 
(Gregory this volume); being severely depressed is another (Lauria this volume). 
These conditions might impair one’s motivational system and feelings without 
affecting one’s desire and presumably one’s knowledge of them. This is one way 
of making the question of whether motivation is the essence of desire 
particularly salient—which is this volume’s starting point.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that this collection creates the ground for a more 
systematic debate on the nature of desire. It is high time that contemporary 
philosophers paid more attention to desire and put into question the dogmas 
associated with it. In exploring various conceptions of desire from different 
perspectives, and in examining how these conceptions can illuminate many 
issues in several domains, we hope that this volume  (p.21) makes a first step 
toward reinstalling desire at the heart of our philosophical preoccupations.
Notes
(1.) See Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007; Friedrich 2012.
(2.) The thought behind the intuition is already present in Hume 2000, but the 
metaphor has been introduced into the philosophy of mind by Anscombe 1963 
and Searle 1983.
(3.) See, for instance, Plato 1953b; Aristotle 1962; Aquinas 1920–1942; Kant 
1997; Oddie 2005; Raz 2008; Tenenbaum 2013.
(4.) See Plato 1953a, Aquinas 1920–1942; Descartes 1989; Locke 1975; Hobbes 
1994; Sartre 1984; Kenny 1963; Dretske 1988.
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Abstract and Keywords
This essay argues for an evaluative theory of desire—specifically, that to desire 
something is for it to appear, in some way or other, good. If a desire is a non-
doxastic appearance of value then it is no mystery how it can rationalize as well 
as cause action. The theory is metaphysically neutral—it is compatible with value 
idealism (that value reduces to desire), with value realism (that it is not so 
reducible), and with value nihilism (all appearances of value are illusory). 
Despite this metaphysical neutrality the thesis opens up an epistemological gold 
mine. Non-doxastic value appearances can provide defeasible reasons for value 
judgments in roughly the same way that perceptual appearances provide 
defeasible reasons for perceptual judgments. The paper presents a new line of 
argument for the evaluative theory—drawing on recent work on fitting attitudes
—and rebuts some of the most pressing criticisms.
Keywords:   value appearances, value perception, realism, idealism, value bearers, fitting attitudes, 
wrong kinds of reason, solitary goods, death of desire
[In] the [pull] of the will and of love, appears the worth of everything to be 
sought or to be avoided, to be esteemed of greater or lesser value.
—AUGUSTINE 19821
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WHAT IS THE relation between desire and the good? In this paper I elaborate 
and defend an account of the nature of desire that deems the connection 
between these two concepts to be very tight indeed. It is a version of the 
evaluative theory of desire, that desires are essentially evaluative in nature. 
There are two possibilities within this approach: that desires are value 
judgments (doxastic value seemings) and that desires are value appearances 
(non-doxastic value seemings).2 I defend the second of these, the value 
appearance thesis.3 To desire something is for it to appear, in some way or other, 
good. To be averse to something is for it to appear, in some way or other, bad. To 
be indifferent to something is for it to appear lacking in either positive or 
negative value.
Augustine, in the passage above from The True Meaning of Genesis, is clearly 
articulating a version of the value appearance thesis. But while the thesis is by 
no means novel, it has been given a new lease of life in recent work on the 
metaphysics and epistemology of value.4
If desires are value appearances, then, under the right conditions, they amount 
to perceptions of value. If a desire is a perception of value, then it is no mystery 
how, in addition to being involved in the causal explanation of action, desires 
play a role in the rational explanation of action. An agent  (p.30) who perceives 
a state of affairs as good has a reason to act to bring it about. If, in addition, her 
perception is accurate, then her reason for so acting may well be a good one.
It is a virtue of the value appearance thesis that it is neutral among a wide range 
of metaphysical stances on value. It is quite compatible with the idealist thesis 
that facts about value entirely reduce to or supervene upon desires—that value 
supervenes on the value appearances. But it is also compatible with the realist 
thesis that facts about value are not reducible to desires, that they enjoy a 
robust independence from the value phenomena, that value appearances and 
value reality can come apart. Finally, it is also compatible with the nihilist thesis 
that nothing at all is of value. Our desires might present as valuable things that 
have no value at all.
While the value appearance thesis is metaphysically quite neutral, it is a 
powerful epistemological thesis. If there were no value appearances, then we 
would be stuck with excogitating value facts a priori from constraints of reason 
alone, or perhaps postulating a faculty of “value intuition” that somehow 
connects us to, and mysteriously delivers, value judgments. Value appearances 
would provide reasons, albeit defeasible reasons, to accept the corresponding 
value judgments, in roughly the same way that perceptual appearances provide 
defeasible reasons for accepting perceptual judgments. And since desire and 
aversion are ubiquitous, the thesis that desires are value appearances promises 
a rich source of value data.
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The value appearance thesis thus has a number of nice features, but it has also 
attracted some serious criticisms.5 It has been faulted for rationalizing bizarre 
actions, for denying desires to human neonates and non-human animals, and for 
entailing that one can desire what one already knows to be the case. While my 
main aim is to present a new line of argument for the thesis, one that draws on 
work on fitting attitudes, I also hope to answer some of the critics.
1 The Objects of Desire and the Bearers of Value
In what follows I take desire and want to be synonyms that denote what might be 
called a thin concept, a determinable of which there are various thick 
determinates. We have quite a rich vocabulary for different determinates of 
desire: crave, hanker, yearn, wish, hunger, long, and fancy, among others. There 
are also closely related concepts, such as like and love, that may involve desire, 
although it is not immediately clear that they are just determinates of desire. 
They may, however, be concrete realizations of  (p.31) desire. That is, they may 
be constituted by desire together with additional contingent features. Any claim 
that involves either the thin determinable desire or one of its thick determinates 
or realizations I call a desire claim.
One fundamental question that a complete theory of desire should answer is 
this: What type, or types, of entity can serve as the objects of desire? The 
surface grammar of desire claims suggests there are many different types of 
object. For example: Harry has a hankering for a hokey-pokey ice-cream; Joan 
fancies a picnic in the mountains; Basho longs for Kyoto; Martha desires 
happiness above all else; Grace yearns for the war to be over; Count Kaiserling 
would like the Goldberg Variations. The types of objects apparently desired 
include small material particulars (a hokey-pokey ice-cream); large sprawling 
particulars (Kyoto); possible states (the war’s being over); types of episodes (a 
picnic in the mountains); properties of individuals (being happy); musical works 
(the Goldberg Variations). Despite the apparent diversity of types it is widely 
presumed that the objects of desire, like the objects of belief, all hale from some 
uniform ontological category. And the prevailing view is the objects of desire 
(and of belief) are propositions, or closely related entities like states of affairs.6
The propositional view, although widely held, sits unhappily with the surface 
grammar of desire claims. However, one can usually recast such claims, framing 
their objects as propositions. Whenever a desire seems directed at something 
non-propositional—like a hokey-pokey ice-cream, Kyoto, or happiness—what one 
really wants is a certain interaction with that thing: to eat a hokey-pokey ice-
cream, to be in Kyoto, to instantiate happiness. So Basho longs for Kyoto should 
be parsed as Basho longs for it to be the case that Basho is in Kyoto.
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Despite the popularity of the propositional view, it is at least as natural to take 
the objects of desire to be states of being—such things as eating a hokey-pokey 
ice-cream, hearing the Goldberg Variations performed, being happy. What 
makes it true that one wants this or that is that one wants to stand in some 
appropriate relation to this or that.7 The case of desiring a state of affairs, like 
the war’s be over, is a special case—what is desired is being in circumstances in 
which the war is over. However, we can take the propositional view to be a 
reasonable first approximation of the property view, and the differences between 
the propositional and the property view do not materially affect the arguments 
presented here. From now on I will call the objects of desire states.
In addition to being suitable objects of desire, states are apt subjects of value.8
Of course, not all potential bearers of value are states. Other kinds of entities 
can have value: a hokey-pokey ice-cream, Kyoto, the Goldberg  (p.32) 
Variations, persons, species, and ecosystems are all apt subjects for evaluation. 
Perhaps the value of these objects is reducible to or derives from the value of 
states in which they feature. It may be that the fundamental value bearers are 
states and the fundamental value facts consist in states bearing value. But we 
need not explore this possibility here. It is necessary for the value appearance 
thesis that the objects of desire are potential bearers of value properties. But it 
isn’t necessary that all value bearers be objects of desire. The converse of the 
value appearance thesis—that all appearances of value are desires—would 
require that all value bearers be objects of desire. But that is obviously a 
logically independent claim, and it isn’t plausible. Certain objects might well 
bear value (perhaps derivatively) but are objects of desire only indirectly at best. 
Certain emotional states—like loving, cherishing, or taking delight in—might be 
the appropriate responses to such entities. And while it is possible, it is by no 
means obvious that these are either desires or reducible to desires.
2 The Per se Authority of Desire
The value appearance thesis, or at least various close neighbors, has an ancient 
pedigree. If we interpret both the pull of the will and the pull of love as 
desiderative states, then Augustine, in the quote with which we began, may be 
affirming not only that desires are appearances of value but also that value 
appearances are desires.
A widely noted scholastic saying—“Sicut enim nihil desiderat appetitus nisi sub 
ratione boni, ita nihil fugit nisi sub ratione mali”—is often called the guise of the 
good thesis.9 That we do not desire anything except under the “guise” of the 
good might be considered a version of the value appearance thesis.10 There is, 
however, an interpretation of the “guise of the good” that aligns it with the 
doxastic version of the evaluative theory: that one cannot desire S without 
believing or judging S to be good.11 But the doxastic version is implausible—one 
can desire what one doesn’t believe to be good, or what one believes to be bad, 
or about which one harbors no evaluative beliefs at all.12
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Perhaps neither Augustine nor Aquinas is unambiguously committed to the value 
appearance thesis. For a clear and unequivocal statement we must turn to a 
remarkable paper by Stampe:
The view I shall take is this: Desire is a kind of perception. One who wants 
it to be the case that P perceives something that makes it seem to that 
person  (p.33) as if it would be good were it to be the case that P, and 
seem so in a way that is characteristic of perception. To desire something 
is to be in a kind of perceptual state, in which that thing seems good.13
The value appearance thesis is, in Stampe’s view, the best available explanation 
for what he calls the per se authority of desire—the idea that a desire for S
provides, through itself, a reason to pursue S. If desires are brute dispositions to 
bring about S, this authority would be mysterious. However, if a desire were a 
kind of perception of the goodness of S, then desire would carry with it the 
authority of perception.
Because it is a form of perception, desire is autonomous in its authority, as 
is any perceptual modality, not requiring legitimation by the 
representations of the intellect. A desire is certified a reason to act by its 
perceptual content; being a state in which it seemed to one as if it would 
be good were a certain state of affairs to obtain, it is a state in which the 
thing wanted is represented as such that it would be good were that state 
of affairs to obtain.14
Here is what I take Stampe to be arguing: On the standard belief-desire account 
of reasons, one has a reason to do A just in case there is some state S that one 
desires, and one believes that doing A is a way of bringing about S. What would 
desires have to be like for the standard story to be plausible?
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Consider the dispositional theory of desire, that desires just are states that mesh 
with beliefs to cause actions. Or, as Stalnaker puts it, “To desire that P is to be 
disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that P in a world in 
which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true.”15 Stampe argues that such 
dispositions are not reason generating. To see this, imagine that a malevolent 
demon plants a chip in Radioman’s brain so that whenever he believes of any 
radio within reach that he can turn it on, he turns it on. Ipso facto, on the 
dispositional account he desires radios within his reach to be on. Two questions: 
First, does Radioman have a reason, even a weak one, to go around turning on 
radios? No, he just finds himself turning the damn things on. He finds he can no 
more stop doing this than someone with a social anxiety disorder can stop 
blushing every time she comes to believe she has become the center of 
attention. Second, does Radioman even have a desire that radios within reach be 
on? If we ask Radioman whether he wants radios to be on, he denies it. He 
doesn’t like the sound of radios blasting, and he would be just as happy if radios 
didn’t exist at all. And he has no desire to have  (p.34) radios within reach so 
that he can have them blasting away. Not only does he not enjoy radios in his 
vicinity being on, he doesn’t like turning them on. But he has found that his 
attempts to stop doing it make no difference to his disposition. Radioman’s 
disposition not only doesn’t fill the reason-generating role demanded of desire 
on the standard account, but Radioman himself denies he has any such desire. 
So it seems a bit perverse to say that he has such a desire simply in virtue of 
having that pesky disposition. So there must be more to desire than a behavioral 
disposition. But what, exactly?
Consider Radiowoman. She has the same behavioral disposition as Radioman, 
but this is because the radio’s being on seems good to her, she feels drawn to 
the prospect, it is alluring. And when she hears the radio come on she feels 
satisfied by that. Radiowoman, unlike her male counterpart, wants the radio to 
be on. Radioman sees no difference in value between radios being on and radios 
being off. By contrast, Radiowoman does, and this helps explain both her 
disposition to turn radios on and her acting on that disposition.16 It makes sense 
for her to turn radios on, given the way things seem to her. So if desires are 
perceptions of value, Radiowoman’s desire gives her some kind of reason to turn 
radios on, while Radioman’s disposition does not.
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How good is Radiowoman’s reason?17 Suppose that the demon foisted on 
Radiowoman her desire for radios to be on, just as he foisted on Radioman his 
disposition to turn them on. How can having this rather bizarre desire foisted on 
her give her a genuine reason for going around turning on radios, whereas 
having the related tic foisted on Radioman doesn’t give him any reason? Suppose 
Radiowoman were to find out about the etiology of her desires. Then she would 
know that they are not reliable indicators of goodness. Rather they are 
systematic illusions of goodness. They are like the Mueller-Lyer illusions that, 
once you know about them, give you no reason at all to believe that the lines 
that appear unequal really are unequal.18 And even if she knows nothing of the 
peculiar etiology of her desire, Radiowoman’s desires are defective (assuming 
that it is not actually good for radios in Radiowoman’s vicinity to be on). It 
follows from the value appearance thesis itself that desires can be misleading, 
and the reason-generating power of value appearances may be destroyed by 
their inaccuracy.
There is certainly something very suggestive about Stampe’s claim that desires 
are reason-generating, but this power seems to be a conditional one. For 
example, if nihilism is right, it is not clear that desires do generate genuine 
reasons, as opposed to the illusion of reasons.
 (p.35) 3 Value Data and the Magnetism of the Good
In an earlier work I argued that two considerations weigh in favor of the value 
appearance thesis.19 The first appeals to the necessity for value data. The 
second appeals to the apparent magnetism of the good.
For value theorizing to get off the ground we need more than purely formal 
constraints on value, like universalizability or the transitivity of the better-than 
relation. Such constraints provide no reasons for rejecting the nihilist thesis that 
nothing is more valuable than anything else. What we need, in addition to such 
formal constraints, is some source of data that provides evidence for substantive 
value claims, such as that pleasure is good or pleasure is better than pain. Quite 
generally, X’s seeming F is defeasible evidence for the judgment that X is F. And 
S’s seeming good would be defeasible evidence for the judgment that S is good. 
Value seemings could thus play the same role in value knowledge that 
perceptual appearances play in regular knowledge of the world. We don’t have 
to postulate value seemings. Seeming good, bad, and indifferent are ubiquitous 
features of everyday experience. We are bombarded with value appearances all 
the time. The only question is this: What kind (or kinds) of mental states are 
appearances of value?
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Let’s say that a representation of X as F is belief-entailing if it entails the belief 
that X is F. Believing that X is F, knowing X is F are, trivially, belief-entailing 
representations. Perceptual experience is not belief-entailing. One can visually 
experience a rose as pink without believing that it is pink. One might be having 
the visual experience while believing that one is looking at a white rose through 
rose-tinted glasses. It is only because they are not just more beliefs that 
perceptual experiences might halt the regress of justification of beliefs. So 
perceptual seemings, to play a role in the justification of beliefs, must be non-
belief-entailing representations of things. By analogy the appearance of S as 
good would also have to be a non-belief-entailing representation of the goodness 
of S, if it is to serve as evidence for the non-inferentially justified belief that S is 
good. A state can appear good to one without that entailing that one believes or 
judges that it is good. (One might be quite aware that certain value appearances 
are being systematically distorted in some way, perhaps through intoxication or 
bias.) Additionally, one can believe that a state is good without its appearing 
good. (For example, one might take the word of someone one trusts about such 
matters, such as the recommendation of a reliable critic.) Since value seemings 
and value beliefs can come apart at both seams, whatever the value seemings 
are they should be non-belief-entailing.
 (p.36) Desires have this feature. That one desires S does not entail that one 
believes that S is good, nor does the belief that S is good entail that one desires 
S. By satisfying the non-belief-entailing requirement, desires are, in this respect, 
good candidates for the role of value data.
This argument still seems to me to provide some support for the value 
appearance thesis, although it is clearly not decisive. There are, for example, 
other candidates for the role of value appearance that are not belief-entailing 
(for example, certain emotions).
I gave another argument for the value appearance thesis that now strikes me as 
less good:
When I desire that P, P has a certain magnetic appeal for me. It presents 
itself to me as something needing to be pursued, or promoted, or 
preserved or embraced. Now the good just is that which needs to be 
pursued, promoted, or preserved or embraced. So my desire that P 
certainly involves P’s seeming good… . It is but a small step from there to 
identifying the desire that P with the experience of P’s seeming good.20
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This has two defects. First, it appears to commit an intentional fallacy. Even if X
appears to be φ, and φ is ϕ, it does not follow that X appears to be ϕ.21 (The 
morning star appears to be the brightest celestial body in the morning sky, and 
the brightest celestial body in the morning sky is the brightest celestial body in 
the evening sky, but it does not follow that the morning star appears to be the 
brightest celestial body in the evening sky.) This kind of objection might be 
blocked if the identity in question—that the good just is that which needs to be 
pursued—is taken to be analytically true. But treating it as analytically true is 
problematic. Need here is clearly some kind of deontic notion. The idea is that S
is good if and only if it ought to be pursued (etc.). But if this is right, then the 
argument assumes a deontic version of the fitting attitude analysis of value that
—as we will see in section 5—isn’t plausible.
Despite this, I think the seeds of a decent argument are buried here. The 
magnetism of the good, or of the apparent good, has seemed somewhat 
mysterious. As non-cognitivists have long urged, if there are truth-evaluable 
propositions about goodness, then it would be possible to judge that S is good
without feeling in the least bit moved to pursue, welcome, appreciate, or 
embrace S. A purely cognitive apprehension of the goodness of S might leave 
one completely unmoved about the prospect of S, or even averse to S. And there 
is nothing to prevent this disconnect between judgment and desire being 
systematic and all-pervasive.
 (p.37) The non-cognitivists are right about this, but contrary to what they have 
claimed, this gap between value judgment and desire is not only possible but a 
fairly common feature of experience. In itself it doesn’t seem particularly 
puzzling at all. What would be deeply puzzling, however, would be if genuine 
acquaintance with goodness were to be accompanied by such systematic 
indifference or aversion. If a cognitivist cannot block that possibility, then she 
has a problem. It should not turn out to be a matter of sheer chance or 
preestablished harmony that those who know what’s good, through an 
awareness of that goodness, feel moved by what they know to be good.
Now, suppose that there are certain ubiquitous appearances of goodness and 
that these kinds of appearances either are or entail associated desires. Then the 
magnetism of the apparent good would lose its mystery. For those who become 
aware of the goodness of things through such value appearances would ipso 
facto have the relevant desires. Call this the desire-entailing desideratum on 
value appearances.
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Let’s summarize the desiderata so far. First, value data must come in the form of
non-belief-entailing representations (i.e. appearances) of goodness, badness, and 
betterness. Second, to explain the magnetism of the apparent good, value 
appearances have to be desire-entailing and ubiquitous. If desires are value 
appearances, then these desiderata are satisfied. They are desire-entailing 
(trivially); they are non-belief-entailing representations of goodness; and they 
are ubiquitous.
4 The Fittingness of Attitudes
The fitting attitude thesis provides independent support for these desiderata, 
but to show this requires some work.
There is a tight conceptual connection between certain evaluative properties 
and certain attitudes. This is especially clear in the case of the so-called thick 
evaluative properties. Consider the pairs: being delightful and taking delight in, 
being admirable and admiring. The fitting attitude account tells us that the 
delightful is not just what people happen to take delight in or what people 
typically take delight in, but in what it is fitting to delight in.22 And for each thick 
value attribute (e.g. admirable, precious) there will be suitable attitudes (e.g. 
admire, cherish) that stand in this fittingness relation. A number of value 
theorists maintain that the same kind of relation holds between the thin 
evaluative attribute of goodness (or desirability) and desire. The idea can be 
traced back to Brentano and receives a clear if characteristically guarded 
statement here by C. D.  (p.38) Broad: “I’m not sure that ‘X is good’ could not 
be defined as meaning that X is such that it would be a fitting object of desire to 
any mind which had an adequate idea of its non-ethical characteristics.”23 Quite 
generally, the fitting attitude account of value posits the following schema for 
the connection between value V and an associated attitude F(V):
(FA schema) X has value V if and only if it is fitting to take attitude F(V) to 
X.
For the schema to be universally applicable, with each value attribute V there 
must be an associated attitude F(V) (or perhaps class of attitudes) for which the 
biconditional holds.24 The fitting attitude reduction of value consists in (i) an 
endorsement of the general schema for all values and (ii) the claim that 
instances of the schema provide a reduction of facts about V to facts about the 
fittingness of F(V). According to the reduction thesis, the right-hand side (a fact 
about fittingness) is fundamental; the left-hand side (a value fact) is reducible. If 
the biconditional schema fails, then the reduction also fails. But even if the 
biconditional schema succeeds there remains a question about which of these 
two kinds of fact are fundamental. One can endorse the schema without buying 
into the reductive claim that the LHS holds in virtue of the RHS.
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Here I am only concerned with the success of the FA schema, not the reductive 
claim, which I think fails. The FA schema is successful only if there is a suitable 
notion of fittingness, and for each value attribute there is an associated attitude 
that generates a true instance of the schema. While F(V) is an attitude connected 
to V in the FA schema, it may or may not be the case that F(V) has evaluative 
content. On some FA accounts it will; on others it won’t. (For example, the 
attitude of judging X to be precious can be specified only by means of evaluative 
content. But some at least might consider the attitude that consists in cherishing 
X to be specifiable without invoking that content.)
What does fittingness amount to? In a recent survey of neosentimentalist 
theories of value, Tappolet distinguishes two fundamentally different accounts of 
the appropriateness of emotional attitudes: “There are two main ways to 
understand the concept of appropriateness at stake. The first, which is now 
standard, is to take this concept to be normative. An appropriate emotion is one 
that satisfies a normative requirement; the emotion ought to be felt, in some 
sense of ought.”25 Tappolet notes that there are two different normative 
conceptions of fittingness that are worth distinguishing: “Normative is used in 
its narrow sense, which is equivalent to ‘deontic’ and excludes the evaluative. If 
one takes the normative  (p.39) to encompass both the deontic and the 
evaluative, this would make for two sub-possibilities one of which is being that 
appropriate is evaluative. Given the circularity involved, this might not seem a 
very tempting suggestion.”26 We can commandeer Tappolet’s typology by 
identifying appropriateness with fittingness and expanding the class of attitudes. 
She thus identifies two broadly normative notions of fittingness:
(Deontic FA) X is V if and only if one ought to take attitude F(V) to X.
(Axiological FA) X is V if and only if it is good to take attitude F(V) to X.
Where favoring is a placeholder for F(good), the latter schema yields:
X is good if and only if it is good to favor X.
This biconditional clearly cannot underwrite a reduction of goodness, since good
appears ineliminably on the right-hand side, in the fittingness slot. Nevertheless, 
Axiological FA might conceivably be a necessary truth about goodness, without 
underwriting the possibility of a reduction of good. The Deontic reading, on the 
other hand, is not subject to this circularity and might also provide a reduction 
of evaluative properties to deontic properties.27
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The alternative to a normative reading of fittingness is what Tappolet calls the 
descriptive reading. Tappolet motivates it by appealing to the idea that emotions 
are value appearances: “An alternative conception … is that the appropriateness 
of emotions is a matter of representing things as they are. In the relevant sense, 
appropriate emotions are emotions that are correct from an epistemic point of 
view.”28 With some terminological shifts, I will call this the Representational
notion of fittingness:
(Representational FA) X is V if and only if it is representationally accurate 
for one to take attitude F(V) to X.
On this reading, fittingness depends on the fact that the attitude F(V) involves a 
representation of the object X as having the associated value attribute V. At a 
first pass, a representation of an object X as V is accurate if and only if X has the 
value attribute V that it is represented as having.
Note that accuracy here need not be deemed a normative concept. There is of 
course a large literature that argues truth is a “norm” of belief. But it is difficult 
to spell this out satisfactorily.29 One can take truth and accuracy to be purely 
descriptive concepts and hold that it is a matter of substantive value theory 
whether or to what extent truth and accuracy are valuable  (p.40) features of 
representations generally or of cognitive states in particular. It is by no means 
obvious, for example, that a true belief is in general better than a false belief.30
In any case, I am not interested here in the viability of a reduction of value but 
only in whether or not some version of the biconditional generally holds. What 
notion of fittingness and what kinds of attitudes would we need for the schema 
to hold?
I outline two objections to the FA biconditional: the well-known Wrong Kinds of 
Reason objection (WKR) and the less well-known Solitary Goods objection (SG). 
The WKR objection, if successful, shows that the FA biconditional fails from right 
to left if the notion of fittingness is one or other of the two normative notions. So 
that leaves us with the representational reading of fittingness if the biconditional 
is to succeed. What kinds of representations? The SG objection, if successful, 
shows that the schema fails from left to right if fitting attitudes are either state-
entailing or belief-entailing.
If both objections are on the right track, we end up with one constraint on 
fittingness that dovetails with the requirement that there be value seemings or 
value appearances and another constraint on the fitting responses to value that 
dovetails with the requirement that such appearances be neither belief-entailing 
nor state-entailing.
5 Right-to-Left Failure of the FA Biconditional: The Wrong Kinds of Reason
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Start with the Deontic version of the FA schema. If an evil demon threatens the 
world with some terrible outcome unless you admire him, then you ought to 
admire him. But he isn’t admirable. If successful, this shows that the RHS of 
Deontic FA can hold, while the LHS fails. Such counterexamples can also be 
constructed against Axiological FA. If the demon threatens to bring about the 
worst outcome unless you desire that outcome, and will spare us the worst 
outcome if you do so desire, then it is clearly better for you to desire the worst 
outcome than not. Desiring the worst outcome may be good. But that does not 
make the worst outcome itself desirable or good.31
Olson, following Ewing, suggests that the FA theorist distinguish two notions of 
ought: the moral ought and the ought of fittingness.32 Morally you ought to 
admire the demon—because there would be disastrous consequences if you 
didn’t. However, the ought of fittingness doesn’t apply here, since the demon is 
contemptible. In addition Ewing maintains  (p.41) that whether or not your 
response is morally correct is a matter of what response it is fitting for the rest 
of us to have to your response to the demon. Moral obligation is a matter of 
certain moral emotions (praise and blame, resentment, etc.) being a fitting 
response to an agent’s actions or choices. It would be entirely fitting for you to 
despise the demon, for he is despicable, but it would also be fitting for us to 
condemn your despising him as morally blameworthy. Even though it would not 
be at all fitting for you to admire the demon, it would be fitting for us to praise 
your admiration.
The Ewing-Olson response can deflect the WKR objection, but it houses a 
residual tension. The Representational FA theorist can deflect the objection 
without the tension. The representationalist can say, “It isn’t fitting for you to 
admire the demon, because it is simply inaccurate to represent the demon as 
admirable. He isn’t; he’s contemptible. But you ought to do what you can to 
avert the disaster even though it involves taking an attitude toward the demon 
that isn’t accurate. So in order to do what you ought to do you must take an 
attitude to him that misrepresents him.” The representational account may or 
may not allow disvalue to accrue to inaccurate attitudes, but that is irrelevant to 
the fittingness of those attitudes. It is unfitting to admire the demon because the 
fellow simply isn’t admirable. The normative aspects of your attitudes (whether 
or not they are good or obligatory) can be prised apart from their accuracy. So it 
may be that it is good or obligatory to admire the demon, although quite 
unfitting to do so.
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We can thus rescue what is intuitively compelling about the FA schema from the 
WKR counterexamples, provided we go representational with the notion of 
fittingness and embrace evaluative content in the fitting attitudes themselves. 
This delivers a constraint on fitting attitudes (namely that they be capable of 
being representationally accurate) that will narrow the range and nature of the 
fitting responses to evaluative attitudes in general and to the thin evaluative 
attribute of goodness. The fitting response to a state’s being good must be a 
presentation of that state as good.
6 Left-to-Right Failure of the FA Biconditional: Solitary Goods
Berkeley hoped to reduce physical objects to congeries of experiences. 
According to Berkeley, there is a tree in the quad just in case experiencers have 
suitable tree-in-the-quad experiences. But a tree in the quad that  (p.42) goes 
unexperienced is a problem: no tree experiences, no tree. Berkeley posited an 
omni-experiencer to make up for a possible dearth of experiences. 
Phenomenalists, unwilling to appeal to supernatural beings, retreat to 
counterfactual experiences. There is a tree in the quad if suitably placed 
observers would have appropriate tree-in-the-quad experiences. But suppose it 
would be impossible for anyone to have the appropriate experiences. Berkeley 
invites us to contemplate the following object: an object not conceived by 
anyone. He claims it is impossible to conceive of an object that is not conceived 
by anyone (cf. experience a tree that is not experienced by anyone). If this is 
right, Berkeley had already disposed of the phenomenalist fix even before it was 
proposed.
A strict value idealist would, like Berkeley, hold that something has a certain 
value attribute only if some valuers actually take the associated valuing attitude 
to it. No attitudes, no value. But some things have value in the absence of actual 
responses. Absent an infallible omni-valuer, the value idealist might well retreat 
from actual responses to merely possible but fitting responses. That is, a thing is 
good if valuers would respond to it favorably were they suitably placed and 
responding fittingly. The fitting attitude schema can thus be construed as a 
version of value phenomenalism.
Bykvist argues that the FA schema suffers from analogues of the unexperienced 
tree.33 Solitary goods are those that exist without anyone’s being around to 
respond to them fittingly. Such goods should surely be deemed possible by all 
but strict value idealists.
Let’s dub the fitting attitude for goodness favoring. Favoring is that attitude, if 
there is one, that underwrites the FA biconditional schema for the thin evaluative 
property of goodness: S is good if and only if favoring S is fitting. I will take it 
that favoring covers both favoring positively and favoring negatively (i.e. 
disfavoring) and that it admits of degrees, just as goodness admits of degrees.
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Bykvist assumes that even if no one actually favors S, for S to be good it must be 
both logically possible and rationally coherent for some valuer to favor S. So S’s 
being good cannot logically preclude the favoring of S (call this the logical 
constraint), nor can it preclude the coherence of favoring S (call this the 
coherence constraint).
Let’s say that an attitude or relation is state-entailing if one cannot bear that 
relation to S without S obtaining. So bringing S about, knowing that S, and 
taking pleasure in the fact that S are all state-entailing. Consider an apparently 
good state, E, that happy egrets exist. Conjoin E with the state F: that there are 
no past, present, or future favorers. Suppose that  (p.43) the conjunctive state 
E&F is also good. Then we can show that if the FA schema holds, favoring cannot 
be state-entailing.
Proof: By assumption E&F is good. Suppose favoring is state-entailing. 
Assume (for the sake of a reductio) that someone favors E&F. Then E&F
obtains; so there are no past, present, or future favorers. Contradiction. 
Hence E&F’s being good logically precludes anyone’s favoring E&F, 
violating the logical constraint.
Being state-entailing is a rather stringent requirement on an attitude. Call a 
relation between an individual and a state S belief-entailing if an individual’s 
bearing the relation to S entails that he believes S obtains. Suppose Moe and Joe 
are competing for Olympic gold, and Moe is listening for the announcement of 
the winner. What he hears over the crackly speaker is “Moe won the gold!”. He 
delights in winning, and since winning is delightful his response is entirely 
fitting. But suppose it was in fact Joe who won, and Moe misheard. Moe can still 
delight in winning the gold, so delight is not state-entailing. But Moe soon 
discovers his error. He learns he’s a loser after all. Whatever attitude Moe now 
takes to winning the gold he can no longer delight in it. He cannot delight in 
winning if he doesn’t believe he won. So taking delight in is belief-entailing, as 
are some other attitudes that fitting attitudes theorists invoke.
We can now show that favoring cannot be belief-entailing.
Proof: By assumption E&F is good. Suppose favoring is belief-entailing. 
Assume (for the sake of a reductio) that someone X favors E&F. So X
believes E&F obtains. But E&F entails that no one favors anything. So X’s 
favoring E&F entails X believes something logically incompatible with X’s 
favoring E&F. So it would be incoherent for X to favor E&F, violating the 
coherence constraint.
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One problematic feature of these arguments is that E&F is assumed to be good. 
That doesn’t follow from the assumption that E is good. Whether E&F is good 
depends both on the degree of goodness of F and the way in which the value of 
compound states depends on the value of the components. It might be that the 
non-existence of fitting responders to value is a defect of the universe. If it is bad 
enough, then E&F wouldn’t be good after all. Suppose F isn’t bad but merely an 
indifferent state of affairs (neither good nor bad). Then if value is additive, E&F
has the same value as E. But value may not be additive over conjunction, in 
which case all bets  (p.44) on the goodness of E&F are off. So whether or not 
value is additive, the goodness of E doesn’t guarantee the goodness of E&F.
It would be better if we could run the argument without having to settle 
substantive issues in value theory. And we can. For E&F must have some degree 
of value. It may not be better than E, and it may well be worse than E, but it lies 
somewhere on the spectrum of thin value (V), and, as such, according to the FA
schema, there must be some degree of favoring F(V) that fits. But if F(V) is state-
entailing it will violate the logical constraint, and if it is belief-entailing it will 
violate the coherence constraint. So favoring can be neither state-entailing nor 
belief-entailing.
The obvious way for a defender of the FA biconditional to block the argument is 
to abandon the idea that any fitting attitudes are state-entailing or belief-
entailing. (It is Bykvist’s intention to narrow down the range of admissible fitting 
attitudes until there are no good candidates left.) But that seems hasty. Surely 
taking delight is the fitting response to what’s delightful, if anything is, and 
taking delight is belief-entailing. So there may be certain thick values the fitting 
responses to which are belief-entailing. But how could there be such values if 
the second SG argument is sound?
It is instructive to try to extend the SG argument to the delightful. We have to 
find a delightful state that it would be impossible or incoherent for anyone to 
take delight in. Suppose D is a delightful state. Let B be the eternal non-
existence of beings capable of taking delight in anything at all. If D&B were 
delightful, then we would have the required state. But there is no reason to 
judge D&B delightful. Embedding a delightful state within some larger state 
doesn’t guarantee that the larger state is delightful. B certainly isn’t delightful, 
and there is no reason to think that the conjunction of a delightful state with a 
decidedly non-delightful state is delightful. The parallel argument thus stalls.
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What we had to assume for the SG argument is that the state E&F has some 
determinate of the thin value of goodness. That is to say, we have to assume that 
E&F can be placed somewhere on the scale of goodness and badness. Where V is 
the value of E&F, the FA biconditional assures us there is some attitude, F(V), 
some determinate of the favoring-disfavoring determinable, that it is fitting to 
take to E&F. So the reductios apply to thin value because every state is assumed 
to lie somewhere on that scale. However, it is not clear that all states have some 
degree or other of delightfulness, encompassing both positive and negative 
degrees, and that delighting in is a determinable that embraces both positive 
degrees and negative degrees of delight. If there are any such thick values, then 
the argument  (p.45) would, of course, apply to them as well, precluding the 
possibility that fitting responses to them are belief-entailing or state-entailing.
What we can conclude from the SG argument about thick attributes is this: If the 
only fitting responses to some thick value V are (say) belief-entailing, then that 
value cannot be exemplified by any state that necessitates the non-existence of 
beings capable of taking attitude F(V). So if delight is the only fitting response to 
the delightful, and delight is belief-entailing, then no state that entails the non-
existence of delighting beings can be delightful.
Whatever the fate of the FA schema for thick values, as far as the thin values go 
fitting responses can be neither state-entailing nor belief-entailing.
7 Inference to the Best Explanation: Desire = the Fitting Response to the 
Good
We now have two desiderata for value data and two desiderata for fitting 
responses to value.
(i) Non-belief-entailing: The basic value data must be appearance-like 
rather than belief-like; they must be non-doxastic value appearances.
(ii) Desire-entailing: To explain the magnetism of the apparent good a 
significant subset of the value data have to be desire-entailing.
There are also two desiderata governing fitting responses to values:
(iii) Representation: The fitting response to an object’s having a particular 
value is a representation of that object as having that value (from WKR).
(iv) Non-state- and non-belief-entailing: The fitting response to the 
goodness of a state cannot be state-entailing or belief-entailing (from SG).
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These four desiderata fit together rather nicely. (iii) and (iv) entail that fitting 
responses to the thin values must be non-belief-entailing, non-state-entailing 
representations of those values—that is, they must be appearances of value. And 
(i) and (ii) tell us that the value data must also be value appearances and that a 
significant subset of those value appearances must be desire-entailing. One 
simple hypothesis that unifies and explains all four is the value appearance 
thesis. For suppose desires are appearances of value. Since they are non-belief-
entailing, desire-entailing, and  (p.46) ubiquitous they satisfy constraints (i) and 
(ii). Since desires are also non-state-entailing they also satisfy (iv). Finally, if the 
desire for S is an appearance of S as good, then that desire will clearly be a 
fitting response to the goodness of S on the representational notion of 
fittingness. The simplest hypothesis that explains and unifies these is that 
F(good) = desire.
Are there other possible responses to value that satisfy all the desiderata? 
Suppose attitude A is a candidate for the role of fitting response to degree of 
value V, and that A is not a determinate of desire/aversion. Attitude A will have to 
be (i) non-state-entailing and non-belief-entailing, (ii) desire-entailing, (iii) as 
ubiquitous as desire, and (iv) an appearance of value. Since A to S is desire-
entailing without being the desire that S, it will have to be a somewhat more 
complex attitude than desire, which suggests that the hypothesis that A = 
F(good) is not as simple as desire = F(good). Further, since A entails desire 
without being entailed by desire, instances of A will almost certainly be less 
ubiquitous than instances of desire, perhaps much less ubiquitous. The only way 
to ensure that instances of A are as ubiquitous as instances of desire would be to 
require that A be necessarily coextensive with desire. But then it is hard to see 
what would set A apart from desire. So, ceteris paribus, any hypothesis other 
than that desire = F(good) is going to violate ubiquity.
8 The Death of Desire
A powerful criticism that has been leveled against the value appearance thesis 
rests on what Lauria calls the death of desire principle.34 It is a widely held 
thesis—one that dates back at least as far as Plato but is also embodied in 
contemporary subjective decision theory—that one cannot desire what one 
already has, or at least what one thinks one has. The idea is that the desire for S
must vanish once one comes to believe that S already obtains. Hence the death
of desire through the acquisition of belief. By contrast the appearance of S as 
good need not disappear when one comes to believe that S obtains. So desires 
and appearances of the good come apart.
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Consider Hillary’s obsessive desire to become the first female president of the 
United States. To fulfill her desire she labors tirelessly for two years 
campaigning for the office. Around midnight on the first Tuesday in November 
2016 she learns that her desire has been fulfilled, albeit by a very narrow 
margin. When her rival, Trump, concedes victory, it tastes very, very sweet to 
her. So becoming the first female president of the United States still seems good 
to her. But surely the prospective desire to  (p.47) become the first female 
president of the United States will cease once it is clear to her that she has in 
fact already achieved that goal. She won’t say “I still want to become the first 
female president of the United States,” and she will stop campaigning for the 
office. Moreover, her desire won’t fade gradually. It will be completely 
extinguished as soon as the vote count is settled in her favor. If this is an 
endemic feature of desire, then the value appearance thesis cannot be right—or 
so the argument goes.
Strictly speaking, the death of desire principle doesn’t clash with the modest 
value appearance thesis: that desires are value appearances. Rather it clashes 
with the converse thesis, that appearances of value are either desires or desire-
entailing. If there are value appearances that are not desires, then the desire 
that S can be extinguished even while S continues to appear good. However, as 
Lauria points out, this defense leaves the evaluative theory without any 
explanation for the death of desire in that range of cases (and perhaps the 
Hillary case is one) in which it seems to hold.35 Nor does it explain how, if the 
appearance is initially sustained by a desire, by what mechanism it is sustained 
when the desire disappears.
The death of Hillary’s desire to become the first female U.S. president may be 
explained by the fact that one cannot become the first female president of the 
United States a second time. After she has already become the first president of 
the United States it would be very odd for her to say “I still want to become the 
first female president of the United States.” This is a case in which a certain 
kind of desire should die with belief. What about Hillary’s desire to be the first 
female president of the United States? It doesn’t seem odd for her to say, after 
learning that she now is the first female president of the United States, “I am 
now the thing I most want to be: the first female president of the United States.” 
She doesn’t find it an unexpectedly disappointing thing to be. Quite generally, 
the following doesn’t seem odd: “For a long time I have wanted things to be 
thus-and-such, and now things are exactly as I want them to be.”36 The following 
haiku by Basho is a rather more striking expression of this:
Even in Kyoto—
hearing the cuckoo’s cry—
I long for Kyoto.37
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But perhaps this is striking precisely because it trades on the intuition that one 
cannot really desire, let alone long for, what one already knows obtains.
 (p.48) Fortunately there is an irenic resolution to this debate within reach. 
There are rival sets of intuitions concerning the connections between desire and 
belief. When this happens we often resort to distinguishing different concepts. 
The downside of this strategy is that it often seems ad hoc—especially when 
there is no obvious connection between the concepts—but in this particular case 
the concepts are clearly linked, the relation being that of a thick determinate to 
its thin determinable.
The thin concept of desire (the all-encompassing notion required by the value 
appearance thesis) can be characterized in terms of the more fundamental 
notion of preference. To desiret S is simply to prefer S to not-S. On the value 
appearance thesis, preferring S to not-S is a case of S’s appearing better than
not-S. Clearly one can maintain such a preference even as one’s credence in S
and not-S change. Imagine that Héloise starts out as a complete agnostic about 
God but strongly prefers God’s existence to God’s non-existence. In her troubled 
uncertainty she yearns for a divinely infused universe; she lives in hope. Then 
one day Héloise chances upon Anselm’s ontological argument (Proslogion 3) and 
becomes convinced not only that God exists but that this is knowable a priori. 
She retains her strong preference for God’s existence, but for the first time her 
deepest desire is satisfied. Later, she chances upon Lactantius’s Treatise on the 
Anger of God, with its pithy summary of Epicurus’s devastating argument from 
evil. She is now convinced that the ontological argument is a sham and that the 
universe is Godless. She retains her preference for God’s existence (things 
would be so much better!) and feels frustrated that God does not exist.
Throughout these swings in belief Héloise unwaveringly retains her desire (or 
preference) for God’s existence. But there are certain changes on the broadly 
desiderative side of her nature. She starts out affirming “I hope God exists,” 
moves to “I am deeply satisfied that God exists!,” and ends up with “My desire 
for God is frustrated!”
The desiret for S can be combined with various different credal attitudes to S.
These different combinations of desire and belief yield different thick concepts 
of desire. One prospectively desires S if one desirest S and is more or less 
uncertain about whether S is or will be the case, investing less than complete 
credence in both S and not-S.
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When we talk of desire we are often talking about prospective desires. One often 
begins in a state of prospectively desiring something, unsure of whether or not 
the desire will be fulfilled. Prospective desires are those that, in conjunction with 
beliefs about one’s causal powers with respect to S, can give rise to actions. If 
one desiresp S and believes of some action A  (p.49) that it could help bring 
about S, one may well decide to do A. If one does A and this brings S about, then, 
provided one has epistemic access to this, one’s uncertainty about S will be 
replaced by a firm belief in S, and (by its very nature) the prospective desire for 
S dies. This is what happens to Hillary. Her prospective desire to become the 
first female president of the United States dies when she becomes certain that 
that desire is fulfilled. But her desiret to be the president of the United States 
does not die. That (thin) desire, her preference for being the president of the 
United States rather than not, survives the change in belief intact.
Suppose, then, that one prospectively desires S, comes to believe S, and retains 
the preference for S. In this case one is satisfied that S. But again the thin desire 
does not die. Desire is still a constituent of satisfied desire: call it desire s. To be 
satisfied that S one must desiret S and be convinced that S obtains. Desiret is a 
necessary condition of desires.
Satisfaction is the subjective correlate of desire fulfillment—of the combination 
of desiringt S and S’s actually obtaining. Having a fulfilled desire and having a 
satisfied desire are, of course, logically independent states, and they play 
important roles in different value theories. (Some maintain that what is good for 
one is desire fulfillment, others that it is desire satisfaction.) But note how 
strange it would be to insist that well-being hangs on fulfilled desires and 
satisfied desires if there were really no such desires at all. On the present 
account fulfilled and satisfied desires are a genuine species of desire. Note also 
that there is a big difference in the psychological state of one who abandons his 
desiret for S as soon as he becomes certain that S and one who retains his 
desiret. The latter is enjoying a state of desire satisfaction; the former is 
probably experiencing disappointment about S.
Consider the state of desiringt S and becoming certain that not-S obtains. If the 
desiret for S survives the change in belief, then one enters the state of desire 
frustration. One is frustrated that not-S (or desiresf S) if one desirest S and is 
certain that S does not obtain, that that desire is unfulfilled. Frustration is the 
subjective correlate of desire non-fulfillment (desiringt S while S does not in fact 
obtain). Frustrated and unfulfilled desires are still desires.
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According to the value appearance thesis, all desires, all determinates of desiret, 
are appearances of value. Desiret is clearly compatible with the many different 
credal relations that one can bear to the object of desire. As one’s credal state 
changes from uncertainty about the prospect to certainty, one’s prospective 
desire dies, to be replaced by a satisfied desire or a frustrated desire. So this 
account does entail the death of a certain species of  (p.50) desire—that is, of 
prospective desire—whenever one acquires a belief in the fulfillment or the non-
fulfillment of the prospective desire. But in such cases the desiret need not lose 
its grip, and often it will persist.
9 Experience and Concept Possession
Tim Schroeder articulates a common objection to the value appearance thesis:
One puzzle for [good-based] theories might be to explain the relationship 
of desires to non-human animals. On the one hand, it would seem that rats 
desire to get away from cats, desire to be around other rats, and the like. 
On the other hand, it would seem that rats do not represent anything as 
good (they would both seem to lack the concept of goodness and to lack a 
perceptual-style representation of goodness that would be well poised to 
generate such a concept). But if rats can desire without representing the 
good, then why would people be different? The options available for 
solving such puzzles have not yet been explored.38
Schroeder’s objection assumes something like the following general concept 
possession principle: X cannot appear F to one who does not possess the (or a) 
concept of F.
Suppose propositions are structured entities that contain concepts as 
constituents, and that to grasp a proposition one must grasp its constituent 
concepts. Suppose, in addition, that desire is an attitude that takes structured 
propositions as object, and that bearing such an attitude to a proposition 
involves grasping it. Then if human neonates (babes) and non-human animals 
(brutes) cannot grasp concepts, they cannot have any desires (or indeed beliefs). 
But it is implausible that human neonates or non-human animals lack desires, 
whether or not they also lack beliefs. Cloudy (my cat) surely enjoys perceptual 
states, states that represent the world as being a certain way. If the food bowl 
that he is staring at is empty, it appears empty to him. And such perceptual 
states combine with desires (like hunger) to dispose him to carry out various 
antics (meowing plaintively in my direction), which he is rightly confident will 
secure the filling of the bowl. Whatever else is true about cats, I think we have 
to agree both that Cloudy gets hungry and that his bowl sometimes appears 
disappointingly empty to him.
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Does Cloudy possess the concept of emptiness? This of course depends on a 
theory of concepts, something that is rather controversial. But we can  (p.51) 
make some progress here without resolving that. Suppose we concede, for the 
sake of the argument, that Cloudy doesn’t possess any concepts—at least not the 
kind of concepts that feature as constituents in propositions. It follows that the 
concept possession principle is false: in general one doesn’t have to have the 
concept of F for X to appear F. So the argument fails, but we are still owed an 
account of how something can appear empty or good to Cloudy.
There are two quite different but promising tacks to take here. One would be to 
embrace the possibility of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. 
We experience a far richer palette of colors, for example, than we have the 
conceptual tools to characterize. Our grasp of various color concepts 
presumably emerges from such color experiences, together with the powers of 
perceptual discrimination that they presuppose and the relationships of 
similarity and betweenness that obtain among the constituents of those 
experiences.39 But we do not have to possess those concepts prior to having the 
experiences. Now suppose desire and aversion bear the same relation to the 
concepts of good and bad that color experiences bear to color concepts. They 
are the basic elements of (evaluative) experience that we have to have to enable 
us to get a grip on evaluative concepts. Of course, just as in the case of color, 
one can have the relevant desiderative experiences before one grasps the 
associated concepts. Thus it is that Cloudy can experience both the emptiness of 
the bowl and the unsatisfactoriness of that emptiness without having to grasp 
the concepts of emptiness or unsatisfactoriness.
But there is a quite different tack that may be just as promising. This has been 
developed by both Friedrich and Lauria in their preferred theories of desire, but 
Stampe also hinted at it.40 A ball might look round, feel round, or (if you perceive 
by means of echo location) sound round. Each of these is a way for the ball to 
appear round. These are different kinds of appearance—the first is visual, the 
second tactile, and the third is auditory—but they are all presentations of the 
ball as round. One might try to locate the difference between these appearances 
in the content of the presentation, but another way is to locate the difference not 
in the content but in the mode of the presentation. Similarly, one can argue that 
there are different modes of presentation of a state of affairs. In the perception 
of S, S is presented as being the case. In the desire for S, S is presented as being 
good. One and the same state can be presented in these two different ways. The 
perception that S and the desire that S take the same object but present S in 
different ways.
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This idea of distinct modes of presentation of one and the same object of 
presentation can be traced back to Brentano. According to Brentano, every  (p.
52) mental state involves a presentation of something, but there are two (and 
only two) different modes of presentation. In the one mode the object is 
presented as existing, and judgment consists in either accepting or rejecting the 
existence of the object. In the other, the mode of interest, the object is presented 
as being good, and acceptance or rejection consists in either loving (desiring) or 
hating (being averse to) the object presented. Being presented as existent is one 
mode; being presented as good is the other. Brentano did not countenance states 
of affairs as the object of presentations, but the basic idea can be transferred. 
For a state S to seem good one does not need to grasp the concept of goodness 
and judge that it applies to S. Rather one just has to accept the presentation of 
the object in the mode of interest. If, in addition, one can master and apply 
concepts, including the concept of goodness, then such presentations would 
provide a reason to embrace the associated judgment.
Both non-conceptual content and mode of appearance are sufficient to ensure 
that babes and brutes enjoy a rich life replete with a full range of desires.
11 Conclusion
The value appearance thesis unifies and explains a wide range of phenomena, 
including the need for value data, the magnetism of the apparent good, and the 
immunity of fitting attitudes to both the wrong kinds of reason and the 
paradoxes of solitary goods. It also suggests that other aspects of value and our 
responses to value may be illuminated by the analogy with perception. Consider 
the fact that experiences in general are highly perspectival. One always 
perceives the world from a particular location within the world. It would be 
absurd to require that all perceivers should “ideally” have exactly the same 
experiences of a perceiver-independent world. One’s perceptions depend not 
just on the properties of perceiver-independent states but on the different 
relations each perceiver bears to those states. This is not a bug in perception but 
a necessary feature of the fact that perceivers are differently situated in the 
world. Perception is always perception of how things appear from where one 
stands in relation to them. So, if desires are perceptions of value, the heavily 
perspectival nature of perception in general provides a powerful resource for 
explaining and legitimizing the subject-relativity of desire, even if and when 
desires are responses to subject-independent value.41
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This paper introduces the distinction between mental content and mental force. 
It argues that desire involves a mental force that is itself tied to a distinctive 
kind of desirous experience, an experience of felt need. Conceiving of desire in 
this manner, it is argued, can not only be defended against a number of prima 
facie objections, but also offers the best explanation of the truism that desire 
plays a crucial role in the rationalization of action insofar as desiring p and 
believing X-ing to promote p does make it at least minimally rational to X.
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Desire, it is often said, is a pro-attitude. This is sometimes understood in the 
sense that desiring p disposes us to act in ways designed to realize p. On 
another understanding desire is a pro-attitude in the sense that desiring p 
entails a positive evaluation of p. Some theorists of desire have focused 
exclusively on the first reading, apparently assuming that the evaluative 
dimension reduces to the causal-functional one or that it can be dispensed with.1
This is a mistake. As has been forcefully argued by Warren Quinn, the mere fact 
of being drawn in one practical direction rather than another is not sufficient to 
yield evaluation; an agent can be drawn to turn off radios, to swear, or to find 
her left hand undoes the work of her right hand without seeing any good 
whatsoever in turning off radios, swearing, or the work of her left hand.2 Hence 
the futility of trying to reduce the evaluative dimension of desire to desire’s 
propensity to move us toward action. Nor can the evaluative dimension be 
dispensed with, as it explains a crucial platitude about desire’s role in rationality, 
namely, that desiring p and believing X-ing to promote that p makes it at least 
minimally rational for one to X.3 If desiring p entails a positive evaluation of p, 
we can explain why desiring p and believing X-ing to promote p does make it at 
least minimally rational to X, since it shows that as a result of desiring p and 
believing X-ing to promote p, there was at least something to be said for X-ing 
from the agent’s point of view. Yet if we dispense with the evaluative dimension, 
we will be at a loss to explain why it is always minimally rational to act in pursuit 
of one’s desired ends.4
 (p.58) A common strategy to explain the evaluative dimension of desire has 
been in terms of evaluative belief. On this view, desiring p entails a positive 
evaluation of p because desiring p entails believing p to be good.5 This view 
faces a number of counterexamples, e.g. Nina the nihilist and Pablo the pervert. 
Nina is convinced nothing has any value whatsoever, but she desires to have 
some fries. Pablo has pedophile desires but also believes that there is nothing 
good whatsoever about realizing his pedophile desires; he believes acting out his 
desires would be a moral abomination, would be prudentially unwise (as he 
would rot in hell), and wouldn’t even give him any momentary pleasure (as he 
would instantly be struck by fear and shame).6
Perhaps more telling, there are also a number of theoretical problems with the 
attempt to account for the pro-attitudinal character of desire in terms of 
evaluative belief. I will briefly highlight two. First, evaluative belief seems to 
presuppose a higher degree of cognitive sophistication than desires. We think 
that dogs, cats, and young children lack the cognitive sophistication required for 
evaluative belief. Even so, it seems that dogs, cats, and young children can have 
certain desires, such as a desire to be fed, to be comforted, or to have a glitzy 
toy.7
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One may, of course, insist that animals and young children can hold evaluative 
beliefs. This does come at a high cost, though. After all, believing something to 
be good involves deploying evaluative concepts. It is not just a matter of wanting 
or liking it. It involves thinking that there are reasons for people to desire or like 
it. Yet it seems really quite implausible to suppose that animals or toddlers think 
about their world in these terms.8 The response that animals and young children 
aren’t capable of desires, on the other hand, seems plainly ad hoc and contrary 
to everyday experience. At the very least, the proponent of the evaluative belief 
account owes us a good reason for thinking that the natural ascription of certain 
kinds of desires to animals and young children should be confused.
Second, beliefs are subject to the norm of truth. They represent things as being 
a certain way and as such are subject to an assessment in terms of whether 
things really are the way they are represented to be. If belief represents things 
as being other than they actually are, belief manifests some kind of failing. This 
does not mean that one always ought to rid oneself of those beliefs, but it does 
mean that the belief manifests a failing and falls short of an inbuilt ideal. If you 
imagine there is an elephant in the room, you do not fall short of any inbuilt 
standard if there isn’t. But if you believe that there is an elephant in the room, 
your belief falls short of an inbuilt ideal if the closest elephant is in the zoo three 
miles away.
 (p.59) Now take any evaluatively neutral state of affairs—e.g. that there is an 
elephant in the room or that there are flowers on one’s grave. Believing these 
evaluatively neutral states of affairs to be good is falling short of an inbuilt 
standard. If believing the desired object to be good were part of desire, then in 
desiring these things one would also have to fall short of an inbuilt standard. Yet 
desiring these states to obtain does not exemplify any shortcoming whatsoever. 
Desires directed at the evaluatively neutral do not fall short of any inbuilt 
standard and are as correct and wholesome as any other desire fairly and 
squarely directed at the most valuable state of affairs.9
Here is another way to make this point. You can put epistemic pressure on 
someone who believes that having flowers on one’s grave is desirable, but you 
cannot put the same epistemic pressure on someone who desires to have flowers 
on her grave. Someone who has this desire can shrug her shoulders and simply 
retort, “Sure, but this is what I want.” There is an important analogy with liking 
here (to which I shall return). One can like something without thereby believing 
that it is valuable. And one can desire those things one likes (e.g. flowers on 
one’s grave) without thereby believing that this would be valuable.10
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In light of counterexamples à la Pablo the pervert or the objection from (a lack 
of) cognitive sophistication, a number of philosophers have tried saving the spirit 
of the view that desiring p entails believing p to be good by claiming instead that 
desiring p entails a perception of p as being good.11 This view, however, is also 
subject to the present objection. Perceptions, like beliefs, purport to represent 
things the way they really are. In virtue of this they too are subject to an 
assessment in terms of whether things really are the way these states represent 
them to be. If you perceive there to be an elephant in the room, then this 
perception falls short of an inbuilt standard if there is no elephant in the room; 
you have a hallucination or are experiencing an illusion. If you perceive there 
being flowers on your grave as good, then this perception manifests some kind 
of failing, but the corresponding desire does not.
II
Let us call a state that represents things as purported facts a cognitive state. 
Beliefs and perceptions are cognitive states by this definition; imaginations, for 
example, are not. We can give a simple and straightforward account of 
evaluation in terms of cognitive states: to evaluate something  (p.60) is to 
represent it as a purported fact that it has an evaluative property. Put differently, 
on this account, evaluation is a matter of a cognitive state with an evaluative 
content.
Is all evaluation cognitive in this sense? If so, we cannot both accept the 
conclusion of the previous section and continue to hold that desiring p and 
believing X-ing to promote p makes it minimally rational to X. For some, this is 
incentive enough to insist that there must be a way to save an account of desire 
as a pro-attitude in terms of evaluative belief, perception, or some other 
cognitive state no matter what. Here I shall consider instead whether there is an 
alternative to cognitive evaluation.
Non-cognitivists usually help themselves to the notion of evaluation, but they 
have arguably not provided an intelligible model of non-cognitive evaluation. 
According to one popular account, for example, cognitive states give us a map of 
the world, whereas non-cognitive states provide us with motivation; cognitive 
states lay out the territory, non-cognitive states push us across it. However, as 
pointed out earlier, being disposed to move in certain practical directions is one 
thing, evaluation another. An alternative account of non-cognitive evaluation is 
needed, and I believe the roots to such an account lie in a distinction (originally 
due to Brentano) between mental content and mental force.12 In the following, I 
will try to explain this distinction and how it affords a framework for non-
cognitive evaluation.
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Some, perhaps all mental states are about things. For example, thinking that 
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet is about Shakespeare writing Hamlet. What a mental 
state is about constitutes one dimension of its content. The other dimension 
concerns its mode of presentation. Thus, there is one sense in which thinking 
that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet differs in content from thinking that the Bard 
wrote Hamlet, but not because these thoughts are about different things but 
rather because they involve different modes of presentation. These two 
dimensions—aboutness and modes of presentation—exhaust mental content.
The cognitivist models evaluation in terms of evaluative content. An evaluative 
mental state is a state with an evaluative content. It is a state that is about the 
world being a certain, evaluatively shaped way. Indeed, how else could a state 
evaluate an object if not by having an evaluative content? This reasoning betrays 
the assumption that a mental state’s overall representational character is wholly 
fixed by its content; that is, it betrays the assumption that the way something is 
given in thought is entirely fixed by content. In contrast, I think the overall 
representational character of a mental state also involves the phenomenon of 
mental force. To explain what  (p.61) I mean by mental force, it will be helpful 
to consider an analogy from the philosophy of language. Sentences that have the 
same extension and the same intension can nonetheless differ in a significant 
way if they have been put forward with different force (Dummett 1993). Contrast 
the assertion “Sam smokes habitually” with the command “Sam, smoke 
habitually.” The two sentences have the same extension and the same intension
—they refer to the same person, predicate the same property, and do so under 
the same mode of presentation. Nonetheless, different things are being 
conveyed by the two sentences. If you knew only the content of a sentence but 
did not know with what force it had been put forward, you would be missing an 
essential element. Something very similar occurs in the case of mental states. 
Contrast, for example, believing that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet with 
entertaining that proposition in thought. While the two mental states have the 
same content, believing that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet involves representing 
that content with a certain force, namely as a purported fact.
There is a difference in the way the proposition that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet
is given in thought depending upon whether this proposition is believed or 
merely entertained. This difference, however, is not a difference in content but a 
difference in force. This shows that explaining evaluation in terms of evaluative 
content is not the only option. There is also the distinct theoretical possibility of 
accounting for evaluation in terms of evaluative mental force. Thus, the non-
cognitivist can say that just as there is a distinctively cognitive manner in which 
content can be given in thought (a cognitive mental force), there also is a 
distinctively evaluative manner in which content is given in thought (an 
evaluative mental force). Just as there is a way in which a content is presented 
to the subject as a purported fact, so there also is a way in which a content is 
presented to the subject in a positive or negative light.
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III
A common response at this point is to object that speaking of mental force is just 
an unusual way of speaking of propositional attitudes, that propositional 
attitudes can be reduced to causal-functional profiles, and that, therefore, the 
current proposal hasn’t effectively advanced over the initial (and inadequate) 
attempt to cash out non-cognitive evaluation in terms of dispositions to act.
Given the distinction between mental content and mental force, two ways of 
accounting for evaluation exist in logical space: one in terms of  (p.62) cognitive 
force + evaluative content and the other in terms of evaluative force. Yet this 
theoretical richness would be a mere chimera if mental force really reduces to 
causal-functional profiles, since evaluation cannot be explicated in terms of the 
latter. Hence we would be back where we started. Cognitive evaluation would 
remain the only game in town. However, the objection is too quick to assume 
that speaking of mental force must be shorthand for causal-functional profiles. 
An alternative is to account for mental force in terms of phenomenal character. I 
will introduce this alternative in the context of hedonic experiences in this 
section. In the next section, I will extend the argument of this section to the case 
of desire.
Consider the case of liking, enjoying, or taking pleasure in something. These 
states are paradigmatic pro-attitudes; they necessarily involve a certain kind of 
positive evaluation of their object. To enjoy the scent of a blooming flower or to 
take pleasure in the taste of chocolate necessarily involves some kind of positive 
evaluation of the sensations involved. As in the case of desire—and for similar 
reasons13—this positive evaluation is ill-captured in terms of cognitive 
evaluation. Consider, instead, that their evaluative dimension is a function of 
them involving a distinctive evaluative mental force, that to take pleasure in 
something involves a distinctive evaluative manner in which the object of one’s 
pleasure is given to the mind. But to be in these hedonic states is also to be in a 
distinctive phenomenal state; there is a distinctive character to what it is like to 
be in those states. Moreover, it is very natural to think that the positive 
evaluation involved in hedonic states is ineliminably tied to the distinctive 
phenomenal character of that hedonic state; that the pro-ness of hedonic states 
is ineliminably tied to the way one feels about the objects of hedonic states when 
one is in these states.
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Admittedly this contradicts much theorizing about the nature of hedonic 
experience. Many philosophers think there is something quite flawed in the 
attempt to understand hedonic states as feelings, preferring instead a desire-
based analysis or an account that treats them as sui generis attitudes. It is 
instructive to consider why these philosophers think that “pleasure is not a 
feeling” (Feldman 1997: 463). Their standard argument begins by highlighting 
that the phenomenal character of pleasure differs in kind from the phenomenal 
character of sensuous qualities of experience, such as the phenomenal character 
of seeing red, tasting something sweet, or feeling a sharp pain. Whereas we can 
strip away those sensuous qualities from the overall experience, the same does 
not apply to pleasure, as  (p.63) Sidgwick famously pointed out. That is to say, 
whereas we can look at a car and notice the same reddish quality that was 
present in our experience of a tomato at the supermarket, we can’t in the same 
way detect a pleasure quality shared between our joy of driving the car and 
eating the tomato. And on this basis it is concluded that hedonic experience has 
no distinctive phenomenal character.14 But this doesn’t follow. What follows is 
just that if there is a distinctive phenomenal character to hedonic experience, it 
can’t be a sensuous quality but must be, as we might put it, a feeling tone—“a 
mode of consciousness distinct in nature and conditions from all 
sensations” (McDougall 1911: 312); in other words, it would have to be the kind 
of phenomenal character apt to characterize evaluative mental force rather than 
a property of the represented content.15
There are good reasons to think that hedonic experience involves a distinctive 
feeling tone.16 First, there is clearly a world of a difference between what it is 
like to enjoy something and what it is like to find displeasure in it. These 
experiences differ in their phenomenal character. This raises a problem for those 
who want to deny that hedonic experience is marked by a distinctive feeling 
tone. How do they purport to explain this platitude? They must argue that the 
difference between taking pleasure and displeasure in something lies in a 
difference in what one takes pleasure and displeasure in. Yet this has the queer 
consequence that it is impossible that one and the same thing may be the object 
of pleasure and displeasure, or, to put it differently, that pleasant or unpleasant 
objects are necessarily pleasant or unpleasant.
Second, a pleasant experience is an intrinsically good experience,17 and it is so 
in virtue of its pleasantness. An unpleasant experience is an intrinsically bad 
experience, and it is so in virtue of its unpleasantness. Indeed, this is why 
hedonic experiences have ethical significance. To account for hedonic 
experiences being good or bad in virtue of their pleasantness or unpleasantness 
we must talk about the way those experiences feel: pleasant experiences are 
good because they feel good, and unpleasant experiences bad because they feel 
bad. We shall be at a loss to make sense of this if we deny that hedonic 
experience has a distinctive phenomenal character.18
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Third, the popular alternatives to feeling-based analyses of pleasure are 
untenable. Consider desire-based accounts, such as the theory that an 
experience is pleasant in virtue of a desire for it to continue and the theory that 
a pleasant experience is the upshot of satisfied desire.19 There are 
counterexamples to both claims. Against the first claim, we can point  (p.64) out 
that there can be too much of a good thing. “There are,” as Kenny (1963: 135) 
reminds us
so many cases where the prolongation or repetition of what was enjoyed 
would ruin the enjoyment. The sweetest last to make the end most sweet 
might not be sweet were it not also last. Enjoying a play does not mean 
wishing that it had six acts instead of five, and one can enjoy the first 
movement of a symphony without being distressed that it is followed by the 
second.
With respect to the second proposal, on the other hand, we can ask what of 
those cases in which we “run into” a pleasure we did not know to exist before we 
found it. Children, for instance, discover all sorts of pleasures that they then 
hold onto or seek again. Surely the pleasure could not have been caused by the 
success of the very desire that the pleasure itself had initiated (Duncker 1941: 
394). This points to a more general problem, namely, that pleasure is simpler
than desire insofar as desire has certain logical presuppositions that pleasure 
lacks. Desire, for example, requires the capacity to conceive of a gap between 
the way the world is and how it could be.20 Pleasure does not. Consider a simple 
organism that lacked the capacity to represent past, future, or merely possible 
states and whose conception of things was strictly limited to its present 
perceptual input. It would seem possible for this organism to take pleasure in its 
perceptual states, but it could not possibly desire anything. Since pleasure has 
fewer logical presuppositions than desire, the attempt to analyze the former in 
terms of the latter must fail.
Desire, Mental Force and Desirous Experience
Page 9 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
The alternative theory that is prominent among those who deny the phenomenal 
nature of hedonic phenomena is that pleasure is constituted by a sui generis
attitude of liking.21 There is, I think, nothing wrong with this as long as one also 
maintains that our grasp of this attitude is anchored in distinctive phenomenal 
episodes. But since this is being denied, proponents of this approach must, it 
seems, have either of two things in mind. They must either think that our 
conception of pleasure is ultimately grounded in its being a state with a certain 
causal-functional profile or that there is simply nothing whatsoever that gives 
substance to our conception of pleasure—neither its phenomenal nature, nor its 
relation to desire, nor its causal-functional properties. The latter option makes 
pleasure objectionably mysterious. The former option seems scarcely more 
credible. What exactly is this functional-causal property supposed to be? It can’t 
be the causal power to give rise to a desire for the experience to continue, but 
(p.65) this would have seemed to be the most plausible candidate. At the very 
least, therefore, someone favoring this option faces the serious challenge of 
specifying the functional causal property that supposedly determines the nature 
of pleasure and hedonic states more generally.
So while it is true that the phenomenal character of hedonic experience differs 
from the phenomenal character of sensuous qualities of experience, we 
shouldn’t conclude that the pleasantness of an experience doesn’t add anything 
to the phenomenal character of the experience. Intuitively it clearly does. As 
such it lends credence to the idea that the evaluative dimension of hedonic 
states can be accounted for in terms of their distinctive evaluative force, where 
this notion of evaluative force is ineliminably tied to a distinctive phenomenal 
character that is part of hedonic experience.
IV
In the previous two sections, my general aim has been to explicate an intelligible 
model of non-cognitive evaluation. Non-cognitive evaluation, I have argued, 
should be understood in terms of evaluative mental force. The notion of 
evaluative mental force is in turn tied to the distinctive feeling tone of certain 
experiences. In this section, my aim is to relate these ideas to desire.
An extension of these ideas to desires requires that there is a feeling tone 
distinctive of desire. Yet the dominant view in modern analytic philosophy is that 
although desire can be caused by phenomenal states (e.g. pangs of hunger) and 
can cause phenomenal states (e.g. suffering if the fulfillment of the desire is 
continually thwarted), there is nothing that can reasonably be labeled the 
phenomenology of desire itself; there are conscious states contingently 
associated with desire, but there is no genuinely desirous consciousness, no way 
for desire (or a constitutive part of desire) itself to be part of our conscious 
experience.22
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I think this influential position gains much of its attraction from two 
assumptions. First, it is observed that there can be standing desires, that 
desiring something does not imply being in an experiential state. And from this it 
is inferred that there is no phenomenology of desire. This, however, falsely 
assumes that only essentially conscious states can be characterized by a 
distinctive phenomenology. Loving someone, for example, does not imply being 
in an experiential state. Yet there clearly is something like a phenomenology of 
love; there are conscious episodes in which love manifests itself in 
consciousness.23
 (p.66) Second, it is observed that there is no bodily sensation essential to 
desire and apt to constitute the phenomenology of desire. From this it is 
concluded that there is no phenomenology of desire. However, why should we 
grant the implicit assumption that the phenomenology of desire would have to 
consist of a bodily sensation? After all, the phenomenal character of experience 
does not in general reduce to bodily sensation nor, I have argued, to mental 
content alone. So we should remain open to the possibility that there is a 
phenomenology of desire that is tied to its mental force.
Modern analytic philosophy aside, thinking of a desire as involving a distinctive 
phenomenal character has been popular. Attempts to explicate the distinctive 
phenomenal character of desire in terms of hedonic experiences have been 
particularly prominent.24 These attempts have come in two broad flavors: as 
pleasure-based theories of desirous experience and as displeasure-based 
accounts of desirous experience. Pleasure-based accounts hold that taking 
pleasure in the thought that p is sufficient for desirous experience, whereas 
displeasure-based accounts hold that taking displeasure in the thought that not-
p is sufficient for the conscious manifestation of a desire for that p.
Neither provides a satisfactory account of the phenomenology of desirous 
experience. As noted earlier, taking pleasure in something does not entail a 
desire for the experience to continue. Similarly, taking pleasure in the thought of 
p does not entail a desire for p to occur. As Mark Johnston (2001: 225) observes,
Suppose that I feel pleased at the thought of my working in the local soup 
kitchen. Even so, I need not find my working in the soup kitchen appealing. 
I might only find the thought of it appealing. I could be a self-indulgent 
dreamer, one who particularly enjoys the costless contemplation of himself 
in a good moral light. I might be pleased at the thought of my working in 
the soup kitchen while knowing that I would not find my working there 
appealing.25
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Mutatis mutandis for having a desire to work in the soup kitchen. Consider 
another case. Suppose I am reading a work of fiction and take pleasure in the 
description of a particular scene. Does this mean that I must have some desire 
for this scene to exist in actuality? Surely not. These two examples point to a 
more general problem with the claim that pleasure in the thought of p suffices 
for desirous experience: If you desire something, you want it to be the case. You 
do not just entertain it, but you entertain it in a way that includes a kind of 
demand that it should come to obtain. Not so in the  (p.67) case of pleasant 
thoughts. Our pleasant thoughts can exemplify a contentment with the way 
things are, that wanting something to be the case must necessarily lack.
Displeasure-based accounts do not fare better. Just as being pleased by the 
thought of p does not entail a desire for p to obtain because being pleased by p 
can lack any direction beyond itself, so too being displeased by the thought of 
not-p does not entail a desire for p to obtain because being displeased by the 
thought of not-p can also lack all engagement with anything beyond itself. To 
illustrate, consider the case of severely depressed people. It is part of their 
condition that they find most things unpleasant. At the same time, severely 
depressed people can lack any desire for things to change. They are so focused 
on their misery, so engulfed in their displeasure, that they don’t conceive of, let 
alone desire, any alternative.26
What emerges from this discussion is that desirous experience involves a certain 
dynamic dimension inasmuch as in desirous experience one entertains the 
desired end in a way that includes a kind of demand for it to become reality. In 
desiring something one does more than conceive of something that is not, but 
could be, the case. One also conceives of it as having to become the case. 
Consider this passage by John Locke (1975: bk. 2, ch. 21, §32):
Who is there that has not felt in desire … that it being “deferred makes the 
heart sick”; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, 
which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people 
cry out, “Give me children.” Give me the thing desired, “or I die.” Life 
itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden that can’t be borne under the 
lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.
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Locke himself took this to be reason to conclude that desire is “nothing but an 
uneasiness in the want of an absent good” (§31). However, this evocative 
passage also serves well to bring an alternative explication of desirous 
experience into focus. For we can note that in Rachel’s cry “Give me children or 
else I die,” she does not just express her frustration with a world that continually 
stymies the satisfaction of her innermost desire. She also gives expression to her
felt need for the world to be a certain way. She feels that she must have children. 
This aspect is missing from hedonic theories of desire. Pleasure and displeasure 
are evaluative states, but they do not essentially involve the felt need for 
something to be a certain way. Desirous experience is different. In desirous 
experience, the desired end is  (p.68) given to the mind under a feeling tone of 
felt need; it is given to the mind as something that must be realized.
Let me try to clarify the idea of a felt need. (i) We are creatures with biological 
needs, and our desires are often linked with our biological needs. In fact, it is 
presumably because of this link with biological needs that we evolved to have 
desires in the first place. But despite the important connection between felt 
needs and biological needs, a felt need is not a biological need. A felt need is an 
experience; a biological need is not. Moreover, to have a biological need for x 
implies that the organism will be seriously harmed unless x is secured in a 
timely fashion. Having a felt need does not imply any such thing. (ii) Felt needs 
can differ in intensity. Often the most natural expression of a felt need will be 
“This must become reality,” but at other times this exclamation will have too 
much of a sense of urgency to capture the phenomenal character of the 
experience, in which case the experience may be better expressed by saying 
“Would only that this state become reality.” (iii) Felt needs often can be given 
linguistic expression. For example, “This must become reality” is a natural 
linguistic expression of paradigmatic felt needs. However, felt needs are not 
linguistic phenomena, and every linguistic expression will at times be somewhat 
inadequate. (iv) A felt need is not a prediction of some kind. To give expression 
to a felt need by saying “This must become reality” is not to imply that being in 
that state involves some conviction that the phenomenally needed thing will 
become reality. We come closer to the truth if we say it involves regarding the 
needed thing as something that must come about in the sense that it ought to 
come about. But while there is certainly some kind of affinity between felt needs 
and normative claims, it would also be a mistake to think that feeling that 
something must become reality implies believing that it ought to obtain.27
Desire, Mental Force and Desirous Experience
Page 13 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
I have argued that there are experiences in which the desire for an end can 
manifest itself in consciousness. These experiences involve a distinctive mental 
force that is anchored in a distinctive phenomenology that can be articulated in 
terms of the notion of a felt need inasmuch as in these experiences the desired 
end is given to the mind as something that has to become reality. I finally wish to 
argue that desirous experience is essential to desire. I can think of at least three 
plausibly weak specifications of this claim: (i) desiring p entails that the subject 
from time to time has a desirous experience of p; (ii) desiring p entails being 
disposed to be in a state of desirous consciousness of p given appropriate 
triggering conditions; or (iii) desiring p entails that the desire could in principle
become an occurrent one and that it would then manifest itself in a desirous 
experience of  (p.69) p. I am sympathetic to the first, but for my current 
purposes I will stay neutral toward these three specifications. Any given 
specification of the idea that desirous experience is essential to desire suffices 
for my current purpose. Why, though, think that desirous experience should be 
essential to desire at all? Or, as Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996: 139) put it, 
“What can be so important about the capacity to become occurrent?” The 
answer is that desirous experience anchors the notion of a distinctive mental 
force involved in desire. It is thus central to a non-cognitive explanation of the 
pro-attitudinal character of desire and its role in practical rationality. It is in 
virtue of the desired end being given to the mind as something that has to 
become reality that acting in ways one believes to promote the desired end is 
minimally rational.28 This non-cognitive account avoids the objections against 
the cognitive evaluation accounts surveyed in the first section. For example, it is 
entirely consistent with p being presented to the mind as something that has to 
become reality that one lacks the belief that p is good. Indeed, since p being 
presented to the mind as something that has to become reality is a matter of p 
being presented under a distinctive evaluative mental force, it is also consistent 
with the desiring agent lacking the cognitive sophistication required for 
evaluative belief. Moreover, because the analysis avoids reference to 
representations of purported fact, it avoids making desire subject to the norm of 
truth. In short, if desirous experience is essential to desire there is a credible 
explanation of the role of desire in rationality. We can explain why desiring p 
makes the pursuit of p minimally rational without having to appeal to an 
unsatisfactory cognitive analysis. This explanatory virtue is the best reason for 
thinking that desire stands in an essential relation to desirous experience.
V
According to a deep-seated intuition, there is something special about desire’s 
motivational power, and it may be thought the current position cannot do justice 
to this intuition. For example, consider the thesis that all action can be explained 
in terms of desire. This, it might be said, is a problem for the current position 
because not all states explaining action stand in an essential relation to episodes 
of desirous consciousness.
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There are two possible responses to this objection. The first response charges 
that the objection involves an equivocation. There are, the response runs, a 
generic and a specific sense of desire. According to the generic sense of desire, 
any mental state that motivates intentional action counts as  (p.70) a desire. To 
say “He X-ed because he wanted to X” is only an alternative way of saying “He X-
ed intentionally.” Desire in this generic sense needs to be distinguished from 
desire proper, that is, desire as a mental state distinct from other kinds of 
mental states such as belief. The objection runs these two senses together 
because while all action can be explained in terms of desire in the generic sense, 
not all action can be explained by desire proper.29
Not everyone is convinced by this line of thinking, pointing to a range of 
arguments designed to show that desire (proper) is the only spring of 
motivation. Here the second response comes into play, which is that the seeming 
implausibility of all states explaining action standing in an essential relation to 
episodes of desirous consciousness is itself an artifact of considering an overly 
strong relationship between desire and desirous consciousness. Is it really so 
implausible, for example, to maintain that all states that play the requisite role 
in action explanation also dispose the agent to experience an episode of desirous 
consciousness or that they could all at least in principle manifest themselves in 
an episode of desirous consciousness? In fact, the current account seems 
congenial to staunch Humean thinking that only desire can motivate action 
(Hume 2003). If one thinks that cognitive states cannot in principle motivate 
action, then one cannot endorse a cognitive account of the pro-attitudinal 
character of desire.30 But I have argued the best non-cognitive account of the 
pro-attitudinal character of desire will make desirous experiences essential to 
desire.
So rather than being a problem for the current account, that only desire 
motivates action would actually further strengthen the present view because it 
would provide a strong additional reason for endorsing a non-cognitive account 
of the pro-attitudinal character of desire. But the current account also sits well 
with weaker explications of the intuition that there is something special about 
desire’s motivational powers. Even if one merely wants to retain the claim that 
only desire necessarily motivates or that motivation by desire is distinct from 
motivation by other states, one needs a non-cognitive account of desire to retain 
a clear-cut contrast to motivation by cognitive states. By highlighting the 
difference between cognitive and non-cognitive evaluation, the current account 
provides the resources to account for motivational differences between 
motivation by desire and motivation by cognitive states—differences that can be 
traced to the differing properties of cognitive and non-cognitive evaluation. In 
contrast, if one embraces a cognitive account of the pro-attitudinal character of 
desire, it is far from obvious how one can do justice to the intuition that there is 
something special about the role of desire in the motivation of action.
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 (p.71) I have argued that acting in ways believed to promote the desired end is 
always at least minimally rational and that in order to vindicate this role of 
desire in practical rationality we need to offer an account of desire that explains 
the pro-ness with which the desired end is apprehended in desire. Attempts to 
do so in terms of evaluative cognition, I argued, are unsatisfactory. Instead I 
have explored the possibility of developing a thoroughly non-cognitive account of 
the pro-ness of desire by drawing upon the notion of a distinctive mental force 
and distinctive episodes of desirous consciousness, specifically episodes of felt 
need. En passant, I have tried to show that many objections to giving desirous 
consciousness a central role in a theory of desire—e.g. the possibility of standing 
desires, that there is no genuine phenomenology to desire, that there is no 
theoretic role for desirous consciousness to play, that all action is motivated by 
desire—are overblown. Finally, I have suggested that a surprising auxiliary 
benefit of the account championed in this paper may be that it allows for a 
better understanding of what underlies desire’s special motivational power.
Notes
(1.) Cf. Armstrong 1968; Smith 1994; Stalnaker 1987.
(2.) Quinn 1993. See also Dancy 2000; Scanlon 1998; Raz 2001. Though see 
Döring and Eker (this volume) for a dissenting view.
(3.) No claim is being made about what an agent has reason to do or about what 
would be more than minimally rational for the agent to do.
(4.) In particular we will be at a loss to explain this if we assume that desiring p 
involves nothing but a disposition to act in ways designed to realize p. For why 
should the mere fact that one was disposed to move in a certain direction make 
it at all rational to do so?
(5.) E.g. Anscombe 1976; Dancy 2000; Quinn 1993; Raz 2001. See also Oddie, 
Döring and Eker (this volume) for critical discussions of this view. See Gregory 
(this volume) for a defense of the related position that for an agent to desire p is 
for the agent to believe that she has a normative reason to promote p.
(6.) Those who are convinced that desires entail evaluative beliefs are unlikely to 
be swayed by such examples. They will insist that people who deny that there is 
anything good about p and who assert that p is not good in any way still also 
believe that p is good if they desire that p; that someone desires p is all the 
evidence one needs to know that she also believes that p is good. That a theory 
commits one to ascribing beliefs to agents that they explicitly disavow, however, 
is a cost we should strive to avoid. All other things being equal, if an alternative 
theory could explain the evaluative dimension of desire without incurring such 
costs, then we should prefer this alternative theory.
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(7.) See also Döring and Eker this volume. Though see Gregory (this volume) for 
a dissenting view.
(8.) Notice too that it is not enough to argue that animals or toddlers can believe 
that securing the object of their desire will be pleasant. I can believe that 
something is pleasant without thereby believing that there are reasons for 
people to desire or promote it. To believe that there are reasons for people to 
desire something, for example, requires some kind of understanding of other 
people as agents that can be swayed by reasons as well as some ability to be 
guided by reasons oneself. Neither this understanding nor this ability seems to 
be present in, say, infants. (I thus disagree with Gregory’s deflationary claim that 
“seeing an action as being called for in some respect”—something I would agree 
is part of desiring and will try to elucidate in section IV—is the same as believing 
that there is a reason to perform the action (Gregory this volume). Nonetheless, 
as any parent can attest, infants can surely still desire things.
(9.) This is not to deny that desire is subject to various norms—e.g. moral and 
prudential norms. It is only to point out that it is not subject to the norm of truth, 
that there are, as one may also put it, strictly speaking no correctness conditions 
for desire.
(10.) It might be said that desiring the evaluatively neutral does not fall short of 
an inbuilt standard because desires invest their objects with significance for the 
good of the agent. In virtue of desire the (hitherto evaluatively neutral) desired 
state acquires value for the agent; the agent will be better off if the desired state 
comes to obtain. I want to stay clear of the question if desire can invest its 
objects with significance for the good of the agent and only point out that it is 
implausible to suppose that desire satisfaction always makes an agent better off. 
For example, it seems implausible to suggest that there being flowers on one’s 
grave makes one better off. (But doesn’t even this kind of desire lend some 
comfort to the agent and is thus at least to some extent good for the agent? 
Perhaps, but in order to avoid the objection it needs to be shown that the desired 
end is good, not that having the desire is good.). Yet even in these cases, in 
having these desires one is not falling short of an inbuilt standard. (Note too that 
this argument does not rely on the view that an agent’s life cannot be made 
better or worse after her death. It may even be that the satisfaction of desires 
that are suitably central to an agent’s life can affect an agent’s welfare after her 
death. The argument here only needs to highlight that it is implausible to think 
that the satisfaction of every desire—no matter its content or time of satisfaction
—adds to an agent’s welfare).
(11.) E.g. Stampe 1986; Oddie 2005, this volume. See also Döring and Eker, 
Lauria, Gregory (this volume) for further discussions of this view.
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(12.) Cf. Brentano 1902, 1911. While Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the 
mark of the mental has generated wide interest, his discussion of the present 
distinction has been mostly ignored in the contemporary literature (though see 
e.g. Lauria this volume for a related proposal. See also Deonna and Teroni 2012, 
whose interesting account of the nature of mental attitudes, though different in 
detail from the one presented here, can also be seen to be inspired by 
Brentano’s distinction between mental content and mental force).
(13.) We can enjoy things even if we believe that nothing has value. We can also 
enjoy things that we believe are bad. Indeed, we can even believe that the 
pleasure we derive from enjoying these things is itself bad. What is more, even 
cognitively quite simple animals seem capable of pleasure. At the same time, 
these animals seem to lack the requisite degree of cognitive sophistication to be 
able to hold evaluative beliefs. While an account in terms of evaluative 
perceptions would avoid these objections, it would still entail that liking or 
taking pleasure in something is subject to the norm of truth. This is quite 
implausible indeed. One does not fall short of any inbuilt standard if one takes 
pleasure in something evaluatively neutral (e.g. the wall being red).
(14.) Sidgwick 1981: 127. See also Alston 1967b; Broad 1962; Feldman 1997; 
Parfit 1987.
(15.) See also Broad 1962; Schlick 2002. Moore (1988: 13), another eminent 
proponent of an account of hedonic phenomena in terms of conscious 
experience, was less careful, at one point even writing that “it is enough for us 
to know that ‘pleased’ does mean ‘having the sensation of pleasure.’ ” Part of the 
problem may lie in the common but flawed assumption that pleasure and pain 
are opposites (for critical discussion see McCloskey 1971; Penelhum 1957; Trigg 
1970).
(16.) To be more precise, there are good reasons to think that hedonic 
experiences involve at least two kinds of distinctive feeling tones: a feeling tone 
distinctive of positive hedonic experiences and a feeling tone distinctive of 
negative hedonic experiences. (Some may argue that fine-grained distinctions 
can and should be made. I remain neutral on this point.)
(17.) Note that saying that a pleasant experience is intrinsically valuable 
(valuable in and of itself) is distinct from claiming that it is necessarily valuable 
(valuable in all possible contexts).
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(18.) It is not good enough to argue that we desire pleasant experiences and that 
this explains their ethical significance. Pleasant experiences would be of ethical 
significance even if they would not be desired (e.g. even if the creature lacked 
the ability to desire. See below for the argument that this is possible). But note 
too that in any case this option isn’t open for most critics of the view that 
pleasure is a feeling, as they also deny that desire has any ethical significance 
(e.g. Feldman 1997; Parfit 1997).
(19.) See Alston (1967a), Armstrong (1968), and Sidgwick (1981) for the first 
kind of analysis. See Heathwood (2006) and Schroeder (2004) for the second 
kind of analysis.
(20.) See also Döring and Eker, Oddie, Massin, Lauria (this volume) for 
discussion of the related claim that one cannot desire that which one believes to 
be the case.
(21.) Feldman 1997. See also Broad 1962; Trigg 1970.
(22.) See e.g. Anscombe 1976; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996; Dancy 2000; 
Kenny 1963; McGinn 1997; Ryle 1984; Shoemaker 1980; Smith 1994. See also 
Döring and Eker this volume.
(23.) Or consider being afraid of death. One can have this fear even when one is 
asleep and not subject to any conscious episode. Yet from this it does not follow 
that there is no distinctive phenomenology of fear.
(24.) To be more precise, analyzing desire in terms of hedonic states has 
commonly been attempted. Often, but not always, this attempt has been carried 
out via an explication of desirous experience. For some proponents of hedonic 
accounts of desire or desirous experience see Duncker 1941; Ehrenfels 1982; 
Ewing 1944, 1953; Fehige 2001; Hobbes 1994; Locke 1975; Mill 1991; Moore 
1988; Schlick 2002; Strawson 1994. For an illuminating historical overview see 
Fehige 2005.
(25.) As I have argued, hedonic states are simpler than desire inasmuch as 
desire requires (but hedonic states do not) the capacity to conceive of a gap 
between the way the world is and how it could be. This also poses a problem for 
any position that holds that a hedonic state is sufficient for desire or desirous 
experience.
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(26.) There is also something theoretically odd about the attempt to understand 
desire in terms of displeasure, because desire is a pro-attitude, whereas 
displeasure is a con-attitude. The response that a con-attitude toward a 
proposition is the same as a pro-attitude toward its negation isn’t convincing 
either. Taking pleasure in something is not the same as taking displeasure in its 
absence or negation, and these states do not necessitate each other. I can enjoy 
a movie without finding not watching the movie displeasurable. I can take 
displeasure in the thought of an accident without taking pleasure in the thought 
of there being no accident. See also Massin this volume.
(27.) Massin (this volume) and Lauria (this volume) distinguish between 
evaluative and deontic theories of desire. Given this distinction, my discussion 
may seem confused. While I speak of providing an account of the evaluative 
dimension of desire, I seem to end up with an account that falls into the deontic 
camp. Now while I do not deny that the realm of values can be distinguished 
from the realm of reasons, requirements, and norms, and while I also do not 
deny that there is a difference between evaluative beliefs and normative beliefs, 
I am not sure that this distinction is fruitfully applied to the case of non-cognitive 
mental force and desirous experience. Thus, I would say that desirous 
experience is both related to normative claims and to evaluative claims and that 
it, strictly speaking, does not exactly involve representing the desired object “as 
that which ought to be” (Lauria, Massin, this volume) nor “as good.” These are 
descriptions that are best suited for the rich inferential and fine-grained 
relations between mental contents, but they are not entirely suitable to exactly 
capture the nature of non-cognitive mental force and desirous experience. In any 
case, these are really minor details (and there is thus, for example, a great deal 
of overlap between the position advocated here and the view defended by 
Lauria, this volume). The main point I am making is that the pro-attitudinal 
character of desire—that which allows desire’s role in rationalization—should be 
understood in terms of non-cognitive mental force, which in turn should be 
explicated in terms of a distinctive kind of desirous experience. Whether this 
pro-attitudinal character should then be understood as purely evaluative or 
purely deontic or, as I would maintain, as containing elements of both is 
interesting but of secondary importance.
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(28.) This brings out a stark contrast to the position defended by Döring and 
Eker this volume. Both Döring and Eker and I agree that desires can rationalize 
action without these desires necessarily involving any conscious episode when 
the desire motivates action. However, whereas Döring and Eker infer that no 
conscious episode can be essential to the rationalizing the power of desire, the 
present argument holds that (non-conscious) desires can rationalize action only 
because they are linked in the right way to episodes of desirous consciousness; 
their rationalizing unfolds against the background idea of the agent being in a 
state that relates the agent in the appropriate way to seeing the desired state in 
a certain light. (Döring and Eker also argue that because an agent need not 
endorse any desirous experience of an object, no such experience can rationalize 
an action. However, this objection seems to conflate minimal rationalization with 
some more demanding notion of rationalization). See also Lauria (this volume) 
for a closely related view about desires.
(29.) Cf. Nagel 1978; Schueler 1995.
(30.) This assumes that the motivational power of desire is mediated by its 
evaluative dimension, that is, that desire disposes an agent to act in ways 
believed to promote the desired end because of the positive light in which the 
desired end is presented to the agent. This view has a number of benefits: it fits 
well with the intuition that we try to get what we desire because of the way the 
object of our desire is presented to us; it can vindicate the intuition that in 
acting on the basis of desire, agents can be guided by and display minimal 
rationality; it makes sense of the idea that the more alluring the desired end 
appears to the agent, the greater desire’s motivational impact; and so forth. In 
addition, Humeans have another strong reason for thinking that the motivational 
power of desire is mediated by its evaluative dimension. For suppose instead 
that desire’s motivational power were independent of its evaluative dimension. 
Then we might ask: Why should it not be possible for a cognitive state to have 
this motivational power as well?
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Notes:
(1.) Cf. Armstrong 1968; Smith 1994; Stalnaker 1987.
(2.) Quinn 1993. See also Dancy 2000; Scanlon 1998; Raz 2001. Though see 
Döring and Eker (this volume) for a dissenting view.
(3.) No claim is being made about what an agent has reason to do or about what 
would be more than minimally rational for the agent to do.
(4.) In particular we will be at a loss to explain this if we assume that desiring p 
involves nothing but a disposition to act in ways designed to realize p. For why 
should the mere fact that one was disposed to move in a certain direction make 
it at all rational to do so?
(5.) E.g. Anscombe 1976; Dancy 2000; Quinn 1993; Raz 2001. See also Oddie, 
Döring and Eker (this volume) for critical discussions of this view. See Gregory 
(this volume) for a defense of the related position that for an agent to desire p is 
for the agent to believe that she has a normative reason to promote p.
(6.) Those who are convinced that desires entail evaluative beliefs are unlikely to 
be swayed by such examples. They will insist that people who deny that there is 
anything good about p and who assert that p is not good in any way still also 
believe that p is good if they desire that p; that someone desires p is all the 
evidence one needs to know that she also believes that p is good. That a theory 
commits one to ascribing beliefs to agents that they explicitly disavow, however, 
is a cost we should strive to avoid. All other things being equal, if an alternative 
theory could explain the evaluative dimension of desire without incurring such 
costs, then we should prefer this alternative theory.
(7.) See also Döring and Eker this volume. Though see Gregory (this volume) for 
a dissenting view.
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(8.) Notice too that it is not enough to argue that animals or toddlers can believe 
that securing the object of their desire will be pleasant. I can believe that 
something is pleasant without thereby believing that there are reasons for 
people to desire or promote it. To believe that there are reasons for people to 
desire something, for example, requires some kind of understanding of other 
people as agents that can be swayed by reasons as well as some ability to be 
guided by reasons oneself. Neither this understanding nor this ability seems to 
be present in, say, infants. (I thus disagree with Gregory’s deflationary claim that 
“seeing an action as being called for in some respect”—something I would agree 
is part of desiring and will try to elucidate in section IV—is the same as believing 
that there is a reason to perform the action (Gregory this volume). Nonetheless, 
as any parent can attest, infants can surely still desire things.
(9.) This is not to deny that desire is subject to various norms—e.g. moral and 
prudential norms. It is only to point out that it is not subject to the norm of truth, 
that there are, as one may also put it, strictly speaking no correctness conditions 
for desire.
(10.) It might be said that desiring the evaluatively neutral does not fall short of 
an inbuilt standard because desires invest their objects with significance for the 
good of the agent. In virtue of desire the (hitherto evaluatively neutral) desired 
state acquires value for the agent; the agent will be better off if the desired state 
comes to obtain. I want to stay clear of the question if desire can invest its 
objects with significance for the good of the agent and only point out that it is 
implausible to suppose that desire satisfaction always makes an agent better off. 
For example, it seems implausible to suggest that there being flowers on one’s 
grave makes one better off. (But doesn’t even this kind of desire lend some 
comfort to the agent and is thus at least to some extent good for the agent? 
Perhaps, but in order to avoid the objection it needs to be shown that the desired 
end is good, not that having the desire is good.). Yet even in these cases, in 
having these desires one is not falling short of an inbuilt standard. (Note too that 
this argument does not rely on the view that an agent’s life cannot be made 
better or worse after her death. It may even be that the satisfaction of desires 
that are suitably central to an agent’s life can affect an agent’s welfare after her 
death. The argument here only needs to highlight that it is implausible to think 
that the satisfaction of every desire—no matter its content or time of satisfaction
—adds to an agent’s welfare).
(11.) E.g. Stampe 1986; Oddie 2005, this volume. See also Döring and Eker, 
Lauria, Gregory (this volume) for further discussions of this view.
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(12.) Cf. Brentano 1902, 1911. While Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the 
mark of the mental has generated wide interest, his discussion of the present 
distinction has been mostly ignored in the contemporary literature (though see 
e.g. Lauria this volume for a related proposal. See also Deonna and Teroni 2012, 
whose interesting account of the nature of mental attitudes, though different in 
detail from the one presented here, can also be seen to be inspired by 
Brentano’s distinction between mental content and mental force).
(13.) We can enjoy things even if we believe that nothing has value. We can also 
enjoy things that we believe are bad. Indeed, we can even believe that the 
pleasure we derive from enjoying these things is itself bad. What is more, even 
cognitively quite simple animals seem capable of pleasure. At the same time, 
these animals seem to lack the requisite degree of cognitive sophistication to be 
able to hold evaluative beliefs. While an account in terms of evaluative 
perceptions would avoid these objections, it would still entail that liking or 
taking pleasure in something is subject to the norm of truth. This is quite 
implausible indeed. One does not fall short of any inbuilt standard if one takes 
pleasure in something evaluatively neutral (e.g. the wall being red).
(14.) Sidgwick 1981: 127. See also Alston 1967b; Broad 1962; Feldman 1997; 
Parfit 1987.
(15.) See also Broad 1962; Schlick 2002. Moore (1988: 13), another eminent 
proponent of an account of hedonic phenomena in terms of conscious 
experience, was less careful, at one point even writing that “it is enough for us 
to know that ‘pleased’ does mean ‘having the sensation of pleasure.’ ” Part of the 
problem may lie in the common but flawed assumption that pleasure and pain 
are opposites (for critical discussion see McCloskey 1971; Penelhum 1957; Trigg 
1970).
(16.) To be more precise, there are good reasons to think that hedonic 
experiences involve at least two kinds of distinctive feeling tones: a feeling tone 
distinctive of positive hedonic experiences and a feeling tone distinctive of 
negative hedonic experiences. (Some may argue that fine-grained distinctions 
can and should be made. I remain neutral on this point.)
(17.) Note that saying that a pleasant experience is intrinsically valuable 
(valuable in and of itself) is distinct from claiming that it is necessarily valuable 
(valuable in all possible contexts).
Desire, Mental Force and Desirous Experience
Page 26 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
(18.) It is not good enough to argue that we desire pleasant experiences and that 
this explains their ethical significance. Pleasant experiences would be of ethical 
significance even if they would not be desired (e.g. even if the creature lacked 
the ability to desire. See below for the argument that this is possible). But note 
too that in any case this option isn’t open for most critics of the view that 
pleasure is a feeling, as they also deny that desire has any ethical significance 
(e.g. Feldman 1997; Parfit 1997).
(19.) See Alston (1967a), Armstrong (1968), and Sidgwick (1981) for the first 
kind of analysis. See Heathwood (2006) and Schroeder (2004) for the second 
kind of analysis.
(20.) See also Döring and Eker, Oddie, Massin, Lauria (this volume) for 
discussion of the related claim that one cannot desire that which one believes to 
be the case.
(21.) Feldman 1997. See also Broad 1962; Trigg 1970.
(22.) See e.g. Anscombe 1976; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996; Dancy 2000; 
Kenny 1963; McGinn 1997; Ryle 1984; Shoemaker 1980; Smith 1994. See also 
Döring and Eker this volume.
(23.) Or consider being afraid of death. One can have this fear even when one is 
asleep and not subject to any conscious episode. Yet from this it does not follow 
that there is no distinctive phenomenology of fear.
(24.) To be more precise, analyzing desire in terms of hedonic states has 
commonly been attempted. Often, but not always, this attempt has been carried 
out via an explication of desirous experience. For some proponents of hedonic 
accounts of desire or desirous experience see Duncker 1941; Ehrenfels 1982; 
Ewing 1944, 1953; Fehige 2001; Hobbes 1994; Locke 1975; Mill 1991; Moore 
1988; Schlick 2002; Strawson 1994. For an illuminating historical overview see 
Fehige 2005.
(25.) As I have argued, hedonic states are simpler than desire inasmuch as 
desire requires (but hedonic states do not) the capacity to conceive of a gap 
between the way the world is and how it could be. This also poses a problem for 
any position that holds that a hedonic state is sufficient for desire or desirous 
experience.
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(26.) There is also something theoretically odd about the attempt to understand 
desire in terms of displeasure, because desire is a pro-attitude, whereas 
displeasure is a con-attitude. The response that a con-attitude toward a 
proposition is the same as a pro-attitude toward its negation isn’t convincing 
either. Taking pleasure in something is not the same as taking displeasure in its 
absence or negation, and these states do not necessitate each other. I can enjoy 
a movie without finding not watching the movie displeasurable. I can take 
displeasure in the thought of an accident without taking pleasure in the thought 
of there being no accident. See also Massin this volume.
(27.) Massin (this volume) and Lauria (this volume) distinguish between 
evaluative and deontic theories of desire. Given this distinction, my discussion 
may seem confused. While I speak of providing an account of the evaluative 
dimension of desire, I seem to end up with an account that falls into the deontic 
camp. Now while I do not deny that the realm of values can be distinguished 
from the realm of reasons, requirements, and norms, and while I also do not 
deny that there is a difference between evaluative beliefs and normative beliefs, 
I am not sure that this distinction is fruitfully applied to the case of non-cognitive 
mental force and desirous experience. Thus, I would say that desirous 
experience is both related to normative claims and to evaluative claims and that 
it, strictly speaking, does not exactly involve representing the desired object “as 
that which ought to be” (Lauria, Massin, this volume) nor “as good.” These are 
descriptions that are best suited for the rich inferential and fine-grained 
relations between mental contents, but they are not entirely suitable to exactly 
capture the nature of non-cognitive mental force and desirous experience. In any 
case, these are really minor details (and there is thus, for example, a great deal 
of overlap between the position advocated here and the view defended by 
Lauria, this volume). The main point I am making is that the pro-attitudinal 
character of desire—that which allows desire’s role in rationalization—should be 
understood in terms of non-cognitive mental force, which in turn should be 
explicated in terms of a distinctive kind of desirous experience. Whether this 
pro-attitudinal character should then be understood as purely evaluative or 
purely deontic or, as I would maintain, as containing elements of both is 
interesting but of secondary importance.
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(28.) This brings out a stark contrast to the position defended by Döring and 
Eker this volume. Both Döring and Eker and I agree that desires can rationalize 
action without these desires necessarily involving any conscious episode when 
the desire motivates action. However, whereas Döring and Eker infer that no 
conscious episode can be essential to the rationalizing the power of desire, the 
present argument holds that (non-conscious) desires can rationalize action only 
because they are linked in the right way to episodes of desirous consciousness; 
their rationalizing unfolds against the background idea of the agent being in a 
state that relates the agent in the appropriate way to seeing the desired state in 
a certain light. (Döring and Eker also argue that because an agent need not 
endorse any desirous experience of an object, no such experience can rationalize 
an action. However, this objection seems to conflate minimal rationalization with 
some more demanding notion of rationalization). See also Lauria (this volume)
for a closely related view about desires.
(29.) Cf. Nagel 1978; Schueler 1995.
(30.) This assumes that the motivational power of desire is mediated by its 
evaluative dimension, that is, that desire disposes an agent to act in ways 
believed to promote the desired end because of the positive light in which the 
desired end is presented to the agent. This view has a number of benefits: it fits 
well with the intuition that we try to get what we desire because of the way the 
object of our desire is presented to us; it can vindicate the intuition that in 
acting on the basis of desire, agents can be guided by and display minimal 
rationality; it makes sense of the idea that the more alluring the desired end 
appears to the agent, the greater desire’s motivational impact; and so forth. In 
addition, Humeans have another strong reason for thinking that the motivational 
power of desire is mediated by its evaluative dimension. For suppose instead 
that desire’s motivational power were independent of its evaluative dimension. 
Then we might ask: Why should it not be possible for a cognitive state to have 
this motivational power as well?
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Abstract and Keywords
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, 
positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in 
many philosophical circles. This essay argues that evaluativism, in both its 
doxastic and its perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterizes the 
connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism 
implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its 
object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude 
whatsoever toward its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot 
even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that 
evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory 
is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the 
explanation of action, yet in fact it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing 
with the relevant puzzle.
Keywords:   guise of the good, standing vs. occurrent desires, desire as belief, perceptual view of 
desire, motivational view of desire, dispositions, Radioman, Quinn, direction of fit, practical rationality
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Few would deny that our desires and our evaluations are closely linked. 
Normally, we desire to achieve or promote the things that we value. Beyond that, 
it is often the case that our desires lead us to evaluate things one way or another 
and that our evaluations, in turn, give rise to novel desires. Suppose, for 
instance, that you are looking for a new car and desire one with an especially 
large boot. This will surely have an impact on how you evaluate the alternatives 
you have. Or suppose you evaluate a movie very positively. This might produce a 
desire in you to see it again. It thus seems plausible that desires and evaluations 
do interact in a significant and thoroughgoing way. This much is, we take it, 
uncontroversial. However, one could advance a much more ambitious thesis 
about the extent and nature of this patent interaction. One could claim, in 
particular, that there is a necessary link between desires and positive evaluations 
because desires just are, or at least necessarily involve, evaluations of their 
object as good—one can desire something only sub specie boni, that is, under the 
guise of the good, as Scholastic philosophers used to put it.1 We shall call this 
view evaluativism about desire.
Let us clarify somewhat how we understand the key evaluativist idea—for talk of 
“necessary involvement” is a bit too vague even for our purposes. We shall 
assume that the claim that desires involve evaluations as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity implies that token desires ontologically  (p.80) depend 
on token evaluations. More precisely, we shall assume that the basic evaluativist 
thesis implies, at a minimum, the following:
(ME) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, if, at t, a
desires that p, then, at t, a evaluates p positively (as good).2
(ME) rules out that an agent can have some token desire that p at some specific 
time, while not evaluating p positively (whatever that amounts to) at that time. 
(ME) is relatively weak, because it is silent about whether desires essentially
depend on corresponding positive evaluations, whether positive evaluations are 
part of the essence of corresponding desires. Note, however, that (ME) is 
stronger than some sort of generic dependence claim according to which, 
roughly, any token desire necessitates some evaluation or other in general but 
none in particular. We shall also assume that the core evaluativist claim is not 
simply a claim about the ontogeny of token desires to the effect that any token 
desire that p is formed or acquired on the basis of a token positive evaluation of 
p, even though the desire that p can persist without the positive evaluation of p. 
(ME) defines a permanent rigid existential dependence and not merely a past
one; thus it commits the evaluativist to something stronger than a merely 
ontogenic claim.3
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Evaluativism is a popular view in contemporary theorizing about desire, and 
versions of it have been endorsed by a number of philosophers.4 Our aim in this 
paper is to argue that evaluativism about desire overstates and mischaracterizes 
the connection between desires and evaluations. We begin section 2 by laying 
some preliminary groundwork that will be useful for the discussion to come. 
Section 3 concentrates on the typical motivation for evaluativism: a well-known 
worry about the role desires are supposed to play in the explanation of 
intentional action. We then discuss in sections 4 and 5 the two main varieties of 
evaluativism and demonstrate why neither of them can establish a plausible 
account of desire. Finally, in section 6, we argue that one can handle the worry 
discussed in section 3 without appealing to any kind of evaluativism and that the 
basic idea behind evaluativism is therefore not even well-motivated in the first 
place.
2. Desire: Some Preliminaries
Desire is sometimes used by philosophers as a generic term for many different 
conative states (or “pro-attitudes,” as they are also called), referring to as 
diverse mental phenomena as wishes, hopes, intentions, appetites,  (p.81) 
preferences, urges, cravings, and longings.5 Of course, such imprecision can be 
observed in everyday discourse as well. It is clear that desires, properly so 
called, should be carefully distinguished from these other conative attitudes, but 
we are not interested in taking on this very general task here.6 Instead, we shall 
simply assume that the intuitive distinction between desires and the other 
conative states is not too obscure.
It is a platitude that desires are intentional mental states: a desire is always 
directed at something, it is always a desire for something. So one basic question 
about the nature of desire is what sort of things a desire can be directed at. Most 
philosophers agree that desires are propositional attitudes; they think that 
having a desire is a matter of having some specific mental attitude with a 
propositional content that represents or expresses some state of affairs.7 To be 
sure, in many contexts, desire reports with transitive verbs or to infinitive 
phrases (“I want a nice cold beer” or “I want to drink a nice cold beer”) sound 
more natural than the corresponding construction with an explicit that clause (“I 
want that I drink a nice cold beer”). Still, we shall assume that the former two 
forms are elliptical for the latter. So when you want a nice cold beer, what your 
desire is really directed at is not a nice cold beer per se but rather the state of 
affairs that you drink a nice cold beer.8 Note that the assumption that desires 
are propositional attitudes does not imply anything substantial about what it is 
for a person to have such an attitude. It is not our purpose here to give a fully 
developed answer to that latter question, but the following discussion will 
roughly indicate the kind of answer we favor.
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Our ordinary notion of desire is not just ambiguous between different sorts of 
conative attitudes but also fails to discriminate between mental phenomena that 
are, in fact, ontologically distinct. However one separates desires from other 
conative attitudes, a distinction remains to be made between standing and 
occurrent desires.9 You probably desire, like most people, to live a long and 
healthy life. This desire will play a role in the explanation of several other 
elements of your psychology as well as some of your actions (your intention to 
lose weight or attempts at quitting smoking, for instance). However, presumably, 
the desire rarely, if ever, occupies your consciousness. Still, you have it not only 
on those rare occasions when you undergo a conscious experience of desiring to 
live a long and healthy life but also when your conscious attention is drawn 
elsewhere. Indeed, you have it even when you temporarily lose consciousness, 
when you are dreamlessly sleeping, for instance; you do not cease to desire to 
live a healthy life just because you fell asleep watching television and then 
acquire this desire once again when you wake up.
 (p.82) The desire to live a long and healthy life, which we can attribute to 
many people and suppose them to have it incessantly over very long periods of 
time, is a standing desire. Now contrast this with the following case. You are 
walking home from work, and you see a woman with her two daughters on the 
street. They remind you of your nieces who live in a different country, and you 
suddenly feel a strong desire to be with them. As you continue walking, you start 
to think about visiting them during the upcoming Christmas, trying to figure out 
how long the flight would take. The desire to be with your nieces that you felt 
(and that led you to think about the flight) is an occurrent desire, a 
phenomenally conscious mental episode. It is of course very plausible to think 
that you have a standing desire to be with your nieces as well (which would also 
explain, at least in this particular case, why the sight of the children led you to 
have the relevant occurrent desire), but this is importantly distinct from the 
occurrent desire you have just had.10 If you have the standing desire to be with 
your nieces, you probably had it well before you saw the children, and you 
continue to have it even as you are making travel plans. Your occurrent desire, 
by contrast, came into existence right after you saw the children and ceased to 
exist once your attention was directed away from your nieces and you started 
thinking about the duration of the flight.
Standing desires and occurrent desires belong to fundamentally different 
ontological categories.11 Your occurrent desire to be with your nieces is 
something that happens—it is an occurrence, a mental event that takes up a 
certain (typically short) amount of time. By contrast, your standing desire to live 
a long and healthy life neither happens nor occurs; rather, it is a mental state of 
yours that consists in your instantiating a certain mental property (however 
complex). You may of course be in this state over a very long period of time, 
which means that standing desires can persist through time (as they typically 
do). Unlike occurrent desires, however, they do not unfold over time.12
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An occurrent desire is, as already indicated, a phenomenally conscious episode 
of desiring; there is something it is like having this sort of experience.13
Standing desires, by contrast, are not phenomenally conscious phenomena. Of 
course, it is possible for you to be conscious of your standing desire that p (or to 
be conscious that you desire that p), in the sense of consciously “monitoring” 
your standing desire that p, but although this does not require an occurrent 
desire that p, it does require an occurrent, conscious thought (or judgment) that 
you desire that p.14 It is also possible for your standing desire that p to “surface” 
in your consciousness.15 Yet this does not mean that, when this happens, your 
standing desire somehow  (p.83) transforms itself into a phenomenally 
conscious attitude (and then back into an unconscious one, when its 
“manifestation” is over); it means only that you experience an occurrent desire 
that has the same content as your standing desire. However, as already noted, 
the occurrent desire that p is not simply the conscious version of the standing 
desire that p; that is, it is not simply the standing desire that p plus 
consciousness.16
So standing desires are not phenomenally conscious mental events. What exactly 
are they, then? Here we cannot offer more than a very rough answer, though one 
that is located within a familiar theoretical framework. On our view, standing 
desire is a dispositional profile of a distinctive kind (let us call this the 
desiderative dispositional profile); accordingly, having some standing desire that 
p consists in having some specific dispositional profile of that distinctive kind.17
We shall not attempt here to give a full characterization of the desiderative 
dispositional profile that we identify with standing desire; we shall, however, 
briefly address some features of it that we take to be crucial.18
The core idea behind dispositionalism about standing attitudes is that the fact 
that you now have some such attitude does not consist in what is now going on 
in your conscious mind but rather in the fact that you now have a complex 
disposition to act and/or react in certain ways under certain circumstances. 
What sorts of disposition might having a standing desire involve? One very 
widespread thought is that desiring that p necessarily involves an inclination to 
act in ways that one takes to be conducive to the realization of p. We can spell 
out this idea a bit more formally as follows:
(D1) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, and any act 
type φ, if, at t, a desires that p, then a is disposed at t to φ in circumstances 
where a takes19 her φ-ing to be conducive to p’s being the case.20
We think that (D1) is true: the sort of multitrack disposition it specifies is partly 
constitutive of any desiderative dispositional profile. We shall elaborate on a few 
points in order to make clear what our endorsement of (D1) does and does not 
imply.
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First, we do not think that having the kind of disposition specified in (D1) is 
sufficient for having a standing desire—our claim is merely that it is necessary 
for it. There are other dispositions that are plausibly typical, though perhaps 
optional, elements of particular desiderative profiles. Moreover, there might be 
other necessary components of the desiderative dispositional profile.21 Second, 
we take “act type φ” in (D1) to refer not  (p.84) just to overt bodily actions but 
also to speech acts as well as mental acts.22 Given these two caveats, it should 
be clear that (D1) does not commit us to what is sometimes called “the 
motivational/action-based theory” of desire; the dispositionalism we favor does 
not focus exclusively on dispositions to engage in observable overt behavior and 
is openly “holistic” in spirit.23
Some philosophers oppose the idea that a desire that p necessarily disposes one 
to act in ways one takes to be conducive to p’s being the case; they think that 
cases where a person (allegedly) desires something that is (logically, 
metaphysically, or merely nomologically) impossible for her to bring about by 
doing something constitute counterexamples to (D1).24 It will be instructive to 
address this issue at some length, because this will allow us to introduce two 
further crucial features of desire.
Timothy Schroeder has us imagine a mathematician in Ancient Greece (let us 
call him Pythagoras) who does not know the value of π but (allegedly) has a 
strong desire that it turn out to be an irrational number (which it already is).25
There is nothing Pythagoras could do to determine the value of π, and he himself 
does not believe there is. So he has a desire, despite not being disposed to do 
anything, or so the argument seems to go.
Galen Strawson presents a scenario that is quite a bit more fanciful:
The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. They 
are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted to the ground, 
profoundly interested in the local weather. They have sensations, thoughts, 
emotions, beliefs, desires. They possess a conception of an objective, 
spatial world. But they are constitutionally incapable of any sort of 
behavior… . They lack the necessary physiology. Their mental lives have no 
other-observable effects. They are not even disposed to behave in any 
way.26
Strawson imagines that the Weather Watchers are also incapable of performing 
any mental acts: although they can passively experience many different sorts of 
mental episodes, they cannot actively initiate them. They are also under no 
illusion that they can change the weather. Strawson claims that these beings can 
have desires that the weather be this or that way, although they are not disposed 
to act in any way.27
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Our diagnosis will eventually be that neither Pythagoras nor the Weather 
Watchers, as they are described originally, have the relevant desires. The 
important point is, however, that this is not so because they fail (D1): they can
have the relevant dispositions all right, but it is still wrong to say that they have 
the relevant desires.
 (p.85) Let us first focus on the case of Pythagoras, who, we are told, desires π 
to be an irrational number and believes that there is nothing he can do to 
contribute to that result. The question is whether, for any φ, he is now disposed 
to φ in circumstances where he comes to think that his φ-ing is conducive to π’s 
being an irrational number. Any such thought would be incorrect, of course, but 
that is not to the point; what matters is only whether Pythagoras would φ, 
ceteris paribus, if he came to form some such thought, and we see no reason to 
think that he would not. We will argue in what follows that Pythagoras should 
not be described as having a desire, but assuming that he has one, there is no 
reason to think that he fails (D1).
To be fair, Schroeder presents this argument against a much cruder rendering of 
the idea that desires necessarily involve dispositions to act and then concedes 
that a more refined formulation of it, which is more similar to our (D1), would 
not be affected by cases like this. However, he believes that such more refined 
versions would still be vulnerable to counterexamples of the following kind:
Suppose I desire that a committee make up its mind in my favor without 
my intervention. This is a state of affairs I might want very much, yet 
because of the very nature of the desire it makes no sense to try to act as 
to satisfy it. What I want is that the committee make a certain decision 
without my needing to do anything.28
We fail to see how this is supposed to constitute a counterexample to (D1), 
however. It is simply false that your desire that a committee decides in your 
favor without any interference on your part is not satisfiable through any
agential contribution of yours. If you have that desire, then there will be (under 
normal circumstances) plenty of actions that you take to count as interfering 
with the committee’s decision process, and you will also think that refraining 
from performing them is conducive to satisfying your desire. (D1) predicts, 
correctly, that if you desire that the committee decides in your favor without 
your intervention, you will be disposed to refrain from performing any acts that 
you regard as interfering. Besides, this desire will involve not just dispositions to 
“perform” intentional omissions but also dispositions to perform “positive” 
actions. Suppose that it came to your attention that your uncle, who is a 
particularly well-connected individual, heard about the committee and is going 
to make some phone calls to increase your chances. (D1) predicts, again 
correctly, that, given your desire, you would, ceteris paribus, ask your uncle not 
to intervene in any way.29
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 (p.86) The case of the Weather Watchers is certainly more complicated. First, it 
is not clear whether these creatures are even capable of taking their 
performance of some act to be conducive to fulfilling their desires; they might 
simply lack the cognitive resources to form such thoughts, to represent 
themselves as acting.30 But even if they could, they would not act in any way, 
simply because they are “constitutionally” incapable of acting.31 This sort of 
inability to act would certainly be ruled out by the ceteris paribus clause in (D1); 
that is, a general ability to act is one of the things that have to be equal for the 
disposition to manifest.32 So the question is, in any case, whether we can ascribe 
to the Weather Watchers dispositions to act in certain ways that cannot possibly 
manifest—that is, unmanifestable dispositions.33 We think that we can and 
should, and here is why.
Since we employ (though are not committed to) the conditional analysis here, 
the issue can be framed in terms of counterpossible conditionals, that is, 
conditionals with impossible antecedents. Now, according to the standard Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics, all counterpossible conditionals are trivially true.34 But if 
there are to be any non-trivial unmanifestable dispositions, some 
counterpossibles must have non-trivial truth values. We reject the triviality of 
counterpossibles in general, but we shall illustrate this point with a specific 
example that is more relevant to the discussion here.35 Suppose that Wendy the 
Weather Watcher has a very strong conative attitude toward there being a snow 
shower; in fact, this is the only positive conative attitude she has.36 By contrast, 
she feels positively averse to there being a rain shower. We think that Wendy 
now has a disposition to make herself visually imagine a snow shower in 
circumstances where she thinks her imagining a snow shower is conducive to 
there being a snow shower and she is capable of making herself imagine 
something. Accordingly, we think that the following counterpossible is non-
trivially true:
(W1) If Wendy were to think that her imagining a snow shower is 
conducive to there being a snow shower, and if she were capable of making 
herself imagine something, she would make herself imagine a snow 
shower, ceteris paribus.
To see why it makes sense to think that (W1) is non-trivially true, contrast it with 
another counterpossible about Wendy:
(W2) If Wendy were to think that her imagining a rain shower is conducive 
to there being a rain shower, and if she were capable of making herself  (p.
87) imagine something, she would make herself imagine a rain shower, 
ceteris paribus.
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Given what we know about Wendy’s current psychology, (W2), unlike (W1), 
seems clearly and non-trivially false, even though the antecedents of both (W1) 
and (W2) are necessarily false, as, ex hypothesi, Wendy cannot make herself 
imagine anything.37 Wendy may be necessarily incapable of acting, but this does 
not, by itself, suffice to trivialize all of the truths about how she would behave in 
certain conditions that are impossible to obtain; given her present conative 
states, she would act only in certain specific ways, and not others, if she were, 
per impossibile, capable of acting.38
The upshot of this is that an agent can be inclined to act in a certain way under 
certain circumstances, even if she is necessarily incapable of acting in that (or 
any) way; the incapability in question may necessarily prevent the inclination 
from manifesting without completely extinguishing it.39 What make (W1) non-
trivially true and (W2) non-trivially false are certain facts about Wendy’s current 
conative psychology, the unmanifestable dispositions she now has or lacks.40
But if the Weather Watchers can have dispositions to act despite their 
incapability of acting, and thus can in principle satisfy (D1), why do we still insist 
that they do not have any desires? The reason is that their situation, as 
described by Strawson, seems to conflict with another necessary constraint on 
desire:
(D2) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, if, at t, a
desires that p, then there is at least one act type φ such that, at t, a does 
not think her φ-ing not to be conducive to p’s being the case.
Notice how weak a constraint (D2) introduces: (D2) does not require that, in 
order to have a desire at all, one must think that there is some act type such that 
one’s performing it is conducive to satisfying one’s desire. You can desire that p
even if you do not think of any particular act that it will be conducive to p’s 
being the case, and this is perfectly compatible with (D2). (D2) merely rules out 
that you can desire that p, while thinking that nothing you could do in any 
possible situation would be conducive to p’s being the case. You may be 
undecided whether any act on your part would contribute to satisfying some 
desire of yours, but you cannot be clear that nothing would make some such 
contribution.
Desires without Guises
Page 10 of 62
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
(D2) captures the familiar idea that the object of a desire must be taken by the 
person who has it to be “attainable, in the sense of being a possible  (p.88) 
future outcome.”41 Note also that (D2) does not apply to mere wishes and thus 
serves to distinguish them from desires.42 This is why we believe that both the 
Weather Watchers and Pythagoras are best described as having wishes rather 
than desires: they believe that nothing they could do would in any way 
contribute to satisfying their respective conative attitudes. Wishes involve an 
inclination to act in certain ways, just as desires do, yet the latter type of 
conative attitude is subject to further restrictions, such as (D2).43
The thought that the object of a desire must be regarded as an attainable, 
possible future outcome by the person who has it has a further implication that 
we would like to briefly clarify:
(D3) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, if, at t, a
desires that p, then, at t, a does not think p already to be the case.44
(D3) is compatible with one’s being undecided about whether p is the case, while 
desiring that p; it only rules out that one can desire that p, while clearly thinking 
that p already is the case. For if you think that p already is the case, then you 
cannot even be undecided about whether some act of yours is conducive to p’s 
being the case; nothing can be conducive (in the relevant sense) to p’s being the 
case if p already is the case.45 Thus, you cannot desire something you take to 
already obtain. So (D2) entails (D3), but the converse entailment does not hold: 
(D3) applies to wishes as well, for instance, whereas (D2) does not.46
This concludes our preliminary discussion of certain key features of desires. In 
what follows, we shall take for granted the admittedly rough picture outlined in 
this section. It will prove useful to take a closer look at the principal motivation 
for evaluativism in the next section, before we go on to critically examine the 
two main variants of it.
3. Motivating Evaluativism
Why think that evaluativism about desire is true? The view is typically motivated 
by focusing on the issue of the explanation of intentional action.47 Actions are 
usually understood as belonging to the ontological category of events, though 
they are clearly not just any old event. An action is not something that simply 
happens to the agent but rather something that is performed by the agent. 
Moreover, intentional action makes up a special subclass of behavior performed 
by an agent. Involuntary reflex movements, for instance, are certainly not 
intentional actions. Intentional  (p.89) actions are purposeful and goal-oriented: 
they are performed with a purpose in mind and some sense of how to achieve 
that purpose—they are, in short, actions performed for a reason.48
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This contrast is also reflected in the respective ways in which mere events or 
non-intentional behavior, on the one hand, and intentional actions, on the other 
hand, are supposed to be explained. When we pose a question of the form “Why 
did x happen?,” where x is an event that is not an action, the sort of explanation 
that is called for is a merely causal one. By contrast, questions of the form “Why 
did the agent φ?” are supposed to be answered, roughly, by citing the reason for 
which the agent φ-ed, by specifying what purpose she took her φ-ing to serve—
that is, by giving a teleological explanation.49
Teleological explanations of actions make reference to certain psychological 
states of the agent, and here desires are supposed to play a crucial role. This 
should hardly come as a surprise, since, as we have seen in section 2, desires 
necessarily involve practical inclinations, dispositions of an agent to act in 
certain specific ways under certain specific circumstances. When a desire 
figures in a correct teleological explanation of an agent’s φ-ing, the propositional 
content of her desire encodes what she seeks to bring about, the goal she 
pursues. When this picture is supplemented with the agent’s beliefs encoding 
information about possible ways of bringing about the desired outcome, we get a 
sense of what motivated her φ-ing, what led her to perform this particular 
action. The action is explained, in other words, not just as a mere effect of 
certain causal processes but essentially as the pursuit of a goal.50
A teleological explanation of an action, then, cites the agent’s propositional 
attitudes (some desire of hers, along with a means-end belief) in order to make 
sense of her overt behavior as the pursuit of a goal. Explaining actions in terms 
of reasons by appeal to certain elements of the agent’s psychological setup is 
commonly thought to have a further important implication: it rationalizes or 
subjectively justifies the action, at least in the minimal sense of making her 
behavior intelligible as the pursuit of a goal. Whether the action is objectively 
justified (relative to whatever system of norms), whether the reason for which 
the agent acted is in fact a good reason, is, of course, a different issue. The claim 
that someone φ-ed for a reason need not be genuinely normative: it does not 
necessarily entail that this person did what she has normative reason to do or 
ought to do.51 But once we understand the reason for which she acted, we can at 
least see what, from the agent’s perspective, counted in favor of performing the 
action, what the point of what she did was, at least in her eyes.
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 (p.90) This precisely is the point at which evaluativists typically launch their 
distinctive claim. They agree, first, that intentional action is action done for a 
reason and also that action done for a reason implies rationalization or 
subjective justification in the sense explained earlier. They then go on to argue, 
third, that the relevant sort of rationalization is not to be had if desires are 
understood as non-evaluative phenomena.52 An intentional action is motivated 
by a desire of the agent that encodes a goal, but if such behavior is to be 
considered rational (even in the aforementioned minimal sense), desires must, 
so the story goes, also involve an evaluation of that goal as something worth
pursuing. Here it is useful to consider Warren Quinn’s influential example of a 
man who feels an urge to turn on each and every radio he sees:
Suppose I am in a strange functional state that disposes me to turn on 
radios that I see to be turned off. Given the perception that a radio in my 
vicinity is off, I try, all other things being equal, to get it turned on. Does 
this state rationalize my choices? Told nothing more than this, one may 
certainly doubt that it does. But in the case I am imagining, this is all there 
is to the state. I do not turn the radios on in order to hear music or get 
news. It is not that I have an inordinate appetite for entertainment or 
information. Indeed, I do not turn them on in order to hear anything. My 
disposition is, I am supposing, basic rather than instrumental.53
Quinn then raises the question whether ascribing to the agent this bare 
disposition to turn on radios suffices to rationalize and render intelligible his 
behavior, and answers it negatively. This is not to simply deny that desires can 
minimally rationalize actions; but, Quinn maintains, they can only do so if they 
accommodate “some kind of evaluation of the desired object as good.”54 From 
this evaluativists draw the moral that Radioman has no genuine desire because 
he does not value turning radios on in any sense. They think the example shows 
that “we do not get a proper intentional explanation of an action, or even a 
proper motivating reason or desire, if we cannot understand how the agent saw 
the object of his desire or action as good in some way.”55
The basic idea behind evaluativism about desire and what typically motivates it 
should now be clear. There are two main versions of evaluativism, which differ in 
how they construe the evaluative element that desires are supposed to 
incorporate. We shall designate them as doxastic evaluativism and perceptual 
evaluativism. In the following two sections, we will discuss these two versions in 
turn. Some of the arguments we will  (p.91) present against them overlap, but 
these accounts are different enough to merit separate address.
4. Doxastic Evaluativism
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According to doxastic evaluativism, the desire that p either just is or, at least, 
necessarily involves the belief that p is good.56 Doxastic evaluativism is a radical 
view, as it runs counter to, and indeed threatens to collapse, the intuitive 
conceptual distinction between desires and beliefs as entirely disparate mental 
states (or, in Humean parlance, as ‘distinct existences’ without any necessary 
connections between them), either by identifying desires with evaluative beliefs 
or by establishing a necessary link between the two.57 This does not quite show 
that doxastic evaluativism is false, but given its radical consequences, it is 
particularly in need of a substantial defense.
One general worry about this variety of evaluativism is that the picture it 
presents seems “overintellectualizing” in the extreme. Desires are closely 
connected to goal-directed behavior, and while goal-directed behavior is clearly 
observed in creatures with psychological apparatus less complex than that of 
adult humans, conceptual evaluation seems to require a considerable degree of 
cognitive sophistication. We normally ascribe desires to many non-human 
animals as well as to human infants and toddlers, but, as many have noted, 
doxastic evaluativism appears to entail that only more mature humans who have 
a sufficient grasp of and competence with evaluative concepts can have desires. 
This is indeed very counterintuitive, for it seems perfectly sensible to think that 
a dog or a human infant can want to play ball, for instance, even if we would 
hesitate to say that a dog or an infant can have a fully fledged belief that playing 
ball is good.58
Some caution is advised in pressing this objection, however. First, the objection 
seems to presuppose both a particular (broadly Fregean) conception of 
propositional content and a particular (rather restrictive) understanding of what 
it takes for a creature to possess concepts or to have some mental attitude with 
propositional content. Second, it could be transformed into an objection against 
the much more general view that desires are propositional attitudes. For if 
propositional content is conceptual in general, and if non-human animals and 
human infants can have desires although they do not possess any concepts, then 
it might seem fundamentally misguided to understand desires as propositional 
attitudes.59 Still, it seems that doxastic evaluativism faces a particularly serious 
challenge  (p.92) here, because evaluative concepts are acquired in much later 
stages of cognitive development.60 Moreover, if standing desires and standing 
beliefs are to be analyzed in terms of dispositional profiles, then one could argue 
that, whereas the doxastic dispositional profile necessarily involves dispositions 
to perform certain mental and linguistic acts that require fairly complex 
conceptual capacities, the desiderative dispositional profile does not, which 
would explain why very young humans and many non-human animals can have a 
desiderative profile, while it is at least questionable that they can have a 
doxastic one.61
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Doxastic evaluativism has implausible implications even if we put aside this 
particular objection, however. First of all, it seems quite clear that the belief that
p is good does not suffice for desiring that p. Recall the constraint we called 
(D2): you cannot desire that p if you think that nothing you can do would be 
conducive to p’s being the case. But no constraint of this sort applies to 
evaluative beliefs; states of affairs that a person takes to be unattainable can 
very well be believed to be good by that person. Suppose that you have the 
evaluative belief that the state of affairs that Mozart lived until his late seventies 
and produced a host of great masterpieces after his forties is valuable. But this 
state of affairs cannot be the object of a desire of yours, even if it can be the 
object of a wish, given your belief that nothing you can do would contribute to 
prolonging Mozart’s life and/or boost his creativity.
Moreover, the objects of our evaluative beliefs are in most cases states of affairs 
that we think already obtain. However, as argued earlier, (D2) entails another 
constraint, namely (D3), that rules out desires directed at states of affairs that 
one takes to already obtain. Thus, while you can now believe that Obama’s being 
president is good, you cannot now desire (nor even wish, for that matter) 
Obama’s being president, because this is a state of affairs you already know to 
obtain (though you can, of course, desire that he remain in his post).
Yet quite apart from these two constraints on desire, it is in general implausible 
that belief in the goodness of that state of affairs implies that one desires it. 
Take, for example, Pollyanna, the famous diehard optimist. Suppose that she is 
falsely accused of stealing milk and, after an unfair trial process, is sentenced to 
six years in prison. Still, being a hopeless Pollyanna, she somehow manages to 
believe that it is good that she will be incarcerated (because, say, she will have 
plenty of time for reading). Does this mean that she genuinely wants to be sent 
to jail? Surely not. The same reasoning goes for less pathological cases of post 
hoc rationalization and occasional sugarcoating of prospective misery.62
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 (p.93) But even if an evaluative belief is clearly insufficient for a corresponding 
desire, it is perhaps necessary for it. It is difficult to see, however, why this 
should be the case. As both Michael Stocker and David Velleman point out, 
having “perverse” desires, that is, desiring some state of affairs that one 
believes to be bad in every respect, and even desiring it precisely because it is so 
bad, seems perfectly possible.63 Stocker and Velleman mention in their 
discussions quite exceptional cases (Milton’s Satan, agents who are depressive 
or self-destructive), but desiring something that you believe to be bad is possible 
even in more mundane, ordinary situations. Suppose that, at the beginning of a 
long business meeting with your colleagues, you suddenly remember a joke that 
a friend told you some time ago. You do not think there is anything good about 
telling the joke during the meeting; not only would it be generally inappropriate, 
but the joke would in fact be extremely offensive to some participants and is not 
even slightly funny. Still, it seems possible that you desire to tell it, even if that 
desire is fortunately too weak to actually influence your behavior.
Doxastic evaluativism is incompatible not only with cases in which a person 
desires p while believing p to be bad in every respect, but also with cases in 
which a person desires p but does not have any opinion about the value of p, 
either because she has not considered it or because, having considered it, she 
suspends (or withholds) judgment about it. Let us focus first on cases of the 
former sort, which we believe are ubiquitous: the vast majority of our everyday 
desires are such that we just have not even considered the value of their object 
and formed an opinion about it. This becomes especially salient when one 
considers extrinsic (or instrumental) desires. Suppose that Thomas is reading 
this paper. He plans to have a short break in about an hour and desires to go to 
the kitchen to brew some coffee. Is it really plausible to say that Thomas now 
literally believes that going to the kitchen in fifteen minutes is (instrumentally) 
good? Fair enough; we can plausibly ascribe to Thomas the means-end belief 
that he can brew coffee by going to the kitchen, but the belief that φ-ing is a 
means of bringing it about that p is not the same as the belief that φ-ing is 
instrumentally valuable; thinking of φ-ing as conducive to the obtaining of some 
state of affairs is one thing, and thinking of it as promoting something valuable 
is quite another.
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It might be thought that we can also ascribe to Thomas the disposition to believe
that going to the kitchen is (instrumentally) good: the disposition to take this 
standing attitude or, perhaps, the disposition to have an occurrent belief (a 
conscious thought) to that effect. We can imagine that these dispositions would 
manifest (so Thomas would form the standing  (p.94) or the occurrent belief 
that going to the kitchen is good), for instance, if he were asked what good he 
sees in going to the kitchen. These specific doxastic dispositions are, however, 
importantly distinct from the standing belief that going to the kitchen is 
(instrumentally) good, itself understood as a doxastic dispositional profile.64 You 
may, at t, have a mere disposition to form the standing belief that p, or a 
disposition to occurrently judge that p, without having, at t, the standing belief 
that p, without having the p-related doxastic dispositional profile, that is. Now 
we do not think that desiring p necessarily involves being disposed to believe 
that p is good, but even if this were true, doxastic evaluativism would not be any 
less wrong. Any version of doxastic evaluativism is committed to (ME), which 
rules out that one can, at t, desire that p, although one does not believe, at t, that
p is good. Suppose that, between t0 and t1, Thomas desires to go to the kitchen. 
During that time interval, he also has the disposition to form both the standing 
and the occurrent belief that going to the kitchen is good. It is perfectly possible 
that, although Thomas has those doxastic dispositions between t0 and t1, these 
dispositions do not manifest between t0 and t1. But if so, then during that period 
of time, Thomas has the desire that p, although he has neither a standing nor an 
occurrent belief that p. But this result is incompatible with any form of doxastic 
evaluativism.65
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Turn now to cases where a person desires that p yet does not believe that p is 
good because she is suspending judgment about the value of p.66 This can 
happen, for example, when one cannot form an opinion about the value of 
something that one desires in advance, before the state of affairs one’s desire is 
directed at actually obtains. Suppose that there is a new French film coming out. 
Pauline is a dedicated cinephile and a true fan of the classic art house movies. 
However, over the past few months, she has seen some recent French films that 
she regarded as appallingly pretentious and derivative. In the present case, she 
is very uncertain about what to expect. The film is a directorial debut, so there is 
no information on the director’s directing ability or style. She read conflicting 
reviews in the media: it is one of those controversial, love-or-hate kind of films 
that has already divided critics. For all she knows, in short, it could be a 
masterpiece or a complete fiasco. Being a true cinephile, she is curious, and she 
has a strong desire to watch the movie. Despite her curiosity, however, she 
knows very well that she will absolutely regret watching the movie if it turns out 
to be bad: she will not, for instance, feel any satisfaction at fulfilling her “duty” 
as a cinephile. So she wants to watch the movie and to find out whether it is any 
good, but, in her eyes, whether her watching it (and her finding out about its 
value) is good or bad depends entirely on the  (p.95) value of the movie itself, 
about which she has absolutely no idea right now. Therefore, she suspends 
judgment about the value of her watching it and her finding out about its value: 
if the movie turns out to be enjoyable, then she will regard her watching it as 
good; if, on the other hand, the movie turns out to be bad, she will regard her 
watching it as a terrible waste of time. Pauline’s case constitutes another 
counterexample to doxastic evaluativism: she wants to watch the movie and find 
out about its value at some specific time t, but she suspends judgment about the 
value of her watching the movie and her finding out about its value at that time.
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Here is a final worry about doxastic evaluativism: Consider once again Quinn’s 
Radioman. The evaluativist’s point has been that we cannot quite understand 
Radioman’s behavior unless we ascribe to him a positive evaluation of his 
pursued goal. Doxastic evaluativists interpret the required evaluation as an 
evaluative belief. Now, let us suppose that Radioman has the belief that turning 
on all the radios in his vicinity is intrinsically good. Our question is: Is there any 
sense in which Radioman’s action is even slightly more intelligible or less 
bizarre now that we imagine him as someone who thinks that turning radios on 
is a worthwhile activity in itself? We think not! Despite having ascribed to him 
the evaluative belief in question, we are still puzzled as to why he acts as he 
does; in fact, now that we assume him to be committed to the idea that turning 
radios on is intrinsically valuable, the case is even more perplexing, if anything. 
Note that we need to imagine Radioman as believing his goal to be valuable for 
its own sake; we cannot simply attribute to him the belief that turning radios on 
is good for listening to music, for instance, because Quinn explicitly stipulates 
that Radioman’s desire to turn on radios is intrinsic, not instrumental.67 It 
seems, then, that if Radioman’s intrinsic desire cannot provide a minimal 
rationalization for his action, neither can his belief that the object of that desire 
is intrinsically good: Quinn’s condition that Radioman’s desire is to be 
understood as non-instrumental already excludes from the case everything that 
could make the corresponding evaluative judgment intelligible and leaves us 
with the deeply puzzling belief that turning radios on is good for its own sake. It 
is therefore redundant to ascribe the relevant evaluative belief to Radioman, as 
this falls short of making the air of bizarreness surrounding his action disappear.
5. Perceptual Evaluativism
As we have seen, the doxastic route to evaluativism is not really viable. But 
perhaps the alleged evaluative dimension of desires could be modeled  (p.96) 
on perception instead. This indeed has been the strategy recently followed by 
many evaluativists.68 On such views, desires are generally conceived of as 
involving both a representational content and a rich phenomenal dimension, and 
sometimes they are understood as analogous to or even simply as a special kind 
of emotion.69 According to one currently predominant view, emotions are 
(analogous to) perceptions, though they differ from ordinary sensory perceptions 
in that their representational content is evaluative: to fear a lion is to experience 
it as fearsome or dangerous; to admire it is to experience it as admirable; and so 
forth.70 Despite (sometimes important) differences among them, perceptual 
evaluativists all share the core idea that, analogously, desiring p is a matter of 
p’s being experienced as good or seeming good. Thus, Dennis Stampe argues:
Desire is a kind of perception. One who wants it to be the case that p
perceives something that makes it seem to that person as if it would be 
good were it to be the case that p, and seem so in a way that is 
characteristic of perception. To desire something is to be in a kind of 
perceptual state, in which that thing seems good… .71
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A variation on this basic idea is found in Thomas Scanlon’s attention-based 
account of desire.72 According to Scanlon, “A person has a desire in the directed-
attention sense that P if the thought of P keeps occurring to him or her in a 
favorable light, that is to say, if the person’s attention is directed insistently 
toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of P.”73 One 
clear advantage of perceptual evaluativism over doxastic evaluativism is that the 
former, unlike the latter, does not require that a person who desires p have a 
fully fledged evaluative belief that p is good. What perceptual evaluativists 
demand is only that the state of affairs p seems good to this person. This allows 
them to avoid the “overintellectualizing” conception of agents’ psychology that 
doxastic versions of evaluativism seems to entail.74 However, there are a number 
of serious difficulties with this variety of evaluativism as well.
Perceptual evaluativists typically identify a person’s desiring p with p’s seeming 
good to that person.75 But the claim that something’s seeming good suffices for 
desiring it is just as implausible as its doxastic variant. To see this, we need only 
adjust and reapply the counterexamples from section 4. Suppose that you are 
confident that Obama is president, and also that nothing you could do would be 
conducive to Mozart’s leading a longer and more productive life than he actually 
did. When you think about these states of affairs, they may very well seem good 
to you; however,  (p.97) (D2) and (D3) rule out that you can desire them. 
Similarly, consider once again the case of Pollyanna, who, being a diehard 
optimist, may regard the time she will spend in prison as good, and her attention 
may be constantly directed toward considerations that seem to count in favor of 
her being incarcerated (to the prospect of having plenty of time for reading or 
writing her memoirs, for instance). Still, it is very implausible to conclude that 
Pollyanna genuinely desires to be sent to jail.
It thus seems that something’s appearing in a favorable light is not sufficient for 
desiring it. Is it at least necessary for it? Again, the arguments against doxastic 
evaluativism we presented earlier apply to perceptual evaluativism as well. 
Recall, for instance, the case of Pauline the cinephile. Pauline has a strong desire 
to watch the movie and find out about its value, yet when she thinks about 
watching the movie and finding out about its value, these states of affairs do not 
seem good to her—if her desire involves any evaluative experience at all, then, 
plausibly, it is an experience of those states of affairs’ seeming to her to be 
evaluatively ambivalent. Hence the case of Pauline constitutes a counterexample 
to the perceptual version of evaluativism as well.
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There is, however, a more pressing difficulty with perceptual evaluativism, a 
difficulty that reveals what is fundamentally wrong with this approach to desire. 
Recall the distinction between standing and occurrent desires. Here is how this 
distinction spells trouble for perceptual evaluativism. On the face of it, 
perceptual evaluativism seems applicable only to occurrent desires since it 
associates desire with some sort of conscious episode in which the desired 
object is experienced as good. So even if it is established that occurrently 
desiring p just is, or necessarily involves, experiencing p as good, this leaves it 
entirely open how standing desires are to be understood. Since the standing 
desire that p can be had even when you are not conscious at all, it can neither 
just be nor necessarily involve experiencing p as good. Therefore, perceptual 
evaluativism cannot pretend to be a general theory of desire; at best, it can 
account only for occurrent desires.76
To appreciate how severe this problem is, note that a huge number of the mental 
phenomena we normally call desires are standing desires, not occurrent ones. 
Besides, it is standing desires that take center stage in many debates in meta-
ethics and the philosophy of action. This is quite unsurprising, given that the 
vast majority of our intentional actions are not preceded by any occurrent 
desires but are rather motivated by our standing desires.77 So restricting the 
account to occurrent desires is not much of an option for the evaluativist, at 
least not within the context of the debate about the explanation of intentional 
action.
 (p.98) Can the perceptual evaluativist extend his analysis to standing desires? 
The perceptual evaluativist might propose that the standing desire that p
necessarily involves the disposition to occurrently desire that p, which, in turn, is 
identified with (or is taken to necessarily involve) experiencing p as good.78 It is 
plausible that dispositional profiles of the desiderative kind typically involve a 
disposition to have occurrent desires with the relevant content, though we do 
not think that such dispositions are necessary constituents of desiderative 
profiles. But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the standing desire 
that p necessarily involves the disposition to undergo experiences of occurrently 
desiring that p in circumstances where, for instance, one occurrently thinks 
about p and so on. Does this solve the perceptual evaluativist’s problem with 
standing desires? It does not, and to see why, consider once again the case of 
Thomas from section 4. Between t0 and t1, Thomas has the standing desire to go 
to the kitchen. We are supposing that, during this period, he also has the 
disposition to occurrently desire to go to the kitchen. However, this disposition 
might not manifest between t0 and t1, and if it does not, then Thomas has a 
standing desire between t0 and t1, without having any corresponding positive 
evaluation. But this is incompatible with (ME), to which any form of evaluativism 
is committed.79 So the perceptual evaluativist cannot account for standing 
desires simply by claiming that desiderative profiles necessarily involve a 
disposition to have corresponding occurrent desires.80
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Here is a further worry about perceptual evaluativism. As we have seen in 
section 3, the principal motivation for evaluativism is that desires cannot have 
the minimal justificatory function they are supposed to have if they do not 
somehow imply that the goal they encode is a goal that is worth pursuing. But it 
is in fact dubious whether evaluative experiences can have this sort of 
justificatory force (if, that is, we are to suppose that non-evaluative conative 
attitudes cannot), even in those cases in which an agent actually undergoes 
them. After all, perceptual evaluativists require only that the pursued goal seems
good to the agent, not that the agent really accepts that goal as good in any 
sense. As many have argued, a desired goal may continue to seem good to the 
agent although he judges that this goal is in fact not worth pursuing. That is, 
desires may prove recalcitrant to the agent’s better judgment. Scanlon gives the 
example of a person who continues to desire a new computer even when her 
better judgment is that she in fact has no reason to buy a new computer.81 The 
perceptual evaluativist’s explanation of such recalcitrant desires is that they 
must be more like perceptions of value, not like value judgments—for otherwise 
we would have to attribute to the person two contradictory judgments,  (p.99) 
which is very implausible.82 As Scanlon puts it, “Desires are unreflective 
elements in our practical thinking.”83 We take this to imply that the evaluations 
involved in desires differ from those involved in beliefs in that they are not 
regarded as true by the agent. They have “the appearance of truth, whether or 
not [the agent] would affirm” their truth.84 While this nicely explains the 
phenomenon of recalcitrant desires (it is only the content of his better judgment 
that the agent regards as true, whereas the content of his desire merely appears 
to be true85), it would seem that this comes at the price of depriving desires of 
their capacity to rationalize actions. For why think that an evaluation that the 
agent does not even affirm, or regard as true, can rationalize his action if his 
non-evaluative conative attitude cannot? While Scanlon seems to think that 
desires cannot even motivate action if their content is not affirmed by the 
agent,86 Mark Johnston insists, on the contrary, that desires can directly 
rationalize action “without going by way of the evaluative beliefs.”87 This comes 
as a surprise, considering that Johnston adopts Scanlon’s perceptual 
evaluativism about desire and connects it with perceptual theories of emotion.88
Whatever Johnston’s reasons for that thesis, it is our view that evaluative 
experiences that perceptual evaluativists ascribe to agents fail to rationalize 
actions because experiencing a desired goal as good does not imply that the 
agent affirms this evaluation.89
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Finally, consider how the perceptual evaluativist’s suggestion applies to the case 
of Radioman, setting aside the problems we canvassed earlier. Let us assume 
that Radioman’s behavior is motivated by an occurrent desire that consists in his 
experiencing turning radios on as good for its own sake. Remember that we are 
not allowed to suppose that this course of action appears instrumentally good to 
him. So the question is once again whether the assumption that Radioman 
experiences turning radios on as intrinsically valuable makes his action any less 
bizarre than it was before, and the answer is once again no. His action is still 
very odd, and it is even more puzzling that turning radios on should seem 
intrinsically valuable to him.
We thus conclude that neither version of evaluativism can provide us with a 
plausible theory of desire: as the arguments we presented in this section and 
section 4 show, a positive evaluation of the desired object, be it doxastic or 
perceptual, does not suffice for desiring something; nor is it, in fact, necessary 
for it. Moreover, it seems that, as far as examples like Radioman’s go, which are 
supposed to be the main motivation for evaluativism about desire, turning 
desires into evaluative beliefs or experiences does not produce any gains. This 
means that the bizarreness of the case of Radioman is due not to his lack of 
some positive evaluation of turning  (p.100) radios on but to something else. In 
section 6, we shall sketch out some ideas on what that something else might be 
and try to explain why evaluativism about desire is an overreaction to whatever 
challenge the case of Radioman poses.
6. Demotivating Evaluativism
Let us recapitulate what we know about Radioman. We know that he desires to 
turn radios on, at least in the sense that he is disposed to turn on any that catch 
his eye. Call this particular conative state of Radioman DESIRE. We know that 
DESIRE is intrinsic. We also know that DESIRE does not involve any evaluation 
of its object as good.
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Suppose now Radioman enters a room and spots a radio at the other end of the 
room. He then steadily walks across the room and turns the radio on. Call this 
particular event ACTION. The question now is whether ACTION can be 
rationalized or explained by DESIRE as an instance of pursuing a goal. Quinn 
and evaluativists of all stripes give a negative answer: they think that 
rationalization is impossible because DESIRE lacks the evaluative element that 
is responsible for making actions intelligible as the pursuit of some goal. We 
think, on the contrary, that no evaluative element is in principle necessary for 
such rationalization, though we also believe that we do not know enough details 
to make a final decision about this particular case. It may be objected that 
ACTION strikes one as bizarre even before we are given more information about 
Radioman’s psychology and the circumstances of ACTION. We agree that there 
is something odd about ACTION, but we think that two issues should be 
distinguished here. On the one hand, there is the question whether ACTION can 
be understood as Radioman’s pursuing some goal, given the facts about his 
psychology. Suppose that it can be so understood. This is compatible, on the 
other hand, with Radioman’s goal being an extremely bizarre one. Indeed, 
turning radios on is a very odd thing to desire intrinsically, and, as we have seen, 
the oddness of it does not simply go away when we ascribe to Radioman the 
corresponding positive evaluations, because those evaluations themselves would 
be every bit as odd as DESIRE itself, if not odder. DESIRE is quite unlike the 
typical intrinsic desires most people have: the desire to be happy, the desire to 
be healthy, the desire to be free from pain, and so on. Compared to being healthy 
or free from pain, turning radios on seems far too trivial to want for its own 
sake. One might also be tempted to say that Radioman intrinsically desires 
something he has no objective,  (p.101) normative reason to desire. It is 
controversial in general whether normative reasons can be given for intrinsic 
desires, but we can safely bypass this controversy because that has never been 
our question.90 Our question was, and still is, whether DESIRE (together with 
relevant means-end beliefs) can explain ACTION as Radioman’s pursuit of some 
goal. We would probably insist that the goal he pursues is absurd, but pursuing 
an absurd goal is still pursuing a goal.
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As already pointed out, it is difficult to give a decisive answer to the question 
whether DESIRE rationalizes (in the relevant minimal sense) ACTION, because 
the example is, as originally presented, fatally underdescribed.91 One might 
imagine Radioman, for instance, as someone who compulsively runs from one 
radio to another, utterly possessed by a mechanical urge to turn them on. It 
might be, for instance, that this urge to turn on radios regularly gets into the 
way of his efforts to satisfy his desires, to realize his intentions and plans. He 
might also be completely alienated from this urge, feeling that the actions 
produced by it are not really performed by him but merely happen to him.92 If 
this is the correct description of the case, then it clearly does not make much 
sense to say that Radioman genuinely pursues some goal in turning the radio on; 
in fact, it becomes highly questionable whether his behavior can still count as an 
intentional action.
The point to be emphasized is, however, that this enriched version of the story 
does not give us any reason to endorse evaluativism about desire.93 It is 
assumed in Quinn’s discussion (and in many subsequent treatments by others) 
that non-evaluativists are committed to the view that desires just are simple 
dispositions to act in certain ways. If this were true, then it would perhaps be 
difficult for non-evaluativists to draw a distinction between desires and 
compulsive urges such as the one we might suppose Radioman to have. But non-
evaluativists have no such commitment.94 Indeed, as we argued in section 2, the 
desiderative dispositional profile does not exhaust itself in the disposition to act 
in ways that you take to be conducive to satisfying your desire, even if that 
disposition is a necessary element of the desiderative profile. A more detailed 
characterization of the desiderative profile would distinguish it from the 
dispositional profile associated with compulsive urges, and this would allow non-
evaluativists to respond to (the enriched version of) Quinn’s example by denying 
that Radioman has a standing desire to turn radios on. So if his conative attitude 
does not minimally rationalize the way he behaves, then this does not quite show 
that a desire, understood non-evaluatively, cannot rationalize actions, but rather 
merely that compulsive urges cannot rationalize actions.
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 (p.102) What other kinds of dispositions might the desiderative profile 
necessarily or typically involve? Here we can do no more than point to one kind 
of disposition that would be useful for distinguishing desires from compulsive 
urges. What we have in mind are, very roughly, dispositions that link desires to 
other agency-related psychological phenomena such as intentions, general 
agential policies, or long-term plans, and spotlight their place within the broader 
context of diachronic or ‘temporally extended’ agency.95 It seems plausible, for 
instance, that the desiderative dispositional profile necessarily includes, roughly, 
dispositions to form long-term intentions to achieve the object of the desire, to 
integrate such intentions into more general and complex plans the agent already 
has, and to form agential policies that encode general patterns of action in 
certain specific situations. Of course, many or even most desires we have do not 
actually lead us to engage in such higher agential activities, but they all dispose 
us to do so under certain suitable conditions. By contrast, urges and 
compulsions plausibly do not involve such dispositions: although urges and 
compulsions of which the agent is conscious are also relevant for the shape her 
overall agency takes, they are more like external limiting factors than mediators 
of potential goals. One can take into account one’s compulsive urge to do 
something that one does not want to do when intending or planning to act, yet 
one does not really intend or plan to act on them. So if desires and compulsive 
urges can thus be contrasted in terms of their different dispositional connections 
with intentions and plans, for instance, then the non-evaluativist can spell out 
why acting out of an urge does not quite count as an instance of pursuing a goal, 
while acting on a desire does.96
Given the lack of detail, we cannot tell whether DESIRE fits the desiderative 
profile, understood as including the sort of agency-related dispositions roughly 
sketched above, and thus qualifies as a genuine desire, or whether it is just a 
compulsive urge. But if it is a genuine desire, it is difficult to see why it should 
fail to rationalize ACTION in the relevant minimal sense. Again, this need not 
prevent us from regarding DESIRE as very unusual or even downright 
outlandish and Radioman himself as quite eccentric. It does not follow from this, 
however, that we need to ascribe to him an evaluation of the object of his desire 
in order to understand him as pursuing a goal.
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There still remains, of course, the further, independent question of whether 
Radioman’s agency-related attitudes make up the kind of coherent whole that 
can be seen as the trademark of a stronger, more robust form of agency, that is, 
ideally autonomous agency. Again, we need to  (p.103) know much more about 
Radioman in order to decide to what extent he is an autonomous agent in 
general and to what extent ACTION is an instance of autonomous agency. Does 
he, for instance, have certain general, higher-order attitudes aiming at self-
regulation? If so, how sensitive are the particular action-related elements of his 
mental setup to these self-governing policies? More specifically, how does he 
behave when DESIRE comes into conflict with other action-related elements of 
his psychology? These are some of the questions we need to be able to answer 
before we can tell whether Radioman can be evaluated as an autonomous agent, 
or whether ACTION can be understood as an instance of autonomous agency.97
Note that failure to comply with forms of autonomous self-regulation, which 
surely comes in degrees, need not mean that the agent cannot be understood as 
pursuing a goal. We can still make sense of an agent’s behavior as an instance of 
pursuing a goal or acting for a reason, even if we think that it falls short of the 
ideal of autonomous agency.98
Notes
(1.) See Massin (this volume) for a similar characterization. Evaluativists 
typically do not specify whether the necessity in question is a conceptual or 
metaphysical sort. The metaphysical claim that attitudes of desiring are identical 
to, or at least necessarily involve, attitudes of positive evaluation need not have 
any conceptual implications, but we shall assume that the claim that the concept 
DESIRE is identical to, or necessarily involves, the concept POSITIVE 
EVALUATION has the metaphysical implication that attitudes of desiring are 
identical to, or at least necessarily involve, attitudes of positive evaluation. Thus, 
we assume that the metaphysical claim is weaker than the conceptual one, and 
this is why we shall focus on the former (though without making any precise 
distinction).
(2.) Note that there are various different relations of ontological dependence (for 
helpful overviews, see Correia 2008; Koslicki 2013; Lowe 2013; Tahko and Lowe 
2015); the one appealed to in (ME) is commonly called rigid existential 
dependence.
(3.) See esp. Correia 2008: 1016 on this.
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(4.) Proponents of evaluativism include Anscombe 1963; Davidson 1980a, 1980c 
(on one reading, at least); de Sousa 1974; Stampe 1987; Scanlon 1998, 2002; 
Raz 1999, 2010; Wallace 1999; Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 2004; Oddie 
2005, this volume; Tenenbaum 2007; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; and Schafer 
2013. Evaluativism is sometimes developed as a claim about intentions instead 
of desires (see, e.g., Raz 2010), but here we will put aside this complication. 
Another related view, deonticism about desire, is that desiring that p entails its 
seeming to one that p ought to be the case or at least that there are normative 
reasons in favor of p’s being the case; see, e.g., Gregory (2013, this volume), 
Lauria (this volume), and Massin (this volume). Some of those who prefer to talk 
of reasons hold that values are somehow reducible to reasons, and this move 
makes evaluativism and deonticism basically equivalent (this is most clear in 
Scanlon 1998, but compare also Schapiro 2009; Schafer 2013). However, 
depending on precisely how it is fleshed out, deonticism about desire can 
potentially differ from evaluativism in crucial respects; therefore, we shall 
ignore in what follows any form of deonticism that is clearly distinct from 
evaluativism, although some of the arguments we present would equally apply to 
some versions of the former view.
(5.) This usage is mainly due to Davidson (1980a). Compare also Davidson 
1980c; Schueler 1995: ch. 1.
(6.) Though later on in this section and in section 6, we shall hint at some of the 
respects in which desires differ from wishes and urges.
(7.) Exceptions do exist, though; see, e.g., Ben-Yami 1997; Thagard 2006. See 
Sinhababu (forthcoming) for a defense of propositionalism about attitudes in 
general.
(8.) Graham Oddie (this volume) explicitly rejects this and argues that the 
primary objects of desires are properties: when you want a nice cold beer, your 
desire is not directed at some state of affairs but rather at the property of 
drinking a nice cold beer. Now, if this is supposed to be a genuine alternative, a 
desire with that property as its object must be distinct from the desire directed 
at the state of affairs that you drink a nice cold beer. It is difficult to see how this 
could be, however. As Oddie himself seems to acknowledge, it makes little sense 
to say that you desire the property of drinking a nice cold beer per se; what you 
desire is having that property or, equivalently, the state of affairs that you have 
(or instantiate) that property. But if this is correct, then what Oddie calls “the 
property view” simply collapses into the picture proposed earlier.
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(9.) For discussions of this, see, e.g., Goldman 1970: 86–88; Mele 2003: 30–33; 
Strandberg 2012; Schroeder 2014: sect. 2.4; Alvarez (this volume). Note, 
however, that the way these authors use occurrent and standing diverges from 
ours; our understanding of the distinction parallels the way Tim Crane (2001: 
102–108, 2013) distinguishes between dispositional beliefs and occurrent, 
conscious thoughts.
(10.) Note, however, that you can have an occurrent desire that p at t, even if you 
did not have a standing desire that p at any point before t or have it at t. 
Suppose, for instance, you have a strong aversion to wearing perfume; you 
disliked all the perfumes you have tried up until now, and you would not even 
consider buying one. Then, one day, you smell a perfume on a colleague at work, 
which, to your own surprise, instantly fascinates you, and suddenly you feel a 
strong desire to find out more about this perfume, to buy it and wear it yourself. 
You may then go on to adopt this as a standing desire, but this is not necessary. 
So occurrent desires need not correspond to some already existing standing 
desire, and they do not necessarily inaugurate a corresponding standing desire.
(11.) See, e.g., Crane 2001: 103, 2013: 163–166.
(12.) More precisely, “mental states obtain over, and throughout, intervals of 
time, and at times; whereas mental events and processes occur/happen/unfold
over time and/or at times. The idea here is that even when a mental state and a 
mental event (or process) have the same temporal extension—even when they 
occupy the same interval of time—they won’t have the same temporal character. 
They will fill that interval of time in quite different ways” (Soteriou 2013: 27). 
See also Soteriou 2007; Steward 1997.
(13.) It is a further question whether occurrent desires have a non-derivative
phenomenal character—that is, whether there is a conative phenomenology of a 
distinctive sort, independent from the phenomenology of other mental episodes 
they may involve or be accompanied by (mental imagery, bodily sensations, 
sensory perceptions and so on); see, e.g., Kriegel 2013, 2015: ch. 2; Friedrich 
this volume. We remain silent on this, but note that the analogous question 
about cognitive phenomenology has attracted a fair amount of attention 
recently; see, e.g., Bayne and Montague 2011; Smithies 2013a, 2013b.
(14.) There is another sense in which one might be said to be “conscious” of 
one’s standing desire that p: you may have a standing belief that you have that 
desire. Being in this state may constitute a form of self-knowledge, but it does 
not accord phenomenal consciousness (or conscious “monitoring”) of your 
standing desire, for the standing belief in question is just as unconscious as the 
standing desire itself: you can have both of these attitudes while you are 
dreamlessly sleeping and have no phenomenal consciousness at all.
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(15.) Thus, when we call standing desires unconscious, we do not thereby mean 
that they are all unconscious in a Freudian sense. Indeed, most standing desires 
(well, except for Freudian ones) will also have what Ned Block (1995, 2002) 
dubbed access consciousness. As Block makes clear (1995: 232), access 
consciousness is an entirely functional notion; an attitude can be access-
conscious, without actually figuring in the subject’s stream of consciousness. 
Crane (2013) suggests that access consciousness should be understood in terms 
of a mental state’s disposition to “manifest” itself in consciousness via some 
conscious, occurrent state.
(16.) This is why Crane (2001: 105–108, 2013) thinks that “occurrent belief” is a 
misleading label for conscious episodes of entertaining some proposition in the 
doxastic mode. This would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to “occurrent desire,” 
but we will not worry about it here.
(17.) See esp. Schwitzgebel 2002, 2013. Our approach is in general quite similar 
to Schwitzgebel’s, though we seem to have some disagreements over the details. 
As will become clear shortly, we think that kinds of attitudinal dispositional 
profiles have some necessary features, whereas Schwitzgebel (2002: 252) seems 
to deny this, conceiving of attitude concepts as strictly cluster concepts. Then 
again his focus is largely on attitude ascriptions and their appropriateness; so 
there is reason to think that our approach may be reconcilable with his. 
However, although he does not quite endorse evaluativism, Schwitzgebel (2013: 
89–90) explicitly downplays the differences between desiring something and 
believing it to be good, saying that they amount to nothing more than a 
“nuance” (90). We are in general sympathetic to the idea that dispositional 
profiles of different kinds can overlap to some degree, but we shall argue that 
the contrast between the conative state of desiring that p and the cognitive state 
of believing that p is good is quite a bit more significant than Schwitzgebel 
seems to think. For further discussion of the dispositional conception, see, e.g., 
Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4; Ashwell 2014; Hyman 2014. See also Alvarez (this 
volume).
(18.) Note that even this rough first approximation entails that, just as the 
occurrent desire that p is not simply a conscious version of the standing desire 
that p, the standing desire that p is not simply a dispositional version of the 
occurrent desire that p—that is, not simply the disposition to have the occurrent 
desire that p. The standing desire that p is a complex desiderative dispositional 
profile that includes many different dispositions, even though it is plausible that 
token desiderative profiles typically include a disposition to have the relevant 
occurrent desire (indeed, one might even regard this as necessary).
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(19.) We formulate the stimulus condition this way because we do not want to 
rule out that a cognitive attitude somewhat weaker (less committal) than 
outright belief (such as mere acceptance; see Cohen 1992; Bratman 1992) can 
also be sufficient to trigger the manifestation.
(20.) Ascriptions of dispositional properties are usually analyzed in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals; accordingly, (D1) can be reformulated as follows:
(D1*) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, and any 
act type φ, if, at t, a desires that p, then, if, at t, a took her φ-ing to be 
conducive to p’s being the case, a would φ, ceteris paribus.
According to the standard Stalnaker-Lewis semantics (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 
1973), the truth value of the counterfactual conditional in (D1*) is determined by 
what goes on in the closest possible worlds in which its antecedent is true: the 
counterfactual is true iff a performs φ at those closest antecedent worlds. The 
counterfactual approach has quite a bit of intuitive appeal; as is well known, 
however, a number of counterexamples have been offered against it: dispositions 
can be “finked,” masked, or mimicked due to the presence of certain interfering 
factors (there is a huge literature on these issues—see, to name just a few, 
Johnston 1992; Martin 1994; Bird 1998); hence the ceteris paribus clause in 
(D1*). Critics argue that this move faces a dilemma: either one attempts to 
specify what other things have to be equal for the manifestation to occur in the 
stimulus conditions, or one does not. Leaving the ceteris paribus clause 
unspecified seems to render the whole analysis vacuous: it is as if one were 
saying that the manifestation would occur in the stimulus conditions unless it did 
not. On the other hand, a comprehensive specification of all the things that have 
to be equal seems rather unlikely in the case of most dispositions. Responses to 
this dilemma fall broadly into two categories: Some (e.g., Lewis 1997; Choi 
2008; Manley and Wasserman 2008; Contessa 2013) seek to provide a general 
but non-vacuous formula for specifying the ceteris paribus clause. Others (e.g., 
Schwitzgebel 2002, 2013; Steinberg 2010) deny that accounts with unspecified 
ceteris paribus clauses are ipso facto vacuous. Here we shall not take a stand on 
these issues since we are not committed to (any particular version of) the 
counterfactual approach (though we shall deploy it in the following, for 
convenience).
(21.) Some philosophers (e.g., Strawson 1994) seem to think, for instance, that 
having a desire that p necessarily involves being disposed to feel pleasure upon 
its seeming that p. This is surely false; one can have a strong desire to attend the 
funeral of a close relative without being disposed in any sense to feel pleasure 
upon attending it (compare Smith 1998: 453–454). Consider a different affective 
disposition instead:
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Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, if a desires that 
p at t, then a is disposed at t to feel relief (to some non-zero degree) when it 
seems to a that p.
This is more plausible as a necessary element of the desiderative profile, yet we 
cannot pursue this any further here. See also Hyman 2014: 85; Friedrich this 
volume.
(22.) So the dispositional account we have in mind has no “reductive” 
aspirations.
(23.) Compare the taxonomy in Schroeder (2014). We state this explicitly 
because evaluativism is commonly supposed to be an alternative to the so-called 
motivational/action-based theory; so committing ourselves to the latter view at 
the outset would seem to be dialectically illicit. Neither dispositionalism about 
standing desire in general nor the particular version of it we outline here is in 
principle incompatible with evaluativism, however—so no question is begged 
against the evaluativist.
(24.) See, e.g., Strawson 1994: ch. 9; Schroeder 2004: 16–20; Arpaly and 
Schroeder 2014: 113–116. See also Lauria (this volume).
(25.) See Schroeder 2004: 16.
(26.) Strawson 1994: 251.
(27.) ibid., 251–258
(28.) Schroeder 2004: 17. See also Strawson 1994: 287, 1998: 473.
(29.) See also Smith (1998: 450–451), Wall (2009), and Ashwell (2014: 473) on 
this issue.
(30.) Both options seem fine by Strawson (1994: 252–253).
(31.) It is not clear whether this implies metaphysical impossibility. The Weather 
Watchers’ complete practical incapability may be “constitutional” by virtue of 
being grounded in their intrinsic features, without being grounded in essential 
properties of them. In that case, their cognitive capacities could be enhanced, 
for instance, by neurochemical means so that they could at least perform mental 
acts. In what follows, we shall ignore these complications and assume that it is 
metaphysically impossible for the Weather Watchers to act.
(32.) Alternatively, one could extend the stimulus conditions in (D1) so as to 
require explicitly that the agent be capable of performing the act in question.
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(33.) See Jenkins and Nolan (2012) for a recent defense of unmanifestable 
dispositions.
(34.) Since the antecedent is not true at any possible world, any antecedent 
world is trivially the consequent world, for any consequent.
(35.) The standard way of providing counterpossible conditionals with non-
vacuous truth values is to extend the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics by introducing 
impossible worlds; see Nolan 1997; Berto 2013; Brogaard and Salerno 2013; 
Bjerring 2014.
(36.) Whether this attitude is a desire depends on other features of Wendy’s 
psychology, as we shall shortly explain.
(37.) Here is a more “mundane” example: Suppose that John is a huge fan of the 
Belle Époque and has a very strong conative attitude toward having a firsthand 
experience of the period. By contrast, he has no interest whatsoever in the Early 
Medieval Period. If John thought that he can have a firsthand experience of the 
Belle Époque or the Early Middle Ages by traveling back into one of the periods, 
and if backward time travel were possible, he would travel back into the Belle 
Époque rather than the Early Medieval Period, ceteris paribus. So John is now 
disposed to travel back into the Belle Époque under certain circumstances, 
although this disposition is unmanifestable, as backward time travel is (ex 
hypothesi) impossible. By contrast, it would be wrong to ascribe to John any 
disposition to take time travel back into the Early Medieval Period, even if that 
disposition too would be just as unmanifestable as the former.
(38.) Michael Fara (2008: 849–853) seems to contend this, though his focus is 
slightly different than ours.
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(39.) This also highlights the fact that “dispositional properties come in different 
flavors. For example, there are tendencies, capacities, liabilities, and 
pronenesses, each differing in modal profile” (Schwitzgebel 2013: 79). Being 
capable of φ-ing can be glossed, very roughly, as the disposition to φ in 
circumstances where one tries to φ. We claim that one can have an inclination to 
φ even if one is not, or even cannot be, capable of φ-ing, although of course 
being capable of φ-ing is a necessary condition for the manifestation of the 
inclination. However, it sounds odd to say that you can have the capacity to φ
even if that capacity cannot manifest, because its stimulus condition cannot be 
fulfilled—because, that is, it is (perhaps even merely psychologically) impossible 
for you to even try to φ. (Incidentally, this might be all that Fara wants to argue, 
and if so, we agree with him on this score; see n37 above.) This suggests that 
there is a significant contrast between practical inclinations (inclinations to act 
in some way) and practical capacities (capacities to perform some act): whereas 
one can possess a practical inclination that is unmanifestable, a practical 
capacity is essentially manifestable. (On this and related issues about practical 
capacities, see Maier 2014, esp. sect. 2-3.)
(40.) Alvarez (this volume) argues that desires are not just essentially 
manifestable but even essentially manifested dispositions. It might seem that this 
contradicts our verdict that there can be unmanifestable practical inclinations, 
but this is illusory. On our view, having some standing desire is having a 
particular desiderative dispositional profile that consists of various different 
dispositions. (Alvarez herself accepts a similarly “pluralist” picture.) The 
inclination to “act” in ways that one takes to be conducive to satisfying one’s 
desire is just one (though necessary) element of such a profile. Alvarez claims 
that one cannot be said to have some particular desiderative profile between to
and t1, if none of the constituent dispositions of that dispositional profile is 
manifested at least once between to and t1, though she is clear that it is not 
required for having that desire between to and t1 that any particular constituent 
disposition be manifested between to and t1. This is perfectly compatible with 
what we have said about unmanifestable inclinations, which are, after all, not 
themselves desires but rather necessary elements of desiderative dispositional 
profiles.
(41.) Velleman 1992a: 17. As already pointed out, however, (D2) is a fairly weak, 
less controversial rendition of that basic idea.
(42.) Drawing the distinction between desires and wishes this way is not just 
intuitively plausible; there is also some linguistic evidence for it:
((1)) I wish that I had been there.
((2)) I wish that he were here too.
((3)) *I want/desire that I had been there.
((4)) *I want/desire that he were here too.
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In (1)–(4) the use of past perfect and past subjunctive signals the perceived 
unattainability of the object of the relevant conative attitude, and, unlike (1) and 
(2), (3) and (4) are clearly ungrammatical. This is not to deny, of course, that the 
verb want can sometimes be used to report wishes rather than desires: an 
utterance of “I want him back!” by someone in grief sounds perfectly natural, for 
instance.
(43.) In fact, it seems plausible that having an inclination of the type specified in 
(D1) is something that all (positive) conative attitudes have in common, or 
perhaps even what makes conative attitudes conative in the first place—the 
essence of (positive) “conativity,” as one might put it. Compare Velleman 2000: 
260–263.
(44.) (D3) corresponds to what Lauria (this volume) calls “the death of desire 
principle.” See also Massin (this volume) and Oddie (this volume) for discussion.
(45.) Importantly, (D3) does not rule out that you can think that p already is the 
case and desire that it continues to be the case because the former thought is 
compatible with thinking that (or being undecided about whether) something 
you could do would be conducive to its continuing to be the case that p. See 
Hyman 2014: 86.
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(46.) Lauria (this volume) disputes that (D3) is entailed by (D2). He gives the 
example of a person who believes that p, and also believes that he can change 
the past. He then goes on to suggest that it will be likely that this person can 
believe her performing of some acts to be conducive to p’s being the case. 
However, Lauria’s discussion leaves it unclear why believing that one can 
change the past might lead you to believe that you can contribute to p’s being 
the case, despite already believing that p. Here is a concrete example that one 
might take to challenge the idea that (D2) entails (D3). Between t0 and t1, John 
desires to be a father. At t1, he becomes a father and forms the belief that he is 
one. It follows from (D3) that, at t1, John no longer desires to be a father 
(though, of course, he may desire to continue to be a father). Suppose now that, 
at t1, John also believes that he can change the past and make it the case that he 
is not a father at t1. It might seem plausible that, in such a case, John, at t1, 
might also believe that his refraining from changing the past in such a way that 
he is not a father at t1 is conducive to his being a father at t1. But if so, John, at t1, 
believes both that he is a father at t1 and that his “performing” a particular act is 
conducive to his being a father at t1—and this would be a counterexample to the 
claim that believing that p implies believing that nothing can be conducive to p’s 
being the case. Besides, if we suppose that John, at t1, is disposed to refrain from 
changing the past in such a way that he is not a father at t1, a disposition that is 
manifested (let us suppose) at t1, it might seem, contra (D3), that he, at t1, 
desires to be a father despite believing, also at t1, that he already is a father. We 
believe that this description of John’s case is mistaken. Given his belief that he is 
a father, John cannot simultaneously believe that something is conducive to his 
being a father—that is, he cannot take something to be contributing to bringing 
it about that he is a father, while he is convinced that his being a father is 
already brought about. However, given his belief that he can change the past, he 
might believe, at t1, that his refraining from changing the past in such a way that 
he is not a father at t1 is conducive to its continuing to be the case that he is a 
father. Now if we suppose that John, at t1, is disposed to refrain from changing 
the past in such a way that he is not a father at t1, this disposition would be 
explained by the desire that John has at t1 to continue to be a father. Further, 
John might also believe that his changing the past in such a way that he is not a 
father at t1 would be detrimental to his being a father at t1. If so, then we can 
also explain John’s disposition to refrain from changing the past in terms of his 
being glad at t1 that he is a father at t1, for it seems plausible that being glad 
that p necessarily involves both believing that p and being disposed to refrain 
from performing actions that one takes to be detrimental to p’s being the case. 
Hence, neither the idea that believing that p implies believing that nothing is 
conducive to p’s being the case nor the idea that (D2) entails (D3) are 
threatened by the possibility of believing that one can change the past.
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(47.) See, e.g., Stampe 1987; Quinn 1993; Wallace 1999; Johnston 2001; 
Tenenbaum 2007: 9–16; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; Friedrich 2012, this 
volume; Schafer 2013.
(48.) The thesis that intentional action is action performed for a reason is widely 
endorsed in contemporary philosophy of action. Davidson (1980a: 6) writes, for 
example, that we can define “an intentional action as one done for a reason.” 
Compare also Davidson 1980b: 264; Anscombe 1963: 9; Goldman 1970: 76; Mele 
1992.
(49.) Whether teleological explanations are just a special form of causal 
explanations or constitute an independent, irreducible type of explanation is a 
matter of ongoing debate, but nothing hinges on this in the present context. For 
further discussion, see, e.g., Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4; Sehon 1994; Schueler 
2003; Mele 2003: ch. 2. See also Alvarez (2007) for a nice overview.
(50.) Note that the view outlined here is a theory of the explanation of 
intentional action; it does not imply anything substantial about the nature of 
desire (or any other attitudes, for that matter), let alone the so-called 
motivational/action-based theory. Indeed, as we shall see soon, most 
evaluativists motivate their view broadly within the framework of this theory of 
the explanation of intentional action.
(51.) This contrast is sometimes explicated by distinguishing between motivating
and normative reasons (see esp. Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4). Motivating reasons 
are not necessarily normative, but they “render an agent’s action intelligible” by 
“specifying what there is to be said for acting in the way in question” (Smith 
1994: 95).
(52.) One important exception is Scanlon (1998: 35), who thinks that “the only 
source of motivation lies in [one’s] taking certain considerations … as reasons.” 
So desires must involve some positive evaluation not just in order to rationalize 
actions, but also (or perhaps rather) in order to be motivationally efficacious at 
all.
(53.) Quinn 1993: 236–237. For similar examples, see Anscombe 1963: 70ff.; 
Helm 2009: 250.
(54.) Quinn 1993: 247.
(55.) Tenenbaum 2013: 3.
(56.) Doxastic evaluativists include Anscombe 1963; Davidson 1980a, 1980c (on 
one reading at least); de Sousa 1974; Raz 1999, 2010.
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(57.) This distinction is commonly cashed out in terms of the different ‘directions 
of fit’ beliefs and desires are supposed to have; see esp. Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4. 
See also Anscombe 1963: 56; Searle 1983; Humberstone 1992; Gregory 2012, 
this volume; Lauria this volume; Railton this volume. Compare David Lewis’s 
(1988, 1996) treatment of this issue within the framework of formal decision 
theory.
(58.) See, e.g., Velleman 1992a: 7; Copp and Sobel 2002: 258; Friedrich 2012: 
292, this volume.
(59.) See Thagard (2006) for an argument to this effect.
(60.) See Hawkins (2008) on this point.
(61.) Compare Baker 2014: 5–6, n8.
(62.) Compare Ruth Chang’s (2004: 68) discussion of “rationalizers.”
(63.) See Stocker 1979: 747–749; Velleman 1992a: 17–21. See also Watson 1975: 
210–211.
(64.) This point is argued extensively in Audi (1994). See also n18 above.
(65.) We should also keep in mind that the principal motivation for doxastic 
evaluativism is to explain how desires can rationalize actions. But why think that 
a mere disposition to believe that p is good can rationalize or subjectively justify 
any action, if the (non-evaluative) desire that p cannot? After all, it is possible 
that, at the time of the action, the agent has the disposition to form the relevant 
belief without actually having that belief.
(66.) We take suspending judgment about p to be a distinct doxastic attitude; 
see, e.g., Friedman (2013) on this.
(67.) See Quinn 1993: 236–237.
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(68.) Defenses of perceptual evaluativism include Stampe 1987; Scanlon 1998; 
Wallace 1999; Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 2004; Oddie 2005, this volume; 
Tenenbaum 2007; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; Schafer 2013. According to 
Friedrich (2012, this volume), desires necessarily involve episodic experiences 
with a distinctive phenomenology. Friedrich is clear that these experiences are 
not “evaluative seemings”; they do not have an evaluative representational 
content. However, he argues that their distinctive phenomenal character 
presents the desired object as something that must obtain, and claims that this 
amounts to a form of “non-cognitive evaluation.” Now, as already announced 
(see n13), we do not intend to take a stand on the question of whether occurrent 
desires have a distinctive phenomenal character, but it is not clear to us why 
Friedrich calls the distinctive phenomenology of occurrent desires evaluative, or 
why, in general, he takes his view to be a form of evaluativism. It seems that one 
can have an experience with the phenomenal character he describes without the 
desired object seeming good or in any evaluative way. So, whatever the merits of 
his view about the phenomenal character of occurrent desires, it does not, as far 
as we can see, constitute a version of evaluativism at all. On the other hand, 
Friedrich’s thesis that desires in general necessarily involve phenomenally 
conscious, episodic experiences falls prey to our main argument against 
perceptual evaluativism; see n78 below for more on this.
(69.) This is particularly conspicuous in e.g., Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 
2004.
(70.) See, e.g., Goldie 2000; Helm 2001; Roberts 2003; Döring 2003, 2007.
(71.) Stampe 1987: 359. Similarly, Oddie (2005: 42) writes: “The desire that P is 
P’s seeming good (or P’s being experienced as good).”
(72.) See, e.g., Copp and Sobel (2002), Schapiro (2009), and Gregory (this 
volume) for critical discussion.
(73.) Scanlon 1998: 39. This is roughly equivalent to the view that desiring p is 
experiencing p as good, because, for Scanlon, “counting in favor of P” is roughly 
synonymous with “being a reason for P” (17), and, according to his famous buck-
passing account, values reduce to reasons. Note, however, that Scanlon specifies 
here only a sufficient condition for having a desire. This is a bit odd, given his 
intention “to capture an essential element in the intuitive notion of (occurrent) 
desire” (39, emphasis added).
(74.) Again these advantages depend on a certain, nontrivial conception of 
perceptual content. See Hawkins (2008) on this issue.
(75.) This is observed by Baker (2014: 3, n6) as well. Note, however, that Oddie 
(this volume) explicitly denies that p’s seeming good is sufficient for desiring 
that p.
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(76.) Does an analogous argument apply to doxastic evaluativism? After all, 
doxastic evaluativists claim that the desire that p necessarily involves the belief 
that p is good, and this does not seem to be applicable to occurrent desires. Well, 
doxastic evaluativists have an easy solution here: they can simply claim that 
while the standing desire that p necessarily involves the standing belief that p is 
good, the occurrent desire that p necessarily involves the occurrent judgment (or 
thought) that p is good. By contrast, it seems that perceptual evaluativists seek 
to characterize both standing and occurrent desires in terms of mental 
phenomena that are essentially occurrent and do not have any “standing” 
counterparts.
(77.) Incidentally, Quinn (1993: 235) states explicitly that Radioman is to be 
understood as having a standing desire.
(78.) This seems to be what Scanlon (1998: 39) has in mind when he writes, 
“What is generally called a desire involves having a tendency to see something 
as a reason.” Friedrich (this volume) also mentions this sort of extension as a 
possible solution to the problem at hand.
(79.) Friedrich (this volume) suggests a stronger link between standing and 
occurrent desires: if, between t0 and t1, a has a standing desire that p, then not 
only must a have, during that time, the disposition to occurrently desire that p, 
but that disposition must also manifest at some point or another between t0 and 
t1. But this does nothing to bypass the objection above, for even if we suppose 
that the disposition manifests frequently, at multiple points between t0 and t1, 
there would at least be some points between t0 and t1 at which Thomas does not 
occurrently desire to go to the kitchen, yet his standing desire persists.
(80.) To reapply yet another point from the previous section (see n64 above), 
here too it is unclear how a mere disposition to experience something as good 
should rationalize any action. After all, the agent can have the disposition to 
experience something as good without actually undergoing any evaluative 
experience before or during his performance of the action.
(81.) Scanlon 1998: 43. See Gregory (this volume) for a critical discussion of this 
example.
(82.) Compare Patricia Greenspan’s (1988: 18) influential argument against 
doxastic analyses of recalcitrant emotions. See also Schapiro 2009; Friedrich 
2012: 293.
(83.) Scanlon 1998: 39.
(84.) Roberts 2003: 92. Compare the notion of the “appearance of good” in 
Tenenbaum (2007).
(85.) See Döring 2010.
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(86.) Scanlon (1998: 41) writes, “Desire … characterizes an important form of 
variability in the motivational efficacy of reasons, but it does this by describing 
one way in which the thought of something as a reason can present itself rather 
than by identifying a motivating factor that is independent of such a thought.”
(87.) Johnston 2001: 206.
(88.) For more details, see Döring 2007: 387–388, n19.
(89.) This is not necessarily to deny that the experience of p’s seeming good to 
one can justify the belief or judgment that p is good, rather in the way that 
perceptions justify perceptual beliefs. The claim is rather that evaluative 
experiences cannot play the justificatory role that perceptual evaluativists 
suppose them to play because they themselves cannot justify actions directly.
(90.) Smith (2012b) makes this point very clearly. Note that Quinn (1993: 253) 
appears to conflate the two issues.
(91.) For similar complaints, see Copp and Sobel 2002; Smith (2012a).
(92.) This is a familiar theme in the philosophy of action. See, e.g., Frankfurt 
1971; Watson 1975; Velleman 1992b; Bratman 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2007.
(93.) Compare Baker (2014: 14–22). This is not to deny that evaluativism may 
also be compatible with this more detailed picture; the point is rather that it is 
not uniquely compatible with it. If this is true, if, that is, the enriched version can 
just as well be accounted for within a non-evaluativist framework, then the 
central motivation for evaluativism is undermined.
(94.) This is also pointed out by Copp and Sobel 2002: 261; Smith 2012b: 80–83.
(95.) These broader agency-related phenomena have been discussed most 
elaborately in Michael Bratman’s work. See, e.g., 1987, 2000a, 2007.
(96.) This is roughly analogous to Smith’s (2012a: 394) response to the example 
of Radioman.
(97.) For more on these issues, see esp. Bratman 2007.
(98.) An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Graduate Colloquium in 
Practical Philosophy at University of Tübingen; we thank Mitchell Green and all 
of the participants for helpful questions and discussions. We are especially 
grateful to Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria for their detailed and insightful 
comments on the penultimate version.
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(1.) See Massin (this volume) for a similar characterization. Evaluativists 
typically do not specify whether the necessity in question is a conceptual or 
metaphysical sort. The metaphysical claim that attitudes of desiring are identical 
to, or at least necessarily involve, attitudes of positive evaluation need not have 
any conceptual implications, but we shall assume that the claim that the concept 
DESIRE is identical to, or necessarily involves, the concept POSITIVE 
EVALUATION has the metaphysical implication that attitudes of desiring are 
identical to, or at least necessarily involve, attitudes of positive evaluation. Thus, 
we assume that the metaphysical claim is weaker than the conceptual one, and 
this is why we shall focus on the former (though without making any precise 
distinction).
(2.) Note that there are various different relations of ontological dependence (for 
helpful overviews, see Correia 2008; Koslicki 2013; Lowe 2013; Tahko and Lowe 
2015); the one appealed to in (ME) is commonly called rigid existential 
dependence.
(3.) See esp. Correia 2008: 1016 on this.
(4.) Proponents of evaluativism include Anscombe 1963; Davidson 1980a, 1980c
(on one reading, at least); de Sousa 1974; Stampe 1987; Scanlon 1998, 2002; 
Raz 1999, 2010; Wallace 1999; Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 2004; Oddie 
2005, this volume; Tenenbaum 2007; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; and Schafer 
2013. Evaluativism is sometimes developed as a claim about intentions instead 
of desires (see, e.g., Raz 2010), but here we will put aside this complication. 
Another related view, deonticism about desire, is that desiring that p entails its 
seeming to one that p ought to be the case or at least that there are normative 
reasons in favor of p’s being the case; see, e.g., Gregory (2013, this volume), 
Lauria (this volume), and Massin (this volume). Some of those who prefer to talk 
of reasons hold that values are somehow reducible to reasons, and this move 
makes evaluativism and deonticism basically equivalent (this is most clear in 
Scanlon 1998, but compare also Schapiro 2009; Schafer 2013). However, 
depending on precisely how it is fleshed out, deonticism about desire can 
potentially differ from evaluativism in crucial respects; therefore, we shall 
ignore in what follows any form of deonticism that is clearly distinct from 
evaluativism, although some of the arguments we present would equally apply to 
some versions of the former view.
(5.) This usage is mainly due to Davidson (1980a). Compare also Davidson 
1980c; Schueler 1995: ch. 1.
(6.) Though later on in this section and in section 6, we shall hint at some of the 
respects in which desires differ from wishes and urges.
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(7.) Exceptions do exist, though; see, e.g., Ben-Yami 1997; Thagard 2006. See 
Sinhababu (forthcoming) for a defense of propositionalism about attitudes in 
general.
(8.) Graham Oddie (this volume) explicitly rejects this and argues that the 
primary objects of desires are properties: when you want a nice cold beer, your 
desire is not directed at some state of affairs but rather at the property of 
drinking a nice cold beer. Now, if this is supposed to be a genuine alternative, a 
desire with that property as its object must be distinct from the desire directed 
at the state of affairs that you drink a nice cold beer. It is difficult to see how this 
could be, however. As Oddie himself seems to acknowledge, it makes little sense 
to say that you desire the property of drinking a nice cold beer per se; what you 
desire is having that property or, equivalently, the state of affairs that you have 
(or instantiate) that property. But if this is correct, then what Oddie calls “the 
property view” simply collapses into the picture proposed earlier.
(9.) For discussions of this, see, e.g., Goldman 1970: 86–88; Mele 2003: 30–33; 
Strandberg 2012; Schroeder 2014: sect. 2.4; Alvarez (this volume). Note, 
however, that the way these authors use occurrent and standing diverges from 
ours; our understanding of the distinction parallels the way Tim Crane (2001: 
102–108, 2013) distinguishes between dispositional beliefs and occurrent, 
conscious thoughts.
(10.) Note, however, that you can have an occurrent desire that p at t, even if you 
did not have a standing desire that p at any point before t or have it at t. 
Suppose, for instance, you have a strong aversion to wearing perfume; you 
disliked all the perfumes you have tried up until now, and you would not even 
consider buying one. Then, one day, you smell a perfume on a colleague at work, 
which, to your own surprise, instantly fascinates you, and suddenly you feel a 
strong desire to find out more about this perfume, to buy it and wear it yourself. 
You may then go on to adopt this as a standing desire, but this is not necessary. 
So occurrent desires need not correspond to some already existing standing 
desire, and they do not necessarily inaugurate a corresponding standing desire.
(11.) See, e.g., Crane 2001: 103, 2013: 163–166.
(12.) More precisely, “mental states obtain over, and throughout, intervals of 
time, and at times; whereas mental events and processes occur/happen/unfold
over time and/or at times. The idea here is that even when a mental state and a 
mental event (or process) have the same temporal extension—even when they 
occupy the same interval of time—they won’t have the same temporal character. 
They will fill that interval of time in quite different ways” (Soteriou 2013: 27). 
See also Soteriou 2007; Steward 1997.
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(13.) It is a further question whether occurrent desires have a non-derivative
phenomenal character—that is, whether there is a conative phenomenology of a 
distinctive sort, independent from the phenomenology of other mental episodes 
they may involve or be accompanied by (mental imagery, bodily sensations, 
sensory perceptions and so on); see, e.g., Kriegel 2013, 2015: ch. 2; Friedrich 
this volume. We remain silent on this, but note that the analogous question 
about cognitive phenomenology has attracted a fair amount of attention 
recently; see, e.g., Bayne and Montague 2011; Smithies 2013a, 2013b.
(14.) There is another sense in which one might be said to be “conscious” of 
one’s standing desire that p: you may have a standing belief that you have that 
desire. Being in this state may constitute a form of self-knowledge, but it does 
not accord phenomenal consciousness (or conscious “monitoring”) of your 
standing desire, for the standing belief in question is just as unconscious as the 
standing desire itself: you can have both of these attitudes while you are 
dreamlessly sleeping and have no phenomenal consciousness at all.
(15.) Thus, when we call standing desires unconscious, we do not thereby mean 
that they are all unconscious in a Freudian sense. Indeed, most standing desires 
(well, except for Freudian ones) will also have what Ned Block (1995, 2002) 
dubbed access consciousness. As Block makes clear (1995: 232), access 
consciousness is an entirely functional notion; an attitude can be access-
conscious, without actually figuring in the subject’s stream of consciousness. 
Crane (2013) suggests that access consciousness should be understood in terms 
of a mental state’s disposition to “manifest” itself in consciousness via some 
conscious, occurrent state.
(16.) This is why Crane (2001: 105–108, 2013) thinks that “occurrent belief” is a 
misleading label for conscious episodes of entertaining some proposition in the 
doxastic mode. This would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to “occurrent desire,” 
but we will not worry about it here.
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(17.) See esp. Schwitzgebel 2002, 2013. Our approach is in general quite similar 
to Schwitzgebel’s, though we seem to have some disagreements over the details. 
As will become clear shortly, we think that kinds of attitudinal dispositional 
profiles have some necessary features, whereas Schwitzgebel (2002: 252) seems 
to deny this, conceiving of attitude concepts as strictly cluster concepts. Then 
again his focus is largely on attitude ascriptions and their appropriateness; so 
there is reason to think that our approach may be reconcilable with his. 
However, although he does not quite endorse evaluativism, Schwitzgebel (2013: 
89–90) explicitly downplays the differences between desiring something and 
believing it to be good, saying that they amount to nothing more than a 
“nuance” (90). We are in general sympathetic to the idea that dispositional 
profiles of different kinds can overlap to some degree, but we shall argue that 
the contrast between the conative state of desiring that p and the cognitive state 
of believing that p is good is quite a bit more significant than Schwitzgebel 
seems to think. For further discussion of the dispositional conception, see, e.g., 
Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4; Ashwell 2014; Hyman 2014. See also Alvarez (this 
volume).
(18.) Note that even this rough first approximation entails that, just as the 
occurrent desire that p is not simply a conscious version of the standing desire 
that p, the standing desire that p is not simply a dispositional version of the 
occurrent desire that p—that is, not simply the disposition to have the occurrent 
desire that p. The standing desire that p is a complex desiderative dispositional 
profile that includes many different dispositions, even though it is plausible that 
token desiderative profiles typically include a disposition to have the relevant 
occurrent desire (indeed, one might even regard this as necessary).
(19.) We formulate the stimulus condition this way because we do not want to 
rule out that a cognitive attitude somewhat weaker (less committal) than 
outright belief (such as mere acceptance; see Cohen 1992; Bratman 1992) can 
also be sufficient to trigger the manifestation.
(20.) Ascriptions of dispositional properties are usually analyzed in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals; accordingly, (D1) can be reformulated as follows:
(D1*) Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, and any 
act type φ, if, at t, a desires that p, then, if, at t, a took her φ-ing to be 
conducive to p’s being the case, a would φ, ceteris paribus.
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According to the standard Stalnaker-Lewis semantics (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 
1973), the truth value of the counterfactual conditional in (D1*) is determined by 
what goes on in the closest possible worlds in which its antecedent is true: the 
counterfactual is true iff a performs φ at those closest antecedent worlds. The 
counterfactual approach has quite a bit of intuitive appeal; as is well known, 
however, a number of counterexamples have been offered against it: dispositions 
can be “finked,” masked, or mimicked due to the presence of certain interfering 
factors (there is a huge literature on these issues—see, to name just a few, 
Johnston 1992; Martin 1994; Bird 1998); hence the ceteris paribus clause in 
(D1*). Critics argue that this move faces a dilemma: either one attempts to 
specify what other things have to be equal for the manifestation to occur in the 
stimulus conditions, or one does not. Leaving the ceteris paribus clause 
unspecified seems to render the whole analysis vacuous: it is as if one were 
saying that the manifestation would occur in the stimulus conditions unless it did 
not. On the other hand, a comprehensive specification of all the things that have 
to be equal seems rather unlikely in the case of most dispositions. Responses to 
this dilemma fall broadly into two categories: Some (e.g., Lewis 1997; Choi 2008;
Manley and Wasserman 2008; Contessa 2013) seek to provide a general but non-
vacuous formula for specifying the ceteris paribus clause. Others (e.g., 
Schwitzgebel 2002, 2013; Steinberg 2010) deny that accounts with unspecified 
ceteris paribus clauses are ipso facto vacuous. Here we shall not take a stand on 
these issues since we are not committed to (any particular version of) the 
counterfactual approach (though we shall deploy it in the following, for 
convenience).
(21.) Some philosophers (e.g., Strawson 1994) seem to think, for instance, that 
having a desire that p necessarily involves being disposed to feel pleasure upon 
its seeming that p. This is surely false; one can have a strong desire to attend the 
funeral of a close relative without being disposed in any sense to feel pleasure 
upon attending it (compare Smith 1998: 453–454). Consider a different affective 
disposition instead:
Necessarily, for any agent a, any proposition p, any time t, if a desires that 
p at t, then a is disposed at t to feel relief (to some non-zero degree) when it 
seems to a that p.
This is more plausible as a necessary element of the desiderative profile, yet we 
cannot pursue this any further here. See also Hyman 2014: 85; Friedrich this 
volume.
(22.) So the dispositional account we have in mind has no “reductive” 
aspirations.
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(23.) Compare the taxonomy in Schroeder (2014). We state this explicitly 
because evaluativism is commonly supposed to be an alternative to the so-called 
motivational/action-based theory; so committing ourselves to the latter view at 
the outset would seem to be dialectically illicit. Neither dispositionalism about 
standing desire in general nor the particular version of it we outline here is in 
principle incompatible with evaluativism, however—so no question is begged 
against the evaluativist.
(24.) See, e.g., Strawson 1994: ch. 9; Schroeder 2004: 16–20; Arpaly and 
Schroeder 2014: 113–116. See also Lauria (this volume).
(25.) See Schroeder 2004: 16.
(26.) Strawson 1994: 251.
(27.) ibid., 251–258
(28.) Schroeder 2004: 17. See also Strawson 1994: 287, 1998: 473.
(29.) See also Smith (1998: 450–451), Wall (2009), and Ashwell (2014: 473) on 
this issue.
(30.) Both options seem fine by Strawson (1994: 252–253).
(31.) It is not clear whether this implies metaphysical impossibility. The Weather 
Watchers’ complete practical incapability may be “constitutional” by virtue of 
being grounded in their intrinsic features, without being grounded in essential 
properties of them. In that case, their cognitive capacities could be enhanced, 
for instance, by neurochemical means so that they could at least perform mental 
acts. In what follows, we shall ignore these complications and assume that it is 
metaphysically impossible for the Weather Watchers to act.
(32.) Alternatively, one could extend the stimulus conditions in (D1) so as to 
require explicitly that the agent be capable of performing the act in question.
(33.) See Jenkins and Nolan (2012) for a recent defense of unmanifestable 
dispositions.
(34.) Since the antecedent is not true at any possible world, any antecedent 
world is trivially the consequent world, for any consequent.
(35.) The standard way of providing counterpossible conditionals with non-
vacuous truth values is to extend the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics by introducing 
impossible worlds; see Nolan 1997; Berto 2013; Brogaard and Salerno 2013; 
Bjerring 2014.
(36.) Whether this attitude is a desire depends on other features of Wendy’s 
psychology, as we shall shortly explain.
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(37.) Here is a more “mundane” example: Suppose that John is a huge fan of the 
Belle Époque and has a very strong conative attitude toward having a firsthand 
experience of the period. By contrast, he has no interest whatsoever in the Early 
Medieval Period. If John thought that he can have a firsthand experience of the 
Belle Époque or the Early Middle Ages by traveling back into one of the periods, 
and if backward time travel were possible, he would travel back into the Belle 
Époque rather than the Early Medieval Period, ceteris paribus. So John is now 
disposed to travel back into the Belle Époque under certain circumstances, 
although this disposition is unmanifestable, as backward time travel is (ex 
hypothesi) impossible. By contrast, it would be wrong to ascribe to John any 
disposition to take time travel back into the Early Medieval Period, even if that 
disposition too would be just as unmanifestable as the former.
(38.) Michael Fara (2008: 849–853) seems to contend this, though his focus is 
slightly different than ours.
(39.) This also highlights the fact that “dispositional properties come in different 
flavors. For example, there are tendencies, capacities, liabilities, and 
pronenesses, each differing in modal profile” (Schwitzgebel 2013: 79). Being 
capable of φ-ing can be glossed, very roughly, as the disposition to φ in 
circumstances where one tries to φ. We claim that one can have an inclination to 
φ even if one is not, or even cannot be, capable of φ-ing, although of course 
being capable of φ-ing is a necessary condition for the manifestation of the 
inclination. However, it sounds odd to say that you can have the capacity to φ
even if that capacity cannot manifest, because its stimulus condition cannot be 
fulfilled—because, that is, it is (perhaps even merely psychologically) impossible 
for you to even try to φ. (Incidentally, this might be all that Fara wants to argue, 
and if so, we agree with him on this score; see n37 above.) This suggests that 
there is a significant contrast between practical inclinations (inclinations to act 
in some way) and practical capacities (capacities to perform some act): whereas 
one can possess a practical inclination that is unmanifestable, a practical 
capacity is essentially manifestable. (On this and related issues about practical 
capacities, see Maier 2014, esp. sect. 2-3.)
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(40.) Alvarez (this volume) argues that desires are not just essentially 
manifestable but even essentially manifested dispositions. It might seem that this 
contradicts our verdict that there can be unmanifestable practical inclinations, 
but this is illusory. On our view, having some standing desire is having a 
particular desiderative dispositional profile that consists of various different 
dispositions. (Alvarez herself accepts a similarly “pluralist” picture.) The 
inclination to “act” in ways that one takes to be conducive to satisfying one’s 
desire is just one (though necessary) element of such a profile. Alvarez claims 
that one cannot be said to have some particular desiderative profile between to
and t1, if none of the constituent dispositions of that dispositional profile is 
manifested at least once between to and t1, though she is clear that it is not 
required for having that desire between to and t1 that any particular constituent 
disposition be manifested between to and t1. This is perfectly compatible with 
what we have said about unmanifestable inclinations, which are, after all, not 
themselves desires but rather necessary elements of desiderative dispositional 
profiles.
(41.) Velleman 1992a: 17. As already pointed out, however, (D2) is a fairly weak, 
less controversial rendition of that basic idea.
(42.) Drawing the distinction between desires and wishes this way is not just 
intuitively plausible; there is also some linguistic evidence for it:
((1)) I wish that I had been there.
((2)) I wish that he were here too.
((3)) *I want/desire that I had been there.
((4)) *I want/desire that he were here too.
In (1)–(4) the use of past perfect and past subjunctive signals the perceived 
unattainability of the object of the relevant conative attitude, and, unlike (1) and 
(2), (3) and (4) are clearly ungrammatical. This is not to deny, of course, that the 
verb want can sometimes be used to report wishes rather than desires: an 
utterance of “I want him back!” by someone in grief sounds perfectly natural, for 
instance.
(43.) In fact, it seems plausible that having an inclination of the type specified in 
(D1) is something that all (positive) conative attitudes have in common, or 
perhaps even what makes conative attitudes conative in the first place—the 
essence of (positive) “conativity,” as one might put it. Compare Velleman 2000: 
260–263.
(44.) (D3) corresponds to what Lauria (this volume) calls “the death of desire 
principle.” See also Massin (this volume) and Oddie (this volume) for discussion.
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(45.) Importantly, (D3) does not rule out that you can think that p already is the 
case and desire that it continues to be the case because the former thought is 
compatible with thinking that (or being undecided about whether) something 
you could do would be conducive to its continuing to be the case that p. See 
Hyman 2014: 86.
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(46.) Lauria (this volume) disputes that (D3) is entailed by (D2). He gives the 
example of a person who believes that p, and also believes that he can change 
the past. He then goes on to suggest that it will be likely that this person can 
believe her performing of some acts to be conducive to p’s being the case. 
However, Lauria’s discussion leaves it unclear why believing that one can 
change the past might lead you to believe that you can contribute to p’s being 
the case, despite already believing that p. Here is a concrete example that one 
might take to challenge the idea that (D2) entails (D3). Between t0 and t1, John 
desires to be a father. At t1, he becomes a father and forms the belief that he is 
one. It follows from (D3) that, at t1, John no longer desires to be a father 
(though, of course, he may desire to continue to be a father). Suppose now that, 
at t1, John also believes that he can change the past and make it the case that he 
is not a father at t1. It might seem plausible that, in such a case, John, at t1, 
might also believe that his refraining from changing the past in such a way that 
he is not a father at t1 is conducive to his being a father at t1. But if so, John, at t1, 
believes both that he is a father at t1 and that his “performing” a particular act is 
conducive to his being a father at t1—and this would be a counterexample to the 
claim that believing that p implies believing that nothing can be conducive to p’s 
being the case. Besides, if we suppose that John, at t1, is disposed to refrain from 
changing the past in such a way that he is not a father at t1, a disposition that is 
manifested (let us suppose) at t1, it might seem, contra (D3), that he, at t1, 
desires to be a father despite believing, also at t1, that he already is a father. We 
believe that this description of John’s case is mistaken. Given his belief that he is 
a father, John cannot simultaneously believe that something is conducive to his 
being a father—that is, he cannot take something to be contributing to bringing 
it about that he is a father, while he is convinced that his being a father is 
already brought about. However, given his belief that he can change the past, he 
might believe, at t1, that his refraining from changing the past in such a way that 
he is not a father at t1 is conducive to its continuing to be the case that he is a 
father. Now if we suppose that John, at t1, is disposed to refrain from changing 
the past in such a way that he is not a father at t1, this disposition would be 
explained by the desire that John has at t1 to continue to be a father. Further, 
John might also believe that his changing the past in such a way that he is not a 
father at t1 would be detrimental to his being a father at t1. If so, then we can 
also explain John’s disposition to refrain from changing the past in terms of his 
being glad at t1 that he is a father at t1, for it seems plausible that being glad 
that p necessarily involves both believing that p and being disposed to refrain 
from performing actions that one takes to be detrimental to p’s being the case. 
Hence, neither the idea that believing that p implies believing that nothing is 
conducive to p’s being the case nor the idea that (D2) entails (D3) are 
threatened by the possibility of believing that one can change the past.
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(47.) See, e.g., Stampe 1987; Quinn 1993; Wallace 1999; Johnston 2001; 
Tenenbaum 2007: 9–16; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; Friedrich 2012, this 
volume; Schafer 2013.
(48.) The thesis that intentional action is action performed for a reason is widely 
endorsed in contemporary philosophy of action. Davidson (1980a: 6) writes, for 
example, that we can define “an intentional action as one done for a reason.” 
Compare also Davidson 1980b: 264; Anscombe 1963: 9; Goldman 1970: 76; Mele 
1992.
(49.) Whether teleological explanations are just a special form of causal 
explanations or constitute an independent, irreducible type of explanation is a 
matter of ongoing debate, but nothing hinges on this in the present context. For 
further discussion, see, e.g., Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4; Sehon 1994; Schueler 
2003; Mele 2003: ch. 2. See also Alvarez (2007) for a nice overview.
(50.) Note that the view outlined here is a theory of the explanation of 
intentional action; it does not imply anything substantial about the nature of 
desire (or any other attitudes, for that matter), let alone the so-called 
motivational/action-based theory. Indeed, as we shall see soon, most 
evaluativists motivate their view broadly within the framework of this theory of 
the explanation of intentional action.
(51.) This contrast is sometimes explicated by distinguishing between motivating
and normative reasons (see esp. Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4). Motivating reasons 
are not necessarily normative, but they “render an agent’s action intelligible” by 
“specifying what there is to be said for acting in the way in question” (Smith 
1994: 95).
(52.) One important exception is Scanlon (1998: 35), who thinks that “the only 
source of motivation lies in [one’s] taking certain considerations … as reasons.” 
So desires must involve some positive evaluation not just in order to rationalize 
actions, but also (or perhaps rather) in order to be motivationally efficacious at 
all.
(53.) Quinn 1993: 236–237. For similar examples, see Anscombe 1963: 70ff.; 
Helm 2009: 250.
(54.) Quinn 1993: 247.
(55.) Tenenbaum 2013: 3.
(56.) Doxastic evaluativists include Anscombe 1963; Davidson 1980a, 1980c (on 
one reading at least); de Sousa 1974; Raz 1999, 2010.
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(57.) This distinction is commonly cashed out in terms of the different ‘directions 
of fit’ beliefs and desires are supposed to have; see esp. Smith 1987, 1994: ch. 4. 
See also Anscombe 1963: 56; Searle 1983; Humberstone 1992; Gregory 2012, 
this volume; Lauria this volume; Railton this volume. Compare David Lewis’s 
(1988, 1996) treatment of this issue within the framework of formal decision 
theory.
(58.) See, e.g., Velleman 1992a: 7; Copp and Sobel 2002: 258; Friedrich 2012: 
292, this volume.
(59.) See Thagard (2006) for an argument to this effect.
(60.) See Hawkins (2008) on this point.
(61.) Compare Baker 2014: 5–6, n8.
(62.) Compare Ruth Chang’s (2004: 68) discussion of “rationalizers.”
(63.) See Stocker 1979: 747–749; Velleman 1992a: 17–21. See also Watson 1975: 
210–211.
(64.) This point is argued extensively in Audi (1994). See also n18 above.
(65.) We should also keep in mind that the principal motivation for doxastic 
evaluativism is to explain how desires can rationalize actions. But why think that 
a mere disposition to believe that p is good can rationalize or subjectively justify 
any action, if the (non-evaluative) desire that p cannot? After all, it is possible 
that, at the time of the action, the agent has the disposition to form the relevant 
belief without actually having that belief.
(66.) We take suspending judgment about p to be a distinct doxastic attitude; 
see, e.g., Friedman (2013) on this.
(67.) See Quinn 1993: 236–237.
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(68.) Defenses of perceptual evaluativism include Stampe 1987; Scanlon 1998; 
Wallace 1999; Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 2004; Oddie 2005, this volume; 
Tenenbaum 2007; Hawkins 2008; Schapiro 2009; Schafer 2013. According to 
Friedrich (2012, this volume), desires necessarily involve episodic experiences 
with a distinctive phenomenology. Friedrich is clear that these experiences are 
not “evaluative seemings”; they do not have an evaluative representational 
content. However, he argues that their distinctive phenomenal character 
presents the desired object as something that must obtain, and claims that this 
amounts to a form of “non-cognitive evaluation.” Now, as already announced 
(see n13), we do not intend to take a stand on the question of whether occurrent 
desires have a distinctive phenomenal character, but it is not clear to us why 
Friedrich calls the distinctive phenomenology of occurrent desires evaluative, or 
why, in general, he takes his view to be a form of evaluativism. It seems that one 
can have an experience with the phenomenal character he describes without the 
desired object seeming good or in any evaluative way. So, whatever the merits of 
his view about the phenomenal character of occurrent desires, it does not, as far 
as we can see, constitute a version of evaluativism at all. On the other hand, 
Friedrich’s thesis that desires in general necessarily involve phenomenally 
conscious, episodic experiences falls prey to our main argument against 
perceptual evaluativism; see n78 below for more on this.
(69.) This is particularly conspicuous in e.g., Helm 2001; Johnston 2001; Chang 
2004.
(70.) See, e.g., Goldie 2000; Helm 2001; Roberts 2003; Döring 2003, 2007.
(71.) Stampe 1987: 359. Similarly, Oddie (2005: 42) writes: “The desire that P is 
P’s seeming good (or P’s being experienced as good).”
(72.) See, e.g., Copp and Sobel (2002), Schapiro (2009), and Gregory (this 
volume) for critical discussion.
(73.) Scanlon 1998: 39. This is roughly equivalent to the view that desiring p is 
experiencing p as good, because, for Scanlon, “counting in favor of P” is roughly 
synonymous with “being a reason for P” (17), and, according to his famous buck-
passing account, values reduce to reasons. Note, however, that Scanlon specifies 
here only a sufficient condition for having a desire. This is a bit odd, given his 
intention “to capture an essential element in the intuitive notion of (occurrent) 
desire” (39, emphasis added).
(74.) Again these advantages depend on a certain, nontrivial conception of 
perceptual content. See Hawkins (2008) on this issue.
(75.) This is observed by Baker (2014: 3, n6) as well. Note, however, that Oddie 
(this volume) explicitly denies that p’s seeming good is sufficient for desiring 
that p.
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(76.) Does an analogous argument apply to doxastic evaluativism? After all, 
doxastic evaluativists claim that the desire that p necessarily involves the belief 
that p is good, and this does not seem to be applicable to occurrent desires. Well, 
doxastic evaluativists have an easy solution here: they can simply claim that 
while the standing desire that p necessarily involves the standing belief that p is 
good, the occurrent desire that p necessarily involves the occurrent judgment (or 
thought) that p is good. By contrast, it seems that perceptual evaluativists seek 
to characterize both standing and occurrent desires in terms of mental 
phenomena that are essentially occurrent and do not have any “standing” 
counterparts.
(77.) Incidentally, Quinn (1993: 235) states explicitly that Radioman is to be 
understood as having a standing desire.
(78.) This seems to be what Scanlon (1998: 39) has in mind when he writes, 
“What is generally called a desire involves having a tendency to see something 
as a reason.” Friedrich (this volume) also mentions this sort of extension as a 
possible solution to the problem at hand.
(79.) Friedrich (this volume) suggests a stronger link between standing and 
occurrent desires: if, between t0 and t1, a has a standing desire that p, then not 
only must a have, during that time, the disposition to occurrently desire that p, 
but that disposition must also manifest at some point or another between t0 and 
t1. But this does nothing to bypass the objection above, for even if we suppose 
that the disposition manifests frequently, at multiple points between t0 and t1, 
there would at least be some points between t0 and t1 at which Thomas does not 
occurrently desire to go to the kitchen, yet his standing desire persists.
(80.) To reapply yet another point from the previous section (see n64 above), 
here too it is unclear how a mere disposition to experience something as good 
should rationalize any action. After all, the agent can have the disposition to 
experience something as good without actually undergoing any evaluative 
experience before or during his performance of the action.
(81.) Scanlon 1998: 43. See Gregory (this volume) for a critical discussion of this 
example.
(82.) Compare Patricia Greenspan’s (1988: 18) influential argument against 
doxastic analyses of recalcitrant emotions. See also Schapiro 2009; Friedrich 
2012: 293.
(83.) Scanlon 1998: 39.
(84.) Roberts 2003: 92. Compare the notion of the “appearance of good” in 
Tenenbaum (2007).
(85.) See Döring 2010.
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(86.) Scanlon (1998: 41) writes, “Desire … characterizes an important form of 
variability in the motivational efficacy of reasons, but it does this by describing 
one way in which the thought of something as a reason can present itself rather 
than by identifying a motivating factor that is independent of such a thought.”
(87.) Johnston 2001: 206.
(88.) For more details, see Döring 2007: 387–388, n19.
(89.) This is not necessarily to deny that the experience of p’s seeming good to 
one can justify the belief or judgment that p is good, rather in the way that 
perceptions justify perceptual beliefs. The claim is rather that evaluative 
experiences cannot play the justificatory role that perceptual evaluativists 
suppose them to play because they themselves cannot justify actions directly.
(90.) Smith (2012b) makes this point very clearly. Note that Quinn (1993: 253) 
appears to conflate the two issues.
(91.) For similar complaints, see Copp and Sobel 2002; Smith (2012a).
(92.) This is a familiar theme in the philosophy of action. See, e.g., Frankfurt 
1971; Watson 1975; Velleman 1992b; Bratman 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2007.
(93.) Compare Baker (2014: 14–22). This is not to deny that evaluativism may 
also be compatible with this more detailed picture; the point is rather that it is 
not uniquely compatible with it. If this is true, if, that is, the enriched version can 
just as well be accounted for within a non-evaluativist framework, then the 
central motivation for evaluativism is undermined.
(94.) This is also pointed out by Copp and Sobel 2002: 261; Smith 2012b: 80–83.
(95.) These broader agency-related phenomena have been discussed most 
elaborately in Michael Bratman’s work. See, e.g., 1987, 2000a, 2007.
(96.) This is roughly analogous to Smith’s (2012a: 394) response to the example 
of Radioman.
(97.) For more on these issues, see esp. Bratman 2007.
(98.) An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Graduate Colloquium in 
Practical Philosophy at University of Tübingen; we thank Mitchell Green and all 
of the participants for helpful questions and discussions. We are especially 
grateful to Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria for their detailed and insightful 
comments on the penultimate version.
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WE OFTEN EXPLAIN human actions by reference to the desires of the person 
whose actions we are explaining: “Jane is studying law because she wants to 
become a judge.” But how do desires explain actions? A widely accepted view is 
that desires are dispositional states that are manifested in behavior. This view 
can be traced back to Davidson’s influential 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and 
Causes,” which opens with this question: “What is the relation between a reason 
and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason 
for doing what he did?” (685). Davidson’s answer, which subsequently became 
the orthodoxy in action theory, is that the relation between the reason that 
explains an action and the explained action is that of cause and effect and that, 
therefore, explanations that give the agent’s reason for acting, which he called 
“rationalizations,” are “a species of causal explanation” (685). A reason why an 
agent did something, according to Davidson, consists of a belief and a desire; 
specifically, he claimed, “Giving the reason why an agent did something is often 
a matter of naming the pro-attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both; let me 
call this pair the primary reason why the agent performed the action” (686). Pro-
attitude is a semitechnical term intended by Davidson to include, among other 
things, “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, … in so far as these can be 
interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a certain 
kind” (686).
Davidson’s characterization of desires is not precise, but he implicitly endorses 
the view that desires are dispositional states and that, like other dispositions, 
they are causal conditions of the actions they explain. This is evident in his 
response to the objection that a primary reason “consist of  (p.120) attitudes 
and beliefs, which are states or dispositions, not events; therefore they cannot 
be causes” (693): “It is easy to reply that states, dispositions, and conditions are 
frequently named as the causes of events: the bridge collapsed because of a 
structural defect; the plane crashed on takeoff because the air temperature was 
abnormally high; the plate broke because it had a crack” (694). The gist of this 
response is, then, that desires and beliefs are states or dispositions, but that 
doesn’t imply that they are not causes, since states and dispositions are often 
named as causes of events. Perhaps, Davidson goes on to say, such states and 
dispositions are causes only on the assumption that there was a triggering event 
(the cause), but again, that does not impugn their status as causes or, more 
precisely, causal conditions of the events they explain.1
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The view that desires, and indeed many psychological states, are dispositional 
states is now widely accepted; in fact it is often taken as obvious.2 And so is the 
view that dispositions are causes (or causal conditions) of their manifestations: 
fragility is often cited as the cause of a fragile object’s breaking, solubility as the 
cause of the dissolving of soluble things, malleability of the change in shape of 
malleable things, etc.3 In this paper I examine this view of desires. While I do not 
reject it, I argue that, if desires are dispositions, they are dispositions with a 
distinctive feature that sets them apart from ordinary physical dispositions, such 
as fragility or conductivity. And I suggest, in my concluding remarks, that this 
feature of desires favors a particular model for how desires explain actions when 
they feature in action explanations, namely the “context-placing” model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1, after some preliminary 
clarifications, I outline the idea that desires are dispositional states. I then 
examine in section 2 the various ways in which desires are manifested, and in 
section 3 I turn to the question of how that manifestation relates to the presence 
of a desire. I suggest that the nature of that relationship shows that desires are 
what I call “manifestation-dependent” dispositions. My concluding remarks 
relate this feature of desires to the question of how desires explain actions.
1. Desires as Dispositional States
In ordinary contemporary usage desire is more often reserved for desires related 
to the natural appetites: desires for food, warmth, comfort, sleep, etc., and, in 
particular, for sexual desire. By contrast, in philosophy the term normally covers 
any state of wanting or desiring (but see Schueler  (p.121) 1995). Some 
philosophers sometimes use desire interchangeably with pro-attitude, while 
others restrict it to refer to states that form a species within that genus. In this 
latter usage, desires are sometimes contrasted with, say, wishes, hopes, 
longings, or cravings. Each of those four concepts (and there are others) differs 
somewhat from the others as well as from the concept of desire with which they 
are contrasted. The first two overlap with desire in involving a positive 
evaluation of their object but differ from it in that they are not tied to behavior, 
or not as closely as desire is. The last two terms are less clearly linked to 
positive evaluation. But all of them, as well as related concepts, are generally 
regarded as sufficiently close to each other that they tend to be brought 
together under umbrella terms such as Davidson’s pro-attitude.
In this paper I shall be concerned primarily with desires in the semitechnical 
and somewhat restricted philosophical sense just outlined. So I shall leave aside 
for the most part other pro-attitudes such as wishes, hopes, longings, and 
cravings and shall not be concerned with whether what I say about desires is 
also true of any of these pro-attitudes, or indeed of other psychological states.
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A further clarification about my focus is needed. It is a familiar point that the 
term desire, like belief, conviction, statement, and many similar psychological 
terms, suffers from what might be called a “state/object ambiguity.” So “my 
desire” may be used to talk about my desiring something or about what I desire; 
for instance, to talk about my desiring to carry the vote at a meeting, or about 
what I desire, namely to carry the vote at the meeting. This paper is concerned 
with desires understood in the first sense, as my desiring something.
So what is it to desire something? A common answer in the philosophical 
literature is that desiring something, like believing something, is or consists in 
being in a state, namely a state of desiring.4 However, if desiring is being in a 
state, it is not a state that need be manifested throughout the time when it is 
true that one desires that thing. For instance, a person may desire financial 
security over a period of time, and yet at some times in that period she may not 
manifest the desire in any way: that is, she may not talk or think about it, or do 
anything related to that desire, etc. at those times. Because of this, because 
desires are states that may be manifested in a variety of ways but that need not, 
at any one time, be manifested in any of those ways, it seems plausible to think 
of desires as dispositional states: states that, perhaps together with other 
dispositional states such as the subject’s beliefs, dispose the agent to certain 
forms of behavior, thoughts, mental images, emotional reactions, sensations, 
feelings, etc.  (p.122) Thus, many philosophers today think of desires as 
belonging to the category of dispositions, in particular of “multitrack” 
dispositions: dispositions that can be manifested in a variety of ways. This view 
of desires raises the question: How are desires manifested?
2. Desires and Their Manifestation
Let me start with a point about the notion of the manifestation of a disposition. 
When we talk about the manifestation of a disposition, we tend to think of the 
occurrence of certain sorts of physical changes or processes that are related to 
the disposition (indeed are defining of the disposition)—changes or processes 
that are in principle “perceivable” through the senses.5 However, although this 
may be right for inanimate things, human psychological dispositions are 
different in that they may be manifested both in perceivable occurrences that 
include, but are not limited to, purposive behavior,6 and also in “purely mental” 
phenomena, such as thoughts, sensations, feelings, emotional reactions, etc. that 
need not have any outward or publicly perceivable expression. Accordingly 
psychological dispositions can be manifested, as we might say, “externally” or 
“internally.”7
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Desires are manifested externally in what seem to be two categorically different 
types of manifestation. First, they are manifested in behavior, which may be 
purposive or simply expressive.8 Second, desires are manifested in physiological 
changes in the agent that has the desire—changes that do not amount to 
behavior. The categorical distinction between behavior and mere physiological 
changes is drawn on the basis of the fact that there are things that we do that 
are, in principle and to some extent, under our direct control even if their 
occurrence is not intentional on a particular occasion, while others are never 
under our direct control. To illustrate: grabbing and cursing are, on this 
characterization, behavioral manifestations; sweating and salivating are not—
they are mere physiological changes.
The behavior that manifests desires may, in turn, be of two kinds: purposive or 
merely expressive (“merely expressive” because purposive behavior may also be 
expressive). A desire is manifested in purposive behavior when the agent who 
has the desire engages in goal-directed behavior: the agent acts so as to bring 
about what the desire is a desire for and adapts its behavior to that end. The 
adaptation of behavior is shaped by the agent’s exercise of its cognitive abilities; 
that is to say, the agent directs its behavior according to its cognition of the 
circumstances—cognition that may  (p.123) be perceptual or of some other kind 
(for instance, inferential) and may or may not involve the manipulation of 
concepts. In cases where the agent is not capable of concept manipulation, 
cognition shapes behavior through the discriminatory capacities of the agent. In 
cases of agents capable of concept manipulation whose desires are manifested in 
purposive action, cognition can shape behavior in several ways: in the 
conceptualization of the object of desire, in reasoning about whether and how to 
satisfy the desire, and in the exercise of the range of cognitive capacities 
(perceptual, inferential, perhaps intuitive, etc.) required to guide the agent’s 
behavior toward the intended goal. In such cases, purposive behavior is not only 
goal-directed but also typically guided by reasons (see Döring and Eker this 
volume).
Accordingly, the desire to eat can be manifested in eating but also in food 
searching and grabbing behavior, both of which are purposive behavior; in the 
case of humans, the desire to eat can also be manifested in linguistic expressions
—which may be purposive or merely expressive (see below). Likewise, a desire 
to buy a car may be manifested in buying a car, but it can also be manifested in 
actions conducive to doing so, for instance, in finding out about the different 
virtues of various cars; saving money to buy a car, perhaps by forgoing other 
purchases; and so on.
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Desires are also manifested in behavior that is not purposive but is, as I noted 
earlier, merely expressive. For example, the desire to eat may be manifested in 
crying (for instance, in babies), meowing (in cats), and, for adult humans, in 
linguistic behavior, such as the exclamation “I’m hungry!”. Similarly, the desire 
to buy a car may be manifested in talking about cars; expressions (e.g. linguistic 
or facial expressions) of disappointment when finding out that car taxes have 
gone up, such as looking sad, or cursing; or in expressions of joy, such as 
smiling, laughing, or cheering, when realizing that one can now afford the 
desired car or that one is about to buy it.
A distinctive feature of desires is that, at least for humans (I leave aside whether 
this is also true of any other animals), it is often possible to suppress what would 
be a behavioral manifestation of a desire one has—for instance, by choosing not 
to act in ways that would lead to the satisfaction of the desire, by suppressing its 
linguistic expression and even voicing a contrary desire, or by suppressing the 
expression of the associated emotions: hiding one’s disappointment or anger, 
pretending or declaring that one feels the opposite emotion, and so on. In other 
words, agents can sometimes choose whether to manifest their desires 
behaviorally.
Desires also have, as I suggested, external but non-behavioral manifestations—
which are manifestations that are not typically under  (p.124) our control: we 
can neither bring them about nor suppress them at will, though we can often do 
things at will that will result in the occurrence of those sorts of changes. These 
manifestations may be purely physiological changes, or they may be changes 
tied to emotions such as fear, joy, anxiety, etc. For example, desires may be 
manifested in bodily changes such as salivation or tummy rumblings (purely 
physiological) or in trembling (with fear), blushing (in anger), or getting flushed 
(with excitement) at the thought or sight of what one wants, or of getting it, or of 
losing it, and so on.
So much for the external manifestations of desires. The internal manifestations 
of desires include thoughts (contemplative, imaginative, calculative, etc.), 
emotional reactions (Strawson 1994), mental images, and sensations and 
feelings of various kinds. The sensations that manifest a desire may be those 
that accompany related thoughts and emotions, such as feelings of fear, 
anticipation, or delight, or sensations associated with bodily appetites, etc. And 
the thoughts, mental images, or daydreams that constitute manifestations of a 
desire may be of the kind that come unbidden, or they may be the result of 
intentional mental activity, such as purposeful deliberation or imagining. Thus, 
engaging in deliberation about how to achieve something and the relative costs 
of doing so, etc. and deliberately imagining satisfying the desire can also be 
manifestations of a desire, as can be emotional reactions and feelings to these. 
(See Schueler this volume on deliberation concerning desires.)
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When desires are manifested in this internal way, they may also be manifested 
externally, and so the desire may be attributed to the agent on the basis of those 
external manifestations. But regardless of whether or not desires are externally 
manifested, these internal phenomena may constitute manifestations of a desire, 
if only to oneself: my well-concealed feelings of envy on hearing of a friend’s 
professional success may make me realize that, contrary to what I thought, I do 
want to achieve professional recognition. In such cases, I may then see some of 
my past actions in a new light, e.g. see them as directed at achieving such 
recognition and hence as manifestations of my desire. But it is also possible that 
the feeling of envy should be the first manifestation of my desire. Because of this 
it is possible that sometimes only its possessor may be in a position to recognize 
that she has a certain desire, although this is by no means always the case. 
Indeed, often the opposite is true: others can be in a position to tell us about 
unacknowledged desires by witnessing their various external manifestations. 
And of course sometimes oneself and others may misinterpret manifestations of 
a desire for A as those of a desire for B. And so on.
 (p.125) Desires have this range of internal and external manifestations partly 
because desires are linked to pleasure and pain in various ways. So desiring is a 
state that often brings with it pain or displeasure, whether in the form of a 
sensation or a negative psychological state, such as frustration, fear, annoyance, 
etc., which may arise from the as yet unsatisfied desire or from the frustration of 
the desire. The satisfaction of desire typically brings with it (a degree of) 
pleasure, as does the anticipation of satisfaction. To be sure, sometimes the 
satisfaction of a desire is disappointing (for instance, less pleasant than one 
expected); distasteful (one may be disgusted after having given in to a desire to 
eat three cream doughnuts; or after doing something one felt one had to do and 
in that sense wanted to do but also found repugnant to do); or regarded by the 
agent as an outright disaster (perhaps very little pleasure and much pain comes 
from the satisfaction of the desire). Still, there is often some pleasure in getting 
what one wants even if it is very short-lived and even if the pleasure merely 
consists in the assuaging of the discomfort or frustration of desiring; and 
repugnance or distaste may be mixed with the pleasure of having done one’s 
duty, or having got an unpleasant task out of the way, and so on. Moreover, even 
when there is very little and short-lived pleasure, there tends to be some 
pleasure in the anticipation of satisfaction. So desires cause and are caused by 
pleasure, pain, or displeasure (physical or psychological), which is itself often 
linked (causally or expressively) to purposive behavior (toward or away from the 
object), emotional reactions, feelings, thoughts, etc.
Thus, we have seen that desires can be manifested externally in purposive 
behavior (including in actions done for reasons), in expressive behavior, or in 
physiological changes, and also internally in certain patterns of thoughts, 
sensations, emotional reactions, etc., which may, in turn, be externally 
expressed.
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It could be objected that, although in a sense of the word manifestation that 
means simply “making evident” these are all possible ways in which desires are 
manifested, they are not all manifestations of a desire in the sense of 
manifestation relevant to dispositions. For dispositions, the objection would go, 
are defined by their manifestations: what the bearer of the disposition does, so 
fragility is the disposition to break in certain circumstances, and solubility is the 
disposition to dissolve, etc. And similarly, what defines a desire is what the 
person who has the desire does: characteristic behavior, and in particular 
characteristic desire-satisfying behavior.9 The objection is unconvincing. First, 
dispositions, such as fragility and solubility are what Ryle (1949: 44) calls 
“single-track dispositions.” But, as he notes, there are also multi-track 
dispositions, “the exercises of  (p.126) which are indefinitely 
heterogeneous” (44), and psychological dispositions such as desires, beliefs or 
character traits, belong in this group. To illustrate the point, Ryle says:
When Jane Austen wished to show the specific kind of pride which 
characterised the heroine of Pride and Prejudice, she had to represent her 
actions, words, thoughts and feelings in a thousand different situations. 
There is no one standard type of action or reaction such that Jane Austen 
could say “My heroine’s kind of pride was just the tendency to do this, 
whenever a situation of that sort arose.” (44)
It may be true that actions, and among them “overt” actions (i.e. those involving 
bodily behavior), are a central way in which desires are manifested, and are 
analogous to the manifestation of simple physical dispositions, e.g. breaking or 
dissolving. But this is no reason to deny that the range of phenomena described 
above can also be genuine manifestations of a desire.
Because of this, it should now be clear that our initial question about how 
desires explain actions will be illuminated by examining the nature of the 
relationship between desiring something and the whole range of “external” and 
“internal” manifestations of that desire, since the range includes intentional 
actions. I turn to that question in section 3, where I argue that there is a feature 
of the relationship between desires and their manifestations that sets them apart 
from the ordinary physical dispositions often discussed in the literature, such as 
solubility, elasticity, fragility, etc.10
3. Desires as Manifestation-Dependent Dispositions
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The SEP entry for dispositions says that “in general, it seems that nothing about 
the actual behavior of an object is ever necessary for it to have the dispositions it 
has” (Choi and Fara 2016). This is clearly intended as a claim about dispositions 
in general and the term actual behavior is meant to include not just the current 
or past actual behavior but the actual behavior of an object over its lifetime. So a 
particular thing may have a disposition such as fragility or solubility even if the 
thing itself never has and never will manifest it. For instance, a particular lump 
of sugar or pinch of salt is said to be soluble (have a disposition to dissolve in 
certain conditions) and a particular glass vase or a ceramic tile is said to be 
fragile (disposed to break under certain kinds of stress) even if they never  (p.
127) have and never will dissolve or break. Typically these dispositions have a 
categorial basis as well as conditions for their manifestation (conditions that 
enable the disposition to be manifested); in addition many require a stimulus or 
trigger that brings about their manifestation—11though it has proved singularly 
difficult to specify what these conditions and triggers are, even for fairly simple 
dispositions, such as fragility, as is shown by the failures so far of attempts to 
provide a satisfactory conditional analysis of dispositions.12 The problem is that 
an object or portion of stuff can have a disposition that is not manifested even 
when the trigger occurs because of the presence of masks, antidotes, or finks; 
and, in such cases, the failure of manifestation does not imply the absence of the 
disposition. The recent literature on dispositions is full of such examples: fragile 
glasses wrapped in Styrofoam that do not shatter when struck, poisonous pills 
that do not poison if ingested together with an antidote (Bird 1998), “finked” live 
wires that don’t conduct electricity when electric currents are applied (Martin 
1994), and so on (Mumford 1998).13 So a particular may have a disposition it 
never manifests, either because it is never in the required conditions (enabling 
conditions, plus trigger) or perhaps because it is, but something blocks or 
otherwise prevents its manifestation. The important point for my purposes is 
that a particular thing may have a disposition that it never manifests.
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By contrast, there seem to be dispositions that are what might be called 
“manifestation-dependent”: the absence of the manifestation over the lifetime of 
the object implies the absence of the disposition. That is, contrary to what the 
SEP entry says, there are dispositions that an individual has only if it has already 
manifested it at some point over its lifetime or is now manifesting it. And this 
dependence of the disposition on its manifestation is not epistemic; that is, it is 
not that in the absence of the manifestation we cannot know whether the object 
has the disposition. Rather, the dependence is constitutive: certain types of 
disposition are not present if they are not manifested. It is part of the concept of 
a disposition of this kind that its presence implies its manifestation at some point 
in the past. The attribution of such dispositions imply not just that its possessor 
would do certain things or undergo certain changes or has the power to do so in 
certain circumstances but that it has done or is doing those things or has 
undergone or is undergoing those changes. Being a smoker and being generous, 
for example, are such dispositions: a smoker is someone who has a disposition to 
smoke even while he’s not smoking, but someone who has never smoked is not a 
smoker, just as someone may be generous without now manifesting that 
character trait in any way, but someone who has  (p.128) never had a generous 
reaction, thought, or feeling or has never performed a generous deed is not 
generous.14 The point about these dispositions is not that they are frequently 
manifested but rather that, unlike other dispositions, attribution of the 
disposition depends (logically) on their having been manifested.
I want to suggest that desires are dispositions of this kind. My claim is that it is 
part of the concept of desire that someone has a desire at time t, only if the 
desire has been manifested in any of the various ways I described above at some 
point up to and including time t. So I have the desire to eat spinach or to become 
a lawyer, only if at some point up to the present I have manifested that desire in 
any of the ways described above (but of course not necessarily in behavior). 
Desires are dispositions such that someone who has a desire is someone of 
whom it is true not just that she would or can do certain things but that she has 
done or is doing certain things: has had or is having certain thoughts, feelings, 
and emotions, or has behaved or is behaving in certain ways, etc.
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Note that I am not suggesting that desires are dependent on any one of the 
possible ways in which they are manifested, whether internally or externally, for 
they clearly are not: someone can have a desire in the absence of a 
manifestation of any one or several of those kinds. So one may have the desire to 
eat without acting on the desire; but not without at least thinking about it, or 
having certain feelings, sensations, etc. Or one may want to put out the washing 
without feeling particularly emotionally engaged in the issue, or one may want 
to become a dentist without really thinking about it at the time or experiencing 
any sensations relating to it; but in both cases there must still be some other 
way in which the desire has been or is being manifested. The literature is full of 
examples where a desire is plausibly claimed to be present in the absence of one 
or several of these sorts of typical manifestations; this has in fact led to 
competing views about what is essential to the concept of desire.15 But my point 
is that a desire is in fact intrinsically connected to the range of phenomena that 
constitute its possible manifestations and, therefore, that an agent cannot 
(conceptually) have a desire in the absence of all of those manifestations over 
the agent’s lifetime: the range of possible manifestations is constitutive of what 
it is to have the corresponding desire. Moreover, the various manifestations of a 
desire are criteria for the strength of desire: the more one feels inclined to 
satisfy a desire (i.e. the harder it is to suppress the relevant purposive behavior), 
the stronger the associated sensations, emotions, the more acute the 
physiological changes, the more frequent related thoughts about it, and 
relatedly, the harder it is to suppress the  (p.129) associated expressive 
behavior, the stronger the desire. Desires are, then, a kind of manifestation-
dependent disposition.
It might be objected that this alleged difference from ordinary dispositions is 
only apparent. For, it might be argued, just as an object may have an ordinary 
physical disposition but not manifest it because it is not in the right conditions, 
or because of the presence of a mask, antidote, fink, etc., that blocks its 
manifestation, a person may have a desire that she has never manifested 
because of the presence of a mask or antidote, for instance because of injury, 
paralysis, physical coercion, perhaps contrary desires, etc. And therefore, as 
with other dispositions, the failure of manifestation does not imply the absence 
of the disposition, i.e. of the desire, but rather the presence of impediments to 
its manifestation.
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There is truth in these remarks, for sometimes a desire is present even though a 
particular form of its manifestation is prevented in the ways just outlined. 
However, there is an important difference concerning the possibility of 
preventing the manifestation of the disposition between the two types of case: 
physical dispositions and desires. For it is true that one can prevent some types 
of manifestation of desires, for example by physically paralyzing a person. But 
even then, it will still be possible for the desire to be manifested in thoughts, 
emotions, etc. And, in order to prevent or block all possible manifestations of a 
desire, the person must be rendered incapable of movement, thought and 
feeling, and so she must be either totally unconscious (i.e. in a coma) or dead. 
The dead have no desires,16 and while a comatose person may still have the 
desires she had before entering that state, those desires will be attributed to her 
on the basis of her having manifested them somehow in the past. On the other 
hand, it is implausible to argue that she can acquire new desires during her 
coma. To be sure, she could express a new desire on waking up, but there’s no 
ground for saying that she had the desire but did not manifest it while in a coma, 
rather than that she acquired the desire and expressed it on waking up. In other 
words, it is implausible to argue that a person can be in a state that makes it 
impossible for her to manifest her desires in any way but can, during that time, 
acquire new desires. Thus the objection fails: although preventing the external
manifestation of a desire in whatever way (physical injury, paralysis, etc.) does 
not imply its absence, the fact that a desire has never been manifested in any 
internal or external way does: that is simply part of the concept of desire.17
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This may seem unconvincing, for surely, it might be argued, it is possible for one 
to discover that one had a desire one didn’t know about. For instance, mention 
or perception of the object of desire may elicit certain  (p.130) reactions, 
internal or external, which evince the presence of a desire that, until then, 
perhaps no one, including the agent herself, knew she had. And surely the right 
way to construe such cases is to say that these reactions (internal or external) 
are evidence for its antecedent presence: the desire was there all along, and the 
reactions simply reveal its existence. But this is also implausible. First, if the 
object of desire is something the agent was not at all familiar with, then it is 
wholly implausible to suggest that the agent’s reaction is a manifestation of a 
desire that was there all along. It is true that a person may desire something, 
say, to have peace of mind, and discover that something else, say, retiring, is just 
what she’d always wanted because it brings peace of mind. That, however, is not 
discovering a desire she has always had but never manifested. It is instead 
discovering that a desire she had and had manifested (perhaps in certain 
feelings of unhappiness or thoughts and actions about how to get peace of mind) 
could be satisfied in ways she didn’t know about. If, by contrast, the object of 
desire is something already familiar to the agent, then it is also implausible to 
say that in the absence of any previous relevant thoughts, emotions, behavior, 
etc., the agent already had the desire for that thing because, again, there seem 
to be no grounds for attributing an antecedent desire rather than a newly 
acquired desire. To be sure, reflection on some already familiar object of desire 
may help one to remember or perhaps recognize past emotional and thought 
patterns as manifestations of a desire for that thing, but then that is a desire 
that had already been manifested. So desires do seem to be manifestation-
dependent dispositions.
This feature of desires does not impugn the dispositional nature of desires, since 
a desire that has been manifested in one way can still be regarded as a 
dispositional state that can be further manifested in other ways.18 But, and this 
is the point I want to emphasize, the feature does distinguish desires (along with 
some other psychological states) from dispositions such as fragility, solubility, or 
conductivity, which may be present in an object despite the object’s never having 
manifested them in any way. For in the case of desires, the presence of the 
acquisition of a desire, the disposition, coincides with at least one of its 
manifestations. This may seem odd because, at least among physical 
dispositions, there do not seem to be any that are acquired only at the point at 
which they are first manifested. But that is grist to the mill: if desires are 
dispositions, they, together with at least some other psychological states, have 
some peculiar features that seem to set them apart from familiar physical 
dispositions.
 (p.131) Conclusion
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As I noted at the beginning, a widely accepted view about how desires explain 
actions, closely associated with Davidson, is that they do so just as dispositions 
in general explain their manifestations. And dispositions are said to explain their 
manifestations causally: dispositions are antecedent causal conditions that, 
when triggered by a stimulus, cause their manifestations to occur. We have seen, 
however, that desires are a distinctive kind of disposition, what I have called 
“manifestation-dependent” dispositions, where the attribution of the disposition 
depends constitutively on their manifestation.
I shall finish with a sketch of an answer to the question posed at the beginning 
of this paper. The feature of desires I have described suggests that an 
illuminating way to understand how desires explain actions is in terms of 
“context-placing” explanations: explanations that place the action in the context 
of the manifestation pattern that is characteristic of the desire in question.19
Accordingly, an action is explained by a desire when we see the action as part of 
an intelligible pattern formed by the agent’s past and future behavior, thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, etc. in the context in which the agent acted—a complex 
pattern that we regard as the characteristic manifestation of the desire in 
question. Because of this, which desire should be attributed to an agent as 
explanatory of her action is constrained in important ways by whether the action 
fits best into one or another of the patterns of manifestation of the different 
desires that the agent can be plausibly thought to have, given the context.
This talk of patterns of explanation echoes another passage in Davidson’s 1963
paper, where he defends his answer to the question of how desires explain 
actions and issues a challenge to dissenters: “One way we can explain an event 
is by placing it in the context of its cause; cause and effect form the sort of 
pattern that explains the effect, in a sense of ‘explain’ that we understand as 
well as any. If reason and action illustrate a different pattern of explanation, that 
pattern must be identified” (692).
In response to Davidson’s claim that the causal-pattern provides an illuminating 
answer to how desires explain action, one can note that the lack of agreement 
about how to understand the concept of causation at play here,20 the many 
decades of (in my view) unsuccessful attempts to resolve the problem of “deviant 
causal chains,”21 and the distinctive type of disposition that desires turn out to 
be together suggest that applying the causal pattern does not guarantee that 
“we now understand the sort of explanation involved” (1963: 692).
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 (p.132) As for the challenge, I have introduced the idea of a manifestation-
dependent disposition and suggested that desires are dispositions of that sort 
and that, therefore, we should understand how desires explain actions by 
reference to that notion of disposition. That idea captures a pattern of 
explanation we understand well for, as we have seen, that’s the distinctive notion 
of disposition at play in conceiving of desires as dispositions. These two 
considerations suggest that the “context-placing” pattern of explanation I have 
identified as characteristic of desires is more illuminating than the causal 
pattern of explanation characteristic of physical dispositions that Davidson 
favored.
These brief remarks do not of course constitute a full account, let alone a 
defense, of how desires explain actions, but I hope I have provided grounds for 
thinking that understanding their relation to action in the way suggested is a 
promising way of going about that task.22
Notes
(1.) Davidson adds that, although we are not always in a position to know what 
the triggering event was, we know that there must have been one. And this is 
true, he says, for explanations of inanimate events, which we take to be causal, 
as well as for action explanations.
(2.) C. B. Martin (2008: 184), for example, writes, “The fact that belief and 
desire states are dispositional is both familiar and obvious.” This is a widespread 
view in the literature on dispositions; see e.g. McKitrick 2004: 2. In the 
philosophy of mind, different views highlight different concepts in order to 
characterize desires: behavior, pleasure/pain, the good, reward, etc. (see 
Schroeder 2004). But most, if not all, of those views implicitly involve or are 
compatible with the idea that desires are dispositional states.
(3.) The causal view of dispositions is widely but not universally held. It has been 
rejected by some who argue, for example, that it is a disposition’s causal basis, 
rather than the disposition, that is causally relevant or causally efficacious. The 
rejection is implicit in David Lewis’s (1986: 223–224) remark: “I take for granted 
that a disposition requires a certain causal basis: one has the disposition iff one 
has a property that occupies a certain causal role.” (See also Prior, Pargeter, and 
Jackson 1982.). I put aside this objection because, if right, it applies to all 
dispositions and not just to desires, which is the topic at issue. For a critical 
discussion of this suggestion see McKitrick 2004, 2005.
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(4.) Desires are also sometimes thought of as “propositional attitudes” (following 
Russell [1918] 2010: 60). This characterization, however, is not ideal, as it has 
been argued by various authors (see Schueler 1991; Zangwill 1998; Alvarez 
2010: 66ff.). Briefly, it cannot accommodate the desires of creatures who lack 
the ability to entertain propositions, such as babies and (most?) non-human 
animals. (See also Döring and Eker, Friedrich, this volume.)
(5.) A disposition may also be manifested in preventing, sustaining, etc. changes 
or processes that would otherwise occur—but this sort of manifestation is also in 
principle perceivable. For ease of exposition I shall talk of manifestations as 
occurrences but using the term to include all these things.
(6.) “Observable occurrences” is here to be contrasted with the internal 
manifestations I outline elsewhere. There are also neurophysiological changes 
inside the body correlated with desires, but I do not include these among the 
internal manifestations partly because they are in principle also observable—
though not without the aid of a special apparatus. Internal physiological changes 
could also count as, in some sense, external “manifestations” of a state of 
desiring—at least in the sense that they are correlated with the presence of the 
desire. But it matters that the identification of such neurophysiological changes 
as manifestations of a particular desire depends on their correlation with the 
external and internal manifestations described elsewhere.
(7.) Schwitzgebel (2002) makes a similar point about the manifestation of 
beliefs. This view is also found in Quine (1990).
(8.) I use the term purposive behavior to include intentional behavior, which is 
typically what we do for reasons (though there may be things done intentionally 
but not for a reason), but also the behavior of animals that are not capable of 
reasoning. And the term behavior is intended to include linguistic behavior as 
well as refrainings, etc. (see Alvarez 2013).
(9.) So, for example, John Hyman (2014: 85) writes:
A desire is manifested in two main ways: first, by purposive or goal-
directed behaviour, specifically, behaviour aimed at satisfying the desire, in 
other words, at getting what it is a desire to have, or at doing what it is a 
desire to do; and second, by feeling glad, pleased or relieved if the desire is 
satisfied, and sorry, displeased or disappointed if it is frustrated.
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And he adds that there are other things related to desires that may be signs or 
symptoms of desires, but these are not manifestations of the desire. But even if 
it’s right that the mere physiological changes are not manifestations but only 
signs or symptoms of desire, Hyman’s range of possible manifestations seems 
too narrow. For in addition to purposive acting and feelings, there is a range of 
(intentional and non-intentional) mental activity as well as expressive non-
purposive behavior that seem legitimate candidates to be counted among 
possible manifestations of a desire. Unless we have a principled way of deciding 
what is a genuine manifestation of a desire, the claim that only goal-directed 
behavior and feelings of pleasure or displeasure concerning its satisfaction or 
frustration count as manifestations seems a stipulation.
(10.) The distinctive feature is also had by other psychological dispositional 
states, for instance, character traits and perhaps beliefs, although I shall not 
discuss those here.
(11.) “Typically” because it is claimed that there are physical dispositions that 
are unusual in that e.g. they “manifest spontaneously, without the need for 
stimulation” (Molnar 2003: 85), or others that do not have a categorial base. See 
McKitrick 2003; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2006. But see Armstrong 1968.
(12.) See, e.g., Martin 2008: ch. 2.
(13.) See Cross (2012) for a summary.
(14.) Being a smoker is a habit which is also normally dispositional, i.e. disposes 
the subject to certain manifestations, while being generous is a character trait. I 
have argued for this view of character traits in Alvarez 2015.
(15.) Thus, some philosophers have privileged one of these concepts (action, 
pleasure, conscious thoughts, etc.) over others in characterizing desires, or have 
even claimed that the preferred concept is what desires reduce to. Recently, Tim 
Schroeder (2004) has criticized many traditional positions and proposed an 
alternative, based on the idea that desire is “a natural kind” essentially linked to 
the concept of reward (though the somewhat technical concept of reward is 
deployed in the empirical literature he discusses.). It is not possible to do justice 
to Schroeder’s arguments here, but it is worth noting that his criticisms of the 
rival theories he examines are not effective against the sort of pluralist 
conception of desires suggested above.
(16.) I’m putting aside the possibility of life after death because if there is such a 
thing, one would be able to manifest one’s desires then, if only mentally.
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(17.) It seems, moreover, that desires have no necessary triggers for their 
manifestation. The presence of the object of desire may sometimes act as a 
trigger for the desire to be manifested, but one may manifest a desire in the 
absence of the object of desire or anything connected to it; indeed, the 
manifestation may consist precisely in spontaneously imagining, thinking about, 
or seeking the object of desire (say, water, or a new house) in spite of its total 
absence in the agent’s environment, indeed in spite of its non-existence. I do not 
mean that nothing will have triggered these thoughts, images, etc. but rather 
that there is no specific kind of occurrence that is necessary to trigger the 
manifestation of a desire.
(18.) Of course if the desire is satisfied, it will not be manifested further, but 
then it is a desire that the agent no longer has. Note that to have what one 
wants need not be to have one’s desire satisfied if one’s desire is, e.g. to keep 
what one has.
(19.) My suggestion is in the same spirit as the views defended in Schroeder 
(2001) and Tanney (2009). I do not take myself to be arguing against the claim 
that reason/desire explanations are in some sense also causal, for reasons given 
in the following paragraphs above.
(20.) For instance, in Davidson’s neo-Humean terms? In terms of 
counterfactuals? As Anscombe ([1971] 1993: 91) suggests, simply in terms of 
“the derivativeness of an effect from its causes”? In some other way?
(21.) Applied to our topic: an action may be caused by a desire and yet not be a 
manifestation of that desire if it is not caused “in the right way.”
(22.) I would like to thank Edgar Phillips, Lucy Campbell, and audiences at 
several seminars where I presented this paper, as well as the editors and referee 
for this collection for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. This 
paper was completed during my tenure of a Leverhulme Trust Major Research 
Fellowship, and I thank the Trust for the award of the fellowship.
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Notes:
(1.) Davidson adds that, although we are not always in a position to know what 
the triggering event was, we know that there must have been one. And this is 
true, he says, for explanations of inanimate events, which we take to be causal, 
as well as for action explanations.
(2.) C. B. Martin (2008: 184), for example, writes, “The fact that belief and desire 
states are dispositional is both familiar and obvious.” This is a widespread view 
in the literature on dispositions; see e.g. McKitrick 2004: 2. In the philosophy of 
mind, different views highlight different concepts in order to characterize 
desires: behavior, pleasure/pain, the good, reward, etc. (see Schroeder 2004). 
But most, if not all, of those views implicitly involve or are compatible with the 
idea that desires are dispositional states.
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(3.) The causal view of dispositions is widely but not universally held. It has been 
rejected by some who argue, for example, that it is a disposition’s causal basis, 
rather than the disposition, that is causally relevant or causally efficacious. The 
rejection is implicit in David Lewis’s (1986: 223–224) remark: “I take for granted 
that a disposition requires a certain causal basis: one has the disposition iff one 
has a property that occupies a certain causal role.” (See also Prior, Pargeter, and 
Jackson 1982.). I put aside this objection because, if right, it applies to all 
dispositions and not just to desires, which is the topic at issue. For a critical 
discussion of this suggestion see McKitrick 2004, 2005.
(4.) Desires are also sometimes thought of as “propositional attitudes” (following
Russell [1918] 2010: 60). This characterization, however, is not ideal, as it has 
been argued by various authors (see Schueler 1991; Zangwill 1998; Alvarez 
2010: 66ff.). Briefly, it cannot accommodate the desires of creatures who lack 
the ability to entertain propositions, such as babies and (most?) non-human 
animals. (See also Döring and Eker, Friedrich, this volume.)
(5.) A disposition may also be manifested in preventing, sustaining, etc. changes 
or processes that would otherwise occur—but this sort of manifestation is also in 
principle perceivable. For ease of exposition I shall talk of manifestations as 
occurrences but using the term to include all these things.
(6.) “Observable occurrences” is here to be contrasted with the internal 
manifestations I outline elsewhere. There are also neurophysiological changes 
inside the body correlated with desires, but I do not include these among the 
internal manifestations partly because they are in principle also observable—
though not without the aid of a special apparatus. Internal physiological changes 
could also count as, in some sense, external “manifestations” of a state of 
desiring—at least in the sense that they are correlated with the presence of the 
desire. But it matters that the identification of such neurophysiological changes 
as manifestations of a particular desire depends on their correlation with the 
external and internal manifestations described elsewhere.
(7.) Schwitzgebel (2002) makes a similar point about the manifestation of beliefs. 
This view is also found in Quine (1990).
(8.) I use the term purposive behavior to include intentional behavior, which is 
typically what we do for reasons (though there may be things done intentionally 
but not for a reason), but also the behavior of animals that are not capable of 
reasoning. And the term behavior is intended to include linguistic behavior as 
well as refrainings, etc. (see Alvarez 2013).
(9.) So, for example, John Hyman (2014: 85) writes:
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A desire is manifested in two main ways: first, by purposive or goal-
directed behaviour, specifically, behaviour aimed at satisfying the desire, in 
other words, at getting what it is a desire to have, or at doing what it is a 
desire to do; and second, by feeling glad, pleased or relieved if the desire is 
satisfied, and sorry, displeased or disappointed if it is frustrated.
And he adds that there are other things related to desires that may be signs or 
symptoms of desires, but these are not manifestations of the desire. But even if 
it’s right that the mere physiological changes are not manifestations but only 
signs or symptoms of desire, Hyman’s range of possible manifestations seems 
too narrow. For in addition to purposive acting and feelings, there is a range of 
(intentional and non-intentional) mental activity as well as expressive non-
purposive behavior that seem legitimate candidates to be counted among 
possible manifestations of a desire. Unless we have a principled way of deciding 
what is a genuine manifestation of a desire, the claim that only goal-directed 
behavior and feelings of pleasure or displeasure concerning its satisfaction or 
frustration count as manifestations seems a stipulation.
(10.) The distinctive feature is also had by other psychological dispositional 
states, for instance, character traits and perhaps beliefs, although I shall not 
discuss those here.
(11.) “Typically” because it is claimed that there are physical dispositions that 
are unusual in that e.g. they “manifest spontaneously, without the need for 
stimulation” (Molnar 2003: 85), or others that do not have a categorial base. See
McKitrick 2003; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2006. But see Armstrong 1968.
(12.) See, e.g., Martin 2008: ch. 2.
(13.) See Cross (2012) for a summary.
(14.) Being a smoker is a habit which is also normally dispositional, i.e. disposes 
the subject to certain manifestations, while being generous is a character trait. I 
have argued for this view of character traits in Alvarez 2015.
(15.) Thus, some philosophers have privileged one of these concepts (action, 
pleasure, conscious thoughts, etc.) over others in characterizing desires, or have 
even claimed that the preferred concept is what desires reduce to. Recently, Tim 
Schroeder (2004) has criticized many traditional positions and proposed an 
alternative, based on the idea that desire is “a natural kind” essentially linked to 
the concept of reward (though the somewhat technical concept of reward is 
deployed in the empirical literature he discusses.). It is not possible to do justice 
to Schroeder’s arguments here, but it is worth noting that his criticisms of the 
rival theories he examines are not effective against the sort of pluralist 
conception of desires suggested above.
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(16.) I’m putting aside the possibility of life after death because if there is such a 
thing, one would be able to manifest one’s desires then, if only mentally.
(17.) It seems, moreover, that desires have no necessary triggers for their 
manifestation. The presence of the object of desire may sometimes act as a 
trigger for the desire to be manifested, but one may manifest a desire in the 
absence of the object of desire or anything connected to it; indeed, the 
manifestation may consist precisely in spontaneously imagining, thinking about, 
or seeking the object of desire (say, water, or a new house) in spite of its total 
absence in the agent’s environment, indeed in spite of its non-existence. I do not 
mean that nothing will have triggered these thoughts, images, etc. but rather 
that there is no specific kind of occurrence that is necessary to trigger the 
manifestation of a desire.
(18.) Of course if the desire is satisfied, it will not be manifested further, but 
then it is a desire that the agent no longer has. Note that to have what one 
wants need not be to have one’s desire satisfied if one’s desire is, e.g. to keep 
what one has.
(19.) My suggestion is in the same spirit as the views defended in Schroeder 
(2001) and Tanney (2009). I do not take myself to be arguing against the claim 
that reason/desire explanations are in some sense also causal, for reasons given 
in the following paragraphs above.
(20.) For instance, in Davidson’s neo-Humean terms? In terms of 
counterfactuals? As Anscombe ([1971] 1993: 91) suggests, simply in terms of 
“the derivativeness of an effect from its causes”? In some other way?
(21.) Applied to our topic: an action may be caused by a desire and yet not be a 
manifestation of that desire if it is not caused “in the right way.”
(22.) I would like to thank Edgar Phillips, Lucy Campbell, and audiences at 
several seminars where I presented this paper, as well as the editors and referee 
for this collection for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. This 
paper was completed during my tenure of a Leverhulme Trust Major Research 
Fellowship, and I thank the Trust for the award of the fellowship.
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IF WE LOOK inside ourselves, as the traditional metaphor goes, we see myriad 
doubts, memories, fears, regrets, loves, and desires. Some people desire to see 
the ocean; others aspire to become great musicians; Romeo pines for Juliet. 
Despite the pivotal role of desire in our lives, the nature of desire has rarely 
been addressed in detail in the philosophical literature.1 What are desires? How 
do desires represent the world, and how are we to understand their 
intentionality? The aim of this inquiry is to investigate these questions. Given 
that the liver was thought to be the seat of desire in a tradition that started with 
Plato and remained influential in the Middle Ages, we may echo Blaise Pascal’s 
famous “Logic of the Heart” by describing this as an attempt at discovering the 
“Logic of the Liver.”2
Allow me to start with a thought experiment in order to approach the issue with 
a more intuitive touch. Imagine a world inhabited by creatures that are exactly 
like us in all respects but one. They have doubts, memories, and maybe even 
emotions and sentiments similar to ours. But unlike us, they have no desires 
whatsoever. The relevant question is the following: How exactly would this 
desireless world differ from the actual world, where desire is ubiquitous?
In the history of philosophy as well as in the contemporary literature, two 
prevailing answers to this question have been put forward, which correspond to 
two classical views of desire.
On the first conception, which is Aristotelian in spirit, desires are essentially 
positive evaluations.3 Roughly, desiring a state of affairs is representing it as 
being good. In desiring to see the ocean, say, one positively evaluates this state 
of affairs. On this view, a desireless world would be a  (p.140) world of 
creatures that do not evaluate anything in a positive light or, at least, that are 
deprived of the positive evaluation constituted by desire.
According to the second classical view, which is Humean in spirit, desires are 
essentially motivational states. Desiring that p, it is claimed, is being motivated 
to act in such a way that p obtains.4 For instance, desiring to visit Los Angeles is 
to be moved to act so as to realize this state of affairs. Desireless creatures 
would be inert or would at least lack the motivational “oomph” characteristic of 
desire. This conception of desire is often taken for granted in the philosophical, 
psychological and neuroscientific literature.5
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My purpose is to explore and question these two classical pictures so as to 
motivate an alternative approach: the deontic view of desire. On this conception, 
the key to understanding desire is neither goodness nor motivation but a deontic 
feature: norms of the “ought-to-be” type. Some states of affairs are such that 
they ought to obtain, and desire, I claim, bears an essential relation to what 
ought to be. More precisely, the proposal is that desires involve a specific way or 
manner of representing content: a deontic mode. To desire p is to represent p as 
what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Desiring to live in New 
York is representing this state of affairs as what ought to be. Desire thus involves 
the “guise of the ought-to-be,” so to speak.
To proceed carefully, it is worth formulating three desiderata that an appealing 
view of desire’s intentionality should meet. This will provide the guidelines for 
our exploration.
According to the “direction of fit” metaphor, beliefs are supposed to conform to 
the world, whereas the world is supposed to conform to our desires.6 This 
contrast appears clearly in cases of mismatch. Suppose Sam believes that it is 
sunny in London, when it is, in fact, raining. What should be modified is his 
belief, not the facts. Beliefs thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit. Consider 
now that Sam desires that it is sunny, when it is raining. Much to his 
displeasure, his desire is frustrated. Yet this is not a sufficient reason for him to 
get rid of or modify his desire, since doing so may well amount to a form of 
cheating or resentment. As illustrated in La Fontaine’s story of sour grapes, 
there is something wrong in discarding a desire solely on the grounds that it is 
doomed to frustration: the fox is wrong in believing the grapes are sour and in 
ceasing to desire them just because he could not get them. If anything, and as 
far as the satisfaction of desire is concerned, the world should change so as to fit 
the desire: desire thus has the world-to-mind direction of fit.7 Much more could 
be said, since the interpretation of this metaphor has proven very controversial. 
 (p.141) What is important in the present context, though, is that any promising 
view of desire’s intentionality should be compatible with and account for the 
intuition that desire has the world-to-mind direction of fit.8
While the first desideratum concerns the relation between desire and the world, 
the next two desiderata concern the relation between a subject’s desires and her 
other mental states. Sometimes desires are partly explained by other mental 
states, such as the subject’s affective dispositions. In other cases, desires partly 
explain other mental states, such as intentions. Sam desires to go New York 
because he likes to go to New York, and this desire in turn explains why he 
intends to go there. Explanations of this type are crucial for understanding 
people’s behavior. Any elegant theory of desire’s intentionality should be 
compatible with the explanatory relations that desires bear with other mental 
states and should ideally explain these relations. Call this desideratum
“consonance.”
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By contrast, some relations between desire and other representations are 
dissonant. One such dissonance is the combination of a desire with the belief 
that the desire is satisfied. Imagine that Sam desires to see Niagara Falls. Mary 
offers to take him there. There they are, enjoying the breathtaking panorama. At 
some point, Sam says, “I want to see Niagara Falls.” “Sam, you are seeing 
Niagara Falls,” replies a quite surprised Mary. We understand Mary’s 
astonishment. It is strange to express a desire to see something while in the 
midst of seeing it. Sam might express a desire to continue seeing the Falls, but 
this is a different desire than a desire simply to see the Falls. How could he 
desire simply to see the Falls while he is seeing them and is aware of his doing 
so? It appears that desire is incompatible with the representation that its 
content obtains. Let us call this phenomenon the “death of desire” principle. 
According to this principle, a desire for p ceases to exist once the subject 
represents that p obtains, for instance once one starts believing that p.9 In other 
words, desires are about states of affairs that are not represented as actual. This 
principle is often taken for granted in the literature and has a long pedigree—
from Plato and Aquinas to Descartes, Locke, Hobbes, and Sartre.10 To the extent 
that it is true, an attractive theory of desire’s intentionality should be compatible
with and ideally illuminate this principle.11
A theory of desire should thus strive to account for desire’s direction of fit, as 
well as for the aforementioned consonant and dissonant combinations of desire 
with other mental phenomena. In what follows, I shall examine the extent to 
which the evaluative (§1) and motivational (§2) conceptions of desire meet this 
constraint. The upshot is that these classical views do not adequately satisfy 
those desiderata, which calls for a  (p.142) revisionary account of desire. In the 
last section (§3), I argue that adopting the deontic conception of desire is the 
best alternative.
1. Desire and the Good: The Evaluative Conception
Imagine that you desire to listen to Brahms’s 4th Symphony. From a first-person 
perspective, listening to this symphony seems good to you in some way (e.g. it 
seems pleasant). The thesis that desire involves a positive evaluation is almost a 
dogma in philosophy, tracing back to Plato. It is nicely captured by the 
Scholastic formula of the “guise of the good”: Nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione 
boni” (There is nothing that is desired, except under the appearance of the 
good).12 After all, how could one desire something without seeing any good in it? 
One way of accounting for this facet of desires is to think of them as positive 
evaluations.13 There are different ways of understanding this idea, so let us 
present a variety of specific shapes the evaluative conception can take (§1.1) 
before raising three challenges to this view (§1.2).
1.1. Types of Evaluative Views
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The most influential form of the evaluative approach to desire—the perceptual 
model—relies on an analogy between perceptual experience and desire. The 
relation between desire and the good is alleged to mirror that between, say, 
visual perception and colors and shapes.14 As vision presents us with colors and 
shapes, desire presents us with the good. Since perceptual experiences can be 
understood as being sensory seemings or appearances, the analogy amounts to 
conceiving of desires as being value seemings or appearances of the good.15
Defenders of this view emphasize similarities between desire and perceptual 
experiences. For instance, both are representations held from a particular 
perspective. Seeing the stars in the sky involves a determinate perspective, 
namely that of a particular human being who is located miles away from the 
stars. Similarly, moving from spatial to evaluative perspectives, going to the 
opera tonight may appear good to me, but not to Sally, depending on our 
respective cares and concerns.16 Whatever the merit of the analogy, one needs 
not adopt it to defend the evaluative conception, since there exist at least two 
other versions of the latter.17
According to the doxastic model of the evaluative approach, desires are 
evaluative beliefs—to desire p is to believe that p is good.18 On this view, as in 
the perceptual model, values are part of desire’s content. Yet it is common to 
think that representations involve an intentional mode in  (p.143) addition to 
content—an idea that can be exploited to defend a third variant of the evaluative 
approach.
Consider belief. Intuitively, in believing something (say, that the cat is on the 
mat), one represents this thing as being true or as actual. By contrast, 
remembering something seems to involve a different manner of representing it, 
namely as belonging to the past. In both cases, there is a specific way in which 
content is represented: a way that seems essential to the psychological type 
under consideration. In this respect, intentional modes should not be confused 
with traditional modes of presentation, the latter not being essential to types of 
representations. For instance, seeing a cup from above and seeing one from the 
right involve distinct modes of presentation. Yet both representations belong to 
the same psychological type: visual perception. Intentional modes are thus more 
than a manner of representing—they are ways of representing that are good 
candidates for distinguishing between types of representations.
Just as belief might be understood as representing a state of affairs as actual and 
memory might be conceived as the representation of a state of affairs as past, 
where this is part of the manner of representing, desire can be thought as 
representing a state of affairs as good. On this proposal, the value is part of the 
mode in which the content is represented.19
1.2. The Evaluative Conception and the Desiderata
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Whatever the variant of the evaluative view one favors, it appears that the 
conception faces major challenges corresponding to the aforementioned 
desiderata.20
1.2.1. Evaluation and the “Death of Desire” Principle
Does the axiological view meet the death of desire or the intuition that one 
cannot desire a state of affairs that is represented as actual? The answer 
depends, of course, on how appealing to a sort of evaluation fares in this respect. 
And there are reasons to think that evaluations do not fare very well.
First, evaluations are compatible with believing that their content obtains. Such 
beliefs are sometimes even required by evaluative states. For instance, how 
could one be happy that Mary is on one’s side and thus positively evaluate this 
state of affairs, if one did not believe her to be on one’s side? Since the “death of 
desire” principle consists in the claim that desires are incompatible with the 
representation that their content obtains, it appears that conceiving of desire 
along evaluative lines does not fit well with the principle.
 (p.144) The aficionado of the evaluative conception might reply that this does 
not prevent desire from constituting a type of evaluation that, unlike other ones, 
satisfies this desideratum.21 Nothing in the axiological view should lead us to 
think that no sort of evaluation meets this constraint. Still, one important 
question arises: Why think that the evaluation at stake in desire satisfies this 
principle, while other types of evaluation do not? In the absence of a convincing 
answer to this question, the reply seems ad hoc.
Second, given that not all evaluations satisfy the “death of desire” principle, the 
axiological view has difficulty explaining this feature of desire, which is 
something a theory of desire should ideally do. Even if one assumes that some 
types of evaluation satisfy the relevant principle, this would still have to be 
conceived as a brute fact or, at least, as a facet that cannot be explained by 
desire’s evaluative nature only. The question remains: Why is it odd for Sam to 
desire seeing Niagara Falls when he is aware of seeing them?
A friend of the evaluative view might go so far as to reject the “death of desire” 
principle, one’s modus tollens being another’s modus ponens. In fact, the 
evaluative view fares well with the denial of the “death of desire” principle.22
However, even if one is convinced that the principle is not true for all desires, it 
remains to be shown why it is a paradigmatic feature of many desires—and 
appealing to their evaluative nature may prove insufficient in this regard.
I shall now emphasize that similar worries for the evaluative conception arise in 
connection with the direction of fit desideratum, mounting further evidence that 
the evaluative approach is unable to account for the intuitive features of desire.
1.2.2. Evaluation and Direction of Fit
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Does the axiological view provide a plausible picture of desire’s direction of fit, 
i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires? The answer to 
this question depends on the direction of fit of the evaluations recruited by one’s 
approach to desire. Unfortunately for the defender of the axiological view, 
evaluations generally seem to have the mind-to-world direction of fit, unlike that 
of desire.
Paying attention to the satisfaction conditions and the correctness conditions of a 
representation will reveal why. A belief is satisfied if, and only if, its content 
obtains, i.e. when it is true. Since true beliefs are nothing but correct beliefs, it 
follows that beliefs’ satisfaction conditions are identical to their correctness 
conditions. By contrast, the satisfaction of desires does not amount to those 
desires being accurate: correct desires might be frustrated  (p.145) (unlucky, 
virtuous Juliet), and incorrect desires might be fulfilled (lucky, vicious Romeo). 
The algorithm is thus the following: When its conditions of satisfaction and 
correctness are identical, a representation has the mind-to-world direction of fit; 
otherwise it has the world-to-mind direction of fit.23
With this algorithm in mind, our question can be reformulated as follows: Are 
the satisfaction conditions of evaluations identical to their correctness 
conditions? On the face of it, the answer is positive—a positive evaluation of an 
object or a state of affairs is satisfied if, and only if, that object or state of affairs 
is good, which amounts to the evaluation being accurate. This is plausible for 
evaluative beliefs, but also for emotions, which can be understood as another 
type of evaluative state with the mind-to-world direction of fit.24 This is exactly 
what is expected from evaluations insofar as they are meant to inform us about 
what is good or bad for us. After all, why should the world conform to our 
evaluations? So it appears that evaluations have the direction of fit opposite to 
that of desire.
As before, it might simply be assumed as primitive fact that desire is a type of 
evaluation that has the world-to-mind direction of fit. But this reply appears to 
be as suspiciously ad hoc as the one we considered in relation to the “death of 
desire” principle. And if the key to understanding desire is its being an 
evaluation, then desire’s evaluative nature should help explain its direction of fit. 
However, the evaluative view seems to fail to deliver such an explanation, since 
evaluations typically instantiate the opposite direction of fit.25 The intuition that 
the world should conform to our desires remains enigmatic.
1.2.3. Evaluative Consonance
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One day, on a whim, I wanted a paper plane. You might wonder why. When 
confronted with an apparently awkward desire, pointing out the features of the 
desired object that one regards as desirable gives some intelligibility to the 
desire.26 As soon as I tell you that I find paper planes to be beautiful, the 
mystery surrounding my desire may vanish a little. These explanations amount 
to specifying the manner in which something is positively evaluated. 
Furthermore, desires can be explained with reference to various types of 
evaluation. Sam may desire to swim in the river because doing so seems good to 
him (i.e. in virtue of an appearance of the good) or because he represents 
swimming in the river as good (i.e. in virtue of the evaluative manner of 
representing content), and so on for other types of positive evaluation.
Now, it is tempting to think that these sorts of explanations are at least partly 
causal explanations: the fact that one evaluates a state of affairs  (p.146) 
positively causes one to desire that state. This means that the axiological view 
faces an immediate challenge. Causal relations are irreflexive: they require 
distinct relata. For instance, the statement “p because p,” understood as “the 
cause of p is p,” does not constitute an explanation: when one wonders why it 
rains and is answered “Because it rains,” one has not been provided with an 
explanation. If desires were positive evaluations, then explaining a desire for 
something by a positive evaluation of this thing would be similarly vacuous. As 
outlined, however, explaining desires by positive evaluation is far from being 
vacuous. This should lead us to conclude that the axiological picture cannot 
make sense of our intuitions regarding the sorts of explanations to which desires 
are subject.27
If this is correct, it appears that the evaluative conception does not satisfy our 
desiderata adequately. However, a positive moral emerges: evaluations can be 
the grounds of desire.28 Desire can involve the “guise of the good” without being
an evaluation but in virtue of depending on an evaluation. This nicely captures 
the intuition driving the axiological view while avoiding its difficulties. A world in 
which creatures do not evaluate anything would, indeed, be a desireless world. 
However, this is the case because evaluation is a necessary condition for desire
—not because desire is a kind of evaluation. It is time now to turn our attention 
to the second classical conception of desire.
2. Desire and Action: The Motivational Conception
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Juliet intensely desires to see Romeo. It is likely that this strong desire will give 
her the motivation to act in ways that will make this desire come true. She might 
not know how to do so. She might hesitate. She might be afraid of satisfying this 
desire. Still, she is disposed to realize it. According to the motivational 
conception of desire, this is the key to understanding desire. On this very 
popular view, desire is nothing but a motivational state.29 Since motivation is 
considered to be desire’s function, this picture corresponds to the standard 
functionalist approach to desire. In this section, I shall present the motivational 
conception (§2.1) before assessing it in light of our three desiderata (§2.2).
2.1. The Motivational Dogma
The standard way of defining desire in motivational terms is by conceiving it as a 
disposition to act in favor of the obtaining of its content.30 In other  (p.147) 
words, in desiring p, a subject is disposed to act in favor of p or, at least, in ways 
she believes will bring about p. For instance, desiring to contemplate the stars is 
being disposed to act in such a way that is conducive (or so we believe it to be) 
to being absorbed by them. Since desires are understood as dispositions to act, 
this view is compatible with the existence of desires that do not manifest 
themselves in actions and, more controversially, with desiring subjects who are 
not actually motivated to act. In desiring to change the past, for instance, Romeo 
might not be actually motivated to act in such a way that what he desires comes 
about. In this case, it is reasonable to explain the absence of actual motivation 
by the idea that being actually motivated to act requires believing that one has 
the power to realize the desire—a belief that Romeo does not hold. Yet although 
Romeo is not actually motivated to act, he is still disposed to act so that the 
desired state of affairs obtains. Were he to believe that he could erase the past, 
he would try to do so, all things being equal.31
One might think that the standard motivational conception is at odds with a first-
person approach to the intentionality of desire that aims at capturing how 
desires represent their content. After all, the dispositional picture is silent on 
this point; it seems to capture desire from the outside, so to speak. A more 
promising approach is to construe desires as involving a motivational mode. On 
this variant, desiring a state of affairs is representing it as a goal or as what 
ought to be done.32 For instance, desiring to see Juliet is representing this state 
as a goal or as what ought to be done. Be that as it may, is a motivational 
approach to desire more promising than an evaluative one? I shall argue that 
this is not the case as motivational and evaluative accounts face the same 
problems.33
2.2. The Motivational Conception and the Desiderata
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This last assertion may be surprising. At first glance, one might be inclined to 
think that the motivational conception has the resources to meet the three 
desiderata. First, the standard interpretation of the direction of fit is 
motivational in spirit: the fact that the world should conform to our desires—the 
world-to-mind direction of fit—is usually equated with the thought that desires 
dispose us to act. Second, the motivational view also seems to be in a position to 
satisfy the “death of desire” principle. After all, one is not disposed to act in 
favor of a state of affairs that one believes already obtains. How could 
Desdemona be disposed to marry Othello if she were aware that she had already 
married him? Finally, dispositions to act appear to lend themselves to being 
explained by evaluations in  (p.148) the same way as desires. Romeo’s 
disposition to visit the MoMA can be explained by his positive evaluation of this 
state, just like his desire to visit the MoMA. On these grounds, it is tempting to 
adopt the motivational conception of desire. However, I think that this 
temptation should be resisted. Let us begin with what may well be the most 
surprising claim, namely the one concerning direction of fit.
2.2.1. Motivation and Direction of Fit
According to the standard interpretation, the world-to-mind direction of fit 
amounts to the following. In the case of a mismatch between desire and the 
world, i.e. when a desire is frustrated, one should not change the desire. Rather 
(and this is where the motivational view enters the picture), the subject should 
act in such a way that the desire will be satisfied.34 For this is desire’s function.
One general problem with the motivational conception and the aforementioned 
interpretation of the world-to-mind direction of fit hangs on the satisfaction 
conditions of dispositions to act and, more generally, of motivational states. 
Indeed, it is natural to think that the satisfaction conditions of motivational 
states consist in the subject intentionally acting. If Sam is disposed to go to 
London, his disposition is realized or satisfied when he intentionally goes there. 
This is explicit in the functionalist picture of desire, especially in its 
teleosemantic version.35 In case this intuition is not shared, let me emphasize 
that desire’s satisfaction conditions should bear a particular relation to action in 
order for the motivational view to secure an essential link between desire and 
action. The worry is that the satisfaction conditions of desire refer to the 
obtaining of its content, which can happen independently of the subject’s action. 
The desire that it rains, say, is satisfied by the fact that it rains, period. If this is 
on the right track, then the conclusion is that the motivational approach does 
not deliver the right satisfaction conditions for desires.36
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This in turn has an impact on the direction of fit desideratum, since the direction 
of fit of a representation is conditioned on its satisfaction.37 Indeed, the world 
should conform to our desires only insofar as their satisfaction is concerned. For 
instance, all things considered, the world should not conform to our immoral 
desires, as this would lead to a world of evil. Yet as far as the satisfaction of 
those desires is concerned, it remains true that the world should conform to 
them, although this consideration is defeated by their immoral nature. Since it 
appears that the motivational view does not deliver the right satisfaction 
conditions for desires, it is difficult to see how it could account for their 
direction of fit in an appealing way.
 (p.149) In fact, it delivers counterintuitive verdicts in situations where the 
content of a desire obtains independently of the subject’s action. If satisfaction 
consists in the subject’s acting such that the desire’s content obtains, the desire 
will not count as satisfied when the subject gets what she wants independently 
of her actions. Hence the world should still conform to the desire. This sounds 
far-fetched, to put it mildly. Even if it assumed that the desire is satisfied in such 
circumstances, the norm that the subject act so as to satisfy the desire has not 
been met. This is problematic, as the following case will illustrate.
Imagine that Romeo desires to see Juliet and can arrange a meeting by writing a 
letter to her. Before having the opportunity to do so, he meets her in Venice by 
pure chance. According to the motivational interpretation of desire’s direction of 
fit, Romeo should have acted to bring about the satisfaction of his desire. But he 
did not comply with this norm. We should then conclude that something went 
wrong: Romeo’s behavior was inappropriate or dysfunctional. But this is absurd: 
Romeo did nothing wrong, and such cases seem far from dysfunctional. Isn’t it 
ideal to get what one wants without making any effort? One might reply that the 
inappropriate character of Romeo’s behavior is defeated by other 
considerations: Romeo has been prevented from acting, and ultimately the right 
result happened, provided that this reunion is a good thing. Yet this reply should 
lead one to suspect that what matters for desire satisfaction is that the content 
of the desire obtains, whether in the presence of action or in its absence. After 
all, the satisfaction conditions of desire do not make any reference to action, so 
why put so much emphasis on action? A conception of desire that clearly implies 
that desires are satisfied when their content obtains is more elegant.
Consequently, it is not clear that desire’s direction of fit should be equated with 
the norm that desiring subjects act so as to satisfy their desire. Rather, a more 
modest norm suggests itself: that the world should change for the desire to be 
satisfied. The motivational conception might well make sense of the direction of 
fit of intentions or dispositions to act, since the satisfaction conditions of those 
phenomena are constituted by actions. Still, as far as desire is concerned, the 
view seems to be slightly off target. And the reason is that it fails to capture the 
right conditions of desire gratification.
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2.2.2. Motivation and the “Death of Desire” Principle
As emphasized earlier, it is tempting to think that the motivational approach has 
the resources to meet the “death of desire” desideratum. For subjects  (p.150) 
are not disposed to bringing about states of affairs they believe already obtain.38
As intuitive as this may sound, I think this explanation is suspect.
First, according to the “death of desire” principle, a desire for a state of affairs 
ceases to exist when one represents that one’s desire has been satisfied. The 
principle then appears to depend on the representation of desire’s satisfaction. 
Now, if the motivational view delivers the wrong picture of desire’s satisfaction 
conditions, as I argued, it cannot elegantly meet the desideratum on the death of 
desire either. This argument relies on the same considerations as the ones 
presented in section 2.2.1, so let us turn our attention to a further problem.
In order to make full sense of the “death of desire” principle, the motivational 
view should explain the apparent incompatibility between desiring p and 
representing p as obtaining. Why are we not disposed to act in favor of states of 
affairs that we believe already obtain? It is quite plausible to think that one is 
disposed to act in favor of a state of affairs only if one believes that there is 
something one could do, albeit maybe in an ideal world, to bring it about. Now, if 
the state of affairs already obtains, then there is nothing one can do to bring it 
about. So, presumably, if a subject believes that a state of affairs obtains, she 
will not believe that there is something she could do to bring it about.39 The 
belief in a desire’s satisfaction thereby prevents one from being motivated, since 
it is incompatible with the belief that one can bring about the desire’s 
satisfaction. Believing that a desire is satisfied will thereby kill the desire.
Despite being intuitive, the story remains problematic. Imagine that Othello 
believes that a state of affairs obtains and also believes that he can change the 
past. He will very likely believe that he can act in favor of the obtaining of this 
state, despite his belief that the state already obtains. It is thus not clear why 
believing that a state obtains should require the absence of the belief that one 
could act in its favor. And since no alternative motivational story of the “death of 
desire” principle suggests itself, the lesson is that the motivational view fails to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of it.
This observation should lead us to worry whether the motivational conception is 
compatible with the “death of desire” principle in the first place. Imagine that 
Othello believes that he had a gin and tonic, while also believing that he can go 
back in time. He might still be disposed to act in favor of having this very same 
drink, despite believing that he has just had it. Indeed, were he to travel back in 
time and at this point have the desire for this cocktail again, he would act so as 
to have it again. It is important to remind the reader that, in order to account for 
desires that do not involve  (p.151) actual motivation, the motivational view 
should provide room for such counterfactual motivation, as outlined earlier.40
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This case would be harmless if desires did not vanish when subjects believe both 
that they can bring about a state of affairs and that this same state of affairs 
obtains. However, restricting the principle in this way is not really an option. 
Even if Othello believes that he can travel back in time, he might cease to desire 
to drink this particular gin and tonic at the instant he believes that he just drank 
it. True, as soon as he believes that he has traveled back in time, he might again 
desire that cocktail. But this might be because he then believes that he did not
have this very same gin and tonic. In this respect, dispositions to act differ from 
desires: even before he traveled back in time, and despite believing that he just 
had this gin and tonic, Othello is disposed to have this drink. According to the 
motivational view, one should conclude that he still desires so. Yet, as just 
emphasized, this conclusion is counterintuitive. As far-fetched as this scenario 
may seem, it reveals that the motivational conception does not account for the 
death of desire: when one represents that a desire is satisfied, the desire 
vanishes, yet the disposition to act may still remain alive.
2.2.3. Motivational Consonance
We commonly explain one’s motivations with reference to one’s evaluations in 
the same way as we do for desire. At first sight, the motivational view thus 
seems well placed to illuminate the explanation of desires. But does it capture 
explanations by desires?
Consider the following explanation. Mary loves the Metropolitan Opera. This is 
why she desires to go to the Metropolitan Opera. And she is disposed to go to the 
Metropolitan Opera because she desires to go to there. The more we know about 
Mary’s mental states, the more we understand why she is disposed to act in this 
way. One explanation of the disposition is provided by her desire, which is in 
turn grounded in a positive evaluation (love). Although the mention of Mary’s 
desire might be insufficient to justify her disposition to act, prima facie it 
provides a partial explanation of it. Moreover, the explanation seems to be partly 
causal: the desire causes and might also be the reason for her motivation.
Now, given the already mentioned irreflexivity of causal relations, such 
explanations turn out to be vacuous if desires are nothing but dispositions to act. 
Yet intuitively, these explanations appear to be informative. It thus seems that 
the motivational view fails to make sense of desire’s explanatory power.
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 (p.152) This argument of course relies on a conception of motivation that the 
defender of the motivational conception of desire is unlikely to share. On this 
approach, desiring just is being motivated, and the alleged explanatory relations 
are vacuous. By contrast, our argument invites us to think of motivation as being 
partly dependent on desire rather than as being identical to it.41 In order to 
motivate this picture, it is fruitful to consult our modal intuitions about cases in 
which someone desires a state of affairs but is not disposed to act in its favor. If 
such inert desires are conceivable, then we have a reason to think of desire as 
grounding motivation rather than being a motivation.42
Imagine that Romeo is suffering from a particular type of depression. His 
depression is such that it has deprived him of having any dispositions to act. 
Still, it is conceivable that he desires certain states of affairs. He might desire 
that his beloved Juliet fares well, despite not being disposed to do anything to 
bring this about. This case should not be confused with others in which a person 
fails to be motivated to act so as to satisfy some desire because a second, 
stronger desire of hers outweighs the motivation of the first one. In the case 
under discussion, Romeo has no stronger desire, nor is he lacking the modal 
beliefs necessary for being disposed to act. He strongly wants that p, has no 
conflicting desire, and believes that he can act in favor of p, yet fails to be 
disposed to act. The depression has not only masked the manifestation of the 
disposition; it has damaged the motivational system. This, I contend, is 
conceivable. Empirical studies even suggest that patients suffering from 
Parkinson’s disease or akinetic mutism manifest this kind of inertia, despite the 
fact that these people seem to have desires.43 Moreover, the intuitive verdict of 
such cases is instructive: it is natural to diagnose Romeo as suffering from 
strong practical irrationality, or at least from an absence of practical rationality. 
This suggests that desires provide some reason to be disposed to act in favor of 
their satisfaction, although they might do so with the help of the evaluation on 
which they are based. This is one way that desires can ground motivations.
If this argument is on the right track, then it appears that motivation is at most a 
sufficient condition for desire but not a necessary one. A desireless world could 
thus be a world without motivation, possibly inhabited by totally passive 
creatures. But this is explained by desires grounding motivations rather than 
being identical with them. The motivational “oomph” of desire could then be 
captured by means of this grounding relation.
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To sum up the dialectical situation, the classical conceptions of desire face 
inverted problems. On the one hand, axiological views focus on a necessary but 
insufficient condition for desire by outlining the evaluative  (p.153) ground of 
desire. On the other hand, motivational views focus on what is at most a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for desire, as they put emphasis on 
motivations based on desire. If this is correct, then the grain of truth in these 
approaches concerns the grounding relations instantiated by desire: what is 
grounded on desire (motivation) and what desire is grounded in (evaluation). 
This is why they seem to miss what they should capture: this thing called desire.
This conclusion has been motivated by means of philosophical exploration, but 
the neuroscientific evidence on desire points our inquiry in the same direction. It 
is almost a dogma in neuroscience that desires are involved in the reward 
system and are related to the neurotransmitter dopamine.44 According to the 
neuroscientific picture, desire comes with an anticipation of reward that 
regulates motivation and is in turn regulated by the experience of the actual 
reward. One important challenge is to translate these findings in folk-
psychological terms so as to shed light on the intentionality of desire. In this 
respect, Schroeder has done substantial work in claiming that the 
neuroscientific findings call for a picture of desire that differs from the classical 
ones. He argues that equating desire with an evaluative cognition fares poorly in 
the face of the empirical evidence.45 Similarly, he claims that the neuroscientific 
picture does not favor the motivational conception of desire.46 It goes far beyond 
the scope of this essay to discuss this issue in detail. However, as far as our 
dialectic is concerned, it seems that the conclusions drawn so far in this chapter 
are in line with Schroeder’s interpretation of the neuroscientific evidence. 
Furthermore, studies reveal that motivation is strongly influenced by desire and, 
in turn, by positive anticipation. It thus appears that the neuroscientific picture 
of desire aligns itself with the moral that has emerged: positive evaluation might 
ground desire, and desire might ground motivation. In light of the empirical 
evidence, Schroeder has proposed to identify desires with representations of 
rewards.47 I venture that the deontic view of desire is one way of understanding 
what representations of rewards are from a first-person perspective. In section 
3, I argue that the deontic conception can fill the explanatory gap between 
evaluation and motivation that has appeared on a priori grounds and that our 
neuroscientific interlude has corroborated.
3. Desire and Ought-to-Be: The Deontic Conception
What if desires, like vows, prayers, and demands, were essentially deontic 
representations, i.e. representations concerning what should be the  (p.154) 
case? Desiring to live in New York would amount to being somehow struck by 
the fact that one’s living there is how things should be. This is the intuition that 
drives the deontic conception of desire defended in this essay. This section 
presents this view (§3.1) and sketches three arguments in its favor (§3.2).
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3.1. The Deontic View
The deontic conception I shall defend has it that desiring is representing a state 
of affairs as what ought to be or as what should be, where this captures the 
deontic mode of representing.
Given that this proposal refers to norms of the ought-to-be type, let me say a few 
words about them. There is a plethora of norms: one ought to keep one’s 
promises, to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering, and to eat properly, etc. In 
these examples, the word ought refers to the obligation for given subjects to act 
in certain ways. We use the same word ought with a closely related but distinct 
purpose when we say, for instance, that cancer ought not to exist, that Mary 
being happy is how things should be, or that things turned out the way they 
should have. Prima facie, no appeal to obligation to act in a certain way seems 
necessary to explain these uses of ought. I shall assume here that the latter are 
ought-to-be norms—they are about states of affairs—and should be contrasted 
with ought-to-do norms.48 For the remainder of my discussion, it is important to 
keep in mind that the deontic view appeals exclusively to ought-to-be norms.49
It is another feature of the deontic conception that it rests on the distinction 
between mode and content.50 Desiring p is representing p as what ought to be
or, if one prefers, as what should be. The content of a desire is a state of affairs 
(typically a non-deontic one), while its deontic character is taken care of at the 
level of the mode of representing the content. Desires are thus distinct from 
deontic beliefs: while deontic beliefs take deontic states of affairs as their 
content, desires involve a deontic manner of representing. In order to clarify the 
contrast, let me formulate an analogous proposal for belief. In believing p (say, 
that it rains), one represents p as obtaining or as actual. Within this picture, the 
difference between desire and belief consists in the presence either of a deontic 
or of an “existential” feature in the respective modes.51 Most philosophers 
acknowledge the existence of intentional modes but often assume that they are 
reducible to functional roles.52 On my proposal, it is important to observe that 
the deontic mode is irreducible to the functional role of desire, namely 
motivation.53 My approach takes modes seriously and uses  (p.155) them to 
unravel desire’s semantics, which, I think, was the credo of early 
phenomenologists.54
To my knowledge, there are no advocates of the deontic view in the 
contemporary literature, but Velleman and Massin defend related accounts.55
Meinong, however, if I interpret him correctly, has proposed this picture of 
desire.56 Be that as it may, the conception has the resources to meet our three 
desiderata, or so I will argue.
3.2. The Deontic View and the Desiderata
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The main idea is that ought-to-be norms are all we need to make sense of our 
desiderata because these norms instantiate the properties that were singled out 
in each desideratum. Let us address them in turn.
3.2.1. Direction of Fit and Ought-to-Be
Let us assume that there is a sense in which norms have a direction of fit. This 
sense might not be literal. Directions of fit are features of representations, and 
considering that norms may not be representations, the assumption may seem 
far-fetched. But there are reasons to think it is not. If the idea of a direction of fit 
is to be understood in terms of appropriate ways for fit or satisfaction to obtain, 
then norms may well have a direction of fit. Norms, like desires, can be satisfied 
in the sense that their content can obtain. More importantly, in cases of 
mismatch between a norm and the world, it is clear that what should be 
changed, all things being equal, is the world. Consider that Sam ought to keep 
his promise. It is an essential feature of this norm that what should be changed, 
if anything, is the world—not the norm. As in the case of desire, changing the 
norm rather than the world would amount to cheating. This facet of norms is 
what makes them crucial in regulating people’s behavior and ideally making the 
world a better place. This observation, of course, emerges from considering the 
satisfaction of norms and is entirely compatible with some norms being 
inappropriate and thus in need of being changed. Still, if we focus exclusively on 
satisfaction, even inappropriate norms are such that the world should conform 
to them. In all these respects, then, norms behave exactly like desires. Note too 
that the differences between ought-to-do and the ought-to-be norms are 
irrelevant here as there is no reason to think that these norms differ in this 
regard. It is essential to the norm according to which, say, it ought not to be that 
people die in terrible pain that the world should conform to it rather than the 
other way around.
 (p.156) This feature of norms, I contend, is the key to understanding the 
direction of fit of desire. Indeed, if desires involve a deontic mode, then the 
world must conform to them in order for satisfaction to obtain. The reason is 
that the world should meet norms. The contrast in direction of fit is made 
manifest when we focus on representations not involving a deontic mode. 
Consider the similar proposal made for beliefs. In believing that it rains, say, one 
represents the state of affairs that it rains as obtaining. Unlike desire, which 
involves a deontic manner of representing content, beliefs can be described from 
a first-person perspective without reference to any norm. After all, facts (i.e. 
what obtains) are not deontic entities, unlike norms. Since facts are not such 
that the world should conform to them, representing a state of affairs as 
obtaining does not imply that the world should conform to the representation. 
Rather, if anything, the representation of content as actual should conform to the 
facts, given that it represents its content as a fact. Beliefs thus come with the 
norm of conforming to reality, i.e. the mind-to-world direction of fit.
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The deontic view, then, is not only compatible with the direction of fit of desire; 
it also provides an appealing elucidation of this vexed metaphor. Desires have 
the world-to-mind direction of fit because they involve a deontic mode. In 
contrast to the evaluative conception, the proposal under discussion, grounded 
as it is in an essential feature of norms, is not ad hoc. Similarly, given its 
emphasis on ought-to-be rather than ought-to-do norms, the deontic view 
delivers the right satisfaction conditions for desire, unlike the motivational 
picture. The world should thus conform to our desires because the world is 
supposed to fit norms.
3.2.2. The “Death of Desire” Principle and Ought-to-Be
How does the deontic conception fare with the death of desire? Again, norms 
seem to satisfy a principle close to that of the death of desire.
Consider this sentence: “Sam ought to answer this question now, and Sam has 
answered this question now.” Prima facie, this sentence sounds odd. Intuitively, 
if Sam has answered the question, then it is not the case that he ought to answer 
it, for he just did. Likewise, if Sam ought to answer the question, then it is not 
the case that he did, precisely because answering it is what he ought to do. 
Within this sentence, then, the deontic operator does not coexist happily with 
the existential operator.
Now, there is prima facie no reason to think that the ought-to-be operator differs 
from the ought-to-do operator in this respect. It then follows that deontic 
operators are incompatible with the existential operator governing the very 
same content. In other words, norms are incompatible with the  (p.157) 
obtaining of their content. The norm is in place as long as its content does not 
obtain. As soon as its content is realized, it disappears. Norms do not survive 
their satisfaction. Or so it is intuitive to think.57
If there is indeed an incompatibility between a norm being in place and its being 
satisfied, then the following claim suggests itself: desires die when one believes 
that they are satisfied. For desire involves a deontic mode, while belief involves 
an existential one. As norms are incompatible with the facts that constitute their 
satisfaction, so are desires incompatible with beliefs about their actual 
satisfaction. Again, the symmetry between norms and desires is the key to 
explaining the “death of desire” principle.58
This being said, the deontic view is compatible with a more modest attitude vis-
à-vis the “death of desire” principle. There are apparent counterexamples to the 
principle. For instance, my desire to treat other people with respect seems 
compatible with my belief that I treat them with respect. The same is true of any 
desire about general or non-dated states of affairs.59
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It is important to recognize that any apparent counterexamples in the case of 
desires also have analogous counterparts in the case of norms.60 Indeed, if we 
focus our attention on general norms, e.g. the norm that one should respect 
other people, then one might start questioning the alleged incompatibility of 
norms with their satisfaction. After all, at least prima facie, some people do 
respect others while still being supposed to do so. Sometimes things are exactly 
as they should be.61 Since the deontic view is committed to an analogy between 
desires and norms, it is not committed to the truth of the “death of desire” 
principle but merely to the mirroring of desire and norms in relevant respects. It 
can accommodate counterexamples to the “death of desire” principle where 
there are symmetrical counterexamples to the claim that norms are 
incompatible with their satisfaction. Depending on one’s intuitions, one may 
endorse a stronger or weaker claim about the principle without impacting on the 
force of its deontic explanation.
The deontic conception can thus illuminate the “death of desire” principle 
whether or not the principle is true of all desire. Unlike the evaluative view, and 
provided that norms satisfy a similar principle to some extent, it does so without 
being ad hoc. In contrast with the motivational picture, it delivers the right 
satisfaction conditions while avoiding the problem that comes with an appeal to 
dispositions. Scheler already pointed out that norms are incompatible with facts 
and that representations of norms are in the same way incompatible with 
representations of facts.62 The originality of my proposal lies in equating the 
relevant representations of norms with desires, which shares the spirit of 
Meinong’s suggestion.63
 (p.158) 3.2.3. Consonance and Ought-to-Be
In light of our discussion of the classical conceptions of desire, the deontic 
proposal should provide room and account for the following explanatory 
relations: desires are partly explained by positive evaluations and can partly 
explain motivations. The deontic view appears to meet this requirement. It is 
intuitive to explain why Sam represents being in New York as what ought to be 
with reference to his positive evaluation of this state of affairs. Similarly, it 
makes sense to explain why Mary is motivated to go to Los Angeles with 
reference to her representing this state of affairs as what ought to be. Can we 
substantiate these intuitions further? The answer will depend on whether values, 
ought-to-be norms, and ought-to-do norms instantiate similar relations.
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At first approximation, this seems to be the case. It is natural to think that p 
ought to be because p is valuable.64 Consider the norm that it ought to be that 
people heed traffic lights. This norm seems to be grounded in the goodness of 
heeding traffic lights, which, in turn, is inherited from the value of life. Likewise, 
obligations to act in given ways seem to be explainable by what ought to be, i.e. 
the state of affairs resulting from the action required. Mary ought to go to Los 
Angeles because it ought to be that she lives there. This might constitute only 
part of the explanation of the ought-to-do norm. Appealing to the evaluative 
property grounding the norm will provide a (more) complete explanation. Still, 
since explanatory relations are (at least to some extent) transitive, this is 
compatible with the idea that ought-to-be norms partly explain ought-to-do 
norms.
Of course, much more can be said about the relations ought-to-be norms bear to 
values and ought-to-do norms.65 In particular, it should be shown that they are 
irreducible to these other entities, since reduction here would make the 
corresponding explanations vacuous.66 Yet on the face of it, the suggested 
articulation of the relations between values, ought-to-be norms, and ought to-do 
norms seems to be informative or, more to the point, as consonant as the 
explanatory relations holding between desires, evaluations, and motivations. 
Desires can explain motivations and be explained by evaluations because ought-
to-be norms ground ought-to-do norms and are built on goodness.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that the deontic conception of desire constitutes a 
promising approach to the intentionality of desire. Desiring is representing  (p.
159) a state of affairs as what ought to be. Indeed, classical views face the 
challenge of explaining desire’s direction of fit, accommodating the “death of 
desire” principle, and articulating satisfactorily the explanatory relations 
instantiated by desire. I claimed that the deontic view can meet the three crucial
desiderata, since norms of the ought-to-be type share the relevant properties. In 
a nutshell, the deontic mode elegantly espouses the contours of desire: desires 
and ought-to-be fit like hand and glove. This is not to say that the classical views 
of desire fail to capture anything about desire. Quite the contrary, in fact: if the 
deontic conception is correct, then the classical views of desire emphasize what 
appear to be the grounding relations instantiated by desire. In this respect, the 
deontic conception can secure the grain of truth of the classical views without 
suffering from their pitfalls.
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In addition to offering an alternative picture of desire, the proposal is a first step 
in reinstalling intentional modes at the heart of our philosophical 
preoccupations. It is not clear that functional roles capture all there is about 
intentionality. There is room for a first-person approach to the mind that takes 
seriously the idea that mental representations are different points of view about 
the world. Specifying this idea in terms of intentional modes could then disclose 
the “logic” of mental representations, as I tried to do with the case of desire.
A desireless world would thus be a world in which creatures do not represent 
anything as what ought to be, do not require anything of the world, and do not 
care whether or not some states of affairs obtain. It would be a dull world 
deprived of any aspirations—and of much of its charm—because desire is the 
“eye” of what should be.67
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this volume). For reasons I do not have the space to present here, I think this 
move is not helpful (Lauria 2014: 56–59).
(26.) See Anscombe 1963: 70–78.
(27.) One might reply that some reflexive explanations are informative. I have 
argued that this reply does not stand, given the disanalogies between reflexive, 
informative explanation and the explanation of desire by evaluations (Lauria 
2014: 61–63).
(28.) See Massin (this volume) and Meinong (1917) for a similar view; see, 
however, Döring and Eker this volume.
(29.) See, for instance, Armstrong 1968; Stampe 1986; Stalnaker 1984; Smith 
1994; Dancy 2000; in this volume, Döring and Eker, Alvarez, Railton, Ashwell.
(30.) See, for instance, Stalnaker 1984: 15.
(31.) Some have argued that those cases are counterexamples to the 
motivational view (Mele 2003) or mark the distinction between wishes and 
desires (Döring and Eker this volume). However, see Armstrong (1968: 155), 
Schroeder (2004: 17), and Dancy (2000: 87–88) for a reply.
(32.) See e.g. Schafer 2013.
(33.) For further criticism of the motivational view, see Döring and Eker, Alvarez, 
Gregory, Railton this volume.
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(55.) Velleman (2000: 105) explicitly writes that desiring is representing some 
content as to be made true, while believing is representing content as a fact. 
However, it appears that Velleman equates the mode of desire with goodness 
(106, 115) and is thus a proponent of an evaluative conception of desire. In this 
volume, Massin argues that desire’s formal object is the ought-to-be or ought-to-
do, whereas the present proposal focuses on ought-to-be norms. Moreover, 
Massin does not equate desires with deontic representations, unlike what I 
argue here. See also Mulligan (2007) for the idea that the formal objects of 
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(56.) See Meinong (1917: 91, 96) for the essential relation desires bear to the 
ought-to-be and Meinong (1917: 37) for the view that the ought-to-be is part of 
desire’s mode, at least as I understand him.
(57.) See Castañeda 1970.
(58.) See Meinong 1917: 143–145.
(59.) See Oddie this volume for another counterexample.
(60.) See, however, Lauria (2014: 243–250) for a defense of the principle against 
those cases.
(61.) See Massin this volume.
(62.) Scheler 1973: 207–208.
(63.) As Massin this volume underlines, Meinong understood the “death of 
desire” principle in terms of the idea that we desire future and contingent states 
of affairs. My understanding is different (Lauria 2014). Yet the explanation of the 
principle is the same: the appeal to norms.
(64.) See Meinong 1917: 99; Scheler 1973: 184; Mulligan 1998; Ogien and 
Tappolet 2009; Tappolet forthcoming.
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(25.) One might reply that desire has both directions of fit (see Railton, Gregory 
this volume). For reasons I do not have the space to present here, I think this 
move is not helpful (Lauria 2014: 56–59).
(26.) See Anscombe 1963: 70–78.
(27.) One might reply that some reflexive explanations are informative. I have 
argued that this reply does not stand, given the disanalogies between reflexive, 
informative explanation and the explanation of desire by evaluations (Lauria 
2014: 61–63).
(28.) See Massin (this volume) and Meinong (1917) for a similar view; see, 
however, Döring and Eker this volume.
(29.) See, for instance, Armstrong 1968; Stampe 1986; Stalnaker 1984; Smith 
1994; Dancy 2000; in this volume, Döring and Eker, Alvarez, Railton, Ashwell.
(30.) See, for instance, Stalnaker 1984: 15.
(31.) Some have argued that those cases are counterexamples to the 
motivational view (Mele 2003) or mark the distinction between wishes and 
desires (Döring and Eker this volume). However, see Armstrong (1968: 155), 
Schroeder (2004: 17), and Dancy (2000: 87–88) for a reply.
(32.) See e.g. Schafer 2013.
(33.) For further criticism of the motivational view, see Döring and Eker, Alvarez,
Gregory, Railton this volume.
(34.) See, for instance, Searle 1983; Smith 1994. In this volume, this 
interpretation is assumed in Railton’s and Gregory’s contributions.
(35.) See e.g. Millikan 2005; Papineau 1984.
(36.) See Friedrich (2008: 5–6) for a similar objection.
(37.) This is motivated further by the thought that the fitting relation is
satisfaction (Lauria 2014: 142–146).
(38.) Stampe 1987: 336–337. See also Armstrong (1968: 155), Dretske (1988: 
114), and Goldman (2009: 96), although the last two do not appeal to 
representations of facts but merely to facts. See also Russell’s analysis of desire 
in Kenny 1963: 72.
(39.) See Döring and Eker this volume.
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(40.) The worry presented focuses on the dispositional variant of the 
motivational view, but extends as well to the variant appealing to a motivational 
mode.
(41.) See Marks 1986: 139–141; Schroeder 2004: 139; Friedrich 2008: 6–7.
(42.) See Strawson’s (2009) Weather Watchers for a candidate of inert desire.
(43.) See Schroeder 2004: 173–174.
(44.) See Schroeder, Railton this volume.
(45.) See Schroeder this volume.
(46.) Schroeder 2004: 107–130.
(47.) Schroeder 2004.
(48.) On the distinction between ought-to-do and ought-to-be norms, see Harman 
1973; Geach 1982; Jackson 1985; Von Wright 1998; Wedgwood 2006, 2007; 
Schroeder 2011.
(49.) In this respect, the view I favor differs from the other deontic accounts in 
this volume, which appeal to reasons to act (Gregory) or norms in general 
(Massin). It is also different from accounts relying on the imperative mode or 
force, at least if the latter is constituted by an ought-to-do norm (see Schafer 
2013; Archer 2015).
(50.) See Friedrich this volume. On modes, see Lauria 2014: 122–128.
(51.) Given the presence of the deontic feature in the mode, one might say that 
desiring p is oughting p. If it is assumed that oughts are requirements, it follows 
that desiring is, in a sense, requiring a state to obtain. I take it that those are 
equivalent formulations of the deontic view (Lauria 2014: 131).
(52.) This is explicit in the teleosemantic approach (e.g. Millikan 2005).
(53.) See Lauria 2016.
(54.) For other approaches to desire appealing to modes or force, see Friedrich 
2012, this volume. Schafer (2013) and Archer (2015) use force to unravel 
justificatory or inferential relations, respectively.
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(55.) Velleman (2000: 105) explicitly writes that desiring is representing some 
content as to be made true, while believing is representing content as a fact. 
However, it appears that Velleman equates the mode of desire with goodness 
(106, 115) and is thus a proponent of an evaluative conception of desire. In this 
volume, Massin argues that desire’s formal object is the ought-to-be or ought-to-
do, whereas the present proposal focuses on ought-to-be norms. Moreover, 
Massin does not equate desires with deontic representations, unlike what I 
argue here. See also Mulligan (2007) for the idea that the formal objects of 
desires and wishes are, respectively, ought-to-do and ought-to-be.
(56.) See Meinong (1917: 91, 96) for the essential relation desires bear to the 
ought-to-be and Meinong (1917: 37) for the view that the ought-to-be is part of 
desire’s mode, at least as I understand him.
(57.) See Castañeda 1970.
(58.) See Meinong 1917: 143–145.
(59.) See Oddie this volume for another counterexample.
(60.) See, however, Lauria (2014: 243–250) for a defense of the principle against 
those cases.
(61.) See Massin this volume.
(62.) Scheler 1973: 207–208.
(63.) As Massin this volume underlines, Meinong understood the “death of 
desire” principle in terms of the idea that we desire future and contingent states 
of affairs. My understanding is different (Lauria 2014). Yet the explanation of the 
principle is the same: the appeal to norms.
(64.) See Meinong 1917: 99; Scheler 1973: 184; Mulligan 1998; Ogien and 
Tappolet 2009; Tappolet forthcoming.
(65.) For a more detailed discussion, see Lauria 2014: 177–185.
(66.) On the distinction between values and norms, see Massin this volume.
(67.) This essay is a summary of my PhD dissertation. I wish to express my 
gratitude to the following people for their insights and support: Julien Deonna, 
Gianfranco Soldati, Fabrice Teroni, Kevin Mulligan, Graham Oddie, Peter 
Railton, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Richard Dub, Otto Brun, Alexander Bown, Clare 
Mac Cumhaill, Alexander Skiles, David Sander, Timothy Bayne, Olivier Massin, 
Amanda Garcia, Ghislain Guigon, Anne Meylan, Julien Dutant, and the 
contributors to this volume.
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Abstract and Keywords
The thesis defended in this essay, the “guise of the ought,” is that the formal 
objects of desires are norms (oughts-to-be or oughts-to-do) rather than values 
(as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature 
of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that 
ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key 
distinction between values and norms: positive and negative norms (obligation 
and interdiction) are interdefinable through negation; positive and negative 
values aren’t. This contrast between norms and values, it is argued, is mirrored 
within the psychological realm by the contrast between desires and emotions. 
Positive and negative desires are interdefinable through negation, but positive 
and negative emotions aren’t. The overall, Meinongian picture suggested is that 
norms are to desires what values are to emotions.
Keywords:   desire, guise of the good, values, norms, ought, emotion, polarity, Meinong
The language of desire, and aversion, is imperative; as, Do this, forbear 
that.
—HOBBES, Leviathan
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WHEN ONE DESIRES something, philosophers used to agree, one desires it 
under the guise of the good. In Scholastic terminology, the formal objects of 
desires are values. One issue raised by this traditional view is that values are 
also widely claimed to be formal objects of emotions. When one entertains a 
positive emotion toward something, it necessarily appears good to us. For those 
who put hope in the project of individuating kinds of attitudes—such as beliefs, 
emotions, and desires—through their formal objects and want to keep emotions 
and desires distinct, this is bad news. Both emotions and desires end up having 
the same sort of formal objects and, relatedly, the same kind of correctness 
conditions.
Meinong (1972) proposed a neat way out: emotions require presentations of 
values, but desires require presentations of norms. In a nutshell, one cannot 
have a positive emotion toward something without it appearing good in some 
way, and one cannot desire something without it appearing as something that 
ought to be. Values are the formal objects of emotions; norms are the formal 
objects of desires. This paper focuses on the desire side of Meinong’s proposal: 
on the view that desires, by nature, require presentations of norms. Taking up 
Lauria’s (this volume) apt expression, I shall call this the “guise of the ought” in 
contrast to the traditional “guise of the good” thesis, which claims that desires 
require by nature  (p.166) presentations of values. My claim is that the “guise 
of the ought” thesis fares better than the “guise of the good” thesis.
Although Meinong’s view about emotions—according to which emotions are 
essentially connected with presentations of values—has become widely 
influential within contemporary philosophy (see in particular Tappolet 2000 for 
pioneering work), his correlative views about desires have remained widely 
unnoticed outside circles of Meinong scholars. Yet one of the first systems of 
deontic logic—the one developed by Ernst Mally (1926: 241) in his tellingly 
entitled book The Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of the Logic of Willing—
crucially relies on Meinong’s view that the formal object of willing is the 
Seinsollen of states of affairs. More recently, Mulligan (1998: §2) and Konrad 
(2000) mention Meinong’s view of desire favorably, and Lauria (2014, this 
volume) deserves full credit for having reintroduced Meinong’s theory to the 
contemporary philosophy of desire. One possible reason for this neglect is that 
although Meinong’s views are conceptually limpid, they are not always easy to 
get at due to his idiosyncratic terminology.1
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A more substantial reason for this neglect, worth dismissing from the start, is 
that prima facie it sounds preposterous to claim that we cannot desire but what 
appears to us as something that ought to be or that we ought to do. The guise of 
the ought seems to capture only these self-righteous desires, arising from some 
Kantian sense of moral duty. It apparently leaves most mundane desires out of 
the picture. If I desire to drink a glass of Burgundy, I am clearly not under the 
impression that it is my duty to do so. This objection relies on a 
misunderstanding about the sense of ought in Meinong’s proposal. Though ought
often has moral connotations, Meinong’s ought is not restricted to the moral 
domain. Any kind of obligation (rational, aesthetic, legal, etc.) is relevant, 
including instrumental obligation (Meinong, 1972: 98ff.). The ought under 
consideration in the “guise of the ought” thesis is the normative, unqualified 
ought: ought morally, ought rationally, ought aesthetically, etc. are only species 
of ought simpliciter.
The arguments I shall advance in favor of the guise of the ought, as against the 
guise of the good, rely on the view that the opposition between desire and 
aversion is of the same kind as the opposition between obligation and 
interdiction, but of a different kind from the opposition between goodness and 
badness. Section 1 introduces the guise of the ought by locating it within 
Meinong’s full deontic account of desire and by contrasting it with the guise of 
the good thesis. Section 2 argues that one neglected difference between values 
and norms is that obligations and interdiction  (p.167) of contradictory contents 
are equivalent, which is not the case with good that and bad that. Section 3 
argues that the very same difference holds between desires and emotions: 
wanting p is equivalent to diswanting non-p, which is not true of positive and 
negative emotions. Section 4 relies on this analogy between desires and norms 
and disanalogies between desires and values to defend two arguments in favor 
of the guise of the ought as against the guise of the good. Section 5 addresses 
some objections to the guise of the ought.
1 The Guise of the Ought
1.1 Meinong’s Deontic Conception of Desires
The idea that norms are to desires what values are to emotions was defended by 
the late Meinong (1972: 28, 37–38). According to Meinong, emotions (das 
Fühlen) are presentations of values, while desires (das Begehren) are 
presentations of norms.2 Contrary to evaluative conceptions of desires, which 
equate desires with presentations of values,3 Meinong (and Lauria, this volume, 
following him) equates desires with presentation of norms, namely, oughts-to-be:
Meinong’s deontic conception of desires: To desire something is to be 
presented with it as something that ought to be.4
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To desire to eat a florentine is to be under the impression that it ought to be the 
case that one eats a florentine. Are values deprived of any motivational oomph in 
such an account? And does Meinong’s view entail that desire is a faculty that 
allows us to grasp the ought-to-be-ness of a state of affairs independently of any 
of its other natural features? No, because Meinong’s deontic conception of 
desires leans against two further claims:
1. Necessarily, if one has some presentation of norms, one has some 
presentation of values.5
2. Necessarily, if one has some presentation of values, one has some 
presentation of natural properties.6
These two claims are the psychological counterparts of the claims that norms 
are grounded in values and of the claim that values are grounded in natural 
properties (two claims also endorsed by Meinong 1972: 99). Since  (p.168) 
Meinong equates emotions with presentations of values, the first claim boils 
down to the claim that desires are grounded in emotions.
Although in this chapter I take my lead from Meinong’s approach to desires, I 
have two main objections to his deontic conception of desires—one questioning 
its sufficiency, the other its necessity.
My worry concerning necessity stems from the fact that the deontic conceptions 
of desires mentions only oughts-to-be, at the expense of oughts-to-do. This 
distinction, however, would help the deontic conception of desires to account for 
the difference between propositional desires, or desires-that, and desires-to
(Kenny 1966: 86 ff.). Desiring that p would be equated with the impression that p
ought to be, while desiring to ϕ would be equated with the impression that one 
ought to ϕ. Meinong does not take this distinction seriously: he thinks that 
oughts-to-do reduce to oughts-to-be (the so-called Meinong-Chishom reduction). 
Indeed, the corresponding view with respect to desires is quite standard: 
desires-to are taken to be reducible to desires-that (Schueler 1995: 12). Now, 
neither of these two reductions, even if widespread, is uncontroversial. So it 
would be better for the deontic conception of desires not to be committed to 
either of them.
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My objection concerning the sufficiency of Meinong’s analysis of desires is that 
since (i) one can be under the impression that things are as they ought to be and 
(ii) one cannot desire what one thinks is already the case, then some deontic 
presentations are not desires. Meinong agrees with (ii). He even provides one of 
the most precise specifications advanced so far of what one can desire (Meinong 
1972: 85, 143ff.). In essence, Meinong’s view is that our desires are directed at 
states of affairs (objectives) that the desirer takes to be future and contingent. 
We cannot desire what we take to be already the case. And among the states of 
affairs that, we think, do not obtain, we can desire only those that, we think, will 
neither necessarily obtain nor impossibly obtain.
But Meinong rejects (i). Oughts-to-be, he claims, necessarily apply to non-actual 
states of affairs.7 This is precisely why, in his account, desires essentially bear on 
apparently non-actual states of affairs. The view that desires are directed toward 
what is presented as contingent futures derives, then, from the view that oughts-
to-be apply to contingent futures (Meinong 1972: 143–145). This is where I 
disagree with Meinong. There is no conceptual inconsistency, pace Meinong, in 
saying that things are as they should be or that some things have been, are, and 
necessarily will be as they ought to be.8 When Meinong insists that such things 
“cannot be said,” he presumably conflates pragmatics with semantics. (A similar 
conflation, if I am right, is to be found in Lauria, 2014:  (p.169) 237 ff.; this 
volume.) One common reason one mentions norms, admittedly, is to improve 
their fulfillment. But in other contexts, mentioning fulfilled norms is relevant: for 
instance when, in a more contemplative or conservative mood, we wish to argue 
that certain things should not be changed. Even if mentioning things that are as 
they ought to be is often pragmatically irrelevant, it remains perfectly 
meaningful semantically. Hence the view that desire essentially involves 
presentations of oughts-to-be does not entail the strong restrictions that 
Meinong thinks it does with respect to the kinds of states of affairs we can 
desire. If desires are indeed future-directed—as I tend to think, following 
Meinong and many others—this is not a consequence of their being norm-
directed. Hence the nature of desires is not exhausted by their being directed at 
states of affairs that (seemingly) ought to be. Presentations of norms are 
necessary but not sufficient to desires.
Meinong’s deontic view, minus the reduction of oughts-to-be to oughts-to-do, and
minus the view that presentations of norms are sufficient to explain desires, 
leaves us with the view that desires entail presentations of oughts-to-be or 
presentations of oughts-to-do. This view, the guise of the ought, is, I believe, the 
essential grain of truth in Meinong’s deontic conception of desires.
1.2 The Guise of the Good versus the Guise of the Ought
The guise of the ought (henceforth, GO) is entailed by Meinong’s deontic view 
but is weaker than that view. It is best introduced in contrast to its famous 
cousin, the guise of the good (GG), which I define as follows:
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“Guise of the Good” Thesis: In virtue of the immediate nature of desire:
1. If S desires that p, it seems to S that p is good.
2. If S desires to ϕ, it seems to S that ϕ-ing is good.
In order to remain non-committal with respect to the reduction of desires-to to 
desires-that, in accordance with the above, this definition of the GO mentions 
two sorts of desires. The definition departs in two other ways from more 
standard formulations of GG. First, it claims that evaluative presentations are 
not only necessary but also essential to desire. The reason the necessity at stake 
is claimed to be grounded in the nature of desire is that GG purports to shed 
light on what desires are and that not everything that is necessary to desire is 
essential to it (Fine 1994). Besides, the nature  (p.170) of desire is claimed to 
be immediate rather than mediate. (The distinction between immediate and 
mediate nature is taken from Fine 1995: §5.) This pertains to Meinong’s view, 
mentioned earlier, that all desires require some presentations of values because 
they require presentations of norms. This does not make Meinong an upholder of 
GG: the presentation of values, under Meinong’s approach, belongs only to the 
mediate nature of desire. GG, by contrast, claims that evaluative presentations 
belong to their immediate essence.
Second, the definition of GG appeals to evaluative seemings instead of the more 
usual evaluative beliefs or thoughts. The reason for this is to allow GG to deal 
with counterexamples, such as the squash player desiring to slam her racket 
against her opponent: although the player might well believe upon reflection 
that this is a bad thing to do, this action might still appear to her in that very 
moment as a good one.9 I shall speak indifferently of value seemings or value 
presentations (which is Meinong’s terminology) and assume that presentations 
or seemings are neither factive (in order to include incorrect desires) nor anti-
factive (in order to include correct ones).10 Furthermore, I shall be interested in 
GG only insofar as it purports to shed light on the following sort of desires, 
which are my explananda:
1. The desires and emotions at stake are those directed toward states of 
affairs or actions, whose contents can be expressed by propositions 
(loving/desiring that p) or infinitive complements (loving/desiring to ϕ).11
The contrast I shall emphasize between desires and emotions relies on 
the way desiring and “emoting” behave when their content is negated. To 
the extent that referring expressions—names—cannot be negated (Geach 
1980: §31), no such contrast holds for objectual desires, if there are such 
things.12
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2. I shall assume that GG is restricted to occurrent desires, in contrast to 
standing and dispositional ones. Döring and Eker (this volume) point out, 
against GG, that dispositional desires do not entail occurrent seemings of 
values. Insofar as GG is restricted to occurrent desires, it is immune to 
that objection.
3. I shall be interested here only in thin desires, in the sense of desires 
taken apart from any of their affective accompaniments. Schueler (1995: 
11ff.) points out that there are cold desires, deprived of strong 
phenomenological character, such as desiring to arrive on time or 
desiring to buy some milk, and that there are also desires accompanied 
with strong feelings, which, like hunger and other cravings,  (p.171) 
urges, or appetites, can be felt. What I call thin desires are desires taken 
apart from their affective clothes. Thick desires, by contrast, are complex 
states, involving affects (bodily sensations, feelings, emotions, moods, 
etc.) somehow related to thin desires. Hunger, for instance, might refer to 
a complex state involving the feeling of hunger together with the thin 
desire to eat (see Hamilton 1882: vol. 2, 433; Gregory this volume). 
Perhaps there are only thick desires; perhaps thin desires are only 
abstractions that, in reality, always come clothed with affects (even if of 
low intensity). But this does not threaten the conceptual distinction 
between thin and thick desires. Even if desires are necessarily thick, one 
can grasp thin desires, in abstract thought, by peeling off their affective 
skin.
In sum, the focus is on thin propositional occurrent desires. Speaking of 
desirings might help make clear that the desires at stake are occurrent. But 
desiring is often used to express desires connected to strong feelings: desirings
are occurrent, but they are still too thick. Wantings is perhaps the best candidate 
for expressing what we are after here. Wantings are at once more occurrent and 
less affectively loaded than desires. As it happens, wanting is often used instead 
of desiring in the literature on desire (see e.g. Kenny 1966: ch. 5; Audi 1986).
With this in hand, the “guise of the ought” thesis might be introduced as follows:
“Guise of the Ought” Thesis: In virtue of the immediate nature of desire:
1. If S desires that p, it seems to S that p ought to be.
2. If S desires to ϕ, it seems to S that he ought to ϕ.
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GG claims that because occurrent desires are what they are, it is immediately 
impossible to desire something without being under the impression that it is 
good in some way. GO claims that because occurrent desires are what they are, 
it is immediately impossible to desire something without being under the 
impression that it ought to be. GO therefore is only a small, albeit crucial 
modification of GG (just replace good with ought). GG and GO are close cousins: 
both claim that desires essentially entail normative presentations, by which I 
mean presentations that are either evaluative or deontic.
It is worth stressing that neither GG nor GO entails that normative presentations 
are constituents or parts of desires. Compare this to emotions.  (p.172) It has 
been maintained that presentations of values are essential to emotions without 
being for all that constituents of emotions: emotions could be reactions to 
presentations of values.13 Although less often noticed (but see Tenenbaum 2007: 
23), the same possibility holds as far as desires are concerned: the claim that 
desires require normative presentations—GG or GO—is compatible with the view 
that presentations of values or norms are essential to but not constitutive of 
desires. One interesting thing about that view is that normative presentations 
can then be said to provide internalist justification to desires, to constitute 
subjective reasons for desires. The reason Julie desires to laugh is that laughing 
seems good to her (GG) or that it seems to her that she ought to laugh (GO). To 
the extent that justification is irreflexive, such a move is not open to the 
evaluative nor to the deontic conceptions of desire.14
1.3 Guises and Formal Objects
GG and GO might be usefully rephrased in the “formal object” jargon: GG 
amounts to the view that values are the formal objects of desires, while GO 
amounts to the claim that norms are the formal object of desires. This 
connection with the concept of “formal objects” presents two interesting 
points.15
First, it helps make clear what the correctness conditions of desires are under 
GG and GO. There are two mains conceptions of formal objects in the literature:
• The first, in line with Kenny (1966: ch. 9), relies on the idea that kinds of 
intentional episodes put some restriction on the kinds of objects that these 
episodes can bear upon. The kind of object that episodes of some kind 
necessarily bear upon constitute their formal object. Accordingly, the formal 
objects of desires have to be internalized: for GG the formal objects of desires 
are presented values; for GO they are presented norms.
• The second approach to formal objects relies on the idea that kinds of 
intentional episodes put some restriction on the kinds of objects that these 
episodes should bear upon. Formal objects are here equated with the kinds of 
objects that attitudes of a kind ought to bear upon. Formal objects are then 
external “correct-makers.”
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GG and GO allow for a straightforward explanation of the connection between 
the internal and external formal object of desires. A desire is  (p.173) correct if 
and only if the axiological or deontic presentation it involves is veridical. Hence 
GG will say a desire is correct if and only if its object is good, while GO will have 
it that a desire is correct if and only if its object ought to be (or if the desirer 
ought to do it).16
Second, the “formal object” jargon allows us to rephrase GG and GO in yet 
another, third way. Kenny distinguishes trivial formal objects, which are obtained 
by “modalising the relevant verb,” from non-trivial ones. The trivial formal object 
of desire, admittedly, is the desirable (i.e. what we desire is presented as 
desirable to us, and our desire is correct if and only if what we desire is 
desirable). GG and GO are views about the non-trivial formal objects of desires. 
According to GG, the desirable is what is good. According to GO, the desirable is 
what ought to be, or what the desirer ought to do.
The thesis to be defended now is conditional: If we have to choose between GG 
and GO, we should endorse GO. Since I focus on the relative advantage of GO 
over GG, I shall assume that the arguments and replies advanced by upholders 
of GG are available, mutadis mutandis, to the upholders of GO. For instance, the 
annoyed squash player might believe that it would be wrong to smash her racket 
against her opponent, but the action might still non-epistemically appear to her 
as right, as an action she ought to do.
But why should we even choose between GG and GO? Since GO (contrary to the 
deontic view of desires) does not give sufficient conditions for desires, and since 
GG (contrary to evaluative view of desires) does not give sufficient conditions 
either, both are in principle compatible. Since each purports to provide only a 
partial insight into the nature of desires, one could accept both. But that 
wouldn’t be a very comfortable position to be in. What we can gain from having 
two independent normative presentations essentially tied to desires is unclear, 
but what is to be lost is much clearer. First, the conjunction of GG and GO is 
open to two sets of objections: those raised against GG and those raised against 
GO. Second, the conjunction of GG and GO over-complexifies the nature of 
desire: every desire would go, in virtue of its immediate essence, with both 
deontic and evaluative presentations. Third, insofar as goodness and oughtness 
are not co-extensive, as I shall argue, the conjunction of GG and GO entails that 
a desire can be partly correct and partly incorrect. It is no accident that the 
conjunction of GG and GO has found no proponents yet. Hence I shall assume 
that GG and GO are rival views.
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One reason to favor GO over GG is that GG, together with the view that emotions 
have values as formal objects, leads to the view that emotions  (p.174) and 
desires share their formal objects. If desires and emotions are distinct kinds of 
mental episodes, and if formal objects individuate kinds of attitudes, then GO is 
preferable to GG (Mulligan 2010). Likewise, if emotions and desires with the 
same content can have different correctness conditions, then GO is preferable to 
GG. Although I sympathize with this line of thought, I shall press for another 
kind of argument here. Its key premise is that desires, like norms—and contrary 
to values and emotions— forbid indifference to the negation of their content. To 
establish this, let us first contrast values and norms in that respect.
2 Norms versus Values
Although the Humean fact/value dichotomy tends to conflate them, there is a 
distinction between values (good, bad, elegant, etc.) and norms (obligatory, 
impermissible, ought, etc.). Where exactly the distinction lies, however, is a 
tricky and somewhat neglected issue.17 Several criteria have been advanced. At 
the risk of adding confusion, I shall introduce another one, seemingly 
overlooked.
That values essentially have a polarity is one of the few fairly uncontroversial 
claims in value theory.18 Such a claim is more rarely made with respect to 
norms, but one might think that in the same way that good is positive and bad 
negative, obligation is positive and interdiction negative. What I want to bring 
out is that the way positive and negative values are opposed to each other 
essentially differs from the way that positive and negative norms are opposed to 
each other. Although superficially similar, the positive/negative opposition found 
in the axiological sphere is distinct from that found in the deontic realm. (The 
difference I am going to introduce holds only for values and norms that have a 
negatable content: propositions, states of affairs, or actions; see Schroeder 
2007.)
2.1 Formal Analogies between Values and Norms
In the same way that there are the good, the neutral, and the bad, there are the 
obligatory, the optional, and the forbidden. Both the axiological and the deontic 
spaces are carved out in a trichotomic way, giving rise to the analogous 
axiological and deontic squares of opposition (see Figure 6.1, building on 
McNamara 2006):
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Figure 6.1  Values and Norms: Formal 
Analogies
Correspondingly, many 
tautologies about norms and 
values closely match each other 
(see Goble 1990). Good, neutral, 
and bad are contraries,  (p.175)
 (p.176) and the disjunction of 
any two of them is the 
contradictory of the third. The 
same holds for obligatory, 
optional, and forbidden.
What we are trichotomizing 
here is not the whole world but, respectively, the axiological and deontic 
spheres. That is, we are considering only the kinds or categories of objects that 
could be said to be good, neutral, or bad or that could be said to be obligatory, 
optional, or forbidden.19 Not everything that is neither obligatory nor forbidden 
is optional (the number 2, for instance): it has to be deontically assessable. We 
then have:
• If p belongs to the axiological domain, then p is either good, axiologically 
neutral, or bad. (exclusive disjunction)
• If p belongs to the deontological domain, then p is either obligatory, 
optional, or impermissible. (exclusive disjunction)
(I am assuming for simplicity that the relevant conditions are fulfilled, such as: 
at the same time, for the same person, under the same respect, in the same way, 
etc.)
The relation of opposition that will play a central role here is the relation of polar 
opposition between, on the one hand, goodness and badness, and on the other, 
obligation and interdiction. The concept of polar opposition that is of interest 
here is one sub-species of contrariety: polar opposites are contraries falling on 
both sides of a “zero point” (Meinong 1996: 14520), “indifference zone” (Lehrer 
and Lehrer 1982), or “pivotal region” (Cruse 1995: 205).21 I shall define polar 
opposition between predicates as follows:
Polar opposition between predicates: Two predicates P and Q are polarly 
opposed if and only if (i) there is an indifference predicate I between them; (ii)
P, Q, and I are contrary predicates.
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Thus being very good and being mildly good are not polarly opposed, for no 
indifference point lies between them. Likewise being good and not being good
are not polarly opposed, for not being good and being axiologically neutral are 
not contrary predicates. But being good and being bad are polar opposites, for in 
between them stands being axiologically neutral, which is a contrary of both. 
How “betweenness” is to be understood here is a question I shall leave open: the 
intuitive sense in which the axiologically neutral lies between the good and the 
bad is enough for our present purpose. Likewise, being obligatory and being 
impermissible are polar opposites, for in between them stands being optional. So 
are it  (p.177) is obligatory that and it is impermissible that, provided the 
contrariety relations between properties also hold, mutatis mutandis, between 
unary connectives. We shall say that two unary connectives are contraries if and 
only if, for any sentence, the two sentences formed from them cannot both be 
true. We can then define polar opposition between connectives as we defined 
polar opposition between predicates:
Polar opposition between connectives: Two connnectives C and C” stand in 
a relation of polar opposition if and only if (i) there is a neutral connective C’
between C and C”; and (ii) C, C’, and C” are contrary connectives.
Thus it is necessary that and it is impossible that are polarly opposed, for in 
between them stands it is contingent that, and these three connectives are 
contrary to each other.
Being good and being bad, like being obligatory and being forbidden, are polarly 
opposed predicates; it is good that and it is bad that, like it is obligatory that and 
it is impermissible that, are polarly opposed connectives. Both the axiological 
realm and the deontic realms are trichotomized and polarly structured.
2.2 Formal Disanalogies between Values and Norms
Appearances notwithstanding, however, the polar opposition between goodness
and badness is crucially different from the polar opposition between obligation
and interdiction.22 While all norms (of the same type) can be defined in terms of 
obligation and standard logical connectives alone, there is no way to define 
values (of the same type) in terms of goodness and such connectives alone. Let 
us review four deontic tautologies that, on intuitive grounds, have no axiological 
counterpart. (G stands for “good that,” N for “axiologically neutral that,” and B
for “bad that”; OB stands for “obligatory that,” OP for “optional that,” and IM for 
“impermissible that.”)
First:
(1)
( p ) ( I M p ↔ O B ¬ p )
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It is impermissible to smoke if and only if it is obligatory not to smoke. 
Obligation and interdiction are interdefinable through negation (as are necessity 
and impossibility). But the corresponding formula does not  (p.178) hold true of 
values: “It is bad that p” is not equivalent to “It is good that ¬p”:
(1’)
¬ ( p ) ( B p ↔ G ¬ p )
That it is bad to bully for fun does not entail that it is good not to bully for fun. 
That might be axiologically neutral. Conversely, that it is good to laugh does not 
entail that it is bad not to laugh. For while its being good to laugh perhaps 
entails that it is not good not to laugh,23 its being good to laugh is compatible 
with its being axiologically neutral not to laugh. A famous example is given by 
Chisholm and Sosa (1966): assume that only happiness is intrinsically good, and 
unhappiness intrinsically bad. Then, that there are unhappy egrets is bad. But 
there being no unhappy egrets does not add any positive value to the universe. 
This is a neutral state of affairs, even if its negation is good. While the 
obligatoriness of a state of affairs is equivalent to the impermissibility of its 
negation, the goodness of a state of affairs is not equivalent to the badness of its 
negation (nor is its badness equivalent to the goodness of its negation).
Consequently, for norms, we also have:
(2)
( p ) ( O B p → ¬ O P ¬ p )
(3)
( p ) ( I M p → ¬ O P ¬ p )
If it is obligatory to drive on the right, it cannot be optional not to drive on the 
right: this has to be forbidden. And it cannot be impermissible to smoke and 
optional not to smoke. This has to be obligatory. On the other hand, “It is good 
that p” is compatible with “It is neutral that ¬p.”
(2’)
¬ ( p ) ( G p → ¬ N ¬ p )
(3’)
¬ ( p ) ( B p → ¬ N ¬ p )
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It might be elegant to wear a hat without it being inelegant not to wear a hat: 
not wearing a hat might be axiologically neutral. It might be bad to steal and 
neutral not to steal. States of affairs might be good or bad while their absence is 
axiologically neutral. That a state of affairs is obligatory entails that its negation 
is not optional, but that a state of affairs is good is compatible with its negation 
being neutral. In Chisholm’s (1968: 24) words: “Good states of affairs and bad 
states of affairs, then,  (p.179) have this feature in common: they have neutral 
negations, negations that are neither good nor bad.” Obligatory states of affairs, 
on the contrary, have no neutral negations, that is, no negations that are neither 
obligatory nor impermissible.
Relatedly, the following equivalence holds tautologically for norms:
(4)
( p ) [ O P p ↔ ( ¬ O B p ∧ ¬ O B ¬ p ) ]
Smiling is optional if and only if it is neither obligatory to smile nor obligatory 
not to smile. But axiological neutrality, contrary to deontic indifference, cannot 
be defined in terms of goodness and logical connectives alone:
(4’)
¬ ( p ) [ N p ↔ ( ¬ G p ∧ ¬ G ¬ p ) ]
A state of affairs might be neutral while its negation is good or bad. Not 
experiencing pleasure is neutral. But experiencing pleasure is good.
Interestingly, the negated equivalence here might still be used to define other 
concepts, distinct from axiological neutrality. One might call—somewhat 
paradoxically—positively indifferent a state of affairs of which neither it nor its 
negation are good. A state of affairs will then be negatively indifferent iff neither 
it nor its negation are bad. Finally a state of affairs will be indifferent, tout court, 
if it is both positively and negatively indifferent. Consequently, all states of 
affairs indifferent tout court are neutral (and so are their negation). But not all 
neutral states of affairs are indifferent tout court, because some neutral states of 
affairs might be such that their negation is good or bad.24
These contrasts between values and norms are not confined to values and norms 
viewed as propositional connectives. They also hold for axiological and 
deontological predications:
• ϕ-ing is obligatory  ¬ϕ-ing is forbidden.
Again, the corresponding axiological equivalence does not hold:
• ¬(ϕ-ing is good  ¬ϕ-ing is bad)
↔
↔
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If smiling is obligatory, then not smiling is forbidden. But that smiling is good 
does not entail that not smiling is bad. Not smiling might be axiologically 
neutral.
 (p.180) Neither is this asymmetry restricted to thin values and norms. It also 
holds for thicker or specified ones:
• (p) (it is morally obligatory that p  It is morally forbidden that ¬p)
The corresponding equivalences do not hold for adverbially specified values:
• ¬(p) (it is morally good that p  It is morally bad that ¬p)
Nor do they hold for thick values:
• ¬(p) (it is admirable that p  It is despicable that ¬p)
Whether connectives or predicables, indeterminate or adverbially specified, 
operating on propositions, actions, or state of affairs, obligation and interdiction 
are interdefinable only with the help of negation. Goodness and badness are not. 
The goodness of something is not equivalent to the badness of its negation. One 
would strive in vain to get goodness out of badness and negation alone.
The polar opposition between goodness and badness is therefore importantly 
distinct from the polar opposition between obligation and interdiction. The polar 
opposition between obligation and interdiction might be called formal in the 
sense that one can get from one to the other by applying standard logical 
connectives. The polar opposition between goodness and badness, on the other 
hand, is material, in the sense that no matter how one plays with standard 
logical connectives, one cannot get from the one to the other.
Formal polar opposition between connectives: Two unary sentential 
connectives C and C” stand in relation of formal polar opposition if and only if 
(i) they are polarly opposed; and (ii) for any proposition p, .
Material polar opposition between connectives: Two unary sentential 
connectives C and C” stand in relation of material polar opposition if and only 
if (i) they are polarly opposed; and (ii) they are not formally polarly opposed.
↔
↔
↔
C p ↔ C ’ ’ ¬ p
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Figure 6.2  Emotions and Desires: Formal 
Analogies
While material polar opposition is ubiquitous among axiological concepts, it is 
nowhere to be found among deontic ones. That deontic  (p.181) concepts are 
formally related is what allows standard deontic logic to rely on a formal 
language that contains only one primitive deontic concept (permission, as in Von 
Wright 1951, or more standardly obligations or oughts). Although the other 
deontic concepts do not figure in the basic language, they are easily introduced 
by adding some definitional patch that defines each of the missing deontic 
modalities in terms of the fundamental one (“the traditional definitional 
scheme,” as McNamara 2006 calls it). By contrast, no definitional scheme of the 
sort could be added to a logic of goodness, say, so as to get a logic of neutrality 
and badness. A logic of values requires at least two axiological primitives (which 
might be one reason logics of values are less developed than deontic ones).
3 Desires versus Emotions
This section argues that the above analogies and disanalogies between values 
and norms closely match the analogies and disanologies between emotions and 
desires.
3.1 Formal Analogies between Desires and Emotions
Like the axiological and deontic realms, the affective and conative are spheres 
displaying a tripartite distinction. There are positive and negative emotions, and 
there are states of affective indifference. There are positive and negative 
conations, and there are states of conative indifference. Following the 
Brentanian use, let us use “love” to subsume all the positive emotions and “hate” 
to subsume all the negative ones. And following standard philosophical use, let 
us call “desire” the positive conation and “aversion” the negative conation. None 
of these terminological choices is unproblematic. In particular, “aversion,” 
perhaps even more than “desire,” suggests a thick conative attitude instead of 
the thin one we are after. Suffice it to say that the term “aversion” is here used 
in a theoretical sense, to label the opposite of thin occurrent propositional desire
(see 1.2). If “wanting” is the best way to express such desire, then “diswanting” 
could be perhaps a better way to express the polar opposite of thin desires.
Figure 6.2 represents two 
squares of oppositions that 
might be built from the affective 
and conative trichotomies.25 As 
with values and norms, these 
two trichotomies are 
understood as dividing not all 
entities but,  (p.182)  (p.183) 
respectively, the affective and 
conative domains. Accordingly, 
they can be rephrased as 
follows:
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• If p is an affective content, then p is either loved, affectively indifferent, or 
hated. (exclusive disjunction)
• If p is a conative content, then p is either wanted (desire), conatively 
indifferent, or diswanted (aversion). (exclusive disjunction)
(I am assuming for simplicity that the relevant conditions are fulfilled, such as: 
at the same time, by the same person, under the same respect, in the same way, 
etc.)
Desire and aversion, like love and hate, are polar opposites. Desires, like 
emotions, have a polarity: aversion is negative; desire is positive. In Davidsonian 
terminology, desire is a “pro-attitude,” aversion a “con-attitude.” In between 
desire and aversion lies the conatively indifferent in the same way that in 
between love and hate stands the affectively indifferent.
3.2 Formal Disanalogies between Desires and Emotions
As it first appears, the formal relations between desire and its opposites seem to 
match closely those between love and its opposites. However, these superficial 
analogies conceal a deeper disanalogy. Desire and aversion are interdefinable 
through negation, as are obligation and interdiction (see e.g. Heathwood 2007). 
If D stands for “S desires that,” A for “S is averse to,” and CI for “S is conatively 
indifferent to,” we have:
(5)
( p ) ( D p ↔ A ¬ p )
For instance, being averse to being in pain is equivalent to desiring not being in 
pain. This equivalence might be challenged on terminological grounds, for, as 
noted earlier, aversion seems to involve more than mere “desiring 
not” (Schroeder 2004: 26). But recall that aversion is here used as a term of art 
to denote the polar opposite of thin occurrent desire. Terminological issues 
aside, the substantial point is that one cannot think of a polar opposite to desire 
that would not be co-extensional with desiring not. The fundamental reason for 
this is that one cannot desire something and be conatively indifferent to its 
negation. If we want the presence of something, we cannot but diswant its 
absence. If Julie desires to smoke, she cannot be indifferent to not smoking. She 
has to be averse to it. Nor  (p.184) can we be averse to something and be 
indifferent to its negation: if Julie is averse to being in pain, she cannot be 
indifferent to not being in pain. She has to desire it. Hence we also have:
(6)
( p ) ( D p → ¬ C I ¬ p )
(7)
( p ) ( A p → ¬ C I ¬ p )
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By contrast, the polar opposite of love (of positive emotions) is not co-
extensional with loving-not. Loving to do something is not tautologically 
equivalent to hating not doing it (L stands for “S loves that,” H for “S hates that,” 
and AI for “S is affectively indifferent to”):
(5’)
¬ ( p ) ( L p ↔ H ¬ p )
While “Suzy wants to swim” is equivalent to “Suzy diswants not to swim,” “Suzy 
likes swimming” is not equivalent to “Suzy dislikes not-swimming.” This is true, 
it seems, of all polarly opposed emotions that have a propositional content. Thus, 
that Paul would be proud if Julie was his wife does not entail that Paul would be 
ashamed if Julie was not his wife. Or: that one enjoys reading Stendhal does not 
entail that one suffers not reading him.
This is due to the fact that it is possible to love something and to be indifferent 
to its negation: Julie might love smoking without hating not smoking. Or Julie 
might hate being in pain without loving not to be in pain.
(6’)
¬ ( p ) ( L p → ¬ A I ¬ p )
(7’)
¬ ( p ) ( H p → ¬ A I ¬ p )
Finally, being conatively indifferent to something is equivalent to being neither 
desirous of it nor desirous of its negation. Paul is conatively indifferent to 
walking if and only if he neither desires to walk nor desires not to walk.
(8)
( p ) [ C I p ↔ ( ¬ D p ∧ ¬ D ¬ p ) ]
But emotional indifference is not like this. One can be affectively indifferent to 
being healthy while strongly disliking not being healthy. One can be affectively 
indifferent to the absence of bears but still afraid of their  (p.185) presence. 
The lack of perfume from a rose leaves us cold, while we would be delighted by 
its presence.26
(8’)
¬ ( p ) [ A I p ↔ ( ¬ L p ∧ ¬ L ¬ p ) ]
In sum, while conative indifference and aversion can be defined only with the 
help of desire and the standard logical connectives, affective indifference and 
hate cannot be defined in the same way from love and standard propositional 
connectives. Desires and aversion are formal polar opposites; love and hate are 
material polar opposites.
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This disanalogy between emotions and desires, I surmise, stems from the fact 
that positive and negative emotions have—while positive and negative conations 
lack—opposite hedonic valences. The polar opposition between pleasantness and 
unpleasantness is of the very same kind as the polar opposition between positive 
and negative values (Klocksiem 2010): in the same way that bad that p is not 
equivalent to good that not p, pleasant that p is not equivalent to unpleasant that 
not p. Desire and aversion, on the other hand, do not differ with respect to their 
hedonic valence, thus licensing their interdefinability through negation.27
4 In Favor of the Guise of the Ought
The analogies between norms and desires, on the one hand, and values and 
emotions, on the other, are quite strong: the four necessary truths (1–4) about 
norms have the same logical form as the four necessary truths about desire (5–
8); the four necessary truths about values (1’–4’) have the same logical form as 
the four necessary truths about emotions (5’–8’); and the conative-deontic 
truths, on the one hand, and affective-axiological truths, on the other, have 
distinct logical forms. Although these formal analogies between norms and 
desires do not per se constitute an argument in favor of GO, they certainly do 
raise suspicion in favor of GO as against GG: it would come as a surprise that 
desires connect more closely to values than to norms. I shall propose two 
arguments to that effect, both relying on these formal analogies.
4.1 The Formal Objects of Aversion and Conative Indifference
To do so, I need first to make clear what the formal objects of conative 
indifference and aversion are under GG and GO. Under GO, necessarily, the 
object of aversion will be presented under the “guise of the  (p.186) forbidden”; 
whatever is “diswanted” will be presented as something that ought not to be.
GO(aversion): In virtue of the immediate nature of aversion (desiring not):
1. If S desires that ¬p, it seems to S that ¬p ought to be.
2. If S desires to ¬ϕ, t seems to S that he ought to ¬ϕ.
While under GG we will have, in virtue of the above:
GG(aversion): In virtue of the immediate nature of aversion (desiring not):
1. If S desires that ¬p, it seems to S that ¬p is good.
2. If S desires to ¬ϕ, it seems to S that his ¬ϕ-ing is good.
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As for conative indifference, which is equivalent to “neither desiring nor 
desiring-not,” one might think at first that it requires only the absence of any 
normative presentation. But recall that conative indifference toward p, which is 
here understood as an occurrent episode, is not only the absence of desire and 
aversion toward p. Conative indifference must, on top of that, belong to the 
conative domain. (Sets or spatial regions, for instance, are not conatively 
indifferent.) Under these assumptions, in order to be conatively indifferent to 
some action or state of affairs, one has to be presented with its normative status. 
Under GG and GO, one cannot be in a state of occurrent conative indifference 
toward something without considering its axiological or deontic status. 
Accordingly, in the case of GO what we are conatively indifferent to must be 
presented to us as optional, while, for GG, what we are conatively indifferent to 
must be presented to us as axiologically neutral:
GO(indifference): In virtue of the immediate nature of conative indifference:
1. If S is conatively indifferent to p, it seems to S that (neither p nor ¬p
ought to be).
2. If S is conatively indifferent to ϕ-ing, it seems to S that (S neither ought 
to ϕ nor ought to to ¬ϕ).
GG(indifference): In virtue of the immediate nature of conative indifference:
1. If S is conatively indifferent to p, it seems to S that (neither p nor ¬p are 
good).
2. If S is conatively indifferent to ϕ-ing, it seems to S that (it is neither 
good that S ϕ-s nor good that S does not ϕ-s).
 (p.187) One this basis, two arguments in favor of GO as against GG might be 
advanced.
4.2 First Argument: The Explanatory Advantage of GO over GG
Values and emotions license indifference to the negation of their content; norms 
and desires forbid such an indifference. If one desires something, one cannot be 
indifferent to its negation. The first argument in favor of GO as against GG is 
that GO, contrary to GG, provides a natural explanation of this impossibility.
How is it that Julie cannot desire to laugh while being indifferent to not 
laughing? According to GO, if Julie desires to laugh, she is under the impression 
that she ought to laugh. Now suppose Julie were also conatively indifferent to 
not laughing. GO entails that she would be under the impression that it is not the 
case that she ought to laugh. But then she would have two simultaneous 
presentations with contradictory contents: she would feel that she was both 
under the obligation to laugh and not under that obligation. Hence, by reductio, 
Julie cannot be indifferent to not laughing.
Desires, Values and Norms
Page 21 of 38
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
Besides, if the upholder of GO endorses, following Meinong, the view that values
are the formal objects of emotions, he will be in a position to explain why Julie 
can love to laugh and to be affectively indifferent to not laughing. Since it is 
possible that laughing is good and that not laughing is indifferent, Julie can, 
without contradiction, be presented with its being good to laugh and with its 
being axiologically indifferent not to laugh. So the reason emotions license 
indifference to the negation of their content is that their formal object—values—
do the same. And the reason desires forbid indifference to the negation of their 
content is that their formal object—norms—do the same.
Under GG, by contrast, no such explanation is at hand. Julie’s desire to laugh 
entails that laughing seems good to her. This presentation is compatible with not 
laughing seeming neutral to her, so no explanation of why she cannot be 
conatively indifferent to not laughing is available here. Furthermore, if values 
are also the formal objects of emotions, then obviously GG cannot provide an 
explanation of the formal contrast between conations and emotions by relying on 
their formal objects.
One could object that the explanation advanced on behalf of GO shows only that 
it would be irrational for Julie to desire to sleep while being indifferent to it: it 
does not show that this is impossible. But even  (p.188) if we grant this, GO’s 
comparative advantage remains. For upholders of the view that contradictory 
deontic presentations are not impossible but irrational will also be led to say that 
all the psychological necessities we have been putting forward are in fact just 
necessities of rational psychology. Suppose it is not impossible but only irrational 
to desire something while being aversive to its negation. GO’s explanatory 
advantage remains, mutatis mutandis: the reason one cannot rationally desire to 
laugh while being indifferent to not-laughing becomes that one cannot rationally 
be presented with laughing as something that ought to be and be presented with 
not-laughing as something optional.
Another possible objection is that the explanation advanced goes backward. A 
subjectivist or a buck-passer about norms could think that, if anything, the 
formal relations between norms derives from the formal relations between 
desires: “obligatory that p” forbids “optional that non-p” because “desire that p” 
forbids “conative indifference to non-p.” Here again, even if this is granted, the 
explanatory advantage of GO over GG remains. For a GO buck-passer, for 
instance, will be in a position to say that the reason the obligation to ϕ entails 
the interdiction to not ϕ is that being obligatory amounts to being the object of 
an appropriate desire, while being forbidden amounts to being the object of 
some appropriate aversion. He will then appeal to the more fundamental fact, 
according to him, that desiring to ϕ entails being avert to ¬ϕ to explain the 
corresponding deontic truth. A GG buck-passer could not do that.
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In sum, under GO, deontological necessary truths might be used to explain 
conative necessary ones (or the reverse), which cannot be done under GG. 
Besides, the upholder of GO can straightforwardly explain the contrast between 
emotions and desires by appealing to the analogous contrast between values and 
norms. For upholders of GG these startling analogies are purely coincidental—
which is implausible and renders the explanatory agenda quite heavy.
4.3 Second Argument: The Motivational Inertness of the Bad
Second, the fact that one cannot be conatively indifferent to the negation of 
what one desires is not only something that GG, contrary to GO, fails to explain; 
it is also an important troublemaker for it. For it leads to the consequence that 
badness is not the formal object of any conation. Only goodness is motivationally 
relevant: badness is deprived of any immediate motivational oomph. This 
directly follows from the way that formal  (p.189) objects of desire, conative 
indifference, and aversion are understood under GG. To recall:
1. The formal object of desire is the good (it is good that p).
2. The formal object of conative indifference is not the axiologically 
neutral (but: neither p nor ¬p is good, which is not equivalent to p’s being 
axiologically neutral).
3. The formal object of aversion is not the bad (but: ¬p is good, which is 
not equivalent to p is bad).
That goodness is our only motive and that badness is motivationally inert under 
GG is clearly seen by looking at conative indifference. Since conative 
indifference requires only finding “neither p nor ¬p good,” and that neither p 
nor ¬p are good is compatible with p is bad, it is possible to be conatively 
indifferent to p while finding p bad. Conative indifference is not essentially 
connected to axiological neutrality (but only to “positive indifference”; see §2.2 
and note 26). GG captures the attractiveness of the good at the price of giving 
up the repulsiveness of the bad.
GO, on the other hand, has no problem handling the motivational role of 
impermissibility, for if something is obligatory, its negation has to be 
impermissible:
1. The formal object of desire is the obligatory (it ought to be that p).
2. The formal object of conative indifference is co-extensional with the 
optional (neither p nor ¬p ought to be).
3. The formal object of aversion is co-extensional with the impermissible
(it ought to be that ¬p).
Under GO, the three elements of the deontic trichotomy are presented, 
respectively, by one element of the conative trichotomy. Under GG, only the first 
element of the axiological trichotomy, goodness, figures in the content of all 
three types of conation.
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5 Objections Answered
5.1 Ought Has No Polar Opposite
In order to argue that the deontic domain is formally polarly structured, I have 
focused on obligation and interdiction. But, one might object,  (p.190) ought, 
contrary to obligation, has no polar opposite. If this is correct, formal polar 
opposition is not essential to deontic concepts, and it cannot be true that norms, 
contrary to values, are formally polarly opposed. Worse, if ought is the central 
deontic concept, this suggests that interdiction is just a notational variation for 
ought to not instead of a sui generis deontic concept, so that in the end polar 
opposition would be completely absent from the deontic realm.
As a first reply, I want to suggest that ought does have a polar opposite. True, 
ought has no lexical polar opposite in English, French, or German. But it is easy 
to construe such a polar opposite from negation: the polar opposite of ought, I 
submit, is ought not. Ought not, as Meinong (1972: 97, 103) rightly stresses, is 
emphatically not the contradictory—or external—negation of ought. This is due 
to the fact that ought, as linguists say, is a neg-raising verb (Horn 1989: 308–
330; Gajewski 2007). A verb is neg-raising if its external negation typically 
entails its internal negation. Thus “It ought not to be that people starve” does 
not (only) mean “It is not the case that it ought to be that people starve,” for it 
also entails “It ought to be that people do not starve.”
But this does not show yet that ought has a polar opposite, for, granting that the 
negation in ought not to ϕ is not external, it then appears to be internal, that is, 
to modify ought’s content: ought to not-ϕ. All we would have then are oughts 
with contradictory contents but not polarly opposed oughts. One plausible 
suggestion, however, is that the negation in ought not is neither external nor 
internal. “It ought not to be that p” is neither the same as “It is not the case that 
p ought to be” nor the same as “It ought to be that ¬p.” The idea is that in ought 
not the negation modifies ought rather than its sentential complement. A first 
hint that it might be so is that English modals license the contraction of negation 
(oughtn’t, shouldn’t, etc.). Second, consider:
1.
(a) Paul ne doit pas rire. [Paul ought not to laugh.]
(b) Paul doit ne pas rire. [Paul ought to not laugh. (?)]
2.
(a) It ought not to be that people starve.
(b) It ought to be that people do not starve.
3.
(a) What A ought not do is B.
(b) What A ought to do is not B. (Horn 1989: 87)
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 (p.191) Because ought is neg-raising, there are no external negations in any of 
these examples, in particular in sentences (a). Relatedly, sentences (a) and (b) 
have the same truth conditions. But intuitively they have different connotations 
or meanings. That negation is in one case constructed with the modal and in the 
other with its complement, suggesting that even if we lack modals for 
interdiction, we still have linguistic resources to mark them qua distinct for 
obligation with negative content. (See Horn 1989: 86–89 for further 
considerations to this effect.)
Although I sympathize with this reply, there is another reply to the present 
objection that is less committal. According to it, all that is required for the 
arguments above to go through is that ought, like desiring but contrary to good, 
forbids indifference to its contradictory content. Even if ought has no polar 
opposite, “It ought to be that p” is incompatible with “It is optional that ¬p,” in 
particular with “It ought to be that ¬p.” The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for 
desire-that but false for “It is good that.”
5.2 Right and Wrong Are Not Formal Polar Opposites
Another objection, brought to my attention by Federico Lauria, has it that some 
deontic predicates—such as right and wrong—are not formally but materially 
opposed. If this is true, some deontic concepts display the same formal relations 
as axiological concepts and are consequently closer to emotions than to desires. 
The argument goes as follows:
P1 Right and wrong are deontic predicates.
P2 Right and wrong are polarly opposed predicates.
P3 Its being right to wear a hat does not entail its being wrong not to 
wear a hat.
C The polar opposition between some deontic predicate (right and wrong) 
is not formal (given the definition of formal polar opposition above) but 
material.
This objection, I submit, relies on an equivocation about the extension of right. 
Right has a broad and a narrow sense (Timmons 2002: 7–9). In the broad sense, 
right is co-extensional with obligatory or optional, that is, with permissible. In the 
narrow sense, right is co-extensional with obligatory. If right is used in the broad 
sense, P3 is true (for it can be optional to wear a hat) but P2 is false (for there is 
no indifference zone between right—permissible—and wrong). If right is read in 
the narrow sense, then P2 is  (p.192) true (optional lies in between right and 
wrong), but P3 is false (for if it is right—obligatory—to wear a hat, then it has to 
be wrong not be wear one).
5.3 Desire Has No Polar Opposite
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In the same way as modals like ought and should, desire seems to lack any 
proper English opposite. As noted above, aversion is a rather poor term for the 
polar opposite of thin desires, for it is affectively loaded. One might indeed use 
aversion in a cold technical sense, but it then becomes unclear that aversion is 
anything other than desiring-not. McTaggart (1927: §449, p. 138) presses the 
point conspicuously:
I think we must say that there are no such things as negative desires. The 
quality of being a desire is not a genus with two species, one of which has 
the quality of being positive, and the other the quality of being negative. In 
the cases which we distinguished … as positive and negative, there is no 
difference in the desire itself. The difference is only in the object desired. 
One is a desire for A to be X, the other is a desire for A not to be X. The 
nature of that which is desired is different, but the nature of the desire is 
the same.
If desire has indeed no polar opposite, then the central claim above, according to 
which the polar opposition between desire and aversion is of a distinct kind from 
the polar opposition between positive and negative emotions, collapses.
A first reply is to reject McTaggart’s proposal and maintain the existence of 
negative desires. A first hint that this might be true is that if, as suggested 
above, wanting is the best way to express thin occurrent desires, then other 
languages provide words corresponding to diswanting, such as disvolere in 
Italian (see Wierzbicka 1994: 476–477 for other examples). Second, since 
wanting is neg-raising—contrary to desiring (see Horn 1989: 321)—one could 
here again rely on the difference between “Julie does not want to laugh” and 
“Julie wants not to laugh” to argue that diswanting something is not merely 
wanting its negation (although the two are equivalent). So wanting might, after 
all, have a polar opposite.
A second reply is simply to accept McTaggart’s proposal that the distinction 
between positive and negative desires boils down to a distinction in the objects 
of desires, but to reject that this threatens any of the arguments above. Even if 
the formal polar opposition between desire and  (p.193) aversion, wanting and 
diswanting, are just notational variations, as long as wanting or desiring forbid 
conative indifference to the negation of their content, contrary to emotions, we 
have all we need to carry through these arguments.
5.4 The Guise of the Better
Another objection has it that a close cousin of GG is immune to the objections 
raised above. According to this, the formal objects of desires are comparative 
values: whatever one desires is presented to us as better than its negation:
Guise of the Better (GB): In virtue of the immediate nature of desire:
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1. If S desires that p, it seems to S that p is better than ¬p.
2. If S desires to ϕ, it seems to S that ϕ-ing is better than ¬ϕ-ing.
Under GB, the formal object of conative indifference will be “having the same 
value as its negation,” while the formal object of aversion will be “being worse 
than its negation.” So construed, GB is immune to the two objections raised 
against GG, for better than, same value as, and worse than behave like obligatory 
that, optional that, and impermissible that—and unlike good that, neutral that, 
and bad that. Better than and worse than are formal polar opposites: “p is better 
than ¬p” iff “¬p is worse than p.”
Why, then, prefer GO to GB? The cautious answer is that the view defended here 
is only the preferability of GO over GG and that GB is not a version of GG. True, 
upholders of GG sometimes switch more or less surreptitiously from the guise of 
the good to the guise of the better (Davidson 2001; Tenenbaum 2013). But since 
being good is neither necessary nor sufficient for being better, this is a 
substantial step toward a distinct theory. Let me, however, hint at two reasons 
GO might still fare better than GB.
First, one main motivation in favor of GO is to preserve the one-to-one 
correspondence between kinds of attitudes and kinds of formal objects. But 
betterness is naturally construed as the formal object of preferences rather than 
of desires. In the same way that GG leads to the view that desires and emotions 
share their formal objects, GB leads to the view that desires and preferences 
share their formal objects.
Second, it is unclear that desiring that p always entails taking p to be better than 
¬p, for the reason that some desires might not be grounded in values at all, even 
comparative ones. These are desires whose formal  (p.194) objects are norms 
that are not grounded on the values of their bearers. Such as:
1. Norms grounded on values other than those of their bearer. Such as (i) 
conventional norms: the obligation to drive on the right side of the road is 
arguably not grounded in its being good or better to drive on the right;28
(ii) instrumental norms: Meinong (1972: 103–104) suggests that 
instrumental oughts ground instrumental values rather than the reverse. 
(iii) Relatedly, some consequentialist norms for actions, grounded on the 
value of their results or consequences.
2. Norms directly grounded in natural/non-normative properties:29 Julie 
ought to do what she promised, arguably, simply because of the nature of 
promises.
3. Norms directly grounded on rights or freedoms (property rights, 
freedom of speech, etc.). Julie’s obligation not to steal Paul’s bike is 
arguably directly grounded in Paul’s property rights to this bike.30
Desires, Values and Norms
Page 27 of 38
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
4. Norms not grounded, or self-grounded: categorical imperatives 
perhaps; or norms governing reactive attitudes: that one ought to have 
positive attitudes toward things of positive values is perhaps not 
grounded in its being good, or better, to have such attitudes.31
When such obligations are motivating, no presentation of monadic or 
comparative value is required.
5.5 The Motivational Force of Values
Finally, one might object that GO is an even worse position than GG with respect 
to the motivational role of values, for according to GO, no value at all (not even 
goodness) is essentially presented with desires. Presentations of values do not 
belong to the immediate nature of desires: conations are under the tyranny of 
norms.
One way to account for the motivational role of values in the context of GO is, 
following Meinong, to claim that our presentations of norms are grounded in our 
presentation of values. Typically (but not always, as we just saw), things seem to 
ought to be because they seem to have (or lack) some value. This claim is the 
psychological counterpart of the ontological claim that norms are grounded in 
values (Meinong 1972: 99). Values, in Meinong’s terms, are borrowed objects of 
desire. Given the formal disanalogies between values and norms, it cannot, 
however, be claimed that “p ought to be” iff “p is good,” and “p ought not to be” 
iff “p is bad.” Norms  (p.195) grounded on values have to be grounded on 
comparative values, which, as we saw, stand in relations of formal polar 
opposition. More precisely, when norms are grounded on the values of their 
bearer, we will have:
• It is obligatory that p (partly) because p is better than ¬p.
• It is optional that p (partly) because p has the same value as ¬p.
• It is impermissible that p (partly) because p is worse than ¬p.
Hansson (2007: 144) and Tappolet (2014) recall that two main accounts of the 
relation between oughts and values have been advanced. One equates ought with
good: it has to be rejected for the reasons advanced above. The other equates 
ought with best and is in tune with the present proposal, for norms that are 
grounded on values.
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A natural objection to such a proposal is that it ends up giving a pretty 
complicated picture of the motivational force of values. To motivate, monadic 
values have to ground comparative values, which in turn have to ground norms. 
If monadic values are presented by emotions, if comparative values are 
presented by preferences, and if norms are presented by desires, then to act on 
the basis of a monadic value we need to go through emotions, preferences, and, 
at last, desires. This might sounds far-fetched. But this is not necessarily the 
only way to act on the basis of values. GO is not committed to the view that only 
desires motivate. Emotions might directly motivate. For instance, we might 
sometimes act out of our emotions without the help of any desires.
Finally, note that the present objection to GO, according to which it cannot 
account for the motivational role of value, has a counterpart objection directed 
against GG. For in the very same way that desires are value-blind under GO, 
desires are norm-blind under GG. Upholders of GG owe us an account for the 
motivational force of norms.
I conclude that if desires are grounded on some normative presentations, as 
agreed by both upholders of GG and of GO, these presentations are better 
construed as presentations of norms than as presentations of values.32
Notes
(1.) On top of Findlay’s foreword and Kalsi’s introduction to Meinong (1972), 
other useful presentations of Meinong’s late views about emotions, desires, 
values, and norms are to be found in Findlay 1935, 1963; Kalsi 1978; 
Chrudzimski 2009; Marek 2010. Raspa (2012) compares Meinong’s view on 
these issues with the close view of his pupil France Veber.
(2.) Meinong also calls values “dignitatives” and norms “desideratives.” To be 
more precise, on top of being presentations of values and norms, emotions and 
desires are also self-presentations, according to him.
(3.) See Oddie (2005, this volume), Tenenbaum (2007), and Friedrich (this 
volume) for some defenses of the evaluative conceptions of desires.
(4.) Other deontic conceptions of desire are possible. One of them would be to 
equate desires with presentations of ought-to-do (rather than ought-to-be). To 
the extent that normative reasons are deontic concepts, as he seems to admit, 
Gregory (2013, this volume) might be defending as such an ought-to-do version 
of the deontic conception of desires, according to which desires are beliefs about 
normative reasons for actions.
(5.) In Meinong’s terms, presentations of dignitatives are the psychological 
presuppositions of presentations of desideratives.
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(6.) In Meinong’s terms, presentations of objecta or objectives are the 
psychological presuppositions of presentations of dignitatives.
(7.) Similar restrictions about the content of norms are commonplace among 
realist phenomenologists. That what ought to be cannot exist is also defended by 
Scheler (1973: 207); that obligation necessarily bears on future behaviors is 
defended by Reinach (1983: 11).
(8.) A point emphasized by Hartmann 1932: vol. 1, ch. 18(a).
(9.) The squash player example is from Watson (1975). This answer is defended, 
as far as GG in concerned, by Tenenbaum (2007: 41).
(10.) See Döring and Eker (this volume) and Oddie (this volume) for more on the 
distinction between doxastic and perceptual evaluativism about desires.
(11.) I’m here following Meinong and Merricks (2009) in assuming that 
propositional desires (and emotions) are not directed toward propositions (we do 
not, typically, desire or love propositions) but toward states of affairs (which are 
expressed by propositions in attitude ascriptions). This is arguably an important 
distinction between desires and beliefs: we believe propositions; we desire 
states of affairs.
(12.) It is standardly accepted that objectual desires are propositional desires in 
disguise, but see Brewer (2006) and Forbes (2006: ch. 4).
(13.) See Mulligan (2007) for a recent defense of that view and Teroni (2007) for 
a more Meinongian approach in reply.
(14.) See Deonna and Teroni (2012) for an analogous and more detailed 
objection to perceptualist accounts of emotions.
(15.) On formal objects, see Teroni 2007; Mulligan 2007.
(16.) That oughtness is the formal object of desire is accepted by Mulligan 
(2007, 2010).
(17.) See Mulligan (1989, 1998), Konrad (2000), Ogien and Tappolet (2009: ch. 
2), Wedgwood (2009), Tappolet (2013, forthcoming), Fassio (2013) for some 
explicit attempts to tackle this problem.
(18.) Scheler 1955: 103; Hartmann 1932: vol. 2, ch. 36). See Tappolet (2000: 17) 
for further references.
(19.) Such restrictions on the range of contraries are defended by Woods (1969), 
Barnes (1969), and Lehrer and Lehrer (1982). As for values, a similar restriction 
to “axiological regions” is introduced by Husserl (2009: 165, 169). See Mulligan 
2006.
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(20.) Meinong, however, does not think that polar opposites have to be 
contraries.
(21.) See Massin (2014: §§1–2) for further details.
(22.) Some of the value/norm disanologies to be introduced may have been 
anticipated by Meinong (1996: ch. 15).
(23.) See Chisholm and Sosa (1966: 248, Theorem 22), Iwin (1975: 113ff.); 
Hansson (2007: 120).
(24.) Substantially the same point is made by Chisholm and Sosa (1966) in their 
seminal paper, where they introduce the distinction between axiological 
neutrality and indifference.
(25.) The conative square of opposition can be found in Kenny (1966: 88).
(26.) As with values (see §2.2), one can define others kinds of affective 
indifference. “Positive affective indifference” corresponds to the case where one 
neither loves a state of affairs nor loves its negation. “Negative affective 
indifference” corresponds to the case where one hates neither a state of affairs 
nor its negation. “Affective super-indifference” corresponds to the case where 
one neither loves nor hates a state of affairs nor its negation.
(27.) The two main views in the literature about the hedonic tone of desires 
apply to both desires and aversions indifferently. They are:
(1.) Desires and aversions are essentially unpleasant, and hence do not 
have opposite valences (see, e.g., Locke 2008: ch. 21, §§31–32; Bain 1859; 
Marshall 1891).
(2.) Desire and aversion do not have any hedonic tone essentially 
(Sidgwick 1892, 1981, cf. long note at the end of ch. 4; Allen 1930: 27ff., 
Hamilton 1882: vol. 2, 433; Schueler 1995: 11ff.).
One argument in favor of the first view is that since one cannot desire what one 
thinks is the case, desires are essentially unsatisfied, which is essentially 
unpleasant. (See Meinong 1972: 86; Lauria, Oddie, this volume, on the “death of 
desire” principle.) One possible reply is that conditional desires whose condition 
is not met (such as Paul’s desire to buy Mary a diamond if he wins the lottery) 
are not frustrated but only canceled (McDaniel and Bradley 2008), so that 
canceled desires do not have to be unpleasant.
(28.) I thank Christine Tappolet for calling my attention to such cases.
(29.) Reinach 1983: §4.
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(30.) Ibid., §5
(31.) Tappolet forthcoming.
(32.) I wish to express my thanks to Davide Fassio, Federico Lauria, Christine 
Tappolet, and Fabrice Teroni for their detailed and very useful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper, as well as to Julien Deonna, Anne Meylan, and 
Kevin Mulligan for helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks to Riccardo 
Braglia, CEO and managing director of Helsinn Holding SA and the Fondazione 
Reginaldus (Lugano) for financial support of the work published here.
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Notes:
(1.) On top of Findlay’s foreword and Kalsi’s introduction to Meinong (1972), 
other useful presentations of Meinong’s late views about emotions, desires, 
values, and norms are to be found in Findlay 1935, 1963; Kalsi 1978; 
Chrudzimski 2009; Marek 2010. Raspa (2012) compares Meinong’s view on 
these issues with the close view of his pupil France Veber.
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(2.) Meinong also calls values “dignitatives” and norms “desideratives.” To be 
more precise, on top of being presentations of values and norms, emotions and 
desires are also self-presentations, according to him.
(3.) See Oddie (2005, this volume), Tenenbaum (2007), and Friedrich (this 
volume) for some defenses of the evaluative conceptions of desires.
(4.) Other deontic conceptions of desire are possible. One of them would be to 
equate desires with presentations of ought-to-do (rather than ought-to-be). To 
the extent that normative reasons are deontic concepts, as he seems to admit, 
Gregory (2013, this volume) might be defending as such an ought-to-do version 
of the deontic conception of desires, according to which desires are beliefs about 
normative reasons for actions.
(5.) In Meinong’s terms, presentations of dignitatives are the psychological 
presuppositions of presentations of desideratives.
(6.) In Meinong’s terms, presentations of objecta or objectives are the 
psychological presuppositions of presentations of dignitatives.
(7.) Similar restrictions about the content of norms are commonplace among 
realist phenomenologists. That what ought to be cannot exist is also defended by
Scheler (1973: 207); that obligation necessarily bears on future behaviors is 
defended by Reinach (1983: 11).
(8.) A point emphasized by Hartmann 1932: vol. 1, ch. 18(a).
(9.) The squash player example is from Watson (1975). This answer is defended, 
as far as GG in concerned, by Tenenbaum (2007: 41).
(10.) See Döring and Eker (this volume) and Oddie (this volume) for more on the 
distinction between doxastic and perceptual evaluativism about desires.
(11.) I’m here following Meinong and Merricks (2009) in assuming that 
propositional desires (and emotions) are not directed toward propositions (we do 
not, typically, desire or love propositions) but toward states of affairs (which are 
expressed by propositions in attitude ascriptions). This is arguably an important 
distinction between desires and beliefs: we believe propositions; we desire 
states of affairs.
(12.) It is standardly accepted that objectual desires are propositional desires in 
disguise, but see Brewer (2006) and Forbes (2006: ch. 4).
(13.) See Mulligan (2007) for a recent defense of that view and Teroni (2007) for 
a more Meinongian approach in reply.
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(14.) See Deonna and Teroni (2012) for an analogous and more detailed 
objection to perceptualist accounts of emotions.
(15.) On formal objects, see Teroni 2007; Mulligan 2007.
(16.) That oughtness is the formal object of desire is accepted by Mulligan 
(2007, 2010).
(17.) See Mulligan (1989, 1998), Konrad (2000), Ogien and Tappolet (2009: ch. 
2), Wedgwood (2009), Tappolet (2013, forthcoming), Fassio (2013) for some 
explicit attempts to tackle this problem.
(18.) Scheler 1955: 103; Hartmann 1932: vol. 2, ch. 36). See Tappolet (2000: 17) 
for further references.
(19.) Such restrictions on the range of contraries are defended by Woods (1969), 
Barnes (1969), and Lehrer and Lehrer (1982). As for values, a similar restriction 
to “axiological regions” is introduced by Husserl (2009: 165, 169). See Mulligan 
2006.
(20.) Meinong, however, does not think that polar opposites have to be 
contraries.
(21.) See Massin (2014: §§1–2) for further details.
(22.) Some of the value/norm disanologies to be introduced may have been 
anticipated by Meinong (1996: ch. 15).
(23.) See Chisholm and Sosa (1966: 248, Theorem 22), Iwin (1975: 113ff.); 
Hansson (2007: 120).
(24.) Substantially the same point is made by Chisholm and Sosa (1966) in their 
seminal paper, where they introduce the distinction between axiological 
neutrality and indifference.
(25.) The conative square of opposition can be found in Kenny (1966: 88).
(26.) As with values (see §2.2), one can define others kinds of affective 
indifference. “Positive affective indifference” corresponds to the case where one 
neither loves a state of affairs nor loves its negation. “Negative affective 
indifference” corresponds to the case where one hates neither a state of affairs 
nor its negation. “Affective super-indifference” corresponds to the case where 
one neither loves nor hates a state of affairs nor its negation.
(27.) The two main views in the literature about the hedonic tone of desires 
apply to both desires and aversions indifferently. They are:
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(1.) Desires and aversions are essentially unpleasant, and hence do not 
have opposite valences (see, e.g., Locke 2008: ch. 21, §§31–32; Bain 1859;
Marshall 1891).
(2.) Desire and aversion do not have any hedonic tone essentially 
(Sidgwick 1892, 1981, cf. long note at the end of ch. 4; Allen 1930: 27ff., 
Hamilton 1882: vol. 2, 433; Schueler 1995: 11ff.).
One argument in favor of the first view is that since one cannot desire what one 
thinks is the case, desires are essentially unsatisfied, which is essentially 
unpleasant. (See Meinong 1972: 86; Lauria, Oddie, this volume, on the “death of 
desire” principle.) One possible reply is that conditional desires whose condition 
is not met (such as Paul’s desire to buy Mary a diamond if he wins the lottery) 
are not frustrated but only canceled (McDaniel and Bradley 2008), so that 
canceled desires do not have to be unpleasant.
(28.) I thank Christine Tappolet for calling my attention to such cases.
(29.) Reinach 1983: §4.
(30.) Ibid., §5
(31.) Tappolet forthcoming.
(32.) I wish to express my thanks to Davide Fassio, Federico Lauria, Christine 
Tappolet, and Fabrice Teroni for their detailed and very useful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper, as well as to Julien Deonna, Anne Meylan, and 
Kevin Mulligan for helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks to Riccardo 
Braglia, CEO and managing director of Helsinn Holding SA and the Fondazione 
Reginaldus (Lugano) for financial support of the work published here.
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Abstract and Keywords
This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons 
for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But 
the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues 
that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of 
beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as 
hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs 
about reasons are not sufficient for desire, such as weakness of will, and that it 
can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about reasons are 
not necessary for desire, such as addiction. The paper also shows how it is 
superior to the view that desires are appearances of the good.
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IN THIS PAPER I shall defend the view that desires are beliefs about normative 
reasons for action. More precisely, I shall defend a view I call DAB, according to 
which to desire to φ just is to believe that you have normative reason to φ. (For 
other defenses of views similar to DAB, see Humberstone 1987; McNaughton 
1988: 106–117; McDowell 1998; Massin, Lauria this volume.) Though I shall 
briefly sketch some attractions of DAB, my main task in this paper is defensive. 
It may seem as though DAB is obviously false because it is subject to decisive 
objections. But I shall show that the most obvious objections to it fail. I shall also 
compare DAB to views on which desires are mere appearances of normative 
properties rather than full-blown beliefs.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I describe the view, and swiftly 
lay out three attractive features it has. Then, in section 2, I respond to five 
objections to the view: that it is inconsistent with the distinction between the 
direction of fit of belief and desire, that it is falsified by the existence of 
appetites, that beliefs about reasons are not sufficient for desire, that beliefs 
about reasons are not necessary for desire, and that animals have desires but no 
beliefs about normative reasons.1 Finally, in section 3, I compare DAB to the 
view that desires are appearances of the good.
1. Desires as Beliefs about Normative Reasons for Action
To remind you, here is the view that I shall defend:
DAB: To desire to φ is to believe that you have normative reason to φ.2
 (p.202) Let me illustrate DAB with two examples. First, imagine that I desire to 
read Asimov’s Foundation. According to DAB, this is just the same as my 
believing that I have a reason to read Asimov’s Foundation. (Perhaps I think it 
will be fun.) Second, imagine that I believe I have a reason to buy a new scarf 
today. (I’ve lost the old one.) According to DAB, this is just the same as my 
desiring to buy a new scarf today.
DAB is an account of desire. I take desires to be the same as wants and as the 
constituents of preferences. DAB analyzes only desires to act, which I take to be 
the paradigm case of desire. I assume that DAB could be extended by treating 
other desires as desires to act so as to bring about some state of affairs, but I 
shall not make that case here. Desires come in varying strengths, and when I 
talk about what an agent desires to do, I am talking about what she has some
desire to do, not what she most wants to do, all things considered.
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DAB analyzes desires in terms of beliefs about normative reasons for action. A 
normative reason to perform an action is something that counts in favor of that 
action (see, e.g., Parfit 2011: 31; Scanlon 1998: 17). Hereafter, for brevity, I will 
often use the word reason to mean “normative reason for action.” Note that not 
all such reasons are moral reasons: I am not offering a moralized account of 
desire. Further, note that reasons, like desires, come in varying strengths. When 
I talk about what an agent believes she has reason to do, I am talking about 
what she believes she has some reason to do, and not what she believes she has 
most reason to do, all things considered.
DAB has at least three attractive features. First, because DAB identifies desires 
and beliefs about reasons, we do not have to see these two as competitors in our 
motivational system. That allows us to solve a certain puzzle about moral 
motivation: DAB entitles us to agree that normative judgments are beliefs and to 
agree that such judgments have the power to motivate us to act, while also 
allowing us to accept the Humean claim that only desires have the power to 
motivate us to act (cf. McNaughton 1988: 23, 46).3 It is only if we accept DAB 
that these three plausible claims are consistent.
Second, DAB explains why desires are sensitive to evidence about what we have 
reason to do (cf. Fernández 2007; Byrne 2011; Moran 2001: 119). If you want to 
vote Conservative, I might get you to rationally abandon this desire by 
presenting you with evidence that there are no good reasons to vote 
Conservative. Or, for another example, if I ask you whether you want my spare 
plane ticket to China, you will respond by considering the reasons for and 
against taking this choice: the sights, the food, the  (p.203) weather, etc. DAB 
explains why desires are sensitive to evidence about reasons: because they are 
beliefs about reasons.
Third, DAB resolves disagreement about whether what we ought to do depends 
on our desires (see, e.g., Joyce 2001; Schroeder 2007; Williams 1981, 1995). If 
DAB is true, this amounts to the claim that what we ought to do depends on our 
beliefs about what we have reason to do. It is very plausible that this claim is 
ambiguous between something true and something false. It is false in the sense 
that one’s beliefs might be false. But it is true in the sense that what we 
rationally ought to do does depend on our beliefs about what we have reason to 
do (see, e.g., Scanlon 1998: 25). So DAB resolves the controversy regarding 
whether what we ought to do depends on our desires.
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These three points are helpful for contrasting DAB with motivational theories of 
desire (e.g. Smith 1994: 113). DAB coincides with motivational theories insofar 
as both claim that desires have the power to motivate. DAB says that desires 
have motivational potential because they are beliefs about reasons to act, and 
such beliefs have motivational potential. But DAB goes beyond motivational 
theories of desire because it also makes other claims about desire. In particular, 
it explains how they are under rational control and explains the broader role 
they play in determining how we ought to act.
In summary, I hope it is clear that DAB has some appeal. To provide conclusive 
support for DAB I would need to defend these arguments at much greater 
length, and I do not have space to do that here. But in light of the remarks 
above, we should at least be curious about whether DAB can withstand criticism. 
So now I can turn to the real focus of this paper: Are there any convincing 
objections to DAB? We should remember throughout that my goal is purely 
defensive. My goal is the modest one of showing that if there is good 
independent reason to accept DAB, the issues below provide no evidence to the 
contrary.
2. Objections
2.1. DAB Is Inconsistent with the Distinction between Directions of Fit
An initial worry is that DAB is inconsistent with the distinction between the 
direction of fit of belief and desire. According to that distinction, beliefs aim to 
fit the world, whereas desires aim to have the world fit them. Roughly, where 
there is a discrepancy between what you believe and what  (p.204) is true, you 
should change your beliefs. But where there is a discrepancy between what you 
desire and what is true, you should change what’s true. There are many 
questions about how to formulate this contrast more precisely (see Gregory 
2012; Humberstone 1992; Smith 1987, 1994: 111–116; Railton, Lauria this 
volume). But regardless of how we do this, the underlying issue for DAB is the 
same: if beliefs and desires contrast with one another in this way, how could 
desires be beliefs, as DAB says?
The answer is that the direction of fit metaphor should not be understood, at its 
most fundamental, as describing a contrast between beliefs and desires. The 
easiest way to see this is to note that other states of mind—such as intentions 
and memories—also have a direction of fit. So the direction of fit metaphor is 
best understood not as a contrast between beliefs and desires, as such, but 
rather as a contrast between two functional roles a mental state might play. On 
the one hand, a state of mind might be sensitive to evidence in a certain manner: 
being such that it ought to fit certain facts about the world. On the other hand, a 
state of mind might have motivational power: being such that facts about the 
world ought to fit the state.
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One can allow that there is this contrast between these functional roles and 
nonetheless maintain DAB. We merely need to say that some mental states play 
both of these functional roles: that some mental states have both directions of 
fit. This is exactly what DAB says. It says that there is a state of mind that 
represents one proposition as fitting the world, namely that one has reason to φ, 
and simultaneously represents another proposition as something that the world 
should fit, namely that one φ-s. That is, DAB says that there is a state of mind 
that is sensitive to evidence and that also has motivational power. There is 
nothing problematic about this. In short, the direction of fit metaphor is 
consistent with DAB. The direction of fit metaphor is best understood as stating 
a contrast between two functional roles, and that is consistent with DAB, which 
says that some states of mind play both functional roles.
Note further that DAB implies that we have two different names for a single 
state of mind. We might explain this by appeal to the claim that those names 
highlight different features it has (cf. the different names you might use to refer 
to one and the same multi-purpose penknife). So the truth of DAB is consistent 
with the fact that when you describe a state of mind as a “desire,” you draw 
attention to its motivational power, and when you describe a state of mind as a 
“belief about a reason,” you draw attention to its sensitivity to evidence. In turn, 
DAB is consistent with the fact that one direction of fit is more associated with 
desire, and the other with  (p.205) belief. But this is a matter of what we draw 
attention to when we describe this state in these ways, and not a difference 
between which features it in fact has.
There is a worry with what I have said in response to this objection. It might 
seem problematic if DAB entails that desires bear both functional roles to one 
and the same proposition. That would be deeply problematic (Smith 1994: 118). 
But this is not what DAB says. DAB says that desires represent one thing as to 
be made true (that I φ) and something else (that I have reason to φ) as true 
(Little 1997: 64; Price 1989: 120–121). So desires bear these functional roles 
toward different propositions.
In summary, the direction of fit metaphor is consistent with DAB. The direction 
of fit metaphor is best understood as drawing a contrast between two different 
functional roles, and defenders of DAB just need to say that desires—beliefs 
about reasons—play both.
2.2. Appetites Are Desires but Are Not Beliefs about Reasons
One obvious complaint about DAB is that while some desires may somehow 
involve beliefs about reasons, others do not. And appetites like hunger and thirst 
seem to fall into the latter category (see Nagel 1970: 29; Parfit 2011: 52–53; 
Schueler 1995: 9–10; Railton this volume). In what follows, I shall focus on 
hunger, but it should be clear that my remarks will generalize to other states, 
such as thirst.
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The problem is that hunger seems to be a desire to eat, and yet there seem to be 
numerous reasons for thinking that hunger is not a belief about a reason to eat. 
For example, it seems that hunger is outside of rational control: it just assails us. 
Or, for another example, hunger seems to have a distinctive phenomenology that 
no belief could have.
But in cases of this kind we should distinguish two things. First, there is the 
feeling of hunger (predominantly located in one’s abdomen), and second, there 
is the desire to eat. It is easy to confuse these two because the former normally 
leads to the latter. But they are nonetheless distinct. We can desire food even 
when we are not hungry. For example, you might want to eat some food in order 
to be polite or for the taste. (How often do you want dessert because you’re 
hungry?) Vice versa, it would be unusual, but seems possible, that you might be 
hungry and yet not have any desire for food. For example, you might be on a 
religious fast or be a particular kind of anorexic.
With this distinction between the feeling of hunger and the desire to eat in hand, 
it’s easy to see that DAB can overcome the objection. Defenders  (p.206) of DAB 
can grant that the feeling of hunger is not a belief about a reason to eat. But this 
leaves open the possibility that the desire to eat is a belief that one has a reason 
to eat. This claim seems plausible. Normally, we want to eat because we are 
hungry. According to DAB, this comes out as the plausible claim that we often 
take our hunger to be a reason to eat. In other circumstances we might want to 
eat even when we aren’t hungry, as when we want to eat something for the 
taste. According to DAB this comes out as the plausible claim that we might 
believe that other things, such as the taste of the food, are reasons for eating. In 
still other (rare) circumstances someone might be hungry and yet not want to 
eat, as when on a religious fast. According to DAB this comes out as the 
plausible claim that in other (rare) circumstances someone might be hungry and 
yet believe that this gives him no reason to eat.
In summary, once we distinguish the feeling of hunger from the desire for food, 
it is clear that hunger is no threat at all to DAB. The feeling of hunger is isolated 
from belief, but the desire for food is not, and so DAB is quite consistent with the 
existence of appetites. Though the feeling of hunger just assails us and is not a 
rational response to anything, the desire for food is under rational control and is 
a rational response to the reasons as we see them—often responsive to the 
reasons we see for quelling our hunger.
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One final worry is that if my defense of DAB requires that I deny that hunger is a 
desire, then it is revisionary to an implausible degree. Hunger, we might think, is 
the paradigmatic desire, and if a theory of desires excludes hunger from its 
purview, then it is no longer a theory of desire at all.4 However, it would be 
misleading to say that I deny that hunger is a desire. Rather, my claim is that 
‘hunger’ is ambiguous between a desire, a feeling, and the combination of both 
of these. The fact that the word has this loose meaning should not be surprising, 
since normally feelings of hunger and the desire for food go together. But if we 
want our theorizing to carve nature at the joints, we should anticipate that these 
different things will need different analyses. Certainly, if we try to give a theory 
of “desire” that makes sense of all of these things at once, as well as common 
desires such as to catch the train, to finish a paper, or to tie your shoelaces, we 
are going to end up with a disjointed theory, since such desires do not have any 
associated feelings (see, however, Friedrich this volume). There is a more 
general lesson here, which is that the word ‘desire’ may carry certain 
connotations—such as the presence of physical sensations—that are not really 
part of our subject matter when we investigate desires. After all, we are 
supposed to think of desires as the same as wants and as  (p.207) 
systematically related to preferences, but ‘want’ and ‘prefer’ do not necessarily 
carry these same bodily connotations.
2.3. Beliefs about Reasons Are Not Sufficient for Desire
In this section, I address counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about 
reasons are not sufficient for desire. One might think that we are sometimes 
weak-willed in that we don’t want to do things that we believe we have reason to 
do (e.g. Smith 1994: 117–125; Stocker 1979: esp. 741–746). I shall address two 
representative examples. First:
Smoking Sally: Sally is a smoker. She knows full well that she has very good 
reasons to quit: smoking is costly and unhealthy. But she is weak-willed and 
continues to smoke.
Such a case might seem to threaten DAB. Isn’t Sally’s problem that while she 
knows she should quit, she doesn’t want to?
To understand the issue, we should first distinguish desiring to φ from being 
motivated to φ (pace Dancy 2000: 85–88). We should distinguish these for 
various reasons, of which I shall mention two. First, though we desire very many 
things—a list of all your desires would be enormous—motivation is a more 
limited resource that we have to spend frugally. Second, when Humeans claim 
that only desires motivate, they are not making the trivial claim that only 
motivations motivate. Considerations like these make clear that desiring to ϕ is 
distinct from being motivated to ϕ.
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It is worth briefly revisiting a claim I made earlier: that desires have the 
potential to motivate. It should be clear that this claim is consistent with the 
above distinction between desire and motivation. My claim is that desires and 
motivation are distinct, though the former have the power to generate the latter. 
An analogy may help: on my view, desires stand to motivation as beer stands to 
inebriation. Beer has the power to inebriate, but it does not always exercise this 
power. Equally, desires have the power to motivate, but they do not always 
exercise this power.
With this distinction in mind, it seems plausible to suppose that, assuming Sally 
really does think she has very good reasons for quitting, she has some desire to 
quit smoking. Imagine asking Sally, “Would you prefer to stop smoking or 
continue doing so?” It would be incredible if she responded that she preferred to 
smoke. She clearly wants to stop: this is precisely why finding yourself in a 
situation like Sally’s can be frustrating. But this does nothing to show that Sally 
must be motivated to quit  (p.208) smoking. Precisely her problem is that 
although she wants to quit, she cannot motivate herself sufficiently to achieve 
this goal. (Her desire is failing to exercise its motivational power.) This seems to 
be a much more natural way to describe her problem, as well as the similar 
problem faced by those who think they should eat less, exercise more, and other 
such cases. In cases like Sally’s, the problem is that we lack the motivation to 
achieve our goals. If weakness of will is a lack of motivation to achieve one’s 
goals, it is consistent with DAB.
Once we make this distinction between desiring to do something and being 
motivated to do it, DAB can also handle numerous other apparent 
counterexamples, such as people with depression (Stocker 1979: 744–746; see 
also Smith 1994: 119–121; cf. Garrard and McNaughton 1998: 49). Clearly, we 
might believe that we have reason to do something and not be in the least 
motivated to do it. But this is irrelevant to the truth of DAB (pace Oddie 2005: 
37; Tenenbaum 2007: 227–298). DAB entails only that beliefs about reasons are 
sufficient for desire, not that beliefs about reasons are sufficient for motivation, 
and as such is perfectly consistent with weakness of will.5
I now turn to a second example that aims to show that beliefs about reasons are 
not sufficient for desire (cf. Scanlon 1998: 39):
Teething Tabatha: Tabatha knows that she has good reason to go to the 
dentist: her teeth are in an awful state. But she will quite keenly insist that 
she doesn’t want to go to the dentist—who does?
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This kind of case seems to be as much a problem for the Humean theory of 
motivation as for DAB, since it is natural to suppose that Tabatha might go to the 
dentist even though she has no desire to do so. Just as Humeans should try to 
find some interpretation of Tabatha that does justice to what she says but that 
also attributes to her a desire to go to the dentist’s, so too should defenders of 
DAB.6
One way to see that something puzzling is going on here is to imagine that 
Tabatha is indeed going to go to the dentist (as she knows she should) but hasn’t 
made her appointment yet. She picks up the phone, gets through to the 
secretary, and might quite normally say, “Hi, I want to see the dentist today, 
please.” Or imagine that she’s made the appointment and intends to take a taxi 
there. She might quite normally ask the taxi driver, “I want to go to the dentist, 
please.” One possibility here is that Tabatha is just contradicting herself when 
she insists in one breath that she doesn’t want to visit the dentist, and then 
asserts in the next breath that she does want to  (p.209) see the dentist. But a 
more plausible interpretation is that her initial claim was implicitly restricted in 
scope. When she insists that she doesn’t want to go to the dentist, she really 
means only that she doesn’t want the pain that she’ll experience there. But this 
is of course consistent with wanting, all things considered, to go.
Because of this, DAB is vindicated. Clearly, Tabatha doesn’t think she has good 
reason to seek out the pain at the dentist. This is the sense in which she doesn’t 
want to go. But all the same, Tabatha does think she has good reason to visit the 
dentist, all things considered. And all things considered, she does want to go. 
Once we acknowledge this restriction of scope in her initial claim, it is clear that 
DAB is not undermined by the example.
In summary, so long as we attend to the fact that DAB identifies beliefs about 
reasons with desire and not motivation, and so long as we make sure to attend to 
possible implicit restrictions of scope in claims about what someone does or 
doesn’t want to do, DAB is unobjectionable for implying that beliefs about 
reasons are sufficient for desire.
2.4. Beliefs about Reasons Are Not Necessary for Desire
In this section I address counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about 
reasons are not necessary for desire. One might think that we sometimes want 
to do things that we don’t believe we have reason to do (e.g. Stocker 1979: 746–
749; Velleman 1992).
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In this respect, DAB commits us to something like the guise of the good (see, 
e.g., Anscombe 1963: 75; Aquinas ST I-II.1.1, DV 24.2; Davidson 2001: 22–23; 
Raz 2010; Döring and Eker, Massin, Oddie this volume). It entails that we can 
want to do something only if we think there is some merit in it. There are various 
putative counterexamples to the guise of the good, such as Satan, who desires to 
do things precisely because they are bad (Velleman 1992: 18), and the person 
who, in a fit of guilt, desires to make his own life worse (Stocker 1979: 748). But 
we must take care to remember that DAB analyzes desires as beliefs about 
reasons rather than as beliefs about goodness (cf. Massin this volume). As such 
DAB is perfectly consistent with such possibilities: we merely have to endorse 
the plausible claim that Satan believes he has normative reasons to do bad 
things, and the plausible claim that those with self-destructive desires believe 
that there are normative reasons for them to make their lives worse. (I discuss 
these issues in greater detail in Gregory 2013.)
 (p.210) However, there is one other counterexample of this kind that is 
sometimes thought to threaten DAB specifically, and which I shall therefore 
address directly:
Addict Amy: Amy has been a heroin addict for many years. She believes that 
she has very little reason to take the drug. But she strongly craves it 
nonetheless. (cf. Frankfurt 1982: 87–88; see also Smith 1994: 134)
Cases like this may appear to threaten DAB. But again, this is not true. There 
are at least three ways in which we might understand this case consistently with 
DAB. First, earlier I described some cases of weakness of will as involving a 
mismatch between desire and motivation, where one is not motivated, or 
undermotivated, to pursue something that one wants. If we allow for that 
possibility, it seems as though we should also allow for the reverse possibility, 
where one is overmotivated by one’s desires. Sometimes, one’s desires may 
generate more motivation than they ought to. Perhaps this is the situation Amy 
is in. Perhaps Amy’s problem is that though she has only a weak desire to take 
heroin—she thinks she has only a very weak reason to take the drug—this desire 
is very strongly motivating her to take it.
Second, we might say that to the extent Amy is motivated to take heroin by a 
state of mind that is completely irrational and insensitive to facts about what she 
has reason to do, we might think that she is being motivated not by a desire but 
instead by some more primitive compulsion or drive (cf. Railton this volume).7
This way of describing addiction fits well with the natural thought that addicts 
don’t really want to do what they do but are instead compelled to by their 
condition.
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A third (best?) possibility is a hybrid view. Real-life addicts might be partly 
motivated by a genuine desire to avoid withdrawal symptoms, partly 
overmotivated by a very weak desire to take the drug, and partly compelled to 
take the drug by some drive. These things together might generate a strong 
motivation to take the drug in someone who believes he has only weak reason to 
take it. This possibility is entirely consistent with DAB.
2.5. Animals Have Desires but No Beliefs about Reasons
In section 2.4, I defended the claim that beliefs about reasons are necessary for 
desire. Another putative counterexample to that claim needs separate treatment, 
and that is the desires of animals8 (see, e.g., Döring and  (p.211) Eker, Friedrich
this volume). Animals may seem to have many desires but no beliefs about 
reasons at all. For example, you might think that cats can want milk but are 
incapable of having any beliefs about what they have reason to do. Clearly there 
is a great deal to be said here about the appropriateness of attributing various 
mental states to animals, but let me just note two broad possibilities left open by 
DAB.
First, one might be generous in attributing states of mind to animals. One might 
insist that animals have both desires and beliefs about reasons. Just as we might 
think that cats can desire milk even though they have only an extremely minimal 
grasp of the concept of milk—Do cats know that milk must come from a 
mammal?—we might think that cats can believe that they have reason to do 
things, even though they have only an extremely minimal grasp of the concept of 
a reason. Of course animals can’t understand reasons at the level of 
sophistication that we can, but we might nevertheless think they can see an 
action as being favored in some respect (“Good dog!”), and to acknowledge this 
is just to think that they believe there is a reason to perform that action (cf., e.g.,
Korsgaard 2009: 110–112).
Second, one might be stingy in attributing states of mind to animals. One might 
insist that animals have neither desires nor beliefs about reasons. Just as one 
might think that animals have no beliefs but instead only representations, one 
might think that animals have no desires but instead only drives. Certainly, our 
desires are very different from animal “desires” in various respects, such as that 
they are under a greater degree of rational guidance and can be expressed in 
language. We might think that differences like these justify the claim that there 
is a difference in kind between our desires and animal “desires” (cf. e.g., 
McDowell 1994: 114–124). It certainly seems that the defender of DAB should 
distinguish desires from drives (see section 2.4), and once this distinction is 
made, it is not that implausible to suppose that the motives of animals are more 
similar to our drives than to our desires.
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This second view may seem unduly revisionary, since we do often say that 
animals want things. But this is not at all decisive, since we also often say that 
flies, plants, computers, and cars want things (e.g. “The car doesn’t want to start 
today”). Unless we adopt some extremely broad theory of desire that aims to 
capture all of these claims (e.g. Dennett 1987), a better option is to claim that 
some uses of the word desire are looser than others and to aim for a theory that 
captures only the more precise uses of the term. If we take this second 
approach, we might claim that attributions of desires to animals are only of this 
looser kind.
 (p.212) The defender of DAB can of course also appeal to a combination of 
these two strategies. The former response may be more plausible for higher 
animals (e.g. chimps), and the latter response may be more plausible for lower 
animals (e.g. salmon). And they might also say that between these extremes 
there is some indeterminacy as to which is the correct account. It is far from 
clear that there is anything objectionable about such a theory.
3. Desires as Appearances
In summary, DAB can overcome the five objections above. That is, the most 
obvious objections to DAB all fail. I now turn to explain how DAB is superior to 
one popular nearby view, which is the view that desires are appearances of the 
good (see Oddie 2005: 28–46, this volume; Stampe 1987; Tenenbaum 2007). One 
difference between this view and DAB is that DAB analyzes desires as 
representations of reasons rather than as representations of goodness. I 
discussed this briefly in section 2.4 and discuss it in more detail elsewhere 
(Gregory 2013; again, see also Massin this volume). In this section I shall instead 
focus on the other difference between DAB and this rival, which is that this rival 
analyzes desires as mere appearances rather than full-blown beliefs. This view 
states that desires involve actions seeming to be good, and this is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for believing that some act is good, just as it seeming 
that a stick in water is bent is neither necessary nor sufficient for believing that 
it is.
Scanlon’s (1998: 37–49) view is also of this kind. One might think that he 
endorses something like DAB, but this is not true (one might be encouraged by 
his remarks on 7–8, but see the unambiguous remarks on 43–44). He claims that 
to desire to φ is for certain facts to be highly salient in consciousness and to 
seem like reasons to φ (39–40). That is, to desire to φ is for φ-ing to often be 
present in consciousness in a positive light. But Scanlon insists that some act 
might appear in consciousness in this way even when you don’t actually believe 
you have any reason to perform it (43–44) and that you might believe you have 
reason to perform some action without it often appearing in consciousness in a 
positive light (38–39). By implication, on Scanlon’s view beliefs about reasons 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for desire (see, however, Schroeder this 
volume for another sense of desire in Scanlon).
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I will call the Oddie-Scanlon-Stampe-Tenenbaum view the appearance theory. 
The appearance theory may appear to promise similar payoffs to DAB without 
being so bold. But there is little reason to endorse the  (p.213) appearance 
theory. It is generally preferred to DAB on the grounds of the kinds of example 
that I addressed in sections 2.3 and 2.4 (see, e.g., Oddie 2005: 36–38, 40–43; 
Tenenbaum 2007: 227–298). But DAB is consistent with those examples, so it is 
doubtful that they really support the appearance theory over DAB. To confirm 
the point, I shall address an example that Scanlon employs to argue that the 
appearance theory is superior to DAB. I will then offer two examples of my own 
that show DAB to be superior to the appearance theory.
Here is Scanlon’s (1998: 43) example:
Scanlon’s computer: Suppose that … I am beset by a desire to have a new 
computer… . I find myself looking eagerly at the computer advertisements 
in each Tuesday’s New York Times. I keep thinking about various new 
models and taking their features to count in favour of having them… . Such 
a state can occur … even when my considered judgement is that I in fact 
have no reason to buy a new machine.
In this case, two things are contributing to the impression that Scanlon wants a 
new computer but believes he has no reason to buy one. First, Scanlon is 
understating the degree to which he believes he has reason to buy a new 
computer. He clearly thinks there is some reason to buy a new machine: they are 
more fun than his present machine, more efficient than his present machine, 
some of their features might come in handy someday, and so on. I take it that 
Scanlon would agree that he should upgrade if he could do so for free and with 
absolutely no hassle.
The second thing contributing to the impression that Scanlon wants a new 
computer but believes he has no reason to buy one is that he is overstating the 
degree to which he wants to buy a new computer. This desire might keep 
popping into his mind, but we should not think that phenomenology provides an 
infallible guide to the strengths of our desires (Smith 1994: 104–111). For 
example, I want to avoid torturing people much more than I want bacon 
sandwiches, though the former desire almost never occurs to me, and the latter 
desire often does. Once we distinguish the strength of a desire from its 
phenomenological salience, it seems plausible to think that Scanlon’s desire for 
a new computer is actually relatively weak: that’s precisely why he’s unlikely to 
buy one.9
These two facts combine to give us the correct description of the case: Scanlon 
believes he has weak reason to buy a fancy new computer, and he weakly desires 
to buy one, though this desire, it so happens, is highly phenomenologically 
salient. This is all consistent with DAB.
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 (p.214) In short, Scanlon’s example fails to show that the appearance theory is 
an improvement over DAB. I now look at two examples that I believe 
demonstrate DAB to be superior to the appearance theory. I take them together:
Conan the Barbarian: I visit the cinema and see a trailer for the remake of 
Conan the Barbarian. The film looks absolutely thrilling, engaging, and just 
plain awesome. But wait: I’ve seen the reviews and heard from friends that 
the film is terrible. It looks good, but I know better.
The King’s Speech: I visit the cinema and see a trailer for The King’s Speech. 
The film looks excruciatingly dull. I have no interest in the monarchy, and still 
less interest in their speech impediments. But wait: I’ve seen the reviews and 
heard from friends that the film is just fantastic. It looks terrible, but I know 
better.
In these examples, it seems clear that my desires will track my beliefs rather 
than the appearances. In the first case, I might well not much want to see Conan 
the Barbarian (I didn’t), and in the second case, I might well strongly want to see
The King’s Speech, and even make various sacrifices to do so (I did). So DAB is 
superior to the appearance theory.10
These examples highlight a broader problem with the appearance theory. This is 
that it cannot account for the effect testimony, and also deliberation, can have on 
desires (see also Setiya 2010: 106, n16). We can receive advice that influences 
what we want, but it is abnormal, at best, for testimony to affect how things 
appear to us. And we very often deliberate about what to desire, but again, it is 
abnormal, at best, for mere deliberation to affect how things appear to us. 
Indeed, the very point of appearances is that they remain despite deliberation 
and testimony: they involve an external imposition on us over which we have no 
rational control. But desires are not like this: they are responsive to evidence, 
including evidence gained via testimony and deliberation. So it is doubtful that 
desires can be understood as appearances of any kind.
In summary, the appearance theory is not well motivated, faces clear 
counterexamples, and more broadly cannot explain how testimony and 
deliberation can influence our desires.
4. Conclusion
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In this paper I have outlined and defended DAB, according to which to desire to 
perform some action just is to believe that one has some  (p.215) normative 
reason to perform that action. After describing the view and setting out three 
appealing features it has, I defended it from five objections: that it is 
inconsistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of belief and desire, 
that it cannot account for appetites, that beliefs about reasons are not sufficient 
for desire, that beliefs about reasons are not necessary for desire, and that 
animals have desires but no beliefs about reasons. I then argued that DAB is 
superior to the view that desires are appearances of the good. In summary, DAB 
has some prima facie appeal, is defensible, and is superior to rivals. It therefore 
merits further investigation.11
Notes
(1.) In this paper I shall not address David Lewis’s (1988, 1996) decision-
theoretic objection to DAB. I hope to explore this elsewhere.
(2.) Alternatively: To desire to ϕ in respect R is to believe that R is a normative 
reason for one to ϕ. I shall not adjudicate between these two formulations here.
(3.) For this general problem, see Smith 1994; Brink 1989: 43–44, 52; Darwall 
1983: 28. My formulation of the problem above is slightly nonstandard, in that it 
appeals to the motivational powers of the relevant states of mind. Crucially, the 
existence of such powers is consistent with the possibility that those powers are 
not always exercised. This will be important later.
(4.) I thank Julien Deonna for raising this worry.
(5.) Of course, it is also consistent with the kind of weakness of will that Richard 
Holton (1999) discusses, according to which one can be weak-willed by being 
overready to modify one’s intentions.
(6.) In what follows I say nothing more about the Humean theory of motivation, 
but it should be clear that my remarks stand to benefit that view as well as DAB.
(7.) This possibility seems to also explain Ayer’s (1982: 20) case of the 
kleptomaniac: such a person is not acting on his desires at all and so is not a 
counterexample to DAB (pace Smith 1994: 133).
(8.) Here I use animal to mean “non-human animal,” though everything I say in 
this section could plausibly also be said about very young humans.
(9.) Earlier I argued that the strength of a desire does not necessarily correlate 
with the degree of motivation (sections 2.3 and 2.4). But this does not 
undermine the thought that in some circumstances a lack of motivation can be 
defeasible evidence that an agent lacks desire, as is the case here.
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(10.) A defender of the appearance theory might claim that my informants 
change how good the films seem to me, and thereby claim that the examples do 
not demonstrate that DAB is superior to her theory. But testimony cannot 
change how things perceptually appear to us, so it is unclear why things would 
be different here. At any rate, once she allows that this kind of information 
changes how things appear, it becomes far less clear how appearances are 
distinct from beliefs, and in turn how the appearance theory is supposed to be 
distinct from DAB. I thank Graham Oddie for raising this issue.
(11.) For help with the ideas in this paper, I thank the editors of this volume and 
the audience at the conference on which this volume is based, as well as 
Jonathan Dancy, Bart Streumer, and too many others to list.
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This chapter considers T. M. Scanlon’s (1998) theory of action as a specific 
instance of cognitivist theories of action. It raises an unusual sort of objection to 
Scanlon’s cognitivism and its nearest philosophical neighbors: given what is 
known about the low-level neuroscience of action, there is no reasonable way to 
interpret the brain’s action-producing neural pathways consistent with this sort 
of theory. Interpreting the action-producing neural pathways as requiring a 
cognitive representation of reasons to be involved in action production meets a 
variety of objections, depending on just which parts of the action-producing 
neural pathways one interprets as these cognitions about reasons. The chapter 
proposes that a desire-based interpretation of the neural pathways addresses 
the obstacles raised to Scanlonian and related cognitivisms and suggests that a 
desire-based theory of action is thus preferable.
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IF ONE HAD a map of the flow of cause and effect through the brain on the way 
to bodily movement, it would allow philosophers to dismiss certain theories of 
action as inconsistent with this “causal map” while supporting others as being at 
least consistent with it.1 So, at least, one might think. For instance, if the causal 
map revealed two distinct types of routes to bodily movements, that would 
suggest a philosophy of action with two distinct types of motivating mental 
states (Reason and Appetite, perhaps) and tell against theories of action with 
just one type of motivating mental state (pure Reason, perhaps) or theories with 
three types of motivating mental states (Reason, Spirit, and Appetite, perhaps).
In this paper, I describe one familiar theory of action, nestled within a family of 
related theories, and criticize that theory (and, less forcefully, the family of 
related theories) on the basis of what is known at present about the causal map, 
i.e., on the basis of what is known from low-level neuroscience about the 
pathways taken by causal influences through the brain on the way to movement 
production. In doing this, I hope to make a moderately compelling argument 
against the theory on which I focus, of course. But I also hope to suggest the 
shape of a much larger project: the project of describing the causal map and 
using it to answer philosophical questions. This larger project, if undertaken 
fully, would either vindicate or undermine the arguments that I will make in this 
paper, so the arguments here are for the most part advanced somewhat 
tentatively. But everything has to start somewhere, and I propose to start here.
 (p.222) 1. Scanlonian Cognitivism
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In What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon holds that there are two senses of 
the term desire: a broad one and a narrow one. In the broad sense, “anything 
that moves us (at least to intentional action) is likely to count as such a 
desire” (Scanlon 1998: 37). Scanlon’s own preferred theory of what moves us is 
that judgments about our reasons to act play this role (33ff.). Thus, such 
judgments are desires in the broad sense. In this sense, a desire to be truthful is 
a judgment that one has reason to be truthful; a desire for more institutional 
power is a judgment that one has reason to have more institutional power; and 
so on. (Notice that a mere impulse to, say, turn on radios is not a judgment that 
one has a reason to turn on radios and so is not a desire to do so. In this way, 
Scanlon’s theory can distinguish true desires from mere behavioral impulses.) In 
the narrow sense, desires are non-cognitive attitudes that play a central role in 
explaining why it is that, sometimes, we find it hard to do what we judge we 
have most reason to do (see Gregory this volume). But desires in this narrow 
sense are not a countervailing motivational force. On the contrary, “insofar as 
‘having a desire’ is understood as a state that is distinct from ‘seeing something 
as a reason,’ it plays almost no role in the justification and explanation of 
action” (18). Instead, desires in this narrow sense are a matter of our 
dispositions to attend. “A person has a desire in the [narrow] directed-attention 
sense that P if the thought of P keeps occurring to him or her in a favorable 
light, that is to say, if the person’s attention is directed insistently toward 
considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of P” (39). In this 
sense, a desire for cake (for example) is a pattern of having one’s attention 
repeatedly directed toward the sweetness and chocolate-frostedness of the cake. 
But in this sense, having a desire for cake is powerless to move one to eat cake 
until one judges that the sweetness or chocolate frosting are reasons for one to 
eat the cake, that is, until one comes to have a desire in the first sense.
Thus, on Scanlon’s view, the sole springs of action (intentional action, anyway) 
are judgments about reasons.
Scanlon is far from the only philosopher to hold that select cognitive attitudes 
are the only springs of action (see also, e.g., McDowell 1998: ch.4; Oddie 2005, 
this volume; Stampe 1987 Tenenbaum 2007), but his view is recent, popular, and 
very clearly articulated, so I will focus on it in this paper. I will call the family of 
related views, holding that (1) there is only one fundamental source of 
motivation, and (2) this source of motivation is a belief, judgment, perception, or 
other cognitive state, “cognitivism,” and Scanlon’s version of it “Scanlonian 
cognitivism.”
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 (p.223) To see just where Scanlon’s theory stands, it might be helpful to see 
that diametrically opposed to cognitivism is what is commonly called “neo-
Humeanism” (found, for example, in Blackburn 1998; Schroeder 2004; Smith 
1994; Friedrich this volume). According to neo-Humeanism (1) there is only one 
fundamental source of motivation, but (2) this source of motivation is a non-
cognitive attitude known as a desire. The difference between, say, McDowell’s 
cognitivism and neo-Humeanism is obvious: McDowell denies that desires are 
unique motivators, while neo-Humeans assert that they are. But the difference 
between Scanlonian cognitivism and neo-Humeanism is a little more subtle. 
Scanlonian cognitivism and neo-Humeanism agree that desires motivate all 
actions (along with means-end beliefs) but disagree about the nature of desires. 
Scanlon holds that desires are identical to certain cognitive states (see also 
Gregory this volume), while the neo-Humean holds that they are a different sort 
of attitude altogether, a non-cognitive one.
An important feature of Scanlonian cognitivism is that it has certain empirical 
(specifically, neuroscientific) commitments. These commitments are modest, and 
they do not come without any further philosophical reflection, but they exist 
nonetheless. Unfortunately for Scanlonian cognitivism, they appear not to be 
met. The empirical facts do not support Scanlonian cognitivism, or any other 
form of cognitivism. Motivation centrally involves something non-cognitive. This 
is not decisive good news for the neo-Humean, but it is certainly news that 
warrants hopeful optimism from that camp.
2. Empirical Commitments
Most actions involve movements of the body, and for these actions it is a difficult 
but straightforward scientific challenge to trace the cause of the body’s 
movement back to the spinal cord, the primary motor cortex, and then deeper 
into the brain. According to Scanlon, insofar as bodily movements are intentional 
actions, they are the product of judgments about reasons. Thus, Scanlon holds 
that, as the neuroscientist traces the chain of cause and effect backward, she 
will find that her ultimate stopping point (ultimate just with respect to the 
immediate explanation of the particular bodily movement) is an event in the 
brain that can reasonably be interpreted as (or as the realizer of, or as the 
subvenience base of, etc.) a judgment about reasons.
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There are philosophers who reject the idea that judgments can be identified 
with, realized by, supervene on, or otherwise be closely related to  (p.224) 
states of the brain. Robert Brandom (1994), for instance, holds that what a 
person judges is to be identified with (roughly) that person’s current state of 
play in the larger social game of giving and asking for reasons, and thus the 
judgment is identical to a complexly distributed social fact, not localized within a 
particular brain. But Scanlon is not one of these philosophers. In fact, in an 
endnote Scanlon (1998: 21n2) appeals to Davidson for help in defense of the 
claim that “it is the connection with judgment-sensitive attitudes that makes 
events actions.” Here “connection” can only be “causal connection,” if Davidson 
is to be of help.
Now, even if Scanlon is committed to the claim that judgments of reasons cause 
movements of the body, it might be thought that he does not have substantive
empirical commitments of a sort that might cause problems for his theory. One 
might think this for a number of reasons; I will consider two. The first stems 
from the methodology of philosophy and the second stems from the methodology 
of the psychological sciences.
The philosophical reason to think that Scanlon does not have substantive 
empirical commitments is that he has open to him (as every cognitivist does) a 
variety of undemanding theories of mind. Davidsonian interpretationism and 
causal role functionalism, for instance, might be thought to give endless 
flexibility in interpreting the brain. So long as the brain contains some 
mechanism that produces bodily movements of the right sorts, the Davidsonian 
interpretationist can interpret the event of that mechanism’s activity as a 
judgment about reasons given the interpretive principle that we understand 
such movements (the ones we see as intentional actions) as stemming from such 
judgments. Likewise, the causal role functionalist can interpret it as a judgment 
about reasons given the functionalist principle that what it is to be such a 
judgment is, in part, to play such a role in causing such bodily movements. 
Scanlon could embrace either theory of mind, or some similarly flexible theory, 
or simply be agnostic but accept that one such theory within a range must be 
correct, and thereby—it would seem—escape any putatively problematic 
empirical commitments.
However, this sanguine attitude comes under pressure once the philosopher 
interpreting the brain acknowledges more than one causal commitment. If a 
bodily movement is produced, it obviously has some cause. But that cause is not 
guaranteed to have every other causal property one might expect it to have.
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For example, a philosopher who claims that every episode of akrasia is caused 
by pleasure can come under empirical pressure if also committed to claims such 
as: pleasure is almost always a conscious state, it is almost always poised to be 
remembered, it is normally caused by the prospect of  (p.225) wanted things 
occurring, and so on. Although a philosopher can always interpret a particular 
event in the brain as an episode of pleasure, given that it has played a distinctive 
role in causing a paradigmatic instance of akrasia, it is not guaranteed that the 
same event in the brain will play all of these other causal roles, either in general 
(as a causal role functionalist might require) or in a particular token instance (as 
a Davidsonian interpretationist might require).
Likewise, Scanlon can claim that judgments about reasons cause all intentional 
actions, but his view can come under empirical pressure if he is also committed 
to claims such as: such judgments are occurrent events; when one is consciously 
and (paradigmatically) wholeheartedly judging that one has most reason to take 
action A one is not simultaneously unconsciously judging that one has most 
reason to take conflicting actions B, C, D, E, etc.; judging that one has good 
reason to A is not normally a cause of being pleased; judgments of what one has 
most reason to do are not normally drivers of operant conditioning; judgments 
about reasons for action are not found in cats, rats, or most other mammals; and 
so on.
More could be said here, but I hope the reader will accept the principle, at least 
tentatively, for now. Later in the paper, I will address the specific causal 
commitments I take it Scanlon and other cognitivist theorists of action will want 
to hold and the specific problems that such causal commitments generate; if 
there are deep problems for the approach I am advocating, they should be 
evident at that point.
The scientific reason to be skeptical that there are substantive empirical 
commitments behind cognitivism is the straightforward thought that we do not 
know very much about causal relationships in the brain. The brain is just too 
complex an organ to draw any conclusions about philosophical theories at this 
point. This sort of skepticism is thus practical rather than principled: perhaps 
one day the psychological sciences will be able to put pressure on philosophical 
claims about action, but not—it might be thought—today. For today, the 
philosopher can safely ignore the scientific findings.
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I am sympathetic to a weaker version of this view. If one looks only to the 
findings of conventional cognitive psychology or to neuroimaging studies, one 
will be hard-pressed to discover facts that put substantive pressure on 
cognitivism, or indeed on almost any philosophical theory of the mind (so to this 
extent I am sympathetic to the arguments of Berker (2009)). But fortunately 
there is more to the science of the mind than these branches of it. In this paper, 
my starting point will be what is sometimes called “functional neuroanatomy.” 
This is the study of how the neural shin  (p.226) bone is connected to the neural 
knee bone, and how it in turn is connected to the neural thigh bone: the study of 
each step in the causal pathway through the brain toward a given outcome. 
Although the brain is indeed a very complicated place, it is not so complicated 
that nothing can be known about the step-by-step causal production of 
movement. On the contrary, an enormous amount is known about the causal 
production of the bodily movements found in paradigmatic actions. 
Understanding this causal process at the level of individual neurons or clusters 
of neurons provides a solid foundation for testing causal claims.
3. The Causal Map of Movement Production
In order to beg as few questions as possible, I begin with a description of action 
production in terms close to those preferred by neuroscience. I apologize if this 
tour through the neuroscience tries the philosophical reader’s patience. The 
reward for the hard work will be an understanding of the basic causal map 
involved in action production: the basic framework required for any scientifically 
acceptable theory of action. In spite of the level of detail in this section, the 
sketch of the causal map will still be partial and crude; perhaps, though, it will 
be enough. (The reader will probably find it helpful to refer to Figure 8.1
throughout this section.)
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Figure 8.1  Action Production in the 
Human Brain
Begin with the last neural 
structure to be involved in any 
action: the spinal cord. The 
spinal cord is obviously crucial 
for most voluntary behavior,2
but it is equally obviously not 
the place to look for beliefs, 
desires, or the like (even their 
realizers or subvenience bases), 
and I will not linger over it.
Above the spinal cord lies the 
motor cortex, then the pre-
motor cortex, and finally motor 
regions of prefrontal cortex, 
organized more or less 
hierarchically. For convenience, 
I will sometimes discuss these 
regions together as “the motor 
hierarchy.” The label is not a 
standard neuroscientific label, 
but it will keep things as simple 
as possible.
The motor cortex is the last structure to be activated in the brain before the 
body is caused to move, and it is absolutely essential to movement: loss of the 
motor cortex (from both hemispheres of the brain3) causes complete paralysis.4
Essential as it is, however, the motor cortex is also relatively simple in its 
operations. Each region of the motor cortex is dedicated to moving one part of 
the body, and the movements that one of these regions can cause to be made are 
very, very basic: the balling of a fist, the swinging of a leg, the protrusion of the 
tongue, and so on.5 One such dedicated region  (p.227) of motor cortex cannot 
cause, say, crossing the arms over the chest: such a movement would require the 
involvement of multiple sub-regions of the motor cortex and would require not 
just a single activation of these sub-regions but a sequence of activations over 
time. All this suggests an interpretation of the movements commanded by the 
motor cortex as Arthur Danto’s “basic actions” or Donald Davidson’s “primitive 
actions.” That is, movements commanded by the motor cortex appear to be the 
things we do without doing them by doing anything else.6 But arguing for such 
an interpretation would take us far afield.
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Above the motor cortex is the pre-motor cortex, made up of the supplementary 
motor area, the motor region of the anterior cingulate cortex, the lateral ventral 
pre-motor area, and the lateral dorsal pre-motor area.7 These regions are like 
the motor cortex in that they are divided into sub-regions specializing in giving 
commands to particular parts of the body. Unlike the motor cortex, however, 
they are capable of organizing more complex, integrated patterns of movement. 
Whereas the activity of a single region of motor cortex can be expected to 
produce only a simple effect such as the extension or retraction of a limb, 
activity of a single region of pre-motor cortex can produce effects such as the 
utterance of a syllable, a strumming-type movement, a grasping movement 
directed  (p.228) at a particular object, and the like.8 But as these examples 
suggest, the scope of movements caused by activity in the pre-motor cortex is 
still very limited. No region of it is capable of causing one to get to the nearest 
phone to call for a pizza, for example, much less take the steps necessary to 
ensure that one’s car insurance is up to date. Widespread injury to these 
structures, specifically to the supplementary motor area and motor anterior 
cingulate cortex, can produce a profound sort of paralysis. Those who have 
suffered this paralysis only temporarily (the injury being in the form of bruising 
or swelling, which pressed on the structures but resolved over time) report that 
while immobile they had no spontaneous impulses to act or even to think. One 
such person reported she had not spoken because “I had nothing to say.”9 In 
addition to its influence upon the motor cortex, the pre-motor cortex also has 
direct influence over the spinal cord, but in terms of the number of neurons 
involved this influence is small in comparison to the influence of the motor 
cortex, and the pre-motor cortex cannot overcome the loss of the motor cortex to 
cause movement in the absence of that structure.10 As a result, it seems 
reasonable to diagram the relationship between pre-motor cortex, motor cortex, 
and the spinal cord as a linear hierarchy, at least to a first approximation (as in 
Figure 8.1).
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At the top of the motor hierarchy lie the motor regions of the prefrontal cortex 
(specifically those located in Brodmann’s area 46). One of the most important 
functions of the motor PFC is to direct the performance of the pre-motor cortex 
in the near future. Damage to motor PFC does not seem to impair the 
performance of any movement as such. Rather, it seems to impair the ability of 
an individual to keep a movement in mind until the time is ripe for that 
movement.11 Imagine that one is standing over a pot, watching for the hot 
chocolate to show the first signs of boiling, and one’s plan is to remove the pot 
at the first sign. This is the sort of task that damage to the motor PFC impairs: 
one can still stand over the pot and watch it, yet when the hot chocolate starts 
boiling, a person with an injured motor PFC will not automatically reach out and 
take the pot off the stove—that decision would have to be made again, from 
scratch. Damage to the motor PFC does not seem to affect episodic memory. It 
simply turns out that actively waiting to make a movement on some appropriate 
cue requires more than merely storing the belief that one was going to make the 
behavior plus having the relevant goals and abilities. One also, it turns out, 
needs the motor PFC to be intact. All this strongly suggests some role for the 
motor PFC in a full theory of intention,12 but as with basic actions, this is again a 
matter for another day.
 (p.229) With the motor hierarchy in view, it is time to examine the two major 
inputs to the hierarchy.13 The first is from an enormous sweep of cortex: from 
the brain’s unimodal sensory regions (though not primary sensory cortex) and its 
multimodal association regions. These contain the structures that respond to 
single senses (unimodal sensory regions) and that respond to multiple senses 
(multimodal association regions).14 Unimodal sensory regions can be quite 
primitive in their response dispositions (e.g., being triggered by pressure to the 
middle of the pad of the first finger on the left hand), or intermediate in 
complexity (e.g., being triggered by hearing particular phonemes), or quite 
impressive in complexity (e.g., being triggered by seeing faces of particular 
people, regardless of the orientation of the face).
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Multimodal association regions are even more complex in their response 
dispositions, and also more complexly organized. At least two regions of 
multimodal association cortex are worth mentioning in any story of behavior 
production. One, in the temporal lobe, is found where high-level visual 
processing meets high-level auditory processing. Though it is not yet well 
understood how this structure operates, it is thought to be a key locus of 
“semantic knowledge,” also known as our general beliefs about the world, no 
doubt in association with other, related regions of cortex.15 The other region of 
multimodal association cortex that should be singled out is found in the parietal 
lobe and plays a crucial role in visually guided behavior production, especially 
for reaching and grasping movements.16 However, it seems that injury to this 
region does not deprive the sufferer of the ability to reach or grasp as such so 
much as deprive the sufferer of accuracy and ease in making such movements. 
Thus, important as this region is to life, it is less important when the concern is 
with anything like acting for reasons as such, and I will not make anything more 
of this region.
An interesting feature of both unimodal and multimodal regions is the way they 
causally affect other parts of the brain. Both are made up of neurons which, by 
and large, are naturally quiescent.17 It takes an energetic event, in a sensory 
receptor or elsewhere in the brain, to activate these neurons, and so to make 
them have causal effects on the motor system: neurons are not, in general, 
capable of endless high rates of activity. So only those structures currently being 
used in the cortex have any causal influence on the motor hierarchy or any other 
part of the brain. This is no surprise in the case of the unimodal sensory cortex, 
but it is more informative and important when considering the multimodal 
association cortex. In particular, the structures encoding our general beliefs 
about the world are not constantly active, and so, in all likelihood, our general 
beliefs about  (p.230) the world are not all constantly affecting the motor and 
pre-motor cortex. Rather, regions of the multimodal association cortex are 
activated at any given time, with the region activated being influenced by 
current sensory activation, activation of episodic memory, of attentional systems, 
and no doubt activation of still other regions of the brain.
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Finally there are the motor regions of the basal ganglia (BG), the second of the 
two major sources of input to the motor hierarchy.18 The motor BG takes two 
sorts of input and produces one sort of output. Its inputs are from the unimodal 
sensory and multimodal association regions of the cortex (i.e., from the neural 
bases of perception and cognition) and also from the substantia nigra (pars 
compacta), or SNpc, a very small deep-brain structure, signals from which are 
carried in the form of a distinctive compound, dopamine.19 Input to the motor 
BG from the unimodal and multimodal cortex creates activation patterns within 
the motor BG, which input in the form of dopamine then alters, driving down 
some patterns of activation (those weak at the moment) and enhancing other 
patterns of activation (those strong at the moment).20 The output of the motor 
BG affects both levels of the motor hierarchy above the motor cortex: the pre-
motor cortex and the motor PFC.21 Because the motor cortex is dependent upon 
the higher levels of the motor hierarchy for its activation (recall that damage to 
the pre-motor cortex causes paralysis even when the motor cortex is intact), this 
effectively means that the motor BG has direct influence over the entire motor 
hierarchy.
The motor hierarchy is not a quiet place.22 Above the motor cortex, the motor 
hierarchy is constantly bubbling with activity, produced by input from unimodal 
and multimodal regions. That is, sensory and higher-level cognitive responses to 
the world are constantly, directly, activating motor hierarchy responses. 
However, there is little coherence to these directly activated motor responses. 
Seeing a friend might prompt activity in the motor hierarchy of the sort that 
would cause one’s arms to spread wide, as for a hug, while also prompting 
activity of the sort that would cause one’s right hand to extend forward, fingers 
straight out, as for a warm handshake. Of course, one cannot make both 
movements at once, and if both activation patterns were allowed to go forward, 
one’s muscles would seize up at the conflicting signals. Preventing this from 
happening is, in part, the motor BG. The motor BG’s default state is one in which 
it suppresses every form of activity found in the motor hierarchy. So, while 
seeing a friend is likely to prompt all sorts of varied and potentially conflicting 
motor responses to be somewhat activated, all of this activation will be damped 
down by the motor BG as a routine matter. However, the motor BG’s output is 
not  (p.231) restricted to this chronic suppression of the motor hierarchy. It can 
also selectively release its suppression, allowing selected regions of the motor 
hierarchy to become activated after all. This selective release of suppression is 
exactly what is produced as a result of input to the motor BG by the sensory and 
multimodal cortex, on the one hand, and by dopamine from the SNpc, on the 
other.
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The normal manner in which the body gets moved, then, is this: one perceives 
whatever one does, and perhaps also recalls memories and has occurrent 
thoughts. The activated cortex then sends causal influences forward to the 
motor hierarchy in a way that would—left unchecked—result in numerous motor 
commands being formed for numerous (possibly incompatible) movements. 
These causal influences are checked, however, by the chronic suppressant 
influence of the motor BG. But the motor BG too is receiving causal influences 
from perception and thought and from the dopamine-releasing cells of the SNpc. 
Under these influences, it can selectively release its inhibition from regions of 
the motor hierarchy. Assuming these regions are independently being activated 
by the cortex, this will result in motor commands being passed down the motor 
hierarchy to the motor cortex itself, and then out to the spine, causing the body 
to perform the commanded movement.
This whole process, though slow to describe, operates with impressive speed 
and is constantly engaged in ever renewed cycles of behavior production as one 
goes through life, building one’s small behaviors into larger, coherent 
sequences.
Only one crucial stage remains to be described, and that is the production of the 
dopamine signal out of the SNpc and into the motor BG. It turns out that this is a 
very complex affair. This signal is one half of the output of what scientists call 
the brain’s reward system, the other half coming from the immediately adjacent 
ventral tegmental area.23,24 The brain’s reward system computes the difference 
between actual reward and expected reward and produces a positive “spike” if 
the difference is positive (more reward than expected), a constant baseline if the 
difference is zero, and a negative “dip” if the difference is negative (less reward 
than expected).25 Calculation of expected reward appears to be performed in the 
ventral, affective region of the basal ganglia, or affective BG,26 and so to be 
distinct from conscious expectations (these being thought to rely on multimodal 
association regions for their existence, since they are, after all, general beliefs). 
Because they are distinct from what one consciously calculates, they may 
helpfully be thought of as one’s gut-level expectations, what one takes for 
granted, what one is hardened to or jaded about. Actual reward  (p.232) 
appears to be calculated in part of the orbitofrontal cortex, or OFC.27 And the 
OFC, in turn, makes this calculation based on activation of unimodal sensory and 
multimodal association regions of the cortex.28
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Since the label “reward” is interpretatively loaded, it is better for the moment to 
understand the system in less loaded terms. What happens is that sensory 
events, memories, conscious thoughts, and the like get realized by activations of 
the unimodal and multimodal cortex. This activation sends signals forward to the 
OFC. The OFC has fairly stable, though not immutable, long-term dispositions to 
discriminate between these input signals. In response to some, nothing happens. 
In response to others, a signal is sent along to the affective BG. There a 
comparison is made: was the signal expected or not? The result of such 
processing (not yet fully understood) is reflected in the brain’s dopamine signal, 
some of which is directed specifically at the motor BG. Spikes in the signal 
contribute specially to behavior release but are not necessary. However, it is 
essential that some level of dopamine input from the SNpc reach the motor BG. 
Loss of normal input causes Parkinson’s disease, and total loss of dopamine 
input to the motor BG causes Parkinson’s disease so severe that the sufferer is 
completely paralyzed.29
In addition to a reward system, the brain almost certainly also contains a distinct 
punishment system. Its existence may be inferred from such facts as that 
intuitively rewarding stimuli and intuitively punishing stimuli cause distinct but 
similarly located responses in OFC and distinct but similarly located responses 
in the affective BG, and from the fact that there are special brain chemicals 
particularly released in animals like us under punishing conditions and causing, 
e.g., freezing behavior in rats.30 Unfortunately, the effects of the punishment 
system on behavior can only be inferred by analogy to the effects of the reward 
system, as there is as yet no clear identification of the punishment system’s 
output structure. Without fuller information, this part of behavior production will 
have to be left to speculation. It is quite likely that a box for punishment should 
be included in Figure 8.1, but without the necessary information, this box cannot 
yet be drawn in.
After all of this, quick mention should be made of the cerebellum: no claim to 
comprehensively survey pathways to behavior production would be complete 
without it. This very large structure is important to the production of normal 
behavior, but in spite of its size a human being can survive its loss with only 
moderate ill effects and without any loss in the basic ability to act in response to 
perceived reasons. It seems that the role of the cerebellum is to contribute to 
the smooth sequencing of behaviors  (p.233) rather than behavior selection 
itself.31 But since behavior selection rather than behavior smoothness is what is 
of interest for action theory, no further mention of the cerebellum will be made 
here.
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There are other parts of the brain than those mentioned here, and of course all 
are important in one respect or another. But the parts that have been covered 
are those central to what is generally regarded as voluntary behavior. Any 
contribution to voluntary behavior must at some point affect the system already 
described, and so here the survey will stop.
4. Interpreting the Causal Map
One reasonable interpretation of the neuroscientific account might go as follows: 
one senses the world and makes judgments about it. These sense experiences 
and judgments are realized in the unimodal sensory and multimodal association 
cortex. They cause possible basic or primitive actions to be primed, with the 
priming of more complex possible actions (say, strumming a guitar) causing the 
priming of the less complex possible actions that are required (say, shaping 
one’s hand in a certain way, moving one’s arm, etc.). These primed actions can 
be commanded by clusters of neurons found in the motor hierarchy, naturally. 
Primed possible actions existing at a given time are typically more numerous 
than the actions one actually performs or would wish to perform. Thus, primed 
possible actions are all chronically suppressed, this being the role of the motor 
BG. At the same time as possible actions become primed, one’s experiences and 
judgments cause a response in one’s reward system. This response combines, in 
the motor BG, with one’s experiences and judgments. And this combination of 
experiences, thoughts, and reward signals in the motor BG causes a release of 
some of the primed possible actions. Those primed actions that are released 
then get performed. Figure 8.2 illustrates this interpretation.
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Figure 8.2  Partially Interpreted Action 
Production in the Human Brain
An example might help. 
Suppose a new book is waiting 
for you when you walk into your 
office. Your eyes fall on the 
book, and then you behave: you 
reach out and grab the book. 
How does this happen?
First, of course, you see the 
book (itself a very complex 
process) and have the thought 
that you have received a new 
book. The thought primes 
possible behaviors: saying the 
word book, perhaps, and 
reaching out to grasp the book. 
These primed behaviors are 
suppressed for the moment. But 
mere milliseconds after 
perceiving and thinking about 
the book, activity reaches your 
reward system. Since (suppose) 
getting a new book is a reward 
for you, your reward system 
sends a signal to your motor BG that  (p.234) combines with your perceptions 
of and thoughts of the book. This combination causes the motor BG to selectively 
release its inhibition over one of the primed behaviors. In this particular case, 
perhaps, it releases the inhibition against reaching out and grasping the book. 
Thus, you reach out and grasp the book.
Though this picture of behavior makes it seem complex, it is the sort of thing 
that happens without subjective effort all the time, for all of our movements.
5. A Problem for the Cognitivist
The textbook neuroscience of action production presents an immediate and 
obvious problem for the cognitivist. The neuroscience of action suggests a two-
factor account of the production of actions. One is the cognitive factor: 
perception, memory, knowledge, and so on. The other is the reward (and, 
presumably, punishment) factor, a factor not yet interpreted in cognitive or non-
cognitive terms, but a second factor nonetheless.
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According to the cognitivist, behavior begins with perception or thought alone: 
with only a cognitive state. According to the Scanlonian  (p.235) cognitivist, it 
begins with a judgment regarding reasons. These perceptions or judgments 
would seem to be found in the unimodal perceptual cortex or in multimodal 
association cortex, that is, to be found in the regions of the brain that 
neuroscientists take to realize our perceptions, memories, knowledge, and other 
cognitive states. But these neural structures are not the only ones involved in 
producing actions. The reward (and punishment) system is also poised to be 
causally involved.
The cognitivist needs to resist any interpretation of the neuroscience that gives a 
central role to a non-cognitive factor. I see three promising strategies for doing 
so. The first is to deny that the reward (and punishment) factor is important in 
causing paradigmatic intentional actions. The second is to hold that the 
contribution of the reward (and punishment) factor is identical to (or is the 
realization of, or subvenience base of, etc.) judgments about reasons. And the 
third is to hold that the contribution of the reward (and punishment) factor is a 
necessary condition for selected cognitive states counting as states with the 
correct contents.
I’ll consider each strategy in turn.
5.1. Is the Reward (and Punishment) System a Needed Contributor to Paradigmatic 
Action?
A glance at Figure 8.1 or Figure 8.2 reveals that there are two possible ways for 
perception or thought to cause action in the absence of influence from the 
reward (and punishment) system. The first causal pathway runs from the 
unimodal and multimodal cortex (from perception and belief) directly to the 
motor hierarchy (to the priming of possible behaviors). The second causal 
pathway runs from the unimodal and multimodal cortex down to the motor BG, 
and from there to the motor hierarchy. So far as contemporary neuroscience is 
aware, these are the only significant causal pathways by which complex, 
coherent behavior might be produced in the absence of influence from the 
reward (and punishment) system.32 But in fact, neither pathway supports the 
production of paradigmatic actions.
Consider the first pathway. It looks like an especially promising candidate 
pathway for the cognitivist. If it were efficacious, one would simply see, or think 
about, one’s reasons to act, and thereby become moved to act. Seeing that one 
has hurt the feelings of a niece, and thinking that this counts in favor of saying 
something kind, one would be moved to say something kind.
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As it happens, however, this first pathway is not as innocuous as it looks. The 
causal connection between perception and thought, on the one  (p.236) hand, 
and action preparation, on the other, is indeed real. But recall that all of the 
potential actions primed through this causal pathway are suppressed, by default, 
by a signal coming from the motor BG. This signal coming from the motor BG is 
crucially influenced by reward information. Thus, for the first pathway to lead to 
behavior independently of a reward signal, the potential behavior that is primed 
by perception or thought must override this inhibitory signal. And such 
overriding is not innocuous. The only natural model we have for it is found in 
Tourette syndrome.
People with Tourette syndrome are prone to verbal and gestural tics, often 
taking the form of eye blinks, twitches, barks, grunts, the uttering of vulgarities 
and profanities, imitative movements, and so on.33 The best current theory of 
Tourette syndrome has it that the disorder is exactly a failure of the inhibitory 
system based in the motor BG.34 In Tourettic people, possible behaviors are 
primed just as in the rest of us. But in Tourettic people, not all of these primed 
possible behaviors are fully inhibited. Instead, they are often partly but not fully 
activated, giving rise to felt urges to act. And they sometimes spontaneously 
cross the borderline into full activation, independently of the normal 
mechanisms of behavior release, giving rise to what people with Tourette 
syndrome describe as involuntary tics.35
If paradigmatic action generally relies upon the first pathway, overriding the 
inhibition controlled by reward (and punishment) information, then paradigmatic 
action is analogous to Tourettic ticcing. But of course it is not.
There is also a phenomenological reason to deny that the first pathway is the 
pathway of paradigmatic action. The sense Tourettic people have that their 
urges to tic are not their own—are alien, non-self, external—is tied closely to the 
means by which the tics are produced. When a Tourettic urge overwhelms a 
person and forces an involuntary tic, the motor hierarchy is activated quite 
independently of its release by the normal mechanisms of the motor BG.36 This 
same sort of overriding activation, when induced by direct electrical stimulation 
of the brain, likewise induces movements from which experimental subjects feel 
alienated.37 But action does not typically have this sense of alienation tied to it. 
Thus, it seems that a precondition of acting without feelings of alienation is the 
normal involvement of one’s motor BG in releasing one’s action. If paradigmatic 
actions proceeded via the first pathway, then one would expect agents to 
typically experience alienation from their actions, and of course this is not the 
case.
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Turn now to the second pathway under consideration for action independent of 
the influence of the reward system. This is the pathway leading from perception 
and thought, down to the motor BG, and then to the motor  (p.237) hierarchy. 
Once again, we seem to have a pathway that respects a cognitivist theory of 
action: one sees what is reasonable and is thereby moved to act. But once again, 
there are serious complications.
Normally, the motor BG is significantly influenced by the input of the reward 
system, so of course we must imagine something different, a mechanism by 
which the input of the reward system makes no difference to the behavior. Only 
the perceptions or thoughts acting as input are to make any difference to what 
behavior gets produced.
A simple objection to the second pathway is that the complete absence of reward 
input to the motor BG causes complete paralysis: this is Parkinson’s disease 
taken to its absolute limit, beyond its most familiar symptoms (tremor and 
hesitation before initiating or changing courses of action). Hence in any scenario 
in which reward has no influence whatsoever upon the motor BG, no behavior 
whatsoever can be produced, no matter how strong a reason the agent judges 
herself to have to act.
The simple objection is too simple. All that is required for the second pathway to 
be said to operate without influence from the reward system is that the causal 
contribution to behavior caused by perception and thought be largely
independent of the causal contribution of the reward system. Suppose that a 
judgment about reasons caused a powerful positive contribution toward 
releasing inhibition from relevant primed possible actions in the motor 
hierarchy, whether the current reward signal were above baseline, at it, or 
below it, so long as the current reward signal were above the levels found in 
severe Parkinson’s disease. If this were the case, then we would seem to have a 
good case of action driven by judgments about reasons operating independently 
of the influence of the reward system.38
As it happens, this possibility is actual. Judgments about reasons probably do 
causally influence the motor BG in a way that promotes relevant behavior, 
whether or not a reward signal significantly contributes to this process—in some 
people, on some occasions, at least. However, this can be asserted with 
confidence only because every sort of perception or thought can, in principle, 
causally influence the motor BG in a way that promotes relevant behaviors, 
whether or not a reward signal does its part. This is simply the realization of 
behavioral habits in the brain.
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For the second pathway to behavior to be efficacious, the pre-existing internal 
structure of the motor BG must strongly dispose the motor BG to respond to, 
e.g., ideas of what one has reason to do with appropriate output, regardless of 
input from the reward system. So how such a pre-existing internal structure 
might be created is vitally important. This is where the second pathway is 
revealed to be the pathway of habit. Extensive  (p.238) experiments have been 
done on human and non-human subjects dissociating two sorts of learning: 
straightforward learning by remembering what happened to one, and 
unconscious learning through the acquisition of behavioral habits. The former is 
realized in a structure known as the hippocampus (and its connections to the 
cortex), while the latter is realized in the internal structure of the motor BG.39
The prime, and perhaps sole, mechanism by which the internal structure of the 
motor BG is shaped is through the input of dopamine from the brain’s reward 
system.40 This effect of dopamine is a slow-to-form, slow-to-disappear effect that 
is different from its other effect in the motor BG, that of directly influencing 
which primed possible behaviors in the motor hierarchy get released. A standard 
view in contemporary neuroscience is that the release of dopamine by the 
reward system into the dorsal striatum is what mediates operant conditioning, 
and behaviors that have been subject to strong operant conditioning are 
habits.41 Thus, being moved by a combination of strong internal connections in 
the motor BG and perceptual or cognitive input is being moved by habit.
A particularly interesting dissociation experiment reveals the way habits of 
thought depend upon the motor BG just as behavioral habits do. In this study, 
people were asked to learn, by trial and error, whether an arbitrary visual 
stimulus predicted “rain” or “shine.” After guessing, subjects got feedback on 
how they did. Anterograde amnesiacs (who retain old memories but cannot form 
new memories) were found to improve steadily over time, almost as quickly as 
normal control subjects, while people with Parkinson’s disease (lacking a normal 
reward signal to the motor BG) performed throughout with nearly random 
success. Yet the Parkinsonian subjects had normal memory for what had 
happened, while anterograde amnesics could consciously recall nothing. The 
only deficit of the people with Parkinson’s disease was their difficulty in “the 
gradual, incremental learning characteristic of habit learning.”42 This study 
shows both how influential the intrinsic connections of the motor BG can be and 
how pervasive habit and habit-like phenomena are in the control of action.
That said, paradigmatic action is no more habitual than it is Tourettic. Thus, the 
second pathway to reward-indifferent action is no more reasonable a candidate 
for the cognitivist to appeal to than the first.
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Indeed, this whole approach was never particularly promising. The reward (and 
punishment) system is a biologically ancient system with a central role in not 
only action production but in many other mental processes besides. It is no 
surprise that none of our paradigmatic actions is  (p.239) produced in a manner 
that is indifferent to it, given its central position as one of two key biological 
inputs to the dorsal basal ganglia. If cognitivism is to be tenable, it must find a 
way to embrace the activity of the reward (and punishment) system rather than 
to ignore it.
5.2 Does the Reward System Realize Judgments about Reasons?
Much more promising than ignoring the reward (and punishment) system is 
interpreting it as the realization (or subvenience base, etc.) of judgments about 
reasons for action. Indeed, Gideon Yaffe has already proposed a similar 
interpretation of the reward system (in terms of representations of value) as part 
of a theory of addiction.43 After all, upon reflection it seems clear enough that 
even the cognitivist needs a two-factor account of action. On the one hand, there 
is the judgment that one has reason to vote for the amendment (as it might be), 
and on the other hand there is the belief that now raising one’s hand would be 
voting for the amendment. Both seem needed to explain how one gets to the 
point of now raising one’s hand. The most naïve interpretation of the 
neuroscience might have suggested that both the judgment about reasons and 
the means-end belief would be realized in the perceptual or multi-modal 
association cortex, but there is no need to stick to the most naïve interpretation.
This second cognitivist strategy also faces severe problems. I will focus on three.
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First, this strategy has a problem with interpreting damage to the reward (and 
punishment) system. As Parkinson’s disease becomes severe, people suffering 
from it find it increasingly difficult to initiate actions and increasingly difficult to 
change from one course of action to another when they find that a new course of 
action is desirable. These same people do not change what they say about what 
they have reason to do, however. An obvious interpretation of them is that, while 
their judgments about reasons are unaffected, their capacities to act on these 
judgments is impaired. However, given that Parkinson’s disease is caused by the 
death of cells in the SNpc, that is, by the death of cells at the output end of the 
reward system, this obvious interpretation is not clearly open to the cognitivist. 
The cognitivist who holds that the judgments about reasons for action are 
identical to (realized by, subvened by, etc.) reward system events is under 
pressure to say that, when cell death prevents these events from transpiring, 
then it also prevents these judgments from being formed. The reason a person 
with Parkinson’s disease has trouble initiating or switching courses  (p.240) of 
action thus turns out to be that, in spite of her protests to the contrary, she has 
difficulty judging what she has most overall reason to do. And a person with 
such severe Parkinson’s disease that she is paralyzed is a person who has lost 
the capacity to judge what she has most overall reason to do. This is a fairly 
extraordinary interpretation of this disease.
Second, the putative judgments about reasons posited by this second approach 
are problematic in that they are causally isolated from memory and 
consciousness. Activity in the unimodal and multimodal cortex has potentially 
enormous reach, with output going to many different areas of the brain. As a 
result, many scientists have no hesitation in localizing sensory consciousness to 
the unimodal sensory cortex (when appropriately functionally engaged with the 
rest of the brain, of course). And if there are non-sensory conscious thoughts, 
then it would be natural to localize such thoughts in regions of the multimodal 
cortex that seem strongly related to our general capacities to conceptualize the 
world, or perhaps in regions of the multimodal cortex that seem strongly related 
to our general capacities to comprehend speech, if these are ultimately distinct. 
However, once one begins to look specifically at the reward system, one sees an 
absence of projections from this system to regions of the brain that seem 
involved either in consciousness or in episodic memory, at least, organized in a 
manner that would support being conscious of or remembering specific 
judgments of what one has most reason to do, all things considered.
Scanlon can allow for the existence of unconscious judgments about reasons for 
action, so the problem is not that such unconscious and unremembered 
judgments are required to exist. Rather, the problem is that on the present 
interpretation of the brain, there are no conscious or remembered judgments 
about reasons. Everything that seems to be such a judgment is not; there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between what is conscious or remembered and what is 
actually judged.
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Third, a normal causal consequence of increased activity in the reward system is 
pleasure. This has been confirmed in a variety of ways, from direct electrical 
stimulation in non-human animals to drug studies in human beings to 
neuroimaging studies in human beings (reviewed in Schroeder 2004: ch. 3). But 
a normal causal consequence of judging that one has a reason to act is not 
pleasure. According to Scanlonian cognitivism, there are psychologically brute 
facts about what pleases us, and these facts provide us with some—though 
certainly not all—of our reasons to act. But this requires pleasure to be causally 
upstream of judgments about reasons, not causally downstream from them.
 (p.241) 5.3 Is the Reward System a Component of Judgments about Reasons?
Of the three strategies being considered for the cognitivist, the most promising 
for interpreting the role of the reward system in action is also the strategy with 
the weakest commitments: perhaps the reward system is just a necessary part of 
any state that is a judgment about reasons for action.
This approach helps, at least, to deal with the problems about consciousness and 
memory raised earlier. The starting point for a reward signal is a representation 
in perceptual or conceptual regions of cortex. And activity in this same starting 
point is activity that can be expected to sometimes contribute to (or be a part of) 
consciousness and to be remembered as an episode in one’s mental life. If only 
the activity in the brain that is specific to reward counts as the judgment (or as 
realizing it, or subvening on it, etc.), then activity in perceptual or conceptual 
systems cannot be judgments about reasons. But if the connection to reward 
signaling is only one necessary component of the system, then the activity at the 
very start of the process can also be a necessary component of the system. Thus, 
judgments about reasons can be found, partly, in these cortical regions that play 
roles in consciousness and memory, and also found, partly, in the reward system, 
where they play a vital role in the production of action.
On this view, one might have the thought “I have most reason to tell my mother 
the truth,” but it would not be a sincere (or all-in, or likewise fully committed) 
belief about one’s practical reasons, and so would not be an action-governing 
desire, if the neural basis of the thought were not appropriately causally 
connected to the reward system. This appropriate causal connection is, on this 
approach, what constitutes such thoughts (and thoughts about practical reasons 
in general) as genuine, committed, sincere, or the like.
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Although helpful, this approach nonetheless suffers from severe problems as 
well. It does not do anything to answer the objection from Parkinson’s disease or 
the objection from the causation of pleasure. It does not seem that Parkinson’s 
disease diminishes the sincerity of judgments about what one has reasons to do, 
though it decreases the efficacy of such judgments in initiating new courses of 
action (and, at the limit of the disease, it does not seem that one stops making 
such judgments sincerely even while one is paralyzed through lack of activity in 
the reward system). And it does not seem that truly sincere thoughts about what 
practical reasons one has are particularly tied to feelings of pleasure. But 
perhaps these objections can be overcome.
Even if they can, there is a further and potentially deeper concern. The problem 
is that an enormously broad swath of the perceptual and  (p.242) conceptual 
cortex sends projections forward to the region of the OFC that in turn 
constitutes states of affairs as rewards (and punishments). Parts of the brain that 
are not, in any way, credible candidates to be the neural bases of judgments 
about practical reasons can have just as much power to generate dopamine 
signals in the reward system as parts of the brain that might credibly be the 
neural bases of practical judgments. Single modality (visual, auditory, gustatory, 
etc.) perceptual regions of the cortex can also generate dopamine responses, 
and some do: this is (at least part of) the neural basis of taking pleasure in the 
appearance of one abstract artwork more than another, for instance, or taking 
pleasure in the taste of one fruit more than another.44 Such neural connections 
are likewise at least part of the neural basis of impulses to linger over certain 
artworks, to prefer certain fruits over others when selecting what to eat, and so 
on.
The problem created by these other regions of the brain is that, according to 
Scanlonian cognitivism (and cognitivism generally), there is just one source of 
motivation: a cognitive representation of reasons for action, value, or something 
similarly normative or evaluative. But on the present approach to interpreting 
the causal map, there are diverse sources of motivation that are not cognitive 
representations of reasons for action or anything else of a normative or 
evaluative nature, because they are mere perceptual representations of colors 
and shapes, of tastes and smells, and so on. The Scanlonian cognitivist has in her 
toolkit desires in the directed attention sense: inner states that direct one’s 
attention to what seems positive (in some sense) about looking at an artwork or 
choosing a yellow mango. But, crucially, desires in the directed attention sense 
are not springs of action; it is only if one judges, on the basis of the facts to 
which one attends, that one has a reason to look at an artwork or eat a yellow 
mango that one will so act.
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Given the role of perceptual representations in generating dopamine signals and 
so in prompting action, there seem to be two options for the Scanlonian 
cognitivist. One is to deny what appears to be the case and hold that, somehow, 
in the absence of a dopamine signal prompted by a judgment of reasons, 
dopamine signals prompted by the visual qualities of a painting or by the taste 
qualities of a piece of fruit will not actually lead to bodily movement. This cannot 
quite be ruled out given the current state of empirical knowledge, but it seems 
quite unlikely to be the case, as there is no special neural structure yet 
discovered that would mediate such an extraordinary level of control over 
dopamine release. The other option is not much more palatable: the Scanlonian 
cognitivist can hold that our bodies move in complex and seemingly goal-
directed ways all the time, but  (p.243) only occasionally are these movements 
genuine actions. On many other occasions, seeming actions such as lingering 
over an abstract painting or reaching out for a slice of yellow mango turn out to 
be not actions but mere movements. Though this cannot be refuted on the basis 
of empirical considerations, it seems a high price to pay to save the theoretical 
claim that there is just one source of action, and it is a judgment about practical 
reasons.
As a result of these difficulties, it seems that this third strategy for interpreting 
the causal map in a manner consistent with Scanlonian cognitivism is not 
particularly promising. And at this point, I am out of suggestions.
Of course, that I am out of suggestions for the Scanlonian cognitivist is not to 
say that there is no way of interpreting the causal map such that it could satisfy 
the Scanlonian cognitivist, or perhaps a cognitivist of a different stripe. But at 
present, I would suggest, the path forward does not look promising.
6. A Neo-Humean Interpretation
It seems that the causal map strongly favors the thesis that there is a plurality of 
fundamental grounds of motivation to act and that what constitutes such 
grounds is something non-cognitive. To me, this is most naturally read as a story, 
not about representations of normative or evaluative properties but a story 
about what is intrinsically desired.
On the simplest approach to being a neo-Humean, one holds that there are many 
ends that can be desired for themselves (that is, intrinsically). Some of these 
ends might be perceptual in nature: being surrounded by bright primary colors 
or by muted earth tones, tasting peaches or savoring bitter dark chocolate. 
Others of these ends might be more conceptual in nature: not telling lies, having 
the Montreal Canadiens win the Stanley Cup, or discovering new philosophical 
truths.
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On this simplest approach, one holds that desires characteristically dispose us to 
perform actions that seem likely to bring about (or make progress toward) the 
ends we intrinsically desire, and one holds that apparently getting some state of 
affairs disposes us to pleasure insofar as it is a state of affairs that is, or realizes, 
or makes progress toward some intrinsically desired state of affairs. One might 
add other characteristic effects of intrinsic desires (they generate motivated 
irrationality, they direct attention, and more), but on the simplest approach one 
focuses on just these two effects of having intrinsic desires.
 (p.244) This simple neo-Humeanism fits snugly within the contours of the 
causal map. Where cognitivism failed to find a home, neo-Humeanism does much 
better.
According to the causal map, motivation crucially involves certain 
representations of perceivable or conceivable contents, though not all such 
representations. The representations that matter to motivation are those that 
are connected in the right way to the reward system. By being connected in the 
right way, they generate dispositions to act so as to bring about the represented 
ends, and they generate dispositions to take pleasure in states of affairs that are 
identical to, realize, or make progress toward their contents.
Thus, if intrinsic desires are, or are realized by, or subvene on, perceptual and 
conceptual representations that are connected in the right way to the reward 
system (such that their contents are constituted as rewards), then intrinsic 
desires will turn out to have the properties and play the roles attributed to them 
by the simplest form of neo-Humeanism.
This is not to say that the interpretation of the causal map in neo-Humean terms 
is without controversy. But the basic outlines of the neo-Humean approach can 
be seen to fit tidily within the causal map. And that is a fact that should guide 
future inquiry.45
7. Conclusion
There is a tentative character to some of what has been argued for above, for 
there remain questions about what future neuroscience will learn, i.e., about the 
true shape of the causal map, and questions about how philosophers should 
interpret those findings. But already neuroscience has a large body of stable, 
textbook results, results that will be refined over time but not radically 
overthrown, and within that large body is a substantial literature on behavior. It 
is time that philosophers began to import this scientific knowledge into their 
own attempts to explain how actions are performed in general and how moral 
actions are performed in particular. This paper has been an early contribution to 
that process. As time goes on, I hope that other contributions will better it, 
refining our understanding of behavior in the bright light cast when the 
armchair reading lamp and the laboratory bench lamp are directed upon the 
same target.
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Notes
(1.) This paper has spent a long time gestating, and is perhaps still premature. 
Nonetheless, in writing it I have benefited greatly from many philosophers. The 
editors of this volume I particularly thank, for their patient encouragement and a 
stimulating conference where Peter Railton and Graham Oddie, especially, 
provided helpful thoughts. I also owe thanks to the philosophers at the 
University of Texas at Austin, the University of Winnipeg, Washington University, 
and the members of the Moral Psychology Research Group, who heard talks 
based on ancestors of the present paper. Ancestral talks were also presented at 
meetings of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association and the Central 
Division of the American Philosophical Association; thanks to my commentators 
and my audiences on those occasions as well.
(2.) Although voluntary head movements involve the cranial nerves, which are a 
different tract that I will lump together with the nerves of the spinal cord for 
convenience of exposition.
(3.) Almost every structure in the brain comes in a pair, with one in the left 
hemisphere and one in the right hemisphere. For our purposes, this is a 
complexity that can be ignored, however, and so talk of hemispheres will by and 
large be suppressed for convenience of expression.
(4.) Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell (2000: ch. 38). From here on, I will abbreviate 
citations to this canonical textbook as citations of KSJ.
(5.) Ibid.
(6.) Danto 1963, 1965; Davidson 1980: ch. 3.
(7.) KSJ ch. 38.
(8.) Ibid.; Fried et al. 1991; Devinsky, Morell, and Vogt 1995.
(9.) Damasio 1994: 73.
(10.) KSJ ch. 38.
(11.) Ibid.
(12.) Bratman 1987.
(13.) Goldman-Rakic 1987, 1998; KSJ chs. 19, 38.
(14.) KSJ ch. 19.
(15.) Ibid., chs. 19, 62.
(16.) Ibid., ch. 38; Jeannerod 1997.
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On the orthodox view, action is the joint product of belief and desire. We 
naturally assume that evolution would have equipped us for learning in belief, 
yet accurate beliefs would be of no avail if our desires were not adapted to our 
needs, capacities, and circumstances. Should we not, then, expect there to be 
mechanisms of adaptive learning in desire? A chief obstacle to this line of 
thought has been the idea that desire is an affective-conative state, incapable of 
truth or falsity. However, degrees of belief likewise are not true or false, and yet 
we can learn by revising degrees of belief in light of experience. This chapter 
presents philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific considerations in favor 
of a strong parallel between belief and desire; each is a compound state 
involving both a degree of affect (confidence or attraction, respectively) 
regulating action-guiding expectations, which then permit learning through 
discrepancy-reduction.
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Informally, at least, we speak of learning what we do or don’t want, what’s worth 
wanting, and what matters. Such learning, we think, takes place throughout life
—through our own experience and from the experience or example of others. We 
can learn these lessons of life more or less well, and at greater or lesser cost to 
ourselves and others. Moreover, it seems clear that failure to learn such things is 
a way in which our lives as wholes can fail to go well. But these ways of talking 
also pose quandaries.
For a start, the term learning is a factive expression—you can’t be said to learn
that I’m back in town from a text I send you saying, “I’m back in town” unless I 
am in fact back in town when I send it. Even my sincerity and your epistemic 
conscientiousness don’t suffice for learning to take place; if for some reason I 
am mistaken about being back in town, so that my text is non-deceptive, and I 
am usually reliable enough that you are warranted in believing on the basis of 
my message that I am back in town, still, you cannot learn what my text purports 
to tell you unless it’s a fact.
Does this mean everything we learn has to be a fact? That seems too strong. You 
can learn to propel yourself forward on a skateboard without touching the 
ground with your feet, and learn to use the subjunctive in French, but these 
aren’t facts in the usual sense. Even so, we might think that knowledge of facts 
is central to the explanation of these competencies. For example, recent years 
have seen a striking growth of research in cognitive science, psychology, and 
neuroscience that emphasizes the  (p.250) extent to which such acquired skills 
and competencies depend at base upon complex informational structures or 
“internal models,” which can indeed be more or less accurate or faithful to the 
facts (Yarrow, Brown, and Krakauer 2009; Stanley and Krakauer 2013). Of 
course, other capacities are involved in the expression of these competencies or 
skills in action; for example, they involve controlled movements of the body and 
voice. But it appears that such movements themselves are controlled in these 
skilled or competent ways via the operation of internal models. Learning in such 
cases appears to have a factive core after all.
And that makes sense. Skills and competencies are ways of interacting 
successfully with the physical, social, and cultural worlds, and these cannot help 
but be information-intensive tasks. Skills and competencies moreover are 
generative; they enable us to contend with novel situations in novel ways. So 
their successful operation depends upon how well one represents these worlds 
and anticipates their possibilities and the potential effects of one’s actions in 
them. Beliefs and internal models are, in effect, mental stand-ins for reality 
itself; by re-presenting facts within the mental economy, they permit these facts 
to enter into the processes of perception, thought, and the guidance of action.
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As representational structures, beliefs and internal models are said to have a 
“mind-to-world” direction of fit: a representation that p is true just in case p. 
Moreover, the direction of “fit” relation is asymmetric—it is a matter of the mind 
fitting to the facts: a representation that p is true because p. This is a structural 
rather than a causal “because.” For example, while it might matter for epistemic 
warrant whether the fact that my basement is leaking played a role in my belief 
that it is, if in fact my basement is leaking, then this belief would “fit” reality 
even if it came about from sheer guesswork.
But what, then, about learning what we really want, or learning what to want? 
Suppose I desire that p, but p is not the case: I’m thirsty and want water to drink 
but have none. Though the desire’s representational content (that PR be 
drinking water) doesn’t “fit” reality, we don’t say that my desire is therefore 
false. Neither does this failure of “fit” make the desire seem to be defective. On 
the contrary, it would appear that wanting water when one is parched from lack 
of it is, other things equal, a paradigm case of desire doing what it is built to do: 
desire that p doesn’t tell you that p is the case; rather, it motivates you to make p
the case. Grant that. Now suppose that the desire has done its job, and I have 
brought it about that I am drinking the water I sought. Is the desire therefore 
now true? That’s not how we speak, certainly. Yet if desires cannot be spoken of 
as true or false,  (p.251) then they would seem to lack the wherewithal to 
participate in learning—there appears to be no relevant fact to acquire.
On the orthodox view, desire contrasts with belief in just this way. Desire is said 
to have a “world-to-mind” direction of fit: to desire that p is not to represent p as 
true but as to be made true. That would explain why desires are not said to be 
true or false: desire that p might be said to have p as its target, but it is a 
conative rather than cognitive attitude toward that target. If I believe that I will 
succeed in threading this needle, and this belief encourages me to stick to the 
task until I do in fact succeed, then my belief will be revealed as true, but its 
motivational role is thought to be inessential to the belief. In desire things are 
reversed: the motivational role is essential rather than incidental, but successful 
motivation does not reveal the desire to be true. Instead, we say that the desire 
has been satisfied—the target is achieved, and the state of the world now fits the 
representational content of the desire. Far from being cemented in place as a 
lasting bit of learning, like my belief that I have threaded the needle, my desire 
is more likely simply to fade away, having completed its mission.
Perhaps, however, this is the wrong way to look at what learning in desire might 
consist in. Consider a law graduate who had secured her dream job of working 
for a leading private law firm in New York. Smart and unstinting in her 
commitment to success, she manages to reach the rank of partner well ahead of 
schedule. Her long-standing desire satisfied, she finds that she nonetheless isn’t: 
“I finally made partner, but I’ve learned that this isn’t the life I want after all.”
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Defenders of orthodoxy can, however, respond to such cases by saying that all 
the learning involved actually takes place in the individual’s beliefs, not her 
desires. At the beginning of her career in law, she had certain beliefs about what 
the life of a partner in a top-flight law firm would be like, but her experience 
gradually changed these beliefs, so that now she no longer sees having such a 
career as a way of attaining her goal of leading a satisfying life. She isn’t wrong 
in thinking that she’s had a learning experience or that she has in some sense 
learned what to want, but the desire in question is an instrumental rather than 
intrinsic one—and it depended upon a false belief about what being a partner 
would be like. So her learning is factual or representational after all—cognitive, 
not conative.
Hume is seen as the inspiration for this way of translating such cases of 
apparent learning in desire into cases of real learning in belief. In the Treatise
(1888),1 for example, he places desire among the “passions” and writes, “A 
passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification  (p.252) of 
existence, and contains not any representative quality.” Desires, fears, hopes, 
joys, and the like are states of “affection” and bodily arousal, not “copies” of 
some matter of fact. They thus are not in a “strict and philosophic” sense 
capable of truth or falsity (II.ii.3).
When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that 
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am 
thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, therefore, that 
this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth … since this 
contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, 
with those objects, which they represent. (II.iii.3)
Hume then, famously, draws an immediate lesson with respect to the power of 
“reason.” “Reason,” he argues, “is the discovery of truth and falshood” (III.i.1), 
and while we sometimes speak of a passion as irrational or unreasonable, still, 
“nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, 
and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must 
follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are 
accompany’d with some judgment or opinion” (II.iii.3). He explains:
According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, ’tis only in two 
senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. First, When a 
passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on 
the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. 
Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means 
insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of 
causes and effects. (II.iii.3)
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Our lawyer, it would seem, has chosen “means insufficient for [her] design’d 
end” of living a satisfying life. Strictly speaking, the fault lies with her “judgment 
of causes and effects” rather than her desires or aims as such.
This contrast between belief and desire has powerful intuitive force. Moreover, it 
seems to fit well with contemporary rational decision theory, which divides the 
basic components of intentional action into two fundamental categories, 
credences and preferences, taken to be fundamentally different in kind (cf. Lewis
1988, 1996). Credences (belief-like degrees of confidence) are thought to be 
subject to principles of rationality in acquisition and revision (learning), while 
basic or intrinsic preferences  (p.253) (desire-like dispositions to choose) are 
treated as exogenously given and subject only to weak constraints of coherence 
(not learning). As a result, an individual’s credences or changes in credence in 
response to experience can be deemed more or less rational, while his intrinsic 
preferences and changes in intrinsic preference, so long as the resulting set of 
preferences is coherent, escape all rational assessment. Indeed, according to 
some influential views, intrinsic preferences—e.g., for various rewarding 
qualities of experience or for the satisfaction of needs for enjoyment, security, 
affiliation, accomplishment, and self-esteem—are non-rational elements of our 
native human endowment and remain essentially the same throughout life (see 
Bradley 2007). On this view, what changes with experience and maturation are 
merely situational or instrumental preferences, as mediated by revised 
credences. Such instrumental preferences can be evaluated for a kind of means-
end or hypothetical rationality but not for categorical rationality or rationality 
tout court.2
In what follows, I will be raising questions about both sides of this orthodox view 
of the belief-desire, or credence-preference, contrast. In place of that contrast I 
will argue for a more unified account of these two broad classes of mental states
—an account that, I believe, fits better with contemporary psychology and 
neuroscience. This unified account enables us to see how bona fide learning can 
take place in desire and belief alike, and indeed to see how both states have an 
inherent tendency to learn from experience, based upon similar underlying 
dynamics. And I will be defending this unified account with the help of a 
surprising ally: David Hume.
Hume on Belief
So let’s begin with Hume and consider the key passages of the Treatise that are 
the basis for what has come to be known as the “Humean” distinction between 
cognitive, representational, truth-evaluable belief and conative, non-
representational, non-truth-evaluable desire. The passages that inspired this 
distinction, which is not confined to card-carrying Humeans, are well-known. 
Recall that Hume writes:
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When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that 
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am 
thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, therefore, that 
this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth … since this 
contradiction  (p.254) consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as 
copies, with those objects, which they represent.
… As nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a 
reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this 
reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so 
far as they are accompany’d with some judgment or opinion. (II.iii.3)
Reading these lines, one would naturally conclude that Hume is contrasting 
passions, a class of mental states in which he includes desire, anger, and 
approval, with beliefs—cognitions or “judgments or opinions.” What could be 
more obvious?
And yet Hume has earlier formulated an important conclusion in Book I: “Belief 
is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our 
natures” (I.iv.1). And in the Appendix, where Hume attempts to explain some of 
the doctrines he expects to be most difficult for the reader to grasp, he gives 
pride of place to his view that “belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different 
from the simple conception.” He formulates his final argument for this claim, 
which he expects readers to find surprising, by posing a dilemma: “What the 
nature is of … belief … few have had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my 
opinion, this dilemma is inevitable[:] Either the belief is some new idea, such as 
that of reality or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an object, 
or it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment” (Appendix). He dispatches the 
first horn in two moves: “First, We have no abstract idea of existence, 
distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects” (Appendix). As 
a modern might put it, to believe that p and to believe that p is true, or real, or 
extant, come to the same thing—there is no new idea which belief that p needs 
to add to p. Failure to understand this is failure to understand what it is to 
believe that p. He continues: “Secondly, The mind has the command over all its 
ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them as it pleases; so that if belief 
consisted merely in a new idea, annex’d to the conception, it wou’d be in a man’s 
power to believe what he pleased” (Appendix). But we know that we cannot 
believe at will. While we are prone to many forms of wishful thinking and self-
deception, these do not constitute a power to summon a belief into existence 
from scratch or in the face of the evidence. Contrast such mental states as 
imagining that p or supposing that p, in which we are free to “separate, unite, 
mix, and vary” ideas ad libitum, even in the face of overwhelming evidence 
against p.
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What, then, distinguishes belief that p from idly thinking that p, or imagining that
p, or merely supposing that p? It cannot be that belief has a mind-to-world 
direction of fit or is truth-evaluable, since idle thoughts,  (p.255) imaginings, 
and suppositions share both these features. The object or content of a belief may 
be a “copy,” but that is true of these other states as well. Instead, it is the 
“peculiar manner of conceiving” its content that makes belief different from 
these other mental states, and gives it such a different role in our mental 
economy.3
As Hume argues in Book I:
The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the 
whole. We conceive many things, which we do not believe. In order then to 
discover more fully the nature of belief … [I] maintain, that the belief of the 
existence joins no new ideas to those, which compose the idea of the 
object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I 
believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor 
diminishes. But as ’tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple 
conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this 
difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we 
conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it. 
(I.iii.7)
But what could this “manner of conception” be, such that a belief that God exists 
could have such a different role from merely entertaining the thought of God as 
existent? The answer is that the belief must involve some active principle, some 
mental state that by its nature tends to influence how we think and act—to 
shape our will, even though we cannot shape it at will. For Hume, the answer is 
clear: such a state must be a “passion” or “sentiment” and not a mere 
“cogitation.” He writes:
[Belief] is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the 
judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and 
influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the 
mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions. 
(Appendix)
We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling 
or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise 
from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not 
masters. (Appendix)
Learning as an Inherent Dynamic of Belief and Desire
Page 8 of 31
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
In general, Hume uses “determinate causes and principles” to differentiate 
among mental states. For belief, e.g., an invariant perceptual experience of 
heavy objects falling when released gives rise to an expectation or belief that 
they will continue to do so (hence to surprise if a seemingly  (p.256) 
unsupported heavy object fails to fall). Similarly, an impression of contrariety 
among ideas A and B gives rise immediately to a mental resistance in response to 
a purported inference from A to B. By contrast, other mental states sharing 
belief’s “mind-to-world” direction of fit, such as imagining or supposing, have 
different “determinate causes and principles”—e.g., we are free to imagine an 
unsupported heavy object that does not fall, and a dialectician can freely 
suppose for the sake of a reductio that B follows from A, despite her vivid sense 
of their contrariety.
Hume admits that it is difficult to explain in other terms the nature of the 
“peculiar sentiment” of belief, but he thinks we can characterize its distinctive 
functional role. For example, belief that p is projective: it involves, or yields, an 
expectation that p will continue to be the case. This projection, while caused by 
patterns in experience, is no mere logical consequence of them, so pure 
“cogitation” cannot produce it. Moreover, belief induces reliance in thought and 
action: when we believe that p, we think and plan and act as if p. As Robert 
Stalnaker (1984: 15) puts it, “To believe that p is to be disposed to act in ways 
that would tend to satisfy one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in which p
(together with one’s other beliefs) were true.” Though belief that p yields 
expectation that p and reliance upon p, these are not ideas added to the content 
that p—which remains, simply, that p. And while belief that p is a feeling, it is 
unlike aroused, episodic emotional states such as fear, anger, or surprise that p, 
which signal something awry. Belief is rather an unaroused state of assurance 
that persists unobtrusively in the background (Pettit and Smith 1990), with little 
by way of distinctive phenomenology. Hume therefore speaks of belief that p as a 
“firm,” “steady,” or “strong” conception of p that places p itself in the 
foreground, akin to the way a perceptual impression that p places p in the 
foreground:
The act of the mind [in belief] exceeds not a simple conception; and the 
only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join 
belief to the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of what we 
conceive. This act of the mind has never yet been explain’d by any 
philosopher; and therefore I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis 
concerning it; which is, that ’tis only a strong and steady conception of any 
idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate 
impression. (I, n20)
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Just as a strong and lively “immediate impression” carries with it a “sense” of 
the truth of what we perceive, so does belief that p carry with it a “sense” of p’s 
reality. And this “perswasion” then imparts to p a role in the guidance of thought 
and action like the role of a perception that p.
 (p.257) This way of talking, moreover, draws our attention to another 
important feature of belief and the way in which, in belief, “the idea of an object 
is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole” (I.iii.7). For just as 
impressions can be more or less strong and lively, with concomitant variation in 
how much “perswasion” they yield, so can beliefs be more or less strong, lively, 
firm, or steady, with concomitant variation in the manner in which they shape 
thought and action. A weak sensory impression on a foggy night as of a moving, 
roughly skunk-like animal on the sidewalk ahead will make me cautious and walk 
to the other side of the street, but I won’t be much surprised if the animal, 
passing under a light, is revealed to be an opossum. Similarly, occasional 
irregularities in the behavior of my watch when I’m in a tropical country will 
undermine the strong, immediate reliance upon its readings I exhibit in more 
temperate climes, and so I will tend, as I would not elsewhere, to seek some 
confirmation of my watch’s readings when I must make an important 
rendezvous.
How, then, does belief differ from sensation, since Hume admits that not all 
strong and lively impressions are believed (I.iii.13)? It should be clear that, while 
an uncertain sensory impression as of a skunk has a vague and shadowy content, 
an uncertain belief that it is twelve o’clock, after consulting my somewhat 
unreliable watch, has a perfectly definite content, namely, “It is twelve o’clock.” 
My “weak” or “unsteady” manner of conception of this content does not 
translate into the content itself, which does not admit of degrees in this way and 
is, simply, either true or false, not “weakly” or “unsteadily” true. A lack of firm 
evidence yields a lack of firm belief, and this shows itself in the “active 
principle” of the belief, so I will proceed more cautiously. By way of contrast, my 
lack of firm evidence that my watch is reliable is no barrier to my imagining that 
I have instead a perfectly accurate watch.
Here, then, is an interesting fact about belief that distinguishes it from 
imagining or supposing: it will tend by its nature to wax or wane in strength in 
proportion to the waxing or waning of my evidence. In the present context, we 
might put this by saying that belief has an inherent learning dynamic.
What might be a psychological model of belief that would fit Hume’s 
sentimentalist account and exhibit this form of spontaneous learning from 
experience? Here is a proposal:
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(Bel p) A belief that p is a compound state consisting in (1) a degree of 
confidence or trust in a representation, p, that (2) gives rise to and regulates 
a degree of expectation that things are or will be as  (p.258) p portrays them, 
and (3) this degree of confidence or trust is disposed to strengthen or weaken 
in response to the extent to which this expectation that p is met or violated in 
subsequent experience.
Do we have any reason to take seriously such a model of the psychology of 
belief? We will return to that question, but first we must look more closely at 
what becomes of Hume’s alleged contrast between belief and desire once we 
recognize belief as a passion or sentiment.
Hume on Desire
Here is how Hume describes the acquisition of desires or desire-like states:
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or 
cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this 
impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the 
impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, 
when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and 
aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of 
reflexion, because derived from it. (I.i.2)
The distinctive “manner of conception” of p that constitutes desire that p, in 
contrast to belief that p, does add something to “simple conception” that p. Not 
additional content as such—for desire that p and aversion to p share the same 
content. Rather, desire that p is an “impression” of p of a special kind—a 
favorable impression, arising from the prospect of potential pleasure, 
satisfaction, relief of pain, or other benefit from the realization of p. Desire, to 
that extent, presents p in a positive light. Aversion, by contrast, is an unfavorable
impression of what it would be to bring about or sustain p, arising from the 
prospect of displeasure, pain, or other loss from the realization of p; it presents p
in a negative light.
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As in belief, the distinctive “feeling to the mind” or “manner of conception” of 
desire or aversion is more than a passive registration of p; instead it is a 
psychically “active principle” that has a direct influence on how we are disposed 
to act with respect to p: “It is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or 
pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or 
propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness 
or satisfaction” (II.iii.3). And there is more to this active principle than mere 
attraction or repulsion: it shapes  (p.259) how we are disposed to think, priming 
practical reasoning to identify and initiate actions that would bring about or 
avoid p. Continuing the passage just quoted: “It is also obvious that this emotion 
rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends 
whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and 
effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and accordingly 
as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation” (II.iii.3). 
Desire and aversion, then, spontaneously tend to motivate not only pursuit or 
avoidance of their objects but also of what we can see to be the means toward 
these objects: “these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of 
that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (II.iii.3). 
Metaphorically, we might say that these means to realizing or preventing p are 
themselves brought under the favorable light of desire or unfavorable light of 
aversion. More functionally, as Stalnaker (1984: 15) puts it, “To desire that p is to 
be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that p in a world in 
which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true.” Although desire that p adds 
something to the “simple conception” that p, we should be clear, as we were in 
the case of belief, that this is not the conjoining of the idea that p with some 
other idea, say, goodness or desirability. Hume’s argument regarding belief can 
be redeployed. “The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can 
join, and mix, and vary them in all ways possible” (Appendix). In supposition or 
imagination, we are entirely free to conjoin to the idea of goodness or 
desirability the idea that p, but we can no more desire at will than we can 
believe at will. Mere “cogitation” can produce the conjunction of the idea of p
and the idea of goodness, but such a bare supposition does not yield a genuine 
expectation of benefit from p, and thus has no inherent tendency to prime 
thought or action aimed at realizing p.
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Someone who desires that p has a favorable prospect for p, and this is reflected 
in the amount of time or effort she’ll invest in trying to bring about or sustain p. 
She will be to some extent surprised and disappointed if p turns out to be worse 
than expected, failing to yield the pleasure or other benefits it promised. This, in 
turn, will tend to weaken her desire that p going forward. In this way, even 
powerful, long-standing desires, such as our lawyer’s desire to make partner, 
tend to be undermined by persistent disappointment and dissatisfaction with 
what it is actually like to bring about their objects (although of course it can be 
difficult for individuals to identify the source of their disappointment or 
dissatisfaction). By contrast, someone averse to p has a negative expectation 
from p and will try to avoid or prevent it, and will be surprised but not
disappointed if p turns out to be  (p.260) better than expected. Such an 
experience of favorable incongruity between expectation and experience will 
tend over time to lessen the aversion and perhaps even turn aversion into desire.
In supporting feed-forward action-guidance through expectation and reliance, 
and in supporting thereby a process of feedback from experience by assessing 
discrepancy with expectation, desire exhibits an inherent learning dynamic. The 
structure of this dynamic is essentially similar to belief: a sentiment toward p
underwrites an expectation with respect to p that is compared with actual 
outcomes, and, when discrepancy is detected, the sentiment strengthens or 
weakens to reduce this discrepancy.
But if this is learning, what are the facts learned? Certainly one fact is that 
discussed earlier: one will tend to change one’s beliefs about certain means-end
relationships. Is that the whole of it? Hume wrote:
Since a passion can never, in any sense, be call’d unreasonable, but when 
founded on a false supposition, or when it chuses means insufficient for the 
design’d end, ’tis impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each 
other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions. The moment 
we perceive the falshood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any 
means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. I may 
desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of 
my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain 
actions as means of obtaining any desir’d good; but as my willing of these 
actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are 
causes of the propos’d effect; as soon as I discover the falshood of that 
supposition, they must become indifferent to me. (II.iii.3)
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This passage is often cited to justify the claim that Hume was an instrumentalist
about value and thought that the only sort of learning possible in desire and 
valuation is means-end learning that takes place entirely within the realm of 
belief. But it is crucial to note that his emphasis here is on changes in the will
and that his reference to “means” is to the actions, not to means-end beliefs 
about these actions. The focus of his discussion is the “government of the will 
and actions,” not simply the regulation of belief.
We can see that Hume distinguished between changing beliefs and changing 
desires by looking at his discussions of ways in which desire can go astray. 
Astray from what? Astray from the actual values—and not merely their 
instrumental values. Thus he writes, “There is no quality in human nature, which 
causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer 
whatever is present to the distant and remote,  (p.261) and makes us desire 
objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value” (III.iii.7). 
Notice that here he is talking of what we prefer or desire, not what we believe to 
be preferable or desirable, and of “fatal errors in our conduct,” not simply of 
mistaken beliefs. Indeed, he recognizes that it is one thing to come to believe 
that something is good or worthy, and another thing to desire or value it in 
accord with its goodness or worthiness. Proper “government of the will and 
actions”—proper regulation of our conduct in accord with intrinsic value—
requires that our various “passions” or “affections,” and not only those 
sentiments that constitute our beliefs, be proportional to the values at stake. 
Thus mistakes in governance are possible through disproportionate affection:
It has been observ’d, in treating of the passions, that men are mightily 
govern’d by the imagination, and proportion their affections more to the 
light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic 
value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly 
prevails above what lies in a more obscure light; and it must be a great 
superiority of value, that is able to compensate this advantage. (III.ii.7)
Hume analyzes ways in which one’s “affections” can fail to correspond to actual 
values, distinguishing these affective states and their “errors” from one’s beliefs 
about value. For example, in the case of proximity:
Now as every thing, that is contiguous to us, either in space or time, 
strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on the will 
and passions, and commonly operates with more force than any object, 
that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Tho’ we may be fully 
convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to 
regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the sollicitations of our 
passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous. 
(III.ii.7, emphasis added)
Learning as an Inherent Dynamic of Belief and Desire
Page 14 of 31
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
A second source of disproportion between our “affections” and actual values is 
the effect of adaptation:
’Tis a quality observable in human nature, and which we shall endeavour to 
explain afterwards, that every thing, which is often presented, and to 
which we have been long accustom’d, loses its value in our eyes, and is in a 
little time despis’d and neglected. We likewise judge of objects more from 
comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit; and where we cannot 
by some contrast enhance their value, we are apt to overlook even what is 
 (p.262) essentially good in them … [even] tho’ [they are] perhaps of a 
more excellent kind, than those on which, for their singularity, we set a 
much higher value. (II.i.6)
If Hume is to be believed, then, there is a space for learning and correction in 
desire and valuation that is not exhaustively explained by learning and 
correction in belief. Indeed, he seems especially concerned to point out that 
mistakes in desire and valuation are often the most serious sources of 
misfortune in human life, yielding preferences that are not corrected merely by 
knowledge of one’s instrumental interests. Immediately after his remarks about 
the greater imaginative force of proximity, quoted above, he writes:
This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known
interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage, that is 
present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on 
the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach of equity 
seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counter-ballance any 
immediate advantage, that may be reap’d from it. They are, however, never 
the less real for being remote. (III.ii.7, emphasis added)
Still, it is possible to learn from experience concerning such less salient values 
via the operation of sympathy for others (or for future selves): “We partake of 
their uneasiness by sympathy,” and this in turn makes us uneasy with 
proceeding, and increases resistance to the allure of the immediate (III.ii.2). 
Hume writes that “sympathy is a very powerful principle in human 
nature” (III.iii.6), and not just in morality. It plays a central role in the processes 
by which, through experience, our preferences receive feedback that can bring 
them into accord with real, rather than apparent, value, a process that makes it 
appropriate to speak of learning in desire in a way that is not reducible to 
learning in belief.
What, then, might be a plausible psychological model of desire that would fit 
Hume’s sentimentalist account and exhibit these forms of spontaneous learning 
from experience? Here is a proposal:
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(Des p) A desire that p is a compound state consisting in (1) a degree of 
positive affect or favoring toward a representation, p, that (2) gives rise to 
and regulates a degree of expectation that p will be satisfying or beneficial 
and a corresponding degree of motivation to bring about or sustain p, and (3) 
this degree of positive affect or favoring  (p.263) is in turn disposed to 
strengthen or weaken in response to the extent to which this expectation that 
p is met, exceeded, or disappointed in subsequent experience.
Both belief and desire, on the sentimentalist account, thus are compound states 
that are instances of the form:
(Sent p) A compound mental state in which (1) a degree of sentiment toward 
a representation, p, that (2) gives rise to and regulates a degree of action-
guiding and potentially motivating expectation with respect to p, and (3) this 
degree of sentiment is in turn disposed to be modulated by whether, and to 
what extent or in what direction, this expectation with respect to p is met or 
violated.
(Sent p) is a generic model of sentiments that take a propositional object. A 
given proposition, p, can be common to many sentiments at once. One can be 
confident of, attracted to, and intrinsically value the same state of affairs. Or one 
can be attracted to, but fearful and prospectively guilty about, taking an action 
that appears to be in violation of established norms. Sentiments respond to 
different dimensions of appraisal and enter collectively into the determination of 
action. Indeed, it is an important advantage of the sentimentalist account of 
belief and desire that it permits these states as well as other sentiments 
operating at the same time (such as fear, hope, valuing, prospective guilt, etc.) to 
function in an integrated way, contributing via a common affective system to 
directing or redirecting, strengthening or weakening, dispositions to think and 
act.
(Sent p) is also meant to capture the way learning takes place across the wide 
spectrum of sentiments; one might be born with various dispositions to trust, 
fear, like, take interest in, feel sad, etc., but it is only through the course of 
experience that one becomes skilled at discerning whom to trust, what to fear, 
what to like, what to regret, what’s worth time or energy, and so on. It thus is 
vital to the effective operation of the sentiments as sources of appraisal, 
expectation, and action guidance, from the very outset of life on through the 
most complex circumstances of adulthood, that they have an inherent tendency 
to learn from experience by priming us with expectations which then turn action 
into experimentation.
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Among sentiments, belief and desire have a distinctive, central role. (Bel p) and 
(Des p) are paired or complementary sentimental states—each contributes an 
indispensable element to action guidance, and each can operate in its 
characteristic way only thanks to the contribution of the  (p.264) other. Taken 
together, they furnish the minimal requisites for the guidance of thought and 
action—the degrees of credence and strengths of preference of classical decision 
theory. And, working together, they provide a system for feed-forward/feedback 
control of action, updated by discrepancy-based learning—a combination that 
now figures pervasively in the design of intelligent systems, since it can be 
shown formally that systems with this design will tend with increasing 
experience to attune themselves adaptively to meet their goals in a complex 
environment.4
Affect
This is all fine, and even suggests a “how possibly” story about why intelligent 
creatures with states like (Bel p) and (Des p) might have evolved and been 
successful. But do we have any evidence that (Bel p) and (Des p) do in fact 
correspond to the actual psychological states we call beliefs and desires? The 
answer to this question lies in an understanding of the nature and function of 
the affective system.
Affect is the closest correlate in contemporary psychology to Hume’s generic 
category of “passions and sentiments.” Like Hume’s category, affect includes 
transient and persistent states (e.g., episodic emotions and long-term moods), 
states of arousal and states of calm (e.g., anger and confidence), and on-line as 
well as off-line responses (conscious feelings and implicit or simulated affect). 
The affective system incorporates regions of the brain previously called the 
limbic and reward systems (the amygdala, hippocampus, nucleus accumbens, 
striatum, insula, hypothalamus, etc.), as well as several areas of the prefrontal 
cortex. This system is highly interconnected and has extensive projections to 
other areas of the brain. It functions continuously in perception, attention, 
memory, cognition, decision making, motivation, and action-control and 
-monitoring. Elements of the affective system enter early into perceptual 
processing and appear to help sort incoming information for relevance and 
urgency and to encode that information with positive and negative valence and 
weight.
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The emerging explanation for the coordinated operation of the affective system, 
and its pivotal role in perception, thought, and action, is that affect is the brain’s 
principal currency for value. The affective system is thus an appraisal system 
(Ellsworth and Scherer 2003), keeping track not only of patterns of reward and 
punishment and relevance to physiological and social needs or goal attainment, 
but also of degrees of confidence or uncertainty (Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and 
Quartz 2006; Singer,  (p.265) Critchley, and Preuschoff 2009). That is why, 
although it might at first seem strange, Hume’s view that belief is a sentiment 
makes good psychological sense: belief is a non-voluntary, conscious or 
unconscious attitude, not a judgment, which varies in degree of confidence, with 
corresponding variation in the effects it has on the guidance of perception, 
thought, and action. This is precisely the profile and role of affective states (for 
further discussion, see Railton 2014). Indeed, it has come to be thought that the 
chief function of the affective system is to inform and regulate in ways relevant 
to the well-being or success of the individual organism or group (Schwarz and 
Clore 1983, 2003; Nesse and Ellsworth 2009). From the perspective of cognitive 
and affective neuroscience, the traditional distinction between cognition and 
emotion has increasingly come to seem untenable (Pessoa 2008). For example, a 
critical dimension of epistemic appraisal is learning what or whom to trust and 
rely upon and to what degree. And it is via a dynamic interaction between 
perception and the appraisals sustained in the affective system, and then 
between the affective system and cortical regions, that the brain appears to keep 
track of past experience of successful or unsuccessful expectation and reliance 
and to project expectations that guide reliance in the future (Vuilleumier 2005; 
Bhatt et al. 2012).
The place of the affective system in the architecture of the mind reflects this 
dual function. The affective system is situated very early in the perceptual 
stream, coming online prior to conscious experience and interactively shaping 
subsequent mental processing. It appears from neuroscientific and behavioral 
studies to afford the primary substrate for error- or discrepancy-based learning 
(Schultz 2010), to play an essential role in the formation of episodic memories 
(Gilboa et al. 2004), and to play a wide role in the regulation of cognition and 
action—orienting attention and focus, priming memory and inference, 
supporting simulation of possible actions and outcomes, and shifting dispositions 
to act (Storbeck and Clore 2007, Quartz 2007). This makes affect the natural 
locus for an attitude with the functional “job description” of belief and fits it for 
the purpose of feed-forward/feedback guidance of thought and action.
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Our impression that belief involves no affect, and that the affective system has 
only an accidental and often disruptive role in cognition, is due largely to the 
difference in salience between aroused episodic emotions, like anger, as opposed 
to calm, persistent affective states like assurance or trust (for example, the 
default confidence we have in our own senses or memories). It often is only with 
the loss of assurance or trust that the affective character of belief becomes 
visible. In the closing pages of Book I of the Treatise, Hume describes just such 
loss of assurance and trust in  (p.266) his faculties and situation, brought on by 
solitary, single-minded focus on the arguments of the skeptic:
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in 
human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am 
ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even 
as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what 
causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? 
Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings 
surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any 
influence on me? (I.iv.7)
As someone prone to depression, Hume knew only too well how, if the usual 
support of assurance or trust in one’s faculties, abilities, and relationships fails, 
one falls prey to such self-defeating thoughts: “I am confounded with all these 
questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition 
imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use 
of every member and faculty” (I.iv.7).
At this point, one can expect no help from reason—for how could one restore 
confidence in one’s reasoning by reasoning in which one has no confidence? 
Hume instead turns to the capacity of the affective system to restore belief, once 
one quits the philosophical “closet” and its obsessions and brings ordinary 
experience back into play by engaging with the natural and social world: “Most 
fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, 
nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these 
chimeras” (I.iv.7). In responding this way to experience, affect does more than 
soothe the over-heated mind; it re-anchors the mind in reality, enabling it to be 
responsive once again to the evidence of the senses and memory, to return to 
“reasonableness” in its response to skeptical arguments:
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. . . must [I] torture my brain with subtilities and sophistries, at the very 
time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the reasonableness of so 
painful an application, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its 
means at truth and certainty. Under what obligation do I lie of making such 
an abuse of time? … Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a 
good reason for my resistance; and will no more be led a wandering into 
such dreary solitudes, and rough passages, as I have hitherto met with. 
(I.iv.7)
 (p.267) Desire and Direction of Fit
Let us return to the question of learning in desire and, in particular, how the 
sentimentalist account, (Des p), enables us to make sense of this idea. (Des p) is 
patterned on Hume’s remarks about the nature of desire. It involves two primary 
elements: a positive affective attitude toward the content of the desire, p, and a 
motivating expectation directed toward actions that would tend to bring about or 
sustain the state of affairs, p. Following Hume, this affective attitude is not 
understood as a new idea, such as the idea of goodness, annexed to the idea that
p. Rather, the attitude presents p “in a certain light,” a positive light in which p is 
associated with a favorable prospect of some kind. It is this favorable prospect 
that gives rise to and regulates the strength of the motivating expectation 
directed toward bringing about or sustaining p. And it is this favorable light that 
is subject to learning depending upon whether the favorable prospect of p is 
borne out.
It might be objected that this picture of desire contravenes the widely accepted 
view that desire has world-to-mind direction of fit. Direction of fit is thought to 
be univocal—a state of mind with world-to-mind direction of fit cannot also have 
mind-to-world direction of fit. But in the sentimentalist account, the “favorable 
light” in which desire that p presents p seems to have mind-to-world direction of 
fit; as we have seen, it can be out of proportion to the actual value of p, as Hume 
emphasized, and as a result lead to “fatal errors in conduct.”
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But does the actual operation of desire involve genuine mind-to-world direction 
of fit? Consider for example hunger, as it is typically conceived.5 After a period 
without food, it is thought, an animal enters a deficit state, signaled by various 
physiological markers, including a form of discomfort we call hunger. When 
these markers are present, the animal’s dispositions are re-oriented in a 
coordinated way: foodstuffs attract more attention, mobilize active approach, 
and, when proximate, trigger consumption behavior. Hunger typically involves a 
distinctive phenomenology, part of which is a physical discomfort and part of 
which is an alteration in how the world appears to us; the sight and smell of 
food, for example, become more salient. One could call this distinctive 
phenomenology a “favorable light,” but note that it is a consequence of hunger, 
not hunger itself—for hunger is a motivating bodily state that need have no 
propositional object. One isn’t hungry that one needs food, or even hungry that
one consume food—and if one’s hunger is for whatever reason disproportionate 
to one’s need of food, we do not say that it is incorrect. For, while hunger is a 
more or less reliable indicator of the need for food, it is an appetitive state, a  (p.
268) conation, not a more or less reliable representation of any state of affairs. 
Call this the drive model of hunger.
If the drive model were the right model for all of desire, it would be difficult 
indeed to make a case for learning in desire that is parallel with learning in 
belief. However, philosophers and psychologists have long distinguished two 
kinds of motivational states. In Aristotle, for example, motivation (orexis) can be 
either appetitive drive (epithumia) or telic goal-pursuit (boulesis). In appetition, 
no intentional object need be present, and thus epithumia can be found even in 
animals who lack any ideational capacity (Aristotle 2000: 1113a20).6 But in 
boulesis the representation of an action or goal is central, since it is this 
representation that affords the basis for means-end inference and practical 
deliberation. (A boule, for example, is a deliberative assembly of citizens.) Desire 
of this kind essentially requires an imagination (phantasia), since it must be 
capable of presenting to the mind a representation of an action or state of affairs 
that has never been perceived (since it occurs in the future7) and perhaps has 
never yet, and will never, exist.8
A defender of the univocality of the world-to-mind direction of fit of desire would 
be ill advised, however, to look to drives as a model. To apply the metaphor of 
world-to-mind direction of fit, something in the desiderative state must furnish a 
mental template or goal that can be compared with the state of the world and 
assessed for fit. But while we do speak of satisfying a hunger, this refers to a 
change of bodily state—drive reduction or satiety—not a way in which the world 
has come to fit a mental or representational state. As the behaviorists 
emphasized, the drive model permitted experimentalists to talk of motivation 
without what they saw as the “pernicious mentalism” of positing intentional 
content or goals (Lashley 1929).
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Perhaps, if hunger makes available no representation of eating as a state-to-be-
realized, we could call the reduction of the bodily deficit, and thus of the drive 
itself, the goal of the appetitive state? Even supposing that we could set aside 
the conceptual difficulties of this position, it encounters serious empirical 
problems—problems that have led motivation theory over the past half-century 
away from the drive-reduction approach to reward, even in the case of appetitive 
states such as hunger. The neuroscientist Kent Berridge (2004: 191) writes:
Many drive theories of motivation between 1930 and 1970 posited that 
drive reduction is the chief mechanism of reward. If motivation is due to 
drive, then, the reduction of deficit signals should satisfy this drive and 
essentially  (p.269) could be [the] goal of the entire motivation. Thus, food 
could be a reward because it reduces hunger drive, water is a reward 
when thirsty because it reduces thirst drive, and so on. The drive reduction 
concept of reward is so intuitive that it was thought to be self-evident for 
decades. The power of this idea is so great that some behavioral 
neuroscientists today still talk and write as though they believe it. All the 
more pity, perhaps, that the idea turns out not to be true. Drive reduction 
is not really a chief mechanism of reward.
For example, dogs whose stomachs were kept full by a feeding tube nonetheless 
retained a strong desire to eat when food was presented. What was the goal of 
this eating if there was no food deficit and hence no deficit-reduction drive? The 
answer given by contemporary affective neuroscience is that the dog has a 
favorable representation of eating; its affective system encodes a positive value 
for eating, and this then elicits a motivation to eat.
In Berridge’s account, for example, two fundamental components of motivation 
are distinguished: liking and wanting. Liking is an affective state, a positive 
hedonic gloss for a represented action or state, while wanting is a motive state, 
an incentive salience directed toward performing an action or bringing about an 
outcome. In normal motivation, these two states are coupled—the dog likes
eating, and this induces it to want to eat, even in the absence of food deficit 
(Berridge 2009).
But are these two elements of desire, the favorable affective representation and 
the motivated striving, genuinely distinct? Since they are normally coupled in 
the manner just suggested, we must look to cases of dysfunction in desire to see 
how they can come apart. In addiction, for example, individuals can continue to 
experience powerful craving for a drug even when they no longer experience 
any euphoria from it and thus lack a positive affective representation of drug 
taking (Robinson and Berridge 2000). And in “weakness of will,” even a powerful 
positive representation of an action or goal can fail to elicit motivated striving of 
comparable force.
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Thus we arrive at an empirical basis for a compound picture of desire in which 
an affective, evaluative component regulates a conative, action-guiding 
component—essentially, the structure of the Humean view as formulated by (Des
p). Moreover, because the affective component of (Des p) is evaluative, it can be 
subject to the Humean mechanisms described above for learning proportionality 
to actual value; that is, it can have mind-to-world direction of fit. At the same 
time, because this evaluative component has a representational content (e.g., a 
favorable representation of eating)  (p.270) and regulates motivational effort 
toward realizing that content (e.g., toward eating), the state also has a world-to-
mind direction of fit.
The worry that no mental state could have both directions of fit is dispelled by 
seeing that desire, like belief (Bel p), and like sentiment generally (Sent p), is a 
compound state.9 Desire thus has two ways of going awry. We have already seen 
one, the wresting of motivation away from regulation by evaluation, as found in 
addiction and weakness of will. What is the second? We have seen that, too: in 
Hume’s accounts of the ways in which strength of preference can fail to be 
proportional to actual value.
Novel Belief and Novel Desire
It is a feature of this compound picture that we can acquire new motivations by 
making new appraisals, whether this is the favorable appraisal of desire or 
affection, or the unfavorable appraisal of aversion or fear. Creatures are not 
bound to a set of basic drives or goals (plus instrumental motives directed at 
fulfilling these) but are capable of adapting their motivation to whatever they 
can see in a sufficiently favorable light. The mechanism here is essentially 
parallel to belief. Creatures are not bound to a set of basic beliefs either, but 
rather can acquire new beliefs whenever circumstances or persons present 
compelling evidence for something not currently believed.
This is a good thing, since we know that adults have desires, including intrinsic 
desires, that they did not have as tiny infants. This process can qualify as a form 
of learning when, as in the parallel case of belief, the change is the result of 
responsiveness to relevant evidence, and the new valuations thus acquired 
correspond to genuine values.
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However, this same capacity for novelty is also a vulnerability of our beliefs and 
desires, since there are many ways in which a convincing but deceptive 
appearance can be created of facts and values. This is not lost on advertisers or 
propagandists, who typically attempt to manipulate belief and desire together in 
order to change behavior in ways that serve their purposes (Railton 2012). 
Doing this successfully often requires planting in the target audience’s mind a 
sufficiently convincing and favorable (or disfavorable) image, even in the 
absence of actual experience or need. Think of the ubiquitous ads featuring 
lovingly photographed watches in the presence of attractive, confident people, 
with a text exuding the authority and status of a grande marque. Such images 
are calculated to make readily available in the mind of the viewer a confident, 
favorable “manner  (p.271) of conceiving” the idea of owning and wearing such 
a watch, regardless of the viewer’s actual need state or sense of how the world 
actually works. Or think of the way that ugly, hate-inducing propagandistic 
imagery can incite one social, religious, or ethnic group to turn upon another 
with horrible violence, even though the groups had lived together for years in 
peace and have ample evidence of the falsity of the stereotypes presented.
The generative character of belief and desire are fundamental to humankind’s 
capacity to adapt to the most varied environments or undertake the most 
dramatic individual or social changes in knowledge, culture, or ways of living. 
The results are not always happy. Fortunately, however, the learning dynamic 
inherent in (Bel p) and (Des p) makes it clear why producing a mere appearance 
of trustworthiness or desirability does not always suffice to sustain belief and 
desire in the long run. If, by acting on a compelling but false image, or a 
seductive but misleading evaluative appearance, we experience outcomes that 
violate the expectations created by this “affective forecast” (Wilson and Gilbert 
2005), we have a chance to rescue ourselves from our own folly.
The “Aim” of Desire?
If desire, like belief, supports an appearance/reality distinction and functions 
dynamically to reduce the gap between the two, should we say that desire “aims 
at the good”?
Desire indeed involves evaluative appraisal, but there are many kinds of value 
besides “the good”—not all the ways something might attract us, engage us, 
excite us, entice us, or hold promise for us are ways that it seems appropriate to 
describe as belonging to the “the good” or seeming to do so. Still less is it 
plausible to say that desire that p involves a judgment that p is good. Desire is a 
pervasive fact of life, consciously and unconsciously varying in response to 
experience and influencing not only what we do but what we attend to, perceive, 
think, and remember at all levels. It does all this in ways that do not depend 
upon the formation of judgments and that can be quite independent of what we 
judge to be the case, as Hume observed (III.ii.7).
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Should we swing the other way, and say that desire does not attend to “the 
good,” or even to goods—having as its essence simply to motivate the individual 
to make the world fit her preferred picture of things, whatever this might 
happen to be? (Des p) makes it clear why that is only half of it. A creature with 
mental states capable of motivating action, but that  (p.272) does not at the 
same time use feedback from the outcome of motivated action to inform 
subsequent motivation, would be a danger to itself and others. The more we 
recognize the pervasive, often unconscious role of desire in regulating our 
mental economy, the greater this danger can be seen to be.
Better to affirm both aspects of desire and say that desire is “built” for the 
conjoint task of guiding action in light of values and learning values in light of 
outcomes. These are “aims” in the evolutionary sense: the advantages of a 
functional integration of action-guidance with learning from action helps explain 
why desire is built the way it is, in much the same way that the advantages of a 
functional integration of action-guidance with learning from action helps explain 
why belief is built the way it is. Strikingly, neural activity in the affective and 
reward systems exhibit the characteristics of classical value functions—e.g., 
transitivity, cardinality, diminishing marginal returns, and risk sensitivity—and 
shape decision and motivation in ways characteristic of rational decision theory 
(Quartz 2007; Grabenhorst and Rolls 2011; Lak, Stauffer, and Schultz 2014; 
Stauffer, Lak, and Schultz 2014).
Of course, we have been considering here mostly simple cases, where desire 
that p has a content to which experience of “what p is really like” is directly 
relevant. This has made it easier to present a picture of how discrepancy-based 
learning is possible, since it is easy to see how actual experience could fail to 
live up to experiential expectations, even for intrinsic desires, such as those of 
the young lawyer considered earlier. Yet it is possible for learning to occur in the 
case of more abstract or impersonal desires—so long as the individual is capable 
of detecting, even indirectly, a discrepancy between an imagined possibility and 
the actual reality of bringing that possibility into existence (for discussion, see 
Railton 1986).
Recent research on the affective system has emphasized the diversity of the 
evaluative expectations the affective system appears to generate and 
spontaneously revise in the face of experience, representing not only parameters 
of immediate need but also prospective goal relevance and social value, 
including calibration to levels of risk and assessment of fairness or 
cooperativeness in second- and third-party transactions (Reynolds and Berridge 
2008; Behrens, Hunt, and Rushworth 2009). It appears that the affective system 
supports the development of models of the social as well as physical 
environment and that these models serve to guide both physical movement and 
choice behavior (Bhatt et al. 2012; Lin, Adolphs, and Rangel 2012; Xiang, 
Lohrenz, and Montague 2013).
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 (p.273) Conclusion
We have not tried to make a case for the possibility of learning across the full 
range of desire; rather, our aim has been the more modest goal of establishing 
the possibility of such learning in core cases of desire and to relate this to larger 
questions about the intelligent guidance of thought and action.
Belief and desire, we have argued, are complementary states, each with a 
similar, compound architecture involving an affective component that tracks 
value, whether epistemic or practical, and an action-guiding component 
regulated by this valuation, such as the allocation of expectation by degree of 
confidence or allocation of effort by strength of preference. Together these 
states make possible spontaneous action that is regulated by expected value in a 
way that is evidence-sensitive and effective, that is, intelligent. Belief and desire 
moreover each has a representational component that gives shape to their 
forward function (action-guiding expectation and effort) and provides a standard 
for their inverse function (discrepancy-based feedback).
The worry, expressed at the outset, that learning is possible only in mental states 
with truth conditions, can now be seen as misplaced—even in the case of belief. 
For degrees of confidence are no more capable of truth or falsity than degrees of 
prospective liking, yet both can be more or less responsive to the evidence or 
fitting to the situation, and thus capable of learning in a way that tends, with 
increasing quantity and diversity of experience, to lessen the gap between 
appearance and reality. It is no offense to common sense (or, for that matter, to 
contemporary empirical psychology) to speak of learning “the hard way,” that is, 
through painful experience, what or whom to trust, or what or whom to seek or 
avoid, and to what degree.
The Hume-inspired models we developed of belief and desire, (Bel p) and (Des 
p), give an essential role to sentiment, which may seem jarring if we are trying 
to make a case for so cognitive a phenomenon as learning. But we can note that 
sentiment generally is susceptible to the full range of epistemic assessments: 
confidence in a person can be warranted, fears about a situation can be 
confirmed, admiration of a person can be out of proportion to the evidence, 
anger at a situation can be irrational, wanting a result can turn out to be 
mistaken, and attraction to an idea can be ill-grounded or misplaced. Thinking 
about epistemic rationality has undergone a revolution in recent years toward 
more dynamic models: rather than demand that we find a privileged starting 
point secure from doubt,  (p.274) rationality is seen as requiring that we be 
appropriately responsive to new experience given where we start. Thinking 
about rationality in desire should follow suit—there might be no answer to the 
question of which desires are a priori required, but surely there are better or 
worse answers to the question of how our desires should respond to the 
outcomes we experience as we act upon them. And it would seem to be part of 
the business of rationality to help us find these answers.10
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Notes
(1.) Unless otherwise noted, all references to Hume are to the Selby-Bigge 
edition of the Treatise (1888). References to specific locations in the Treatise will 
be given as (Book.Part.Section).
(2.) Interestingly, a literature in cognitive science has recently appeared that 
challenges this decision-theoretic orthodoxy and develops a model of the 
decision makers in which their preferences evolve over time via a mechanism 
quite similar to the process of desire revision described in this paper. For a 
summary of this development, see Busenmeyer 2015.
(3.) For further discussion of the distinction between the “mental force” or 
“mode” of belief and its content, see the essays by Friedrich, Lauria this volume.
(4.) See Franklin et al. 2008; Lebreton et al. 2009. Nothing, of course, is 
guaranteed; for example, any finite body of evidence can fail to be 
representative, so the tendency of discrepancy-based learning to converge upon 
actual expectation values is only a probabilistic tendency. Moreover, while the 
influence of initial expectations tends to decrease with increasing evidence, the 
very possibility of discrepancy-based learning depends upon which categories 
the learner can recognize, and these might or might not be adequate to the task 
of representing relevant features of the environment.
(5.) For discussion of hunger and the phenomenology of desire, see Gregory, 
Massin this volume.
(6.) For a discussion of the distinction between drives and desires, see Gregory 
this volume.
(7.) For Aristotle, all practical thought concerns what is, or appears to be, 
feasible. And whatever we are now in a position to do lies ahead of us, not 
behind. Even a desire for the status quo is a desire for its continuation into the 
future. For discussion of non-actuality in desire, see also Oddie, Döring and Eker, 
Lauria, Massin this volume.
(8.) It is easiest to think of this in terms of visual imagery, but all that is needed 
are appropriate representational vehicles, whether visual, propositional, or 
something else.
(9.) Gregory, in his essay for this volume, also argues that desires have both 
directions of fit. Lauria, in his contribution, argues against this.
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(10.) This paper has benefited from discussions with many colleagues and 
students and from the Workshop on Desire at the Center for the Affective 
Sciences in Geneva (June 2014). I would particularly like to thank Kent Berridge 
and Phoebe Ellsworth for their helpful guidance through the psychological 
literature, and Federico Lauria for detailed and helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. For further discussion of the conception of desire presented 
here, see Railton 2012.
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What is wrong with desiderative inconsistency, having essentially conflicting 
desires that cannot possibly be satisfied at the same time? It was recently 
argued that attempts to explain this in terms of logical inconsistency, preventing 
action, or a failure of rationality are unsuccessful and having such desires is no 
worse than having desires that merely contingently conflict, if it is bad at all. But 
in fact having either essentially or contingently conflicting desires involves 
violating norms of desire, particularly, a norm of avoiding frustration. Appealing 
to a counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for desire shows this is a genuine norm, and 
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INTUITIVELY THERE SEEMS to be something wrong with having desires that 
conflict, such as wanting to eat cake and wanting to stay healthy. Furthermore, 
there seems something worse about having desires that essentially conflict (or 
being desideratively inconsistent), such as wanting to be monogamous and 
wanting to have open relationships, compared to what is bad about having 
desires that conflict merely contingently. Consider some examples to illustrate: 
Suppose that Jean-Paul desires that he goes to fight with the Resistance, and at 
the same time desires that he takes care of his sick mother. Unfortunately for 
Jean-Paul, given the way the world is both his desires cannot be satisfied; they 
are in conflict. However, this conflict is merely contingent: there is a possible 
world in which both desires can be satisfied at the same time, perhaps a world in 
which the Resistance has good health care insurance for its members, allowing 
Jean-Paul to afford a live-in carer for his mother while he is defending his 
country against the occupying forces. Of course, this might be of no help in the 
actual world, and depending on how strongly he holds each of these desires, 
whether he is able to prioritize one desire over the other, whether he is able to 
work toward changing current conditions in the actual world so that it is like a 
possible world in which they no longer conflict, and so on, there might be 
various negative effects for Jean-Paul. For example, he might experience 
disappointment that he cannot get everything he wants; he might become 
indecisive and unable to act to try to satisfy either of his conflicting desires; he 
might experience dissatisfaction with himself, come to question his values, etc. 
However, none of these negative effects is inevitable merely because he has such 
a conflict of desires. We can imagine that  (p.280) Jean-Paul experiences no 
such effects.1 Although we typically think there is something wrong with having 
conflicting desires, any problems seem relative to the agent and what is desired.
Now consider Don, who desires that he stays faithful to his wife, and also desires 
that he sleeps with his mistress. Like Jean-Paul, Don has conflicting desires, but 
in his case the conflict is not merely contingent: there is no possible world in 
which he can both be faithful to his wife and sleep with his mistress. Don has 
essentially conflicting desires, or is desideratively inconsistent.2 It is typically 
thought that having essentially conflicting desires is bad for someone in a way 
that having merely contingently conflicting desires is not; that is, that 
desiderative inconsistency is intrinsically bad or criticizable. Note that Don 
might be able to prioritize one desire over the other, just as someone might be 
able to if the conflict between her desires is merely contingent. The kind of 
desire I am concerned with in these cases are pro tanto, or prima facie, desires 
and not all-things-considered desires. Nonetheless, while Don holds both of his 
essentially conflicting prima facie desires there seems to be something wrong 
with him that is not wrong with Jean-Paul while he holds both of his contingently 
conflicting desires (see for discussion Blackburn 1988: 509–510, contra Schueler 
1988).
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But what exactly is wrong with such desiderative inconsistency as experienced 
by Don? And what explains the special problem with having essentially 
conflicting desires, like Don, over and above whatever, if anything, might be 
wrong with having merely contingently conflicting desires, like Jean-Paul? These 
questions, while distinct, are related. Scholars such as Harry Frankfurt, Gabriele 
Taylor, and David Velleman have often focused on the first question, suggesting 
variously that desiderative inconsistency leads an agent to become alienated 
from and unable to identify with her actions, become indecisive and inauthentic, 
be unable to accept at least one of the elements of her psychology, and typically 
being troubled as a consequence.3 However, I will focus on the second question, 
at least initially: What explains the problem thought to be involved in having 
essentially conflicting desires over and above what might be wrong with having 
merely contingently conflicting desires? Many prominent suggestions claim that 
having essentially conflicting desires involves a failure of rationality in some way 
(e.g. Blackburn 1988, Brink 1994, and Smith 2004 offer differing explanations of 
this kind), something that is not involved in having merely contingently 
conflicting desires.4 However, Patricia Marino (2009, 2010, 2011) has recently 
argued that these explanations are unsuccessful and that, in fact, there is 
nothing especially wrong  (p.281) with having essentially conflicting desires 
over and above whatever might be wrong with having merely contingently 
conflicting desires. Marino discusses a number of responses to this second 
question and argues that all of them either fail to identify something about being 
desideratively inconsistent that is problematic at all or fail to identify something 
about it that is not also a feature of having contingently conflicting desires. 
Inferring that those proposals are the only alternatives, she therefore argues by 
elimination that there is no special problem with desiderative inconsistency. The 
only complaint we might have about having desires that conflict is that they 
result in frustration of at least one of our desires, with the various practical 
consequences that might follow from that. Given that frustration of desires does 
not only occur when we have conflicting desires, we might infer from this that 
there is nothing wrong here at all, as well as there being nothing specially 
wrong with having essentially conflicting desires. Any problems arising from 
having conflicting desires will be agent-relative and over-ridable: that is, 
whether having conflicting desires creates any problems for the agent will 
depend on what it is she desires, whether those things are trivial and how they 
fit in with her broader situation and aims, her character and temperament, such 
as whether she is regimented or easy-going, and so on.
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However, while I agree that the problem with having conflicting desires is a 
matter of frustration of desires, I think this is more than merely a pragmatic 
issue. By appealing to what is a plausible counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for 
desire we can see that there are norms of desire that impose standards of 
correctness on how we should go about forming desires. Avoiding having 
frustrated desires is one such norm. What is especially wrong with desiderative 
inconsistency is then that it involves violating a norm of desire necessarily and 
not merely contingently. Of course, this is not to exaggerate the sense in which 
an agent is at fault for doing this, but it does identify a fault particular to 
desiderative inconsistency, and this is what was in need of explanation.
In the next sections I will present Marino’s argument by elimination, that there 
is nothing especially wrong with having essentially conflicting desires, followed 
by her diagnosis of why we typically think there is a special problem, appealing 
to frustration of desires. But this appeal is instructive and suggests that there is 
actually something more problematic about these conflicts, that they involve 
violating a norm of desire and doing so necessarily. In the subsequent sections I 
will try to motivate and explain this, first by drawing an analogy with the norms 
of belief and using Moore’s Paradox to illustrate how violating such norms is 
problematic.  (p.282) I then appeal to a counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for 
desire to show that analogous norms apply to desires and that violating those 
norms is similarly problematic. Finally I use this to explain why having 
essentially conflicting desires is particularly bad and discuss briefly what 
implications this might have for how we understand the nature of desire.
Some caveats for what follows: Marino discusses inconsistency in various kinds 
of attitude, including desires; other pro-attitudes such as intentions; evaluations; 
affective attitudes such as emotions; and so on. For the sake of this paper I am 
concerned only with desires, the kind of mental state that we attribute to 
someone when we say things like “Adam desires that his numbers come up in the 
lottery”; “Brenda wants to go to the beach”; and “Carl desires an ice-cream.” 
Also, despite these different ways we have of ascribing desires to people, in 
terms of wanting objects or to perform actions, I will follow standard practice in 
taking desires as propositional attitudes such that these attributions are most 
accurately expressed in the form “S desires that p,” and other expressions are 
merely paraphrases of that.
An Argument by Elimination
Marino argues by elimination that there is nothing especially wrong with 
desiderative inconsistency, but the strength of such an argument depends on the 
alternatives considered and ruled out. So which alternative explanations does 
Marino consider?
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First, Marino argues that we cannot distinguish between essentially conflicting 
and merely contingently conflicting desires in terms of some practical or 
pragmatic problems that the former but not the latter create. For instance, there 
is no reason to think that someone who has essentially conflicting desires will be 
unable to act, or will be “paralyzed with indecision,” and that this is bad for her 
from a practical point of view (see, e.g., Blackburn 1988 for this suggestion). 
This might be true if the kind of conflict of attitudes we were interested in was 
between all-things-considered desires or intentions, but here we are concerned 
with conflicts between overridable prima facie, or pro tanto, desires. Someone 
who has essentially conflicting prima facie desires must prioritize between them 
if she is to act on one or other, but this need not be something that will be 
especially problematic (Marino 2009: 282). There is no reason to think that Don 
will be unable to prioritize his desire that he is faithful to his wife over his desire 
that he sleeps with his mistress (or vice versa) and can then form  (p.283) a 
corresponding intention to act. Moreover, this is something that someone who 
has merely contingently conflicting desires must do as well if she is to act on one 
of those desires. Given the way the world actually is, Jean-Paul must prioritize 
one of his conflicting desires in just the same way as Don is required to do if he 
is to act on one of his contingently conflicting desires. So this cannot be what 
distinguishes essentially conflicting desires as being especially problematic, and 
it is not clear that it shows that they are problematic at all.
Relatedly, cases of essential and contingent conflicts cannot be distinguished in 
terms of the possibility of bringing about a world in which the desires do not 
conflict (Marino 2009: 283). It is true that in some cases of contingently 
conflicting desires this is possible. For instance, someone who wants to eat 
cookies and wants to be healthy might work to make the actual world one in 
which both her desires can be satisfied by developing a healthy cookie. But this 
may not always be the case; whether it is possible will depend on the content of 
the contingently conflicting desires and whether the agent has the information 
and resources needed to bring about the relevant changes so that they no longer 
conflict. Jean-Paul might be ignorant about how to change the world so that he 
can both fight with the Resistance and look after his sick mother, or if he did 
know how to do this he might not have the resources or time to bring about 
those changes. So he would be unable to resolve the conflict between his 
desires. In this respect he is no different from Don, who cannot do this because 
there is no possible world in which the conflict between his desires is resolved. 
Again, this fails to distinguish between the kinds of conflict of desires.
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A different suggestion is that “what is bad about essentially conflicting desires is 
that one is bound to be dissatisfied” (Marino 2009: 282–283). Again, however, 
Marino points out that this does not distinguish between essential and 
contingent conflicts of desires. Whether or not Jean-Paul will experience 
dissatisfaction or will be troubled by the fact that he cannot get everything he 
wants will depend on how strongly he desires those different things.5 But this is 
also the case with Don, whose desires conflict essentially. So causing 
dissatisfaction cannot be what makes having essentially conflicting desires 
especially problematic.6
Can a distinction be found between essentially conflicting desires and 
contingently conflicting desires in terms of a failure of rationality in the former 
but not the latter cases? Again Marino dismisses such suggestions. First she 
argues that neither case entails that an agent has straightforwardly inconsistent 
beliefs (see, e.g., Brink 1994). Someone might desire that p and desire that not-p
without forming any corresponding evaluative beliefs  (p.284) that p is good
and that p is not good. Or even if she did form such evaluative beliefs they might 
be more detailed in how they represent the object of the corresponding desires. 
For instance, she might believe that p is good in virtue of having x and believe 
that p is not good in virtue of having y. Such beliefs are not inconsistent. And 
contra Brink, if her desiderative attitudes are based on such evaluative beliefs, 
this need not entail that those desires are similarly fine-grained in how their 
objects are represented. Admittedly some cases that are prima facie cases of 
conflict in fact turn out not to be because what is desired are different aspects of 
a particular object. For example, someone initially described as wanting to eat 
cookies and wanting not to eat cookies might be more accurately represented as 
wanting to eat tasty food and wanting not to eat unhealthy food. But such fine-
grained representation of what is wanted cannot be assumed in all cases.7 It is 
possible that someone is attracted to different features of a particular object but 
that she is not explicitly aware of what these different features are.8 Her actual 
psychology is then most accurately represented on a straightforward coarse-
grained level, as desiring that p and desiring that not-p. Moreover, it is even less 
justified to assume this in cases of essentially conflicting desires that are not 
full-blown instances of ambivalence. Someone such as Don who desires that he 
stays faithful to his wife and also desires that he sleeps with his mistress might 
be ignorant of the fact that being faithful entails not sleeping with his mistress. 
Or even if he is aware he might simply have the corresponding evaluative beliefs 
that being faithful to his wife is good and that sleeping with his mistress is good; 
this need not entail that he also believes that being faithful to his wife is not 
good or that sleeping with his mistress is not good. So having conflicting desires, 
even in the extreme case of genuine ambivalence, need not involve any logical 
inconsistency in one’s beliefs at all, and is no more likely to do so in cases of 
essentially conflicting desires than in cases of contingently conflicting desires 
(Marino 2009: 280–281; 2010: 241–242).
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If desiderative inconsistency is not bad in virtue of entailing having logically 
inconsistent beliefs, does it involve some other kind of mistake of rationality? 
According to Smith (2004), you have normative reason to do what your fully 
rational self would want you to do, that is, what your fully informed counterpart 
who has a maximally coherent, unified set of desires would want you to do. As 
Marino puts it, to find out what we have normative reason to do we deliberate 
about what such a counterpart would want us to do, and part of this includes 
trying to reach a reflective equilibrium between our desires such that they are 
integrated into a “coherent” and “unified” outlook. So we should try to identify 
general desires that  (p.285) explain and justify our more specific desires and 
add those general desires to our overall desire set, thereby making it more 
unified. For instance, someone finding herself desiring to listen to Led Zeppelin 
and desiring to listen to Black Sabbath might adopt a general desire to listen to 
heavy metal music that would explain these more particular desires. And if this 
implied adopting other specific desires, such as a desire to listen to Deep Purple, 
she might adopt those too. Conversely if it implied something that conflicted 
with desires she already had, such as a desire not to listen to glam metal such as 
Motley Crue, she might reject that general desire and instead try to find some 
other general desire that would fit and better unify her overall desire set. As 
Smith (2004) acknowledges, it will not do to adopt any general desire; you have 
to generalize in the right way. And he recognizes that sometimes normative 
reasons conflict and one or other is overridden, such that your fully rational 
counterpart can have conflicting prima facie desires about what she wants you 
to do. However, she will weigh up these conflicting desires, and one will override 
the other, leading to an all-things-considered desire about what she wants you to 
do. It is this that you have normative reason to (perhaps prima facie) desire: you 
should not share the conflict in prima facie desires that your fully rational 
counterpart has. So, for Smith, rationality requires you to have a “tendency 
towards coherence” where this means “something like systematic unification 
among prima facie overridable desires, in a way that maximises 
generality” (Marino 2010: 234). Given that essentially conflicting desires cannot 
be part of such a coherent set, someone with such desires will be less than fully 
rational in that respect. This failure of rationality is then what is wrong with 
having essentially conflicting desires.
Marino is prepared to concede this to Smith when it comes to what we have 
moral reason to do and what morally significant desires we should have. 
However, when it comes to non-moral matters she denies that having conflicting 
desires, either essentially conflicting or contingently conflicting, and thereby 
lacking coherence, would mean that someone was irrational. As described 
earlier, having conflicting desires need not entail having logically inconsistent 
beliefs, so it cannot be irrational in virtue of that. But further, coherence is 
understood in terms of generality and unity, but neither feature within 
someone’s set of desires seems a specifically rational requirement. Consider first 
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generality: Marino argues that having the appropriate general desire is not what 
makes particular desires seem non-arbitrary and therefore not liable to rational 
criticism (which is the connection with rationality claimed by Smith 2004: 268–
270). Rather, what makes an instrumental desire non-arbitrary is its being 
understood as  (p.286) a means to the agent’s ends, and what typically makes 
an intrinsic desire non-arbitrary is that it is for something that we think will 
make us happy, along with our intuitions that it makes sense to want what will 
make us happy. But this is independent of whether or not the desires can be 
generalized. Indeed, general desires can be as vulnerable to a charge of being 
arbitrary as particular desires. Just as someone might reasonably be asked to 
justify and explain her desire to play Tetris, if the explanation is in terms of her 
general desire that she wants to play all video games, then she might just as 
reasonably be asked to justify and explain this general desire too. So the rational 
requirement toward coherence in desires and not having essentially conflicting 
desires cannot be explained in terms of generality. Similarly, there seems 
nothing especially rational about unity in someone’s desires, that is, those 
desires being ones that everyone would share or converge on because they 
would also see that such desires are justified. (So perhaps universalizability
would be a better term here; see Smith 2004: 263–264.) It might make good 
pragmatic sense to share the general desires of one’s community such that you 
have common aims and can get along more easily, be able to resolve disputes in 
a way that others accept, and so on. And we might be able to give justifications 
for our desires along those lines so that others would recognize such 
justification and adopt the same desires. But this need not make their desires 
non-arbitrary and therefore immune from rational criticism. Suppose someone 
justified her desire to support Tottenham Hotspur to others in North London on 
grounds that everyone in that region should support the same football club to 
avoid the risk of violence between fans of rival clubs, and suppose that all the 
other North Londoners recognized that justification and converged in the desire 
to support Tottenham. Although this desire is supported by a justification that 
others would accept, it is still arbitrary to some degree, as an equivalent 
justification could presumably be given for everyone to share the desire to 
support Arsenal. So despite being unified, that desire to support Tottenham is 
nonetheless arbitrary and so, according to Smith, vulnerable to rational 
criticism. So even if considerations of generality or unity require someone to 
have a more coherent set of desires, and not to have essentially conflicting 
desires, these are not considerations of rationality. So, contra Smith, rationality 
(at least when understood in terms of generality and unity) cannot distinguish 
between cases of essentially conflicting and contingently conflicting desires and 
cannot explain what is wrong with having essentially conflicting desires at all.9
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According to Marino, these are the only alternative explanations, and she 
believes she has successfully argued that none of them identifies  (p.287) 
something about having essentially conflicting desires that is both always a 
feature of it and is problematic, or that is distinctive of it and not shared by 
cases of having contingently conflicting desires. Hence she concludes that there 
is nothing especially wrong with having essentially conflicting desires.
Frustrated Desires
For the sake of this paper, grant Marino her dismissal of the alternatives she 
considers in her argument by elimination. How does she explain the (according 
to her, mistaken) intuition many have that there is something wrong with having 
conflicting desires? According to Marino, this is due to the fact that during the 
period when an agent has conflicting desires, either essentially conflicting or 
contingently conflicting, she must have at least one desire that is going to be 
frustrated (Marino 2009: 285; 2011: 66–67). This is obviously the case where 
someone has essentially conflicting desires but must also be the case where the 
conflict between her desires is merely contingent: even if she is able to do 
something to change the actual world such that her desires no longer conflict, 
until she achieves this she is still in a world in which her desires cannot be 
jointly satisfied. And we typically think that there is something bad about having 
our desires frustrated. For instance, a common way of understanding people’s 
well-being is in terms of desire satisfaction: someone is doing better to the 
extent that more of her strongest desires are satisfied and, conversely, doing 
worse to the extent that more of her strongest desires are frustrated.10 So if 
having conflicting desires means that someone has at least one desire that is 
frustrated, then her well-being will inevitably be lower than it would be if she 
was not conflicted, other things being equal, and this is bad. Furthermore, this 
diagnosis in terms of frustration provides a point of difference between essential 
conflicts and contingent conflicts: the person with essentially conflicting desires 
is necessarily frustrated, whereas the person with contingently conflicting 
desires is only contingently frustrated. Hence our intuition that there is 
something especially bad about having essentially conflicting desires: it means 
you will necessarily have at least one frustrated desire, so will necessarily be 
worse off than you would be without the conflict.
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However, according to Marino, there is nothing necessarily bad about having 
frustrated desires (Marino 2011: 66–69). Whether or not it is bad will depend on 
the content of the desire and the agent’s other attitudes.  (p.288) Consider 
someone who desires that the apartheid regime remains in power in South 
Africa. Intuitively apartheid is bad, so it is better that this particular desire is 
frustrated, whatever the implications for the supporter of apartheid and his 
attitudes. And it can even be good by an agent’s own lights that one of her 
desires is frustrated. Consider a conflicted and unwilling addict who has both 
the conflicting first-order desires that she takes drugs and that she stays clean, 
and the higher-order desire that she does not have the first-order desire that she 
takes drugs. If she could not rid herself of the first-order desire that she takes 
drugs, then she would consider it better that that desire remains frustrated. So 
according to Marino, it is because having desires frustrated is typically but 
mistakenly assumed to be bad that we think there is something wrong with 
desire conflicts, and it is because having essentially conflicting desires means 
that necessarily an agent has a frustrated desire that we mistakenly think this is 
worse than having merely contingently conflicting desires where the frustration 
is also merely contingent. But if she is correct, whether there is anything bad 
with having desires that conflict either contingently or essentially depends on 
the particular agent, what the conflicting desires are for, and how they fit with 
her broader interests and concerns.
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Again, for the sake of this paper I will grant much of what Marino says about 
this. However, where I disagree is with her understanding of desire frustration. 
Marino seems to assume that the only way having a desire frustrated could be 
bad is if what is desired is good, or improves one’s well-being, or is beneficial, 
and so on. That is, she explains the badness of frustration in terms of the content 
of particular desires that are frustrated. In that sense she might be correct that 
having a desire frustrated can be good if the content of the desire is for 
something bad, as with the supporter of apartheid, or can be good by an agent’s 
own lights, as with the conflicted, unwilling addict. Nonetheless there would still 
be something wrong with having a frustrated desire. What is wrong with it is 
that it violates a norm of desire.11 So the agent with a frustrated desire is doing 
something wrong considered from the point of view of how she should regulate 
her desires, and the agent with essentially conflicting desires is necessarily 
going wrong in this way. And this is independent of the content of those desires 
that are frustrated. Of course this is not to over-exaggerate the seriousness of 
the mistake the desideratively inconsistent agent is committing: in everyday 
contexts it might seem trivial whether or not we meet certain norms that apply 
to us in virtue of our being agents that form desires. But she is going wrong 
nonetheless. And she is doing so as a result of her having essentially conflicting 
desires, and that is more serious than  (p.289) the way someone with merely 
contingently conflicting desires is going wrong. But why think that there are any 
norms of desire, and if there are, why think that having a frustrated desire 
violates such a norm?
Moore’s Paradox and Norms of Belief
Consider an analogous question asked about belief: Why think there are any 
norms of belief, and what particular norms might there be if there are any at all? 
Moore’s Paradox is instructive in this respect. Moore’s Paradox is a paradox 
involving beliefs and assertions of propositions like the following:
1. It is raining and I believe it is not raining.
2. It is raining and I do not believe it is raining.
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Focus just on those cases involving belief rather than assertion, and further 
focus on belief of propositions like (1), sometimes called commissive Moorean 
beliefs. Propositions like (1) can be and often are true of an agent: any time 
someone has a false belief, then a proposition like (1) is true of her. So believing 
such a proposition does not involve believing something that is inconsistent in 
the way that believing that it is raining and it is not raining would do. Further, 
the problem is not merely that having such a belief is uncommon. We can 
imagine contexts, perhaps jerry-rigged and artificial, in which someone brought 
herself in some roundabout way to have a commissive Moorean belief.12
Nonetheless there would seem something wrong or odd with having that belief. 
And it seems wrong regardless of whether an agent asserts that belief, so it 
cannot be explained in terms of pragmatic norms about what can be properly 
asserted. What is wrong with having a commissive Moorean belief? I will not 
attempt here to provide a solution to Moore’s Paradox (for detailed discussion 
see, e.g., Sorenson (1988), Shoemaker (1997), Moran (2001)) but will merely 
highlight some noteworthy features that suggest an implication about what 
norms are relevant here, sometimes called doxastic norms. First, note that belief 
is mentioned as part of the content of a commissive Moorean belief such that for 
someone to be able to have that belief she must possess the concept of belief. 
Without engaging in a detailed debate about what is involved in grasping a 
concept, it seems plausible that someone must have a grasp of the norms and 
constraints for using the concept correctly. So, if someone can employ the 
concept of belief, then she knows when she can  (p.290) ascribe particular 
beliefs to others, how to distinguish belief from other kinds of mental state, 
when someone is doing something wrong in the way she is attempting to form 
his beliefs and is criticizable for that, and so on. This knowledge may only be 
approximate and implicit, but it is the kind of thing that someone must know and 
be sensitive to if she is to be able to employ the concept correctly, as is required 
to possess that concept.
Second, note that having a commissive Moorean belief involves self-ascription of 
a belief: if it is sincere, then she has judged that she herself can be correctly 
assigned the particular belief mentioned within the Moorean belief (in (1) the 
belief that it is not raining). So she judges that she has satisfied the norms and 
constraints on forming that particular belief. If she judged that she did not 
satisfy those norms and constraints, and so was wrong in holding that belief, 
then we would expect her either to withhold ascription of that particular belief 
or try to rid herself of the belief.
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It is the tension between these features in the particular case of having a 
commissive Moorean belief that seems to explain the intuitive oddness. Because 
she is using the concept of belief we think that she must be able to recognize 
when someone is not forming beliefs correctly in line with the norms and 
constraints on forming beliefs. And because she ascribes a particular belief, for 
example in (1) that it is not raining, then she has judged that she has satisfied 
the appropriate doxastic norms. Yet it seems odd that she can ascribe that 
particular belief while also recognizing that it is in conflict with other particular 
beliefs that she has, such that at least one of those particular beliefs must be 
false. It suggests either she does not have adequate grasp of the concept of 
belief to be able to employ it correctly after all, as she has not recognized that 
she has not satisfied the doxastic norms on having those particular beliefs, or it 
suggests that the mental state she is ascribing is not genuinely a belief at all, so 
its correct ascription does not depend on meeting doxastic norms. And in the 
commissive Moorean case it is the continued self-ascription of a particular belief 
recognized as false that is problematic. It commits her to knowingly maintaining 
a particular false belief; if the commissive Moorean belief is true, then the belief 
it is partly about is false, or if that belief is true, then the commissive Moorean 
belief itself is false. This suggests that it is a norm of belief to not have false 
beliefs, such that someone is going wrong with respect to that doxastic norm if 
she forms or maintains a false belief. Of course, this is not surprising and is 
something that has long been recognized about belief. For example, William 
James famously wrote that we should “believe the true and not believe the 
false” (James 1897).1314 More  (p.291) recently Shah and Velleman have 
attempted to describe how this norm of truth is part of the concept of belief:
To conceive of an attitude as a belief is to conceive of it as a cognition 
regulated for truth, at least in some sense and to some extent… . Also part 
of the concept is a standard of correctness. Classifying an attitude as a 
belief entails applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is 
true.
(Shah and Velleman 2005: 498)
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By “correct” they mean something that one is entitled to believe and that 
involves no error in believing. Conversely, someone would be making a mistake 
by believing something that was not true. Of course, the fact that someone is 
making such an error does not mean that she will always be criticizable in an 
everyday sense. It is plausible that there are a number of doxastic norms, that in 
certain real-world belief-forming contexts it might not be possible to satisfy them 
all, and that satisfying one might have to be traded off against satisfying others. 
For example, in real-world situations in which there are limits on time and 
investigative resources someone might have to merely form those beliefs best 
supported by her incomplete evidence, even if this results in her having a 
number of false beliefs. Strictly speaking she would be criticizable from a purely 
doxastic standpoint in virtue of having failed to meet that norm of belief, not to 
have false beliefs, but it is unlikely that she would actually be criticized if she 
has done her best with the resources available to try to meet it. Yet that merely 
shows that we do not assess people solely from a doxastic standpoint. It does not 
show that avoiding having false beliefs is not one of the doxastic norms or that 
these norms are not genuine standards that we are required to meet. Note also 
that this norm does not determine how someone should respond if it turns out 
that she has formed a false belief. It would be equally in line with that norm to 
respond by changing the world so as to make the belief in question true as it 
would be in line with that norm to stop holding that belief. Of course, the second 
way of responding is a more typical response, but this might be because of other 
considerations, such as our limited ability to change the world: the norm itself is 
neutral about how to respond to violating it. And as Moore’s Paradox helps to 
show, it is plausible that avoiding having false beliefs is a genuine doxastic norm, 
something that should constrain how we form beliefs. If the norms that apply to 
a state and regulate its correct occurrence, when there is something wrong with 
it, and so on, partly determine (or more strongly, partly constitute) what kind  (p.
292) of state it is, then by helping clarify one of the norms of belief Moore’s 
Paradox provides some insight into the nature of belief.
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Notice that if this is correct, then it both complements and conflicts with a 
different, common way of trying to articulate the nature of belief, that is in terms 
of its direction of fit (see, e.g., Anscombe 1957; Smith 1994; Lauria, Gregory, 
Railton this collection for more extensive discussion of this notion). Belief is 
often said to have a “mind-to-world” direction of fit, which is sometimes fleshed 
out by saying that a belief “should,” or “aims at,” or is going wrong in some way 
unless it “fits with” how the world actually is. But what do these phrases mean? 
A natural way of understanding a belief “fitting” with how the world is is in 
terms of it accurately representing the world, but the idea of a belief “aiming at” 
fitting how the world is is more difficult to articulate substantially: What is the 
sense in which a belief “should” fit the world? It is here that this norm of 
avoiding falsity can help elaborate this notion of direction of fit. The idea of a 
belief aiming at fitting with how the world is can be understood in terms of an 
agent violating a doxastic norm if she has a belief that does not accurately 
represent the world, i.e. having a belief that is false. So in helping to elaborate 
on this notion of direction of fit in terms of doxastic norms, the norm of avoiding 
falsity complements that way of describing the nature of belief.15
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However, there is also a conflict between the norm of avoiding false beliefs I 
have argued for and the idea that belief has a mind-to-world direction of fit. As 
mentioned, whereas the norm of avoiding falsity is neutral with respect to how 
someone satisfies that norm, belief’s direction of fit is not. According to the 
latter, correspondence between how the world is and how one’s belief 
represents the world as being should not be achieved by altering the world; if 
someone’s belief does not accurately represent the world, then she would not be 
in line with the direction of fit of belief if she maintained that belief but altered 
the world so that her belief did accurately represent it. Assuming that what I 
have argued about avoiding falsity being a norm of belief is correct, there are at 
least two ways we could respond here. A more confrontational approach might 
say that in fact there is nothing more than mere regularity to this second aspect 
of the direction of fit of belief: we typically meet the norm of avoiding having 
false beliefs by adjusting our beliefs rather than the world, perhaps because it is 
easier to satisfy the norm in this way given our physical limitations and other 
conditions in the world. But while this might make us think that this is the right 
way to satisfy that norm, in fact there is no error in satisfying it in the opposite 
way. So the notion of direction of fit tells us nothing about the nature of belief 
over and above what is revealed by showing that avoiding  (p.293) falsity is a 
norm of belief.16 On the other hand we could adopt a more conciliatory approach 
and try to reconcile this norm of belief with belief having a mind-to-world 
direction of fit. One way of doing this would be to appeal to the norm of avoiding 
having false beliefs as what explains the sense in which a belief should
accurately represent how the world is: this is in terms of someone satisfying the 
requirement on her as a doxastic agent. We could then appeal to some other 
doxastic norm, whatever that might be, to explain the other side of the mind-to-
world direction of fit.17 In that way the direction of fit of belief would tell us 
something about the nature of belief, but it would do so by articulating, or being 
short-hand for, two of the norms of belief. Exploring this further is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but either way of responding would be informative about the 
nature of belief.
A Counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for Desire
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If Moore’s Paradox shows that certain constraints are doxastic norms, is there a 
counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for desire that might help identify what, if any, 
constraints there are on how we form desires, or orectic norms?18,19 Note that I 
am concerned here only with identifying a counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for 
and norms that apply to desire. I am not concerned with other kinds of pro-
attitude, such as intentions, wishes, and hopes. Perhaps there are also norms 
constraining the formation of those kinds of mental state, but they are likely to 
be different from those applying to desire. Note also that I am interested only in 
whether there is something analogous to Moore’s Paradox in the case of desire, 
that is, whether there are propositions that would be odd to desire in a way that 
is analogous to how propositions like (1) and (2) are odd to believe. Given that 
belief and desire are different kinds of mental state it is unlikely that the same 
things would be problematic objects of desire as are problematic objects of 
belief, or that the same norms would apply to desire as apply to belief. But there 
might be analogous problems and norms nonetheless. So, is there a counterpart 
of Moore’s Paradox for desire?
Consider propositions like the following:
3. I have cheesecake and desire that I do not have cheesecake.
4. I have cheesecake and do not desire that I have cheesecake.
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Now suppose that someone had an intrinsic desire for a proposition like (3) or 
(4) (that is, desired it for its own sake and did not merely desire it  (p.294) 
instrumentally as a means toward some other desired end).20,21 Note that in 
each case this would be a single desire for a complex state of affairs, a desire 
that she both has some cheesecake and has a desire to not have any cheesecake, 
or a desire that she both has some cheesecake and lacks a desire for 
cheesecake, respectively. These single desires are both first-order and higher-
order. But the cases are not ones in which someone has a first-order desire and a 
distinct, higher-order desire. Note also that the attitude taken toward these 
propositions is one of desire, so she might express the desire for (3) by saying 
something like “Give me some cheesecake but make me averse to it” or “I want 
to have some cheesecake and to not want any,” and that the attitude mentioned 
within the propositions is one of desire as well.22 There would be something odd 
if someone were to have such an intrinsic desire for a proposition like (3) or 
(4).23 But what explains this oddness? It is not that what is desired is something 
impossible, such that the desire could not be satisfied. Propositions like (3) and 
(4) can be true of someone, and it is likely that they frequently are: a proposition 
like (3) will be true of someone whenever she has a frustrated desire, while a 
proposition like (4) will be true of someone whenever she is indifferent about 
something that actually is the case. And we can un-problematically imagine 
wanting someone else to have a frustrated desire, say, motivated by envy of her 
success, or wanting someone else to be indifferent to something, perhaps 
motivated by annoyance at his general over-excitement. While we might 
disapprove of having such mean-spirited attitudes, it would not be especially 
puzzling to have them. But there is something odd about desiring for yourself 
that you have a particular desire that is frustrated or desiring for yourself that a 
particular state of affairs obtains about which you will be indifferent. And as I 
will argue, this oddness is analogous to the oddness of having a belief in a 
proposition like (1) or (2). It indicates that such a desire would violate certain 
norms of desire, just as the oddness of Moorean beliefs indicates that such 
beliefs would violate certain norms of belief.
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Focus on a desire for a proposition like (3), a desire that I have cheesecake and 
desire that I do not have cheesecake. This will be most relevant in the context of 
this paper. It is a desire that you have a particular desire that is frustrated. This 
is analogous to having a commissive Moorean belief, a belief in a proposition like 
(1): in each case the content of the attitude mentioned within the content of the 
broader belief or desire does not obtain. Frustration for a desire is formally 
analogous to falsity for a belief in that respect; the proposition the mental state 
is directed toward does not obtain. So what explains the oddness of having a 
desire for a proposition  (p.295) like (3), a desire that you have a particular 
desire that is frustrated? This is a desire in part about having a desire, so 
someone must possess the concept of desire if she is to have this desire for a 
proposition like (3). As before, whatever else is necessary for possessing a 
concept it is plausible that it involves knowing and being sensitive to the norms 
and constraints that determine when the concept can be correctly applied, even 
if this is known only implicitly and approximately. In the case of someone 
possessing the concept of desire, this would require her to know and be 
sensitive to the orectic norms such that she is able to decide whether someone 
has met those norms and constraints and can be attributed a particular desire, 
when she has done something wrong in the way she is forming desires, how to 
distinguish desires from other kinds of mental state, and so on.
In addition, if someone were to have a desire for a proposition like (3), then she 
would be desiring that she has or comes to have a particular desire herself. In 
having that desire she is treating having a particular desire that is frustrated as 
a suitable object of desire: she considers both wanting to have that frustrated 
desire and having that frustrated desire as in line with the relevant orectic 
norms that she is committed to being constrained by. If this were not the case, 
then we would expect her to try to give up the desire for a proposition like (3).
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In an analogy with the commissive Moorean belief, it is the tension between 
these features that explains the oddness of having a desire for a proposition like 
(3). For someone to have that desire she must be aware of and sensitive to the 
norms and constraints of desire formation that determine what are appropriate 
objects of desire. But in forming the desire for a proposition like (3) she seems 
not to be following those orectic norms herself. It suggests either that she is not 
sensitive to those norms after all, so could not in fact be having this desire about 
a desire (because she does not possess that concept, so cannot have a desire 
that employs it), or that the mental state she wants to have is not genuinely a 
desire, that it is some other kind of mental state that has been mis-described, so 
her wanting it and obtaining it does not violate any norms of desire. And in this 
case it is the continued wanting to have a particular desire that is frustrated that 
is problematic. It commits her to knowingly desiring to have at least one 
frustrated desire: if the desire for a proposition like (3) is satisfied, then she will 
have the frustrated desire that is part of its content, or if that desire is not 
frustrated, then the desire for the proposition like (3) itself will remain 
frustrated. Because this is odd it suggests that it is a norm of desire to not have 
frustrated desires and that someone is going wrong by having and maintaining 
frustrated desires. This kind of desire, for a proposition like  (p.296) (3), is a 
good candidate for being a counterpart of a Moorean belief: it is a commissive 
Moorean desire.
Perhaps it is more surprising that avoiding having frustrated desires is an 
orectic norm than that avoiding having false beliefs is a doxastic norm. But 
consider how we typically respond to wanting something: other things equal, we 
typically try to get what we want. And if successful this means no longer having 
a frustrated desire.24 Indeed someone would be considered instrumentally 
irrational if she did not act to satisfy a desire if doing so was not overly costly 
and did not conflict with her satisfying other, stronger desires.
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Of course, this orectic norm itself does not determine how someone should 
respond to having a frustrated desire. She could do so by bringing about what is 
desired so it is no longer frustrated, or by ridding herself of that desire. The 
former kind of response is more common, perhaps due to the difficulty of 
bringing about a change in our desires compared to bringing about a change in 
the world, but they are on a par in terms of what is required to conform to that 
norm. But we would certainly expect her to respond in some way or would 
suspect something was amiss. For example, suppose someone appeared to be 
expressing a current desire by saying “I want a doughnut” while standing next 
to a bakery, having plenty of money in her pocket, denying that she had any 
stronger conflicting desires, such as a desire to get the bus about to pull away 
from the stop across the road, or had other reason to want to rid herself of that 
desire, such as having a desire to eat fewer pastries, and so on. Other things 
equal, if she did not go on to buy a doughnut and satisfy her desire when she 
could so easily do so, then we would tend to question whether she properly 
possessed the concept of desire that she was attributing to herself, or question 
whether there was something wrong with her to explain this appearance of 
practical irrationality.25
Admittedly most of us do actually have a number of frustrated desires most of 
the time yet are not criticized for this or considered to be going wrong in doing 
so. But this merely reflects that avoiding having frustrated desires is not the only 
orectic norm and that in real-world situations it may be in tension with other 
norms that it is more important, in that situation, to conform to. For instance, in 
the real world we are limited by time and resources in our abilities to satisfy our 
desires, so often have to prioritize satisfying certain desires and leaving others 
frustrated. This can often be a reasonable use of resources even if it results in 
having some desires that are frustrated. And given that the world is not always 
cooperative there may be situations in which something we want is unachievable 
despite there being  (p.297) good reasons for desiring it. Further, we rarely 
assess people purely from an orectic standpoint, whether they are forming 
desires in a way that meets the norms and constraints of desire formation. But 
this does not show that there are no orectic norms. And as the commissive 
Moorean desire suggests, avoiding having frustrated desires is among these 
orectic norms. Analogously with the case of belief described earlier, by 
identifying one of the norms that constrain what desires it is appropriate for 
someone to have, and if we think that the norms that apply to a state partly 
determine what kind of state it is, then this provides insight into the nature of 
desire.
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Consider a number of implications that the norm of avoiding having frustrated 
desires has for our understanding of desire. Again analogously with the earlier 
belief case, it helps to elucidate a common way of trying to capture the nature of 
desire, in terms of its direction of fit. Whereas belief is said to have a mind-to-
world direction of fit, as mentioned, desire is said to have a world-to-mind 
direction of fit. Desire is said to “aim at” having the world “fit” with it such that 
someone who desires that p should try to make the world the way it is 
represented by her desire. We can understand this in terms of a requirement on 
an agent to meet orectic norms similarly to the way we can understand belief’s 
mind-to-world direction of fit in terms of an agent meeting doxastic norms. So it 
is partly because desires are constrained by an orectic norm of avoiding having 
frustrated desires that someone who has a desire should try to make the world 
the way it is represented by her desire, as this will satisfy that desire and 
thereby meet that norm. So this orectic norm complements the understanding of 
desire in terms of it having a world-to-mind direction of fit.
But just as with the case of belief, there is also a conflict here. If what I have 
argued is correct, then this particular orectic norm does not specify how an 
agent should avoid having frustrated desires to comply with that norm. One way 
is to act to try to satisfy that desire. But it is also in line with that norm to cease 
having that particular desire. In both cases the agent will no longer have a 
frustrated desire. But the second way conflicts with the idea that desire has a 
world-to-mind direction of fit as it involves someone changing her mind, what 
desires she has, rather than changing the world to bring about the fit between 
them. Again there are at least two ways to respond to this. On one hand we 
could insist that the fact that we expect people to bring about correspondence 
between how the world is and how their desires represent it to be by acting to 
try to change the world rather than by giving up their frustrated desires is 
merely because people typically do this. That is, we dismiss this part of  (p.298)
the world-to-mind direction of fit as mere regularity and telling us nothing about 
the nature of desire over and above what is revealed by it being an orectic norm 
that people should avoid having frustrated desires.26 On the other hand we could 
be more concessive and postulate that the fact that we expect people to act on 
the world rather than alter their desires when they have a frustrated desire is 
explained by a different orectic norm from the norm of avoiding having 
frustrated desires. So the idea of desire having a world-to-mind direction of fit 
would capture more than one orectic norm and thereby would be informative 
about the nature of desire. Which of these responses is best is a matter beyond 
the scope of this paper.
Moorean Desires and Desiderative Inconsistency
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Typically we think there is something wrong with having conflicting desires, and 
in particular with having desires that conflict essentially and not merely 
contingently. But what is it that is wrong with such cases, and why is it worse for 
someone’s desires to be for things that necessarily cannot be satisfied at the 
same time? In recent papers Marino has attempted to dismiss these intuitions 
and questions, arguing that any problems that arise in such cases will depend on 
the particular things that are desired and the agent’s broader aims, concerns, 
and so on; she denies that there is anything fundamentally wrong with having 
conflicting desires at all, and a fortiori nothing especially wrong with having 
desires that conflict essentially. However, we can now see that this is mistaken 
and there is a problem that needs addressing. By considering a counterpart of 
Moore’s Paradox for desire I have argued that having frustrated desires is 
always bad, and not merely for any practical, psychological, or other contingent 
reasons that might be overridden or depend on the particular agent, as Marino 
claims. Rather having a frustrated desire violates an orectic norm, or norm of 
desire, that constrains what desires it is appropriate for an agent to have. Such 
orectic norms apply to agents that are capable of having desires, similar to the 
way doxastic norms apply to agents that are capable of having belief: they 
constrain how someone should regulate that part of her psychology simply in 
virtue of her being that kind of agent, one who can form desires. When someone 
has desires that conflict and cannot be satisfied at the same time it is inevitable 
that she will have at least one frustrated desire. So while she has those desires 
she will be violating a norm of desire: she will be falling short of what  (p.299) 
is required of her as a good orectic agent, one who is capable of having desires. 
And where her desires conflict essentially, she is violating such an orectic norm 
necessarily and not merely contingently. So there is always something wrong 
with having conflicting desires, and there is something especially wrong with 
having desires that essentially conflict and not merely contingently conflict. It 
does not matter that the kind of mistake being made here is a mistake 
specifically as someone considered in respect of her management of a particular 
portion of psychology. And it does not matter that this kind of mistake is 
something that might not be pressing in many everyday situations. It is a 
mistake nonetheless. Nor does it matter that the additional seriousness of the 
error in cases of essential conflicts between desires is merely a modal one. Again 
it is a difference that arguably makes the mistake worse. So our original 
intuitions were correct.
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Furthermore, the answers to these questions are informative about the nature of 
desire itself and not merely this particular problem. If we think that the norms 
that constrain what mental states it is appropriate for someone to have partly 
determine, or more strongly partly constitute, a particular mental state, then by 
identifying one of the orectic norms I have shown that it is part of what it is for a 
mental state to be a desire that it should not be frustrated. Interestingly this 
helps explain one aspect of the familiar idea that desire has a world-to-mind 
direction of fit (and raises further questions about how to understand that idea). 
That is, it explains the normative pressure for there to be correspondence 
between how the world is and how it is represented by someone’s desire, even if 
it does not explain why we think that this correspondence should be brought 
about in a particular way. Perhaps surprisingly it also suggests that desire and 
belief are similar in nature in an important respect. In both cases there is 
normative pressure for such correspondence between how the world is and how 
the state represents it to be. This is due to the analogous norms of avoiding 
having frustrated desires and avoiding having false beliefs that create this 
orectic and doxastic pressure, respectively. So there is a genuine, essential 
similarity between these types of mental state. Whether they are also genuinely 
different, and in what ways, will depend on what other norms there are that 
apply to each. And this may inform whether we should think of desires as a 
particular kind of belief, or as a representation of a particular kind of content, or 
as states that have a particular motivating role, or as states with a particular 
affective character, and so on, as claimed by various theories of desire, and as 
discussed in other papers in this volume.27
Notes
(1.) This is especially clear when we consider examples where someone’s 
contingently conflicting desires are relatively trivial, in contrast with those of 
Jean-Paul here. Someone who wants both to have the steak for dinner and the 
fish for dinner, but cannot have both, is unlikely to experience any of these 
effects such as dissatisfaction with herself, questioning values, being unable to 
act, and so on.
(2.) For this terminology and way of distinguishing between types of conflict of 
desires see Marino (2009: 277–278), following a distinction between types of 
rules in Marcus (1980). See also Blackburn 1988: 509.
(3.) See, for example, Frankfurt 1992: 5–16; 1987 (as well as Taylor 1985 and 
Calhoun 1995 for discussion), Velleman 2006: 284–311 (who attributes a similar 
view to Korsgaard 1996), and Williams 1979 (as well as Calhoun 1995 for 
discussion).
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(4.) They argue for this in different ways, but there is a common concern to 
reconcile moral realism with the idea that the (moral) reasons that someone has 
to act in a particular way are related to her desires in some way. However, I will 
set aside such moral issues for the sake of this discussion.
(5.) To illustrate, consider again a case where someone’s contingently conflicting 
desires are for trivial things such as to have steak for dinner and to have fish for 
dinner, where she cannot have both (see n1). There is no reason to think she will 
be particularly disappointed to have either steak or fish even though in each 
case there would be something that she wanted that she did not get.
(6.) A related suggestion considered and dismissed by Marino (2009: 283–284) is 
that there would be a difference between what an agent was dissatisfied with 
between cases of essentially conflicting and contingently conflicting desires 
(assuming that she was dissatisfied). The suggestion is that in the case where an 
agent has essentially conflicting desires any dissatisfaction she feels will be with 
herself for having those desires, whereas if her desires merely contingently 
conflict then any dissatisfaction will be with the world for not being such that 
she can get all that she wants. But we cannot assume this would always be the 
case even if having such conflicting desires always led to dissatisfaction. 
Someone with essentially conflicting desires need not consider herself to be 
doing anything wrong, say, if she denies she has any substantial voluntary 
control over what desires she has, so need not feel any dissatisfaction with 
herself. On the other hand, someone with contingently conflicting desires might 
think she does have a high degree of voluntary control over her desires and 
think she should regulate them so as to avoid even such contingent conflicts, so 
be dissatisfied with herself for not doing so. So the target of any dissatisfaction 
on having conflicting desires cannot be what distinguishes essentially conflicting 
and contingently conflicting cases.
(7.) See Greenspan (1980: 228–234) for discussion of this in the case of 
ambivalence of emotions. Presumably something similar could be argued in the 
case of ambivalence of desires mutatis mutandis.
(8.) Suppose for example that someone liked the richness of cream while 
disliking its cloying mouth feel but was unable to consciously distinguish these 
features. She might then be most accurately described as simply desiring that 
she has cream with her pudding and desiring that she does not have cream with 
her pudding even though the explanation for each desire is a different feature of 
cream.
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(9.) Perhaps there is some other sense of rationality that can explain what is 
wrong with conflicting desires and can distinguish between cases of essential 
and contingent conflicts, but these are the only kinds of rationality Marino 
considers and argues against. Indeed, it is just such a different sense of 
rationality that I will appeal to to try to explain this.
(10.) See, among others, for discussion, Brink 1989: esp. ch. 8; Hawkins 2010; 
Sumner 1996; Scanlon 1998; Heathwood 2006; Brandt 1966; Rawls 1971; 
Haybron 2008. Different versions of this approach appeal to satisfaction of 
actual desires or to satisfaction of those desires one would have if ideally 
rational, fully informed, etc.
(11.) One way to think of this is that there are certain intra-orectic pressures 
toward having consistent desires that can be satisfied at the same time. Marino 
(2010) discusses the case of mathematical beliefs and claims there are reasons 
specific to the subject matter of those beliefs for having consistent beliefs, or 
intra-mathematical pressures for logical consistency among those beliefs, 
related to what we do with those beliefs. Similarly she argues that in the specific 
case of moral desires there might be reasons specific to the subject matter of 
those desires for having consistent moral desires, or intra-moral pressures, 
related to the role that moral rules play in our lives. We can think of norms of 
desire, or one norm in particular, as providing intra-desire, or intra-orectic, 
pressure toward consistency in desires. There is a sense in which this is 
pragmatic, but that is merely because of the fact that desires are related to 
action. It is different from the way the other intra-subject pressures are 
pragmatic in that it is not dependent on how the specific content of the desire 
(or belief) plays a role in our lives. So this intra-orectic pressure, from the 
specific orectic norm to avoid frustration of desires that I will motivate in what 
follows, is not agent-relative or related to the subject matter of the desire. See 
also (Marino 2009: 285) where she explicitly denies this.
(12.) Consider for example someone at the moment she realizes that she is 
deceiving herself, yet before she rids herself of the false belief. In recognizing 
this about herself she might form a belief that “I believe that p, but not p,” a 
commissive Moorean belief. Her recognition of this and formation of this belief 
might be what leads her to rid herself of the false belief. So it is possible for 
someone to have a Moorean belief. Nonetheless, given that self-deception is a 
condition in which someone is going wrong with respect to her beliefs, and the 
Moorean belief arises from that condition, it suggests something odd and 
deviant about that belief.
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(13.) See also James’s “Pragmatic Theory of Truth” (1917:12) where he writes 
when introducing and defending pragmatism, “ ‘What would be better for us to 
believe!’ This sounds very much like a definition of truth. It comes very near to 
saying ‘what we ought to believe,’ and in that definition none of you would find 
any oddity.”
(14.) See also, for example, Wedgewood (2002) for discussion.
(15.) Of course there might be different ways of explaining why that particular 
norm is a doxastic norm and applies to belief. For example, Railton (this volume) 
seems to explain it in terms of evolutionary usefulness, whereas I appeal to the 
notion of an idealized believer or doxastic agent (see Wall 2012). But it would 
take the paper too far from its main subject matter to discuss this in detail here.
(16.) Although it would still be informative about our ability to effect changes in 
the world by acting.
(17.) And recall I mentioned earlier that it is very plausible that there are further 
norms of belief in addition to the norm of avoiding falsity. Investigating what 
they are, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
(18.) On this section see Wall (2012) for further discussion and argument.
(19.) I take the term orectic from Millgram (1997), although my use will differ 
from his. Whereas Millgram uses “orectic state” to “denote psychological states 
that seem to involve an attraction to their objects” (13), so might include states 
such as wishes, fantasies, whims, urges (13), I will use it exclusively to refer to 
desires, the kind of mental state we attribute when saying things like “Homer 
desires Marge,” “Lisa wants to go to the museum,” “Mr. Smithers desires that 
Mr. Burns returns his affections,” and so on.
(20.) There is some terminological variation here, with intrinsic desires 
alternatively being called “final” desires, and instrumental desires sometimes 
called “means-end” desires. I use these terms interchangeably.
Desiderative Inconsistency, Moore’s Paradox, and Norms of Desire
Page 28 of 36
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
(21.) This distinction between intrinsic and instrumental desires is important 
here. It is not being claimed that it would not be possible for someone to have a 
desire for a proposition like (3) or (4) but merely that there would be something 
odd about having such a desire. Yet this is likely to be the case only if the desire 
is intrinsic. It may be relatively easy to imagine contexts in which it would be 
intelligible for someone to have this kind of desire, but this would set it in a 
broader context of the agent’s other aims and desires, effectively making it an 
instrumental desire. And in that context it might not strike us as having any 
oddness that was in need of explanation. But if we were to focus on a desire for 
a proposition like (3) or (4) in isolation, desired for itself, it will seem to be in 
need of explanation. For example, it is plausible that the notion of some penalty 
counting as punishment requires that the person suffering the penalty is averse 
to suffering it. And we can make sense of someone wanting to be punished, say, 
if she believes it important for personal moral development or for maintaining 
social order and wants to achieve those things. This might then involve her 
having a desire such as a desire that she is imprisoned and desires that she is 
not imprisoned, which is a desire for a proposition like (3). But this is intelligible 
only considered as an instrumental desire, desired as a means toward achieving 
the desired end of being a better person or maintaining social order. Without 
this instrumental context it would seem odd for her to desire that she is 
imprisoned and desires that she is not imprisoned, and this is in need of 
explanation. We should expect intrinsic desires to be informative only about 
constraints specific to desire as opposed to constraints on practical reasoning. 
Thanks to Timothy Schroeder for this example and to him, Lauren Ashwell, and 
Alex Gregory for pressing me on this point to help clarify it.
(22.) These verbal expressions of the desires might be the kind of thing uttered 
in prayer, as a request, as a demand, and so on, analogous to assertions that are 
expressions of belief. Thanks to Federico Lauria for these suggestions.
(23.) This is not to deny that someone could actually have a desire like (3) or (4), 
merely that there would be something wrong or odd about her doing so. But in 
this respect these desires are analogous to Moorean beliefs (see n12).
(24.) Note that this need not be simply because getting what we want means no 
longer having a desire for that thing at all, and a fortiori no longer having a 
frustrated desire for it. It is possible to continue to desire something after it has 
been satisfied, and even when the agent is aware that her desire has been 
satisfied. Consider for example someone who desires to be a parent. In most 
cases she will not cease to desire to be a parent after having a child (sleepless 
nights excepted). Similarly, consider someone who gets her dream job and finds 
that it is as fulfilling as she imagined it to be. Before getting the position she 
desired to do that job and after getting it continues to desire to do that job. So 
being successful in trying to get what we want means no longer having a 
frustrated desire, but does not necessarily mean no longer having a desire at all.
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(25.) For instance, we might instead question whether she genuinely possesses 
the concept of the first person that she appears to be using in self-ascribing the 
desire. Compare what Matthew Boyle says about the different ways in which 
someone can use the first-person: “A subject who judges ‘That plank is going to 
hit A in the head’ and who has the normal aversion to being hit in the head, but 
whose so judging does not dispose him to take evasive action, is a subject whose 
use of ‘A’ plainly does not express self-consciousness. By contrast, a subject 
whose use of ‘A’ is connected in this sort of way with his decisions about what to 
do displays an awareness of the fact that the things he decides to do are the 
intentional actions of the thing he calls ‘A’ ” (Boyle 2009: 154).
(26.) Though again this might be informative about our psychological ability to 
alter our desires and our physical ability to alter the world nonetheless.
(27.) This paper was presented at the Thumos Nature of Desire conference at the 
University of Geneva in June 2012. Thanks to that audience for helpful 
discussion, and thanks to Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.
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Notes:
(1.) This is especially clear when we consider examples where someone’s 
contingently conflicting desires are relatively trivial, in contrast with those of 
Jean-Paul here. Someone who wants both to have the steak for dinner and the 
fish for dinner, but cannot have both, is unlikely to experience any of these 
effects such as dissatisfaction with herself, questioning values, being unable to 
act, and so on.
(2.) For this terminology and way of distinguishing between types of conflict of 
desires see Marino (2009: 277–278), following a distinction between types of 
rules in Marcus (1980). See also Blackburn 1988: 509.
(3.) See, for example, Frankfurt 1992: 5–16; 1987 (as well as Taylor 1985 and 
Calhoun 1995 for discussion), Velleman 2006: 284–311 (who attributes a similar 
view to Korsgaard 1996), and Williams 1979 (as well as Calhoun 1995 for 
discussion).
(4.) They argue for this in different ways, but there is a common concern to 
reconcile moral realism with the idea that the (moral) reasons that someone has 
to act in a particular way are related to her desires in some way. However, I will 
set aside such moral issues for the sake of this discussion.
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(5.) To illustrate, consider again a case where someone’s contingently conflicting 
desires are for trivial things such as to have steak for dinner and to have fish for 
dinner, where she cannot have both (see n1). There is no reason to think she will 
be particularly disappointed to have either steak or fish even though in each 
case there would be something that she wanted that she did not get.
(6.) A related suggestion considered and dismissed by Marino (2009: 283–284) is 
that there would be a difference between what an agent was dissatisfied with 
between cases of essentially conflicting and contingently conflicting desires 
(assuming that she was dissatisfied). The suggestion is that in the case where an 
agent has essentially conflicting desires any dissatisfaction she feels will be with 
herself for having those desires, whereas if her desires merely contingently 
conflict then any dissatisfaction will be with the world for not being such that 
she can get all that she wants. But we cannot assume this would always be the 
case even if having such conflicting desires always led to dissatisfaction. 
Someone with essentially conflicting desires need not consider herself to be 
doing anything wrong, say, if she denies she has any substantial voluntary 
control over what desires she has, so need not feel any dissatisfaction with 
herself. On the other hand, someone with contingently conflicting desires might 
think she does have a high degree of voluntary control over her desires and 
think she should regulate them so as to avoid even such contingent conflicts, so 
be dissatisfied with herself for not doing so. So the target of any dissatisfaction 
on having conflicting desires cannot be what distinguishes essentially conflicting 
and contingently conflicting cases.
(7.) See Greenspan (1980: 228–234) for discussion of this in the case of 
ambivalence of emotions. Presumably something similar could be argued in the 
case of ambivalence of desires mutatis mutandis.
(8.) Suppose for example that someone liked the richness of cream while 
disliking its cloying mouth feel but was unable to consciously distinguish these 
features. She might then be most accurately described as simply desiring that 
she has cream with her pudding and desiring that she does not have cream with 
her pudding even though the explanation for each desire is a different feature of 
cream.
(9.) Perhaps there is some other sense of rationality that can explain what is 
wrong with conflicting desires and can distinguish between cases of essential 
and contingent conflicts, but these are the only kinds of rationality Marino 
considers and argues against. Indeed, it is just such a different sense of 
rationality that I will appeal to to try to explain this.
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(10.) See, among others, for discussion, Brink 1989: esp. ch. 8; Hawkins 2010; 
Sumner 1996; Scanlon 1998; Heathwood 2006; Brandt 1966; Rawls 1971; 
Haybron 2008. Different versions of this approach appeal to satisfaction of 
actual desires or to satisfaction of those desires one would have if ideally 
rational, fully informed, etc.
(11.) One way to think of this is that there are certain intra-orectic pressures 
toward having consistent desires that can be satisfied at the same time. Marino 
(2010) discusses the case of mathematical beliefs and claims there are reasons 
specific to the subject matter of those beliefs for having consistent beliefs, or 
intra-mathematical pressures for logical consistency among those beliefs, 
related to what we do with those beliefs. Similarly she argues that in the specific 
case of moral desires there might be reasons specific to the subject matter of 
those desires for having consistent moral desires, or intra-moral pressures, 
related to the role that moral rules play in our lives. We can think of norms of 
desire, or one norm in particular, as providing intra-desire, or intra-orectic, 
pressure toward consistency in desires. There is a sense in which this is 
pragmatic, but that is merely because of the fact that desires are related to 
action. It is different from the way the other intra-subject pressures are 
pragmatic in that it is not dependent on how the specific content of the desire 
(or belief) plays a role in our lives. So this intra-orectic pressure, from the 
specific orectic norm to avoid frustration of desires that I will motivate in what 
follows, is not agent-relative or related to the subject matter of the desire. See 
also (Marino 2009: 285) where she explicitly denies this.
(12.) Consider for example someone at the moment she realizes that she is 
deceiving herself, yet before she rids herself of the false belief. In recognizing 
this about herself she might form a belief that “I believe that p, but not p,” a 
commissive Moorean belief. Her recognition of this and formation of this belief 
might be what leads her to rid herself of the false belief. So it is possible for 
someone to have a Moorean belief. Nonetheless, given that self-deception is a 
condition in which someone is going wrong with respect to her beliefs, and the 
Moorean belief arises from that condition, it suggests something odd and 
deviant about that belief.
(13.) See also James’s “Pragmatic Theory of Truth” (1917:12) where he writes 
when introducing and defending pragmatism, “ ‘What would be better for us to 
believe!’ This sounds very much like a definition of truth. It comes very near to 
saying ‘what we ought to believe,’ and in that definition none of you would find 
any oddity.”
(14.) See also, for example, Wedgewood (2002) for discussion.
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(15.) Of course there might be different ways of explaining why that particular 
norm is a doxastic norm and applies to belief. For example, Railton (this volume)
seems to explain it in terms of evolutionary usefulness, whereas I appeal to the 
notion of an idealized believer or doxastic agent (see Wall 2012). But it would 
take the paper too far from its main subject matter to discuss this in detail here.
(16.) Although it would still be informative about our ability to effect changes in 
the world by acting.
(17.) And recall I mentioned earlier that it is very plausible that there are further 
norms of belief in addition to the norm of avoiding falsity. Investigating what 
they are, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
(18.) On this section see Wall (2012) for further discussion and argument.
(19.) I take the term orectic from Millgram (1997), although my use will differ 
from his. Whereas Millgram uses “orectic state” to “denote psychological states 
that seem to involve an attraction to their objects” (13), so might include states 
such as wishes, fantasies, whims, urges (13), I will use it exclusively to refer to 
desires, the kind of mental state we attribute when saying things like “Homer 
desires Marge,” “Lisa wants to go to the museum,” “Mr. Smithers desires that 
Mr. Burns returns his affections,” and so on.
(20.) There is some terminological variation here, with intrinsic desires 
alternatively being called “final” desires, and instrumental desires sometimes 
called “means-end” desires. I use these terms interchangeably.
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(21.) This distinction between intrinsic and instrumental desires is important 
here. It is not being claimed that it would not be possible for someone to have a 
desire for a proposition like (3) or (4) but merely that there would be something 
odd about having such a desire. Yet this is likely to be the case only if the desire 
is intrinsic. It may be relatively easy to imagine contexts in which it would be 
intelligible for someone to have this kind of desire, but this would set it in a 
broader context of the agent’s other aims and desires, effectively making it an 
instrumental desire. And in that context it might not strike us as having any 
oddness that was in need of explanation. But if we were to focus on a desire for 
a proposition like (3) or (4) in isolation, desired for itself, it will seem to be in 
need of explanation. For example, it is plausible that the notion of some penalty 
counting as punishment requires that the person suffering the penalty is averse 
to suffering it. And we can make sense of someone wanting to be punished, say, 
if she believes it important for personal moral development or for maintaining 
social order and wants to achieve those things. This might then involve her 
having a desire such as a desire that she is imprisoned and desires that she is 
not imprisoned, which is a desire for a proposition like (3). But this is intelligible 
only considered as an instrumental desire, desired as a means toward achieving 
the desired end of being a better person or maintaining social order. Without 
this instrumental context it would seem odd for her to desire that she is 
imprisoned and desires that she is not imprisoned, and this is in need of 
explanation. We should expect intrinsic desires to be informative only about 
constraints specific to desire as opposed to constraints on practical reasoning. 
Thanks to Timothy Schroeder for this example and to him, Lauren Ashwell, and 
Alex Gregory for pressing me on this point to help clarify it.
(22.) These verbal expressions of the desires might be the kind of thing uttered 
in prayer, as a request, as a demand, and so on, analogous to assertions that are 
expressions of belief. Thanks to Federico Lauria for these suggestions.
(23.) This is not to deny that someone could actually have a desire like (3) or (4), 
merely that there would be something wrong or odd about her doing so. But in 
this respect these desires are analogous to Moorean beliefs (see n12).
(24.) Note that this need not be simply because getting what we want means no 
longer having a desire for that thing at all, and a fortiori no longer having a 
frustrated desire for it. It is possible to continue to desire something after it has 
been satisfied, and even when the agent is aware that her desire has been 
satisfied. Consider for example someone who desires to be a parent. In most 
cases she will not cease to desire to be a parent after having a child (sleepless 
nights excepted). Similarly, consider someone who gets her dream job and finds 
that it is as fulfilling as she imagined it to be. Before getting the position she 
desired to do that job and after getting it continues to desire to do that job. So 
being successful in trying to get what we want means no longer having a 
frustrated desire, but does not necessarily mean no longer having a desire at all.
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(25.) For instance, we might instead question whether she genuinely possesses 
the concept of the first person that she appears to be using in self-ascribing the 
desire. Compare what Matthew Boyle says about the different ways in which 
someone can use the first-person: “A subject who judges ‘That plank is going to 
hit A in the head’ and who has the normal aversion to being hit in the head, but 
whose so judging does not dispose him to take evasive action, is a subject whose 
use of ‘A’ plainly does not express self-consciousness. By contrast, a subject 
whose use of ‘A’ is connected in this sort of way with his decisions about what to 
do displays an awareness of the fact that the things he decides to do are the 
intentional actions of the thing he calls ‘A’ ” (Boyle 2009: 154).
(26.) Though again this might be informative about our psychological ability to 
alter our desires and our physical ability to alter the world nonetheless.
(27.) This paper was presented at the Thumos Nature of Desire conference at the 
University of Geneva in June 2012. Thanks to that audience for helpful 
discussion, and thanks to Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.
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Abstract and Keywords
It seems very plausible that actions are done as a result of the agent’s desire for 
something. At the same time we sometimes act on the basis of our practical 
deliberation. But it is hard to fit these thoughts together. Reasoning on the basis 
of the thought “I want phi” can take place whether or not this premise is true. It 
would be the same even if this thought were false, in which case the explanation 
of the resulting action would be the same even if the agent did not actually want 
phi. At the same time, if one acts on the basis of one’s deliberation it seems to 
follow that one wanted whatever it was one was aiming at. So apparently in this 
case the thought “I want phi” must be true, even self-verifying. This paper 
proposes a solution to these puzzles.
Keywords:   desire, deliberation, practical reasoning, self-verifying, want
The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get.
—ANSCOMBE 1963
Every day, do something you don’t want to do.
—STUDENT COMMENCEMENT SPEAKER
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It is very plausible to think that desires motivate at least some intentional 
actions. At the same time it seems clear that at least some actions are done as a 
result of deliberation. That could not be true of all actions, since deliberation 
itself is an “action” in the sense of being something one can do intentionally and 
for a reason.1 But it is plausible to think that deliberation must play a role, 
perhaps a conceptually central role, in the explanation of intentional action of 
rational agents.
In this paper, though, I will argue that there is a serious tension between 
deliberation and desire, as they are commonly understood, when they are both 
relevant to explaining the same action. The question this paper will address is 
how desires figure into the explanations of actions when the agent both has a 
desire that motivates the action and also deliberates and acts on the basis of her 
deliberation. How do the agent’s desires figure into the explanations of such 
actions? I will argue that a common way of understanding this situation, 
contained in a standard version of the practical syllogism, is quite problematic. 
At the same time, sorting out the issues here will let us see what “motivation by 
what one wants” really is, at least when deliberation is involved. It will  (p.306) 
help to start by saying a little about how best to understand “desires” and what 
deliberation is.
The most straightforward procedure, which I will follow, is to take a desire to be 
present whenever a sentence of the form “X wants Y” is true (when X is an agent 
and Y is anything agents can intelligibly be said to want). This will allow us to 
remain neutral about “what desires really are,” e.g. about whether they are 
really beliefs about whether their objects are good, or dispositions to be moved 
toward certain actions under certain conditions, or functionally describable 
parts of a complicated causal network. Similarly we can be neutral about 
whether their “contents” are or are not propositions and about whether they 
essentially involve feelings. For the same reason, as we will see, this allows us to 
avoid the question of whether intentions are “really” desires.2
Sentences of the form “X wants Y” cover two distinct phenomena: things the 
agent likes or is in favor of, and purposes, goals, or aims she has. The jargon 
term pro-attitude covers up the difference here, as indeed does the term desire
itself often enough, but these are different things.3 If I am watching my favorite 
team on television, I want them to win. I’ll be glad if they do, unhappy if they 
don’t. But the fact that I want them to win need not provide me with a goal that 
might lead me to do anything (such as email advice to the coach). I might believe 
that nothing I can do can influence this game. And so unless I am irrational I 
won’t take their winning as the goal of anything I do. But I still want them to 
win. My desire that they win consists of the fact that I am in favor of this 
outcome.4 Another example of this kind of desire is when I want my lottery 
number to have been drawn. I am in favor of that, but I don’t have it as a goal 
since I don’t believe I can change the past.5
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The phenomenon involving goals and purposes is exemplified by intentional 
actions and may be at least part of what Anscombe meant when she said, “The 
primitive sign of wanting is trying to get.”6 One might hold that all intentional 
actions are done for reasons, but in any case some certainly are. And “the 
agent’s reason” typically (or is it always?) refers to the goal or point of the 
action.7 If I walk across campus to get some coffee my reason for doing this is 
the purpose of my action, i.e. to get some coffee. The natural way to describe 
this is by saying “I want to get some coffee.” The purpose of the action, 
whatever it is, is one of the things typically referred to when we speak of an 
agent wanting something. In fact, I would say it follows from the fact that an 
agent did something for some reason that she wanted whatever it was that she 
was aiming at. From the fact that I walked across campus in order to get some 
coffee, it follows that I wanted to get some coffee.8
 (p.307) These two phenomena mostly overlap, which may be why we use the 
same term to refer to both. Our goals are usually things we like or have positive 
attitudes toward. And things we like we often try to achieve. But this is not 
always the case, as we can see from examples where the two conflict. Someone 
who has decided to try to lose weight might know that she would enjoy the 
pastry offered her and at the same time know that eating it would conflict with 
her goal. So does she want the pastry? She might have a strong positive attitude, 
even a craving, toward eating it. So in that sense she wants to eat it. At the same 
time, in the other sense, she doesn’t want to eat it because it would conflict with 
her goal of losing weight. She is not lying when she tells the waiter she doesn’t 
want a pastry. Whether or not she eats the pastry she will do something she 
wants to do and at the same time something she doesn’t want to do. The two 
different senses (or kinds?) of “want” come apart here.9
So two different phenomena can be referred to by want. I will mark that by 
referring to the two “senses” or “uses” of this term. But there is one other thing 
to note about the “X wants Y” criterion for desires, namely that it obviously 
covers intentions. Someone who intends to stop at the grocery has this as a goal. 
So she wants to stop at the grocery. I can convey to someone my intention to 
stop at the grocery by saying “I want to stop at the grocery.” Whether in the end 
we will want to hold that the mental states called “intentions” are or are not a 
variety of the ones we call “desires,” either can be referred to when we speak of 
what some agent wants.
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Turn now to deliberation. Deliberation is a conscious, psychological process, 
which should be sharply distinguished from the propositions that are the 
contents of the mental states that partly constitute it. It is held to come in two 
forms: theoretical reasoning, where the aim is to figure out whether some claim 
is true, and practical reasoning, where the aim is to figure out whether to do 
something.10 We will focus on practical deliberation. There are lots of things 
about this sort of deliberation that have come in for philosophical debate, 
whether for instance the conclusion of such reasoning is a belief about what the 
agent should do or whether it is an intention to act, or even just an action. We 
can remain neutral on such issues for the moment. A start will be made on 
sorting out some of them below.
It is worth noticing here that not only is practical deliberation a goal-directed 
activity, but it is one governed by implicit norms. In order to be deliberating one 
must at a minimum think that there is, or may be, something more to be said for 
doing some things than others and that there is at least a chance of figuring out 
what that is. And like any reasoning, practical  (p.308) deliberation can go 
wrong. One might succeed in reasoning, even in reasoning as well as possible, 
but still fail at the implicit goal of reasoning. If one is engaged in theoretical 
reasoning the belief one arrives at might be false, or, in practical reasoning, the 
action one performs might not be the one that had the most to be said for it. 
Since practical deliberation is a form of reasoning, it can go wrong in any of the 
ways reasoning can go wrong.
2. Reasoning from One’s Own Desires
So much for the preliminaries. As was mentioned earlier, the question this paper 
will address is how desires figure into the explanation of actions when the agent 
both has a desire that motivates the action and also deliberates and acts on the 
basis of her deliberation. How do the agent’s desires figure into the explanations 
of such actions? One well-known answer is provided by Robert Audi, who 
represents one possible schema for deliberation as follows: “Major Premise—the 
motivational premise: I want phi; Minor Premise—the cognitive (instrumental) 
premise: My A-ing would contribute to realizing phi; Conclusion—the practical 
judgment: I should A.”11 This schema, a version of the practical syllogism, 
couldn’t of course be the whole story about deliberation. There is no account 
here of cases where one has to weigh conflicting reasons, and there seem to be 
perfectly good examples of deliberation that start from a claim that something is 
worth doing or otherwise of some value or perhaps is in the interest of the 
agent, not from a reference to something the agent wants. But the central 
feature of this schema, the reference in the “motivational premise” to what the 
agent wants, gives a familiar answer to the question of how desires come into 
the explanation of actions when the agent deliberates. It seems plausible that if 
an agent has a desire on which she is to act, then in order for her to figure out 
how to satisfy that desire she must be aware of it. That is what the motivational 
premise encapsulates. So let’s consider this answer.
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There are several things to notice here. First, since we are considering Audi’s 
proposal as a general account of how desires fit into deliberation, it seems 
implausible to take the wanting referred to in the motivational premise in this 
schema as being of the “liking” or “favoring” sort. I can want things in that 
sense without its being the case that I should try to get them, or even think that 
I should. As the TV football game example shows, there are plenty of things that 
I want to happen, i.e. that I am in favor of, but that I perfectly well know are 
outside my ability to achieve. And even  (p.309) when there is something I 
could do to promote what I favor, it seems false that the mere fact that I like or 
favor something, plus know of a way of promoting it, somehow automatically 
means I should try to get it. Though of course I can reason about how to achieve 
something I like, I can also like or favor some state of affairs without taking its 
realization as a goal.
This is clear if we think of whims or other trivial desires. For instance, I would 
like to return home some day to find my next-door neighbor’s front lawn, which 
he always keeps trimmed to virtual golf course perfection, a riot of wildflowers 
and meadow grasses. It would look a lot better. But though I would like this to 
happen, I have no temptation to take making it happen as a goal or aim of mine 
even to the slightest degree. It is just a whim. So I would not deliberate about 
how to achieve this. I can perfectly well like the idea of this happening, and 
know of something I could do to “contribute to realizing it” (such as buying my 
neighbor a subscription to a natural gardening magazine) without actually 
having it as a goal or aim. And as the dieting example shows, I can have a goal 
or aim for which I feel no positive emotion at all. So aims and positive feelings 
are distinct things.
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At the same time, when we explain actions in terms of what agents want it is the 
fact that we thereby pick out goals or aims the agent is trying to achieve that 
does the explanatory work.12 One’s goals and aims are just the sorts of things 
one does try to figure out how to accomplish. So this is really a conceptual point 
about how what we want explains our actions. Once we distinguish the in-favor-
of sense from the purpose sense of “want,” unless we take Audi’s motivational 
premise as referring to a goal or purpose, there seems to be little plausibility in 
the thought that the agent ought to do what is required to achieve it. It may or 
may not be a mistake not to pursue what you want, i.e. favor having or 
achieving, depending on its value, or at least value to you. Notoriously, though, it 
is sometimes wiser not to pursue, perhaps even wiser to try to extinguish, some 
of your strongest desires. But other things being equal it is irrational not to try 
to achieve your goals in a way that it is not irrational not to try to achieve 
something you know you would like or are otherwise in favor of. Assuming I 
haven’t dropped some goal or thought its pursuit precluded by some more 
important goal, failure to pursue one of my goals seems to call my agency into 
question. So for these reasons I will understand the motivational premise “I 
want phi” in Audi’s schema as referring to some goal or purpose that I have. We 
will consider below the plausibility of taking this premise in the “liking” or 
“favoring” sense.
A second thing to notice about this schema is that as it stands there seems to be 
nothing essentially first-personal about it. Audi states it in  (p.310) the 
grammatical first person, but nothing in his schema requires this. If you know 
the relevant facts, you can reason just as well as I can about what I should do, 
though of course, since you are reasoning about me, you won’t put things in the 
first person. It is obviously plausible to think that someone else can reason about 
what I should do as well as I can, as long as we are thinking of Audi’s schema as 
a description of an argument, that is, as an abstract structure of propositions (or 
forms of propositions) which can be evaluated individually for their truth and, as 
an argument, for cogency.
But we are discussing deliberation, which is not an abstract structure of 
propositions but a psychological process that takes place in an agent. That is 
required by the question on which we are focusing, which involves the agent 
acting on the basis of her deliberation. As it stands Audi’s schema, whatever else 
is true of it, doesn’t seem equipped to make any distinction between the 
theoretical reasoning that ends in a belief about what someone (even perhaps 
someone other than the person doing the reasoning) should do, and practical 
reasoning done by the agent that somehow is acted on. So we will need to return 
to this point.
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A third thing to notice about Audi’s schema is that, as mentioned, explicitly 
basing one’s reasoning about what to do on what one wants is not the only 
possible form of deliberation. However plausible it is to think that we sometimes 
deliberate about how to get what we want, it is not very plausible to think that is 
the only thing we ever use as a basis of deliberation. Such a claim would 
suppose a level of self-absorption that seems beyond all but the most solipsistic. 
So whatever we decide about the idea that desires figure into deliberation that 
starts from a motivational premise about what the agent wants, we will 
eventually need to consider other schemas as well.
3. Two Puzzles
The fourth thing to notice about Audi’s schema will bring us to the problem on 
which I want to focus. The question we are asking here is how desires fit into the 
explanation of actions where the agent has a desire that moves her but also 
deliberates and acts on the basis of that deliberation. According to Audi’s 
schema, the agent simply starts with the realization that she wants something 
and then reasons about what action she can take that will “contribute to 
realizing” what she wants. On its face this seems plausible. But there is 
something puzzling here. According to  (p.311) Audi’s schema, the desire that 
is supposed to motivate the action isn’t, strictly speaking, part of the 
deliberation on which the agent acts at all. This desire is required to make the 
motivational premise true, of course, but reasoning can take place whether or 
not the premises on which it is based are true. All the mental states that 
constitute the deliberation are conscious thoughts, one of which will be about 
what the agent wants (i.e., will have the content “I want phi”). So if the agent 
acts on the basis of her deliberation, it is these mental states, presumably 
conscious beliefs, that explain her action, not her desire. On this story the desire 
itself doesn’t seem to have any work to do in the explanation. Deliberation using 
the motivational premise involves a conscious belief that one wants something, 
but that is not the same thing as the actual desire which, if one has it, makes this 
belief true.
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This won’t be a problem as long as we consider Audi’s schema as representing 
the content of some theoretical reasoning about what I should do, whether you 
do this reasoning or I do it. In either case to say that this is theoretical reasoning 
is at least to say that no action or intention results (or, perhaps, is supposed to 
result), i.e. that the series of mental states of which these propositions are the 
content simply ends with a conscious belief that I should phi. This belief is its 
“conclusion” not in the logical sense (of a proposition supported by other 
propositions that are premises) but in the sense of being the last state in the 
process. But at the same time this is a process of reasoning. So the content of 
this final belief, the proposition believed, is also intended to be a conclusion, in 
the logical sense, of the propositions believed to support it. Reasoning of this 
sort can go wrong in at least two distinct ways: either one or more of the 
premises used in the reasoning might be false, or the structure of reasoning 
itself might be fallacious. I will argue that the structure of reasoning 
represented in Audi’s schema is indeed fallacious, but let’s set that issue aside 
here. We are really interested in any reasoning that uses what Audi calls the 
motivational premise, whether the subsequent reasoning goes as Audi describes 
it or in some other way.
Suppose you are the one doing the reasoning, on my behalf, and the question on 
which you are advising me is the question of whether I should get on the bus 
that has just pulled up at the bus stop at which we are waiting. You engage in 
some theoretical deliberation about what I should do. “Well, you want to go to 
campus,” you say. “And since this bus goes right there, getting on this bus will 
get you to campus. So you should get on this bus.” Clearly you could be 
mistaken in either of the two premises you use in your reasoning here. Perhaps 
this bus doesn’t actually go to  (p.312) campus. Or perhaps I don’t really want 
to go there. If you are wrong about either of these things, then however good the 
form of reasoning you are using, your premises don’t support the conclusion that 
I should get on this bus. And since we are speaking of theoretical reasoning here 
(about what I should do) and since either of us could do this reasoning, I might 
do the same reasoning and, like you, make either of these two mistakes. Of 
course I am less likely than you to be misinformed about what I want. But that 
doesn’t mean I am infallible.13 In any case, though, desires are different mental 
states than beliefs. And reasoning about how to get what I want involves the 
conscious belief that I want phi, not the actual desire for phi. So I might have the 
belief without the desire.
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None of this is problematic as long as we think of ourselves, either you or me, as 
doing theoretical reasoning about what I should do. As with any reasoning, such 
reasoning can go wrong. If it is based on false premises, then there is no 
assurance that the judgment arrived at, that I should get on this bus, is correct. 
This possibility is a feature of any reasoning. The puzzle here is created when I 
act on my deliberation. If the motivational premise I use in deliberation is false, 
the desire referred to in that premise won’t exist. So if I act, and don’t merely 
judge, on the basis of this reasoning, then my (non-existent) desire can have no 
role in explaining my action. So, contrary to what we first thought, Audi’s 
schema could not be used to include the desire described in the motivational 
premise in the explanation of the action done on the basis of the deliberation 
described in this schema. If I act “on the basis” of my deliberation, then it 
doesn’t matter whether the desire described in the motivational premise is there 
or not. I would reason, and act, the same way in either case. This is the first 
puzzle.
Here is a second one: Suppose that I do in fact use this same reasoning as 
practical deliberation and on the basis of this reasoning I get on the bus. Since 
this reasoning has as its motivational premise “I want to go to campus,” doesn’t 
it simply follow that I wanted to go to campus? That is what I would say if 
someone asks me why I was getting on the bus, because that is what I would 
believe. Plus, my action was clearly intentional. It therefore had a purpose. And 
it was done on the basis of my deliberation, deliberation that took as its main 
premise my thought that I wanted to go to campus. So what other possible goal 
could my action have? If someone acts on the basis of a conscious belief that the 
goal of her action was phi, then surely the goal of her action was phi.
So, contrary to what the first puzzle indicated, when we consider this same piece 
of reasoning as practical deliberation on which the agent acts,  (p.313) it is 
hard to see how the motivational premise could possibly be false. In sharp 
contrast to theoretical reasoning involving the motivational premise, this 
premise is made true, apparently, when the person doing the deliberation acts on 
the basis of that very premise. So we have two puzzles here. My belief, that I 
want to go to campus, could of course be false when you or I use it to try to 
figure out what I should do. But even when that premise is false you or I, the 
ones doing the reasoning, might still come to believe, on the basis of this 
reasoning, that I should go to campus. And similarly, when the motivational 
premise is false, my action on the basis of the reasoning in which it is contained 
doesn’t require the existence of the desire to which it refers. But at the same 
time this belief looks like it cannot possibly be false if I act on it. It is made true 
by the very fact that I acted on it. How can this be?
Deliberation and Desire
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So far as I can tell neither of these puzzles is explained by the fact that Audi’s 
schema, when considered as the content of theoretical reasoning to the 
conclusion that “I should phi,” is fallacious, which it seems to be. How could the 
mere fact that I have some goal, just by itself, make it the case that I should do 
what I can to achieve that goal? What if this goal is evil or just wacky? It seems 
true that it is irrational not to try to achieve goals you have. But Audi’s schema 
says that if you have some goal it follows that you should try to achieve it. That 
would mean that merely having the goal gives you a reason to try to achieve it. 
But that is a different and more problematic claim. As John Broome and others 
have pointed out, unless we consider the claim that we “should avoid 
irrationality” here to use a “should” of “wide scope,” we will find ourselves with 
a “bootstrapping” problem that lets absolutely any goal I have give me a reason 
to work toward achieving it, no matter how crazy or evil that goal is.14
To avoid that implausible result we will need to say that the “should” conclusion 
here is “not detachable” in the way Audi’s schema seems to allow, that is, that it 
is not the case that merely having a goal supports a conclusion to the effect that 
I should do what I can to achieve it, or that I have reason to try to achieve it. 
What is true, according to Broome, is not that if I want phi and see that my A-ing 
would contribute to realizing phi, I should A. Rather we should take the “should” 
here as being of wide scope and say that I should make it the case that if I want 
phi and see that my A-ing would contribute to realizing phi, I perform act A. So I 
can do what I should either by doing A or by abandoning my desire for phi. So if 
Broome is right, this shows, or at least strongly argues, that Audi’s schema, 
when considered as the content of theoretical reasoning that ends in a 
proposition about what I should do, is not good reasoning.15
 (p.314) But it is not obvious that the fallaciousness of Audi’s schema precludes 
use of its motivational premise. This premise might still be used in some 
perfectly valid reasoning even if the particular schema in which Audi proposes to 
use it is not valid. To the question of the role of her desire in the explanation of 
an action in which the agent acts on the basis of her deliberation, the 
motivational premise seems a natural answer since it registers the recognition 
on the part of the agent that she has the desire in question. And it is hard to see 
how someone could include a desire in her deliberation unless she realizes she 
has it. This fact is simply not touched by the fallaciousness of the schema in 
which Audi uses it. Still, as we have seen, this motivational premise, however it 
is used, gives rise to the two apparently conflicting puzzles just described.
4. Two Forms of Practical Reasoning
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We can see what is happening here if we notice that two different sorts of 
“reasoning about what to do” get included under the generic label “practical 
reasoning.” Suppose I am working in my office when a friend texts me that she is 
on her way to the coffee house and I should join her. When she texts, though, I 
am trying to meet a deadline. So it is not a good time for me to stop for coffee. 
Some practical deliberation seems called for, weighing the potential enjoyment 
of meeting my friend for coffee against the need to finish my project. 
Presumably both are things I want to do, in the sense of “being in favor of” each. 
And of course I might just ask myself which I like more, that is, which I “want” to 
do more in the “favoring” sense. But I might also think each of these things has 
something to be said for it (i.e. has some value in itself), independently of my 
liking it or being in favor of it. So I might base my deliberation on these 
perceived values, the enjoyment of seeing my friend for coffee and the value of 
finishing my project. And of course I might weigh how much I liked either of 
these activities against how valuable I thought they were. But these bases for 
deliberation will be different from that envisioned in Audi’s schema since my 
reasoning here will not involve anything analogous to his motivational premise, 
which we decided was the agent’s thought that she has some goal. Now I am 
trying to decide whether to adopt a new goal, meeting my friend for coffee. So, 
let’s suppose I reason from judgments about the value of working versus the 
value of having coffee with my friend and come to a conclusion that I should 
meet my friend for coffee.
 (p.315) I then form the intention to do that. That means that a second sort of 
reasoning is now called for, how to actually carry out that intention. This one 
looks a lot like Audi’s schema.
I want to meet my friend for coffee.
I can do that by walking north across campus to the coffee house.
So I’ll walk north.
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If this really were just an instance of Audi’s schema, then the same two puzzles 
would of course arise here as well. But this is not the same as Audi’s schema. In 
Audi’s schema the conclusion was a belief or “judgment” (that “I should do A”), 
and the motivational premise (“I want phi”) appeared in my practical 
deliberation as a conscious belief that I had a certain goal or aim, just as it did in 
my (or your) analogous theoretical deliberation. One puzzle that this view raised 
is that the reasoning on which my action was based could apparently proceed 
and lead to my action, even if the conscious beliefs that it involved were false, 
including my belief that I want phi, i.e., that I have that goal. But the analogous 
mental state in my coffee reasoning above, with the content “I want to meet my 
friend for coffee,” is not a conscious belief about what I want and in fact could 
not be. It is the expression of my intention to meet my friend for coffee. And 
since intentions are neither true nor false, the possibility that I might base my 
action on a false belief does not arise.16
Why do I think this premise must be an expression of my intention, and how can 
an intention itself, as opposed to a conscious belief on my part that I have this 
intention, be part of my reasoning? Though it may be misleading to call what I 
am doing “deliberation,” I think it has to be true that we can and do reason 
about what to do on the basis of our own intentions.17 Think about any complex 
action governed by some intention, e.g. walking across campus to join my friend 
for coffee. The coffee house is roughly two blocks away. To get there I need to 
get up from my desk, leave my office, cross a street, walk north to the far end of 
the central green, turn right onto another street, etc. And of course each of 
these things involves numerous “smaller” actions. Leaving my office, for 
instance, involves walking around my desk and over to my office door. I do all 
these things with the intention of meeting my friend for coffee.
Through all this I am perfectly aware that I am going to join my friend for coffee. 
So of course I believe that this is what I am doing. The various things I am doing 
together constitute going to join my friend for coffee. But turning left at a 
particular point, for instance, is not done as a result of  (p.316) deliberation 
“based on my belief” that I want to meet my friend for coffee. Putting it that way 
leaves open the possibility that my belief could be false, and as we have seen it 
is hard to make sense of that thought. Rather all these things constitute
“meeting my friend for coffee” because they are part of what I realize is involved 
in carrying out my intention.
Deliberation and Desire
Page 13 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York 
Public Library; date: 03 April 2019
Here is a way of seeing the difference. Suppose that you, knowing the way to the 
coffee house better than I do, were to walk along with me and offer your advice 
as to how I should proceed at each point, where I should turn left, etc. Your 
reasoning would be based on your beliefs about how to get to the coffee house, 
plus your belief that I wanted to join my friend for coffee, that that was my goal. 
And, as was argued above, any of those beliefs might be mistaken, including 
your belief about what I want to do. In any case, though, you would engage in 
some theoretical reasoning, based on premises about what I want and how I can 
best get it, that concluded with a judgment about what I should do at each 
particular point in the journey, which you would then convey to me. But though 
of course I could utter the same words you utter and indeed form the same 
beliefs you do, and so engage in the same theoretical reasoning that you do, this 
cannot be how I myself actually perform the actions involved, forming an opinion 
about what I want and how I can get it and then giving myself advice as to what 
I should do. To say that was the way I performed the action of going to meet my 
friend for coffee would mean understanding “acting on an intention” as coming 
to believe I have the intention, figuring out how best to act on it, and then 
advising myself to so act, i.e. doing exactly what you would do if you were 
walking along with me. But that can’t be right. It would be as if the best I can do 
when trying to perform some action is to give myself advice about how to do it, 
in the way that you can give me such advice. But clearly this can’t be the whole 
story. Someone has to actually perform the action, not merely offer advice about 
how to perform it. And that someone is the agent. So we have to say that when I 
act on an intention it must be the intention itself that guides me, not merely my 
belief that I have this intention.
So this second sort of reasoning, though it looks like Audi’s schema, is actually 
quite different. In Audi’s schema the motivational premise was something I 
believed and used in my reasoning to come to a conclusion (i.e. a new belief) 
about what I should do. (The conclusion was the “judgment” that “I should do 
A.”) According to that schema I would be reasoning just as you would be in 
giving me advice. But when I actually act, it is my intention itself, not my belief 
that I have this intention, that enters my reasoning. So there is no question of 
my motivational premise being false.  (p.317) Intentions are neither true nor 
false. So, strictly speaking, my intention to join my friend for coffee, even if we 
say it contains a proposition, should not be thought of as containing a premise in 
the way premises are used in theoretical reasoning. It is not a belief about what 
I want. It is part of my understanding of what I am doing, or even part of the 
actual doing of it.18 Likewise, and for the same reason, the “conclusion” here is 
not my belief that I should do something. It too is part of the actual doing of it, 
perhaps a further, more specific intention, such as an intention to head north, or 
perhaps just a physical movement, actually walking.
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So perhaps we should not call what I am doing here “deliberation,” though it is 
certainly a form of reasoning. Paradigm examples of theoretical reasoning 
involve proceeding from thoughts containing propositions that have truth values 
to a conclusion that is supposed to be made likely or even entailed by the truth 
of those propositions.19 That is not what is happening when I am carrying out 
one of my intentions. In that case I am performing an action that involves the 
employment of some of my beliefs and the formation and execution of more 
specific intentions. But I am not forming judgments about these intentions, as 
might happen when deliberating about what I should do. When I perform some 
action, my beliefs and intentions will be employed in the control of my 
movements. So there will be lots of beliefs involved, about for example such 
things as how to get out of my office. And there will be lots of intentions 
involved, such as my intention to turn my office doorknob, which arises because 
I intend to leave my office and believe that requires opening my office door. And 
in virtue of all this it will be true that I want to leave my office and so want to 
turn my office doorknob. But employing my beliefs and intentions in this way 
when I act, though it involves this sort of “reasoning,” is not the same as 
deliberating, where I start with some claims and try to use them to support some 
conclusion. In the examples we have been using, the sentence “I want to meet 
my friend for coffee,” when used in actual deliberation, records the content of a 
belief and is true or false. But that same sentence, if it represents the expression 
of an intention on which I am acting, gives the purpose guiding my action. So it 
is neither true nor false.20
This suggests that the two puzzles to which Audi’s schema gives rise result from 
conflating these two forms of reasoning. Both puzzles came from trying to 
understand the role of desire in explaining an action done on the basis of 
deliberation as involving a conscious belief by the agent that she has the desire, 
combined with reasoning about how to satisfy it. If the agent then acts on the 
basis of this deliberation, it wouldn’t matter whether or not she had this desire. 
That was the first puzzle. And yet if she acted  (p.318) on the basis of her belief 
that she wanted phi, it would follow that she did want phi. That was the second 
puzzle.
If we understand Audi’s motivational premise as an expression of the agent’s 
intention involved in her action (and change the conclusion to an action, as was 
done in the coffee example), then, since intentions are not beliefs, there is no 
issue of possibly acting on the false belief that she has this desire. So the first 
puzzle doesn’t arise. And if there is no belief about what is wanted included in 
the agent’s reasoning, then there is no question of her making that belief true by 
acting on it. So neither puzzle arises.
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But we need to be careful here. Clearly there are two distinct processes: 
deliberation using beliefs that both the agent and anyone else might have and 
ending in a judgment about what the agent should do, and the reasoning 
involved in performing the action in question, reasoning that starts from the 
agent’s intention to do something and ends in the completion of that action. This 
second sort of reasoning, which is of course confined to the agent who has the 
intention in question, might be very complex and can extend over a long time, as 
would have been the case, for instance, had my intention to join my friend for 
coffee been formed a few days in advance,21 or if the action itself extended over 
a long time and involved lots of sub-actions.22 And one might perform the first, 
deliberative process without then engaging in the second one. Weakness of will, 
absent-mindedness, or even death might intervene.
But from the fact that we have these different processes and that they can come 
apart, does it follow that “when things go as intended, practical deliberation 
involves making up my mind twice,” as Gary Watson says?23 That seems to imply 
that after I have deliberated and concluded what I should do, there is a further 
issue on which I have to make up my mind and so a further decision to make 
(whether to do it). Of course there is a difference between deciding that I should 
do something and forming the intention to actually do it. But it would be a 
mistake to think we could have reasons for or against forming this intention to 
act that were distinct from the ones that bore on the question whether we 
should perform the act. How can that make sense? It would mean that I could 
have reasons for or against doing something that were not reasons for or against 
thinking I should do it. How could that be?
It seems clear that I can have reasons for doing the things I do intentionally. In 
figuring out what I should do, though, I am figuring out what reasons I have for 
doing the thing in question. So even though we can distinguish two different 
“processes,” deliberating about what I should do and actually forming the 
intention to do it, and each of these processes  (p.319) involves steps that are 
themselves intentional, these two processes still have a deep conceptual link. 
The reasons I am trying to evaluate in deliberating about whether I should do 
something just are the reasons that support the action that begins with an 
intention to do that thing. So even though forming the intention to perform an 
action is something I can do after deliberation leads me to conclude I should do 
that action, it is not something for which I could have reasons that were not also 
reasons to think I should do it. Someone who deliberates and comes to the 
conclusion that she should phi, but then thinks she needs some further reason to 
“make up her mind” for or against doing it, will find no further reasons because 
there are none left to find.
5. The Role of Desire in Deliberation
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This paper began with the question of how an agent’s desire, that is, what an 
agent wants, figures into the explanation of her action when this action is done 
on the basis of deliberation. Audi’s schema suggested an answer to this 
question, but the plausibility of that answer was only apparent. When an agent 
acts on the basis of her deliberation, no “desire” (in the “purpose” sense) of hers 
can be referred to or described in that deliberation. But it does not follow from 
this that what the agent wants does not figure into the explanation of actions 
done on the basis of deliberation or even that agents don’t sometimes deliberate 
about how to achieve what they want.24 The question is how to understand these 
things in light of the problem with Audi’s motivational premise that we have 
been discussing.
I suggest:
It is a sufficient condition for acting for a reason that one acts on the basis of 
some deliberation, whatever its content.
That seems plausible if we assume that the purpose or goal of an action just is 
(the same thing as) the agent’s reason for performing the action. Under this 
assumption the suggestion here makes sense of the claim that the fact that an 
agent acted on the basis of deliberation about how to achieve phi entails that she 
wanted phi. If she acted on the basis of some deliberation, then her purpose in 
acting was given in the content of that deliberation and so that is what she 
wanted. On this view the mistake involved in Audi’s schema would be to 
understand “acting on the basis of deliberation about how to achieve phi” as 
meaning that one’s deliberation  (p.320) included, or even could include, the 
conscious belief “I want phi” (in the “purpose” sense).
How are we to understand deliberation on this suggested view? It is worth 
remembering that even had we accepted the idea that Audi’s motivational 
premise is a conscious belief that forms the basis of some deliberation, it is not 
plausible that desires are the basis of all deliberation. Some deliberation surely 
proceeds from the agent’s evaluation of what would be good or worthwhile or 
just something the agent would like (and so “wanted” in that sense). So even if 
someone were to hold that some deliberation proceeded from Audi’s 
motivational premise about the agent’s goal, considered as the content of a 
conscious belief, she would still have to make sense of deliberation where that 
was not the case. Of course one could claim that in such cases no desire figured 
into the explanation of the action done on the basis of that deliberation. But that 
would leave the problem of explaining away the plausibility of the claim that if I 
act on the basis of deliberation about how to achieve phi it follows that I want 
phi.
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So the straightforward thing to do is to accept the suggestion above. When I 
deliberate from the thought that, for example, “It would be a good thing if phi” 
and conclude that “I should A,” and then perform act A on this basis, that just is
having phi as my goal. Likewise, deliberation might proceed from the thought 
that “Phi would be in my interest” or “I would enjoy phi” or even that “I want 
phi” (in the “favoring” sense). If I act on the basis of deliberation that starts from 
one of these thoughts, it follows that I want phi in the “purpose” sense of 
“want.” None of these premises would be subject to the objection made to using 
“I want phi” (in the “purpose” sense) in deliberation because acting on the basis 
of the thought that “It would be a good thing if phi,” for instance, though it 
entails that I want phi, does not entail that phi would be a good thing. I could 
just be mistaken about that, just as I could be mistaken in thinking that phi 
would be in my interest or that I would enjoy phi or even that I favor phi. For a 
similar reason, no bootstrapping would occur if my deliberation was based on 
the thought that phi would be a good thing or in my interest. Bootstrapping 
would result if I could simply give myself a reason to do something by intending 
to do it. But if deliberation works on the basis of one’s beliefs about what would 
be good or enjoyable or the like, then since one can be wrong about these 
things, no bootstrapping results.
Beyond the fact that the reasoning it described was fallacious, there were two 
issues with the attempt to put a desire into deliberation in the way Audi’s 
schema proposed. Since the desire was merely referred to in the motivational 
premise, deliberation could proceed even if the agent’s  (p.321) belief that she 
had this desire proved false. So it would seem that if she acted on the basis of 
her deliberation, then it was her belief that she had this desire, rather than the 
desire itself, that played the essential role in explaining her action. On the other 
hand, since it follows from the fact that I acted with the aim of getting phi that I 
wanted phi, if I deliberate using Audi’s motivational premise and then act on the 
basis of this deliberation, then it follows that I wanted phi and thus this 
motivational premise couldn’t be false. (It is perhaps worth repeating that all 
this applies to “wanting” in the “purpose” sense. That is the only kind of wanting 
that actually serves to explain action.)
I have argued that while it is plausible that deliberation on which an agent acts 
is a source of goals or purposes, that is of what she wants in the purposive 
sense, I have also argued that it is very problematic to think that reference to 
such a desire appears in practical deliberation itself. So the answer to the 
question with which we started, about where what the agent wants figures into 
the explanation of actions when the agent acts on the basis of her deliberation, 
must be this. The purpose an agent has, that is, what she wants in the purposive 
sense, does indeed explain actions in which the agent acts on the basis of her 
deliberation, but not because such wants are referred to or described in the 
agent’s reasoning. They are constituted by the fact that the agent acted on the 
basis of that deliberation.25
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Notes
(1.) See Arpaly and Schroeder 2012.
(2.) This particular puzzle is at least in part created by the fact that desires are 
usually held to be propositional attitudes, i.e. to have propositional content. But 
it is not clear that this works for intentions, at least in those cases where the 
intention in question is guiding an action. See e.g. Lycan (2012). But this, as was 
said, is an issue on which this paper can remain neutral.
(3.) Talking only about “wants” allows me to remain neutral as to whether there 
are desires that have goals as their objects, i.e. in the way intentions do. It is 
hard to see how that could be since having a purpose seems to involve having an 
intention. See n17. In any case, nothing in this paper turns on deciding this 
issue. The argument of this paper at least suggests, however, that the two 
phenomena covered by “X wants Y” are just what are commonly referred to as 
desires and intentions.
(4.) At the risk of belaboring the point, I don’t mean here to deny the possibility 
that this “favoring” sort of desire can be analyzed further, e.g. into a 
counterfactual claim about what the agent would do under certain 
circumstances. My point is simply that this sort of case provides a perfectly 
acceptable use of “want” whether or not such a further analysis is possible.
(5.) Thanks to Jeff Jordan for this example.
(6.) Anscombe 1963: 68.
(7.) The agent’s reason is what in fact led the agent to act as she did, i.e. what 
some philosophers have called the “motivating reason” for the action.
(8.) See Nagel 1970: 29.
(9.) I was recently at a college graduation at which one of the student speakers 
(whose name I never got) admonished her fellow graduates by saying, “Every 
day, do something you don’t want to do.” In the “goal” sense of “want” it is not 
clear this is logically possible, but in the “liking” sense of course it is.
(10.) Putting it this way leaves open the question of what to call deliberation that 
ends in a belief that one should act in a certain way, since sentences of the form 
“X should do Y” can presumably be true and obviously are about whether one 
should do something. We will return to this issue below, but for clarity for the 
moment I will refer to the process that ends in a belief about what one should do 
as a form of “theoretical” reasoning.
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(11.) Audi 2006: 96.
(12.) So, with Döring and Eker (this volume), I would reject any strong version of 
the “guise of the good” thesis. As will be clear, however, acting on the basis of 
your evaluations is completely compatible with doing what you want.
(13.) Some are better than others at knowing their own wants, but anyone who 
remembers her own childhood can probably recall situations where her parents 
knew better than she did what she wanted.
(14.) See Broome 2005. The term bootstrapping comes from Bratman 1987. See 
also Dancy 2002.
(15.) There may still be a puzzle here, though. On Broome’s view it is irrational 
not to act on an intention one has and has not given up, just as it is irrational not 
to believe something that follows from a premise one has not rejected. But 
though it is possible to (irrationally) fail to believe something entailed by 
premises one fully accepts, it is not so clear that it is possible to fail to act on an 
intention one has (assuming one is aware of the relevant facts, not paralyzed, 
etc.). If I am not glued to the chair, am in control of my legs, etc., then doesn’t 
the fact that I don’t stand up show that I did not intend to do so?
(16.) Could we defend Audi’s original schema, or at least his original 
motivational premise, which I argued was a belief about the agent’s own desire, 
by saying here that in his schema the thought “I want phi” expresses a desire of 
the purposive sort (i.e., rather than, as I claim for this new schema, an 
intention)? One problem with this idea is that since desires can 
unproblematically conflict, it is hard to see how such a desire could lead to going 
to meet my friend. I also have a desire to stay in my office, after all. So there 
would be an exactly parallel motive, and deliberation, leading to my staying put. 
There cannot be such conflicting intentions. Could we perhaps say Audi’s 
premise expresses an “all-in” or “de toto” desire of the purposive sort? One 
might think that in any case it is hard to see much difference between the 
expression of an intention and an all-in expression of a desire for some purpose. 
So saying that the new premise “I want to meet my friend for coffee” expresses 
an all-in (purposive) “desire” would hardly be more than a change in 
terminology. But this would be worse than misleading because an intention 
involves a decision or commitment to pursue the goal in question, while a desire, 
even an all-in desire, does not. That is why desires can unproblematically 
conflict while one cannot knowingly have intentions that conflict. I can still 
decide not to pursue a desire, even my strongest one. But if I have an intention, 
the decision has already been made. (Thanks to Federico Lauria for raising this 
question.)
(17.) As has of course been argued by Michael Bratman (1987), as well as by 
many others. We will return to this issue below.
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(18.) This is another reason for not construing the premise here (“I want to meet 
my friend for coffee”) as the expression of any sort of desire.
(19.) See Davidson 2004.
(20.) I am in essence claiming here that my intention to join my friend for coffee 
constitutes what has sometimes been called an “intention-in-action,” roughly, the 
intention that constitutes the purpose of the action.
(21.) See Bratman (1987) and subsequent works.
(22.) Such actions have been discussed under the label “vague projects.” See 
Tenenbaum and Raffman 2012.
(23.) Watson 2003: 176.
(24.) In the “purpose” sense, which is the relevant one. I hope it is clear by this 
point that deliberation that ends in a judgment about what I should do made on 
the basis of what one wants in the “liking” or “in favor of” sense is no more 
problematic than anything else one might take as supporting some action. I 
might try to figure out what I should do based on what I like (want), what is 
morally required, what is in my interest, or anything else that seems relevant to 
this question.
(25.) Very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper came from 
members of the conference on the nature of desire at the University of Geneva 
in June 2012: Daniel Friedrich, Alex Gregory, Federico Lauria, Ronald DeSousa, 
Graham Oddie, Peter Railton, Tim Schroeder, and David Wall. A later version got 
a lot of help during a faculty seminar from several of my colleagues at Delaware: 
Jeff Jordan, Joel Pust, Kai Draper, Richard Hanley, Jeremy Cushing, Kate Rogers, 
Mark Greene, Tom Powers, Alan Fox, and Seth Shabo. The present version was 
greatly improved by the editorial comments of Federico Lauria and Julien 
Deonna.
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(2.) This particular puzzle is at least in part created by the fact that desires are 
usually held to be propositional attitudes, i.e. to have propositional content. But 
it is not clear that this works for intentions, at least in those cases where the 
intention in question is guiding an action. See e.g. Lycan (2012). But this, as was 
said, is an issue on which this paper can remain neutral.
(3.) Talking only about “wants” allows me to remain neutral as to whether there 
are desires that have goals as their objects, i.e. in the way intentions do. It is 
hard to see how that could be since having a purpose seems to involve having an 
intention. See n17. In any case, nothing in this paper turns on deciding this 
issue. The argument of this paper at least suggests, however, that the two 
phenomena covered by “X wants Y” are just what are commonly referred to as 
desires and intentions.
(4.) At the risk of belaboring the point, I don’t mean here to deny the possibility 
that this “favoring” sort of desire can be analyzed further, e.g. into a 
counterfactual claim about what the agent would do under certain 
circumstances. My point is simply that this sort of case provides a perfectly 
acceptable use of “want” whether or not such a further analysis is possible.
(5.) Thanks to Jeff Jordan for this example.
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(whose name I never got) admonished her fellow graduates by saying, “Every 
day, do something you don’t want to do.” In the “goal” sense of “want” it is not 
clear this is logically possible, but in the “liking” sense of course it is.
(10.) Putting it this way leaves open the question of what to call deliberation that 
ends in a belief that one should act in a certain way, since sentences of the form 
“X should do Y” can presumably be true and obviously are about whether one 
should do something. We will return to this issue below, but for clarity for the 
moment I will refer to the process that ends in a belief about what one should do 
as a form of “theoretical” reasoning.
(11.) Audi 2006: 96.
(12.) So, with Döring and Eker (this volume), I would reject any strong version of 
the “guise of the good” thesis. As will be clear, however, acting on the basis of 
your evaluations is completely compatible with doing what you want.
(13.) Some are better than others at knowing their own wants, but anyone who 
remembers her own childhood can probably recall situations where her parents 
knew better than she did what she wanted.
(14.) See Broome 2005. The term bootstrapping comes from Bratman 1987. See 
also Dancy 2002.
(15.) There may still be a puzzle here, though. On Broome’s view it is irrational 
not to act on an intention one has and has not given up, just as it is irrational not 
to believe something that follows from a premise one has not rejected. But 
though it is possible to (irrationally) fail to believe something entailed by 
premises one fully accepts, it is not so clear that it is possible to fail to act on an 
intention one has (assuming one is aware of the relevant facts, not paralyzed, 
etc.). If I am not glued to the chair, am in control of my legs, etc., then doesn’t 
the fact that I don’t stand up show that I did not intend to do so?
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(16.) Could we defend Audi’s original schema, or at least his original 
motivational premise, which I argued was a belief about the agent’s own desire, 
by saying here that in his schema the thought “I want phi” expresses a desire of 
the purposive sort (i.e., rather than, as I claim for this new schema, an 
intention)? One problem with this idea is that since desires can 
unproblematically conflict, it is hard to see how such a desire could lead to going 
to meet my friend. I also have a desire to stay in my office, after all. So there 
would be an exactly parallel motive, and deliberation, leading to my staying put. 
There cannot be such conflicting intentions. Could we perhaps say Audi’s 
premise expresses an “all-in” or “de toto” desire of the purposive sort? One 
might think that in any case it is hard to see much difference between the 
expression of an intention and an all-in expression of a desire for some purpose. 
So saying that the new premise “I want to meet my friend for coffee” expresses 
an all-in (purposive) “desire” would hardly be more than a change in 
terminology. But this would be worse than misleading because an intention 
involves a decision or commitment to pursue the goal in question, while a desire, 
even an all-in desire, does not. That is why desires can unproblematically 
conflict while one cannot knowingly have intentions that conflict. I can still 
decide not to pursue a desire, even my strongest one. But if I have an intention, 
the decision has already been made. (Thanks to Federico Lauria for raising this 
question.)
(17.) As has of course been argued by Michael Bratman (1987), as well as by 
many others. We will return to this issue below.
(18.) This is another reason for not construing the premise here (“I want to meet 
my friend for coffee”) as the expression of any sort of desire.
(19.) See Davidson 2004.
(20.) I am in essence claiming here that my intention to join my friend for coffee 
constitutes what has sometimes been called an “intention-in-action,” roughly, the 
intention that constitutes the purpose of the action.
(21.) See Bratman (1987) and subsequent works.
(22.) Such actions have been discussed under the label “vague projects.” See 
Tenenbaum and Raffman 2012.
(23.) Watson 2003: 176.
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(24.) In the “purpose” sense, which is the relevant one. I hope it is clear by this 
point that deliberation that ends in a judgment about what I should do made on 
the basis of what one wants in the “liking” or “in favor of” sense is no more 
problematic than anything else one might take as supporting some action. I 
might try to figure out what I should do based on what I like (want), what is 
morally required, what is in my interest, or anything else that seems relevant to 
this question.
(25.) Very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper came from 
members of the conference on the nature of desire at the University of Geneva 
in June 2012: Daniel Friedrich, Alex Gregory, Federico Lauria, Ronald DeSousa, 
Graham Oddie, Peter Railton, Tim Schroeder, and David Wall. A later version got 
a lot of help during a faculty seminar from several of my colleagues at Delaware: 
Jeff Jordan, Joel Pust, Kai Draper, Richard Hanley, Jeremy Cushing, Kate Rogers, 
Mark Greene, Tom Powers, Alan Fox, and Seth Shabo. The present version was 
greatly improved by the editorial comments of Federico Lauria and Julien 
Deonna.
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It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one’s mental states is 
highly epistemically privileged. Often this is thought to be explained by 
introspective knowledge’s directness; we somehow know our mental states 
“immediately,” without inference from distinct states. This chapter argues that if 
one holds this view concerning privilege and directness about introspective 
knowledge of desire, then desires cannot be normative or evaluative judgments, 
nor can they entirely consist in appearances of value. Since motivation is one of 
the things we pay attention to in introspecting our desires, this implies that 
motivation is not an entirely separate state from the desire.
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AT LEAST SOMETIMES, I know what I want. And at least sometimes, I know 
what I want in a way that seems quite different from how I know what you want
—I can introspect my desires. To know what you want, I observe how you behave 
and infer your desires from that information. In general, to know another’s mind, 
I need to infer her mental states from her behavior. In order to know whether or 
not my students are enjoying class, I have to look to see if they seem interested 
or bored, if they are paying attention or checking their email on their phones, 
and if they are participating eagerly or are half asleep. But in my own case, I 
know right now that I want another cup of coffee, that I want to qualify for the 
Boston Marathon, and that I want to build a house someday. I don’t usually need 
to wait to observe myself going over to the espresso machine, or to see myself 
looking up qualifying times, or wait to see myself doodling floor plans in my 
notebook. I know these desires before I make any of these observations.1 Yet 
how do I do this?
One might think that this question will be easy to answer once we know what 
desires are. Surely introspecting a desire just involves looking for whether you 
have that desire! If desires are evaluative beliefs, then wouldn’t introspection of 
desire just involve looking for whether you have a particular evaluative belief? If 
they are beliefs about normative reasons, then you’d look for those. If they are 
appearances of value, then you’d introspect by working out what appears 
valuable to you. And so on. And, for similar reasons, it might seem like looking to 
the ways in which we make introspective judgments about desire could give us 
very good reason for accepting a particular view of the nature of desire. If we 
introspect by  (p.326) judging what is valuable, then desires might just be 
beliefs about value. And so on.
These thoughts suggest that there is an extremely close match between desire’s 
metaphysics and epistemology. Yet there isn’t always such a close match 
between metaphysics and epistemology for just any kind of subject matter. Of 
course, if the subject matter is something that we can know about, it has to be 
something that we are able to know about, through some method or other. But 
often all this requires is that the object of knowledge is involved in a causal 
chain that includes something that we can experience and that we can appeal to 
as evidence, together with beliefs about why what we observe counts as 
evidence.
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If we know about something only via its causal interaction with other things in 
the world and with our experiences, then the epistemic method used need not 
reveal all that much about the nature of the thing, and the nature of the thing 
need not tell us all that much about the way we know about it. For example, you 
might know that a solution is acidic by observing that it turns blue litmus red, 
yet it is not as if the redness that you observe reveals the nature of the acid. 
While the disposition to turn blue litmus red may be part of the nature of acid, 
the redness of the paper—the sign of the presence of acid—does not mirror 
anything about the essential nature of the acid. If introspection were like this, 
then we might introspect our desires via attending to signs that are quite 
different from what desires really are. If, say, we knew about desire by attending 
to a chill that the desire causes in the left knee whenever we think about its 
object, this would show us only that desire is the kind of thing that causes chills 
in the left knee; it would not show that desire is, by its nature, chilly and located 
in the left knee.
It is generally thought that introspection cannot be like this. First, introspective 
knowledge is thought to be especially epistemically privileged in relation to our 
knowledge of other minds or the rest of the external world. Our knowledge of 
our own minds is more secure, in some sense, than our knowledge of the world 
outside our mind.2 To account for this epistemic privilege, we should prefer a 
view of the introspective method as sensitive to the nature of the mental state 
introspected rather than one that does so by detecting something distinct from 
that state.3 Second, introspection seems not to involve inference from evidence. 
While we might often find out about something in the external world by inferring 
its existence from something distinct from that thing, as we do when we infer 
the existence of others’ mental states from their behavior, this does not seem to 
happen with introspective knowledge of our own minds.4 We take the existence 
of smoke as evidence of fire; we infer from the existence of smoke that there  (p.
327) is fire. But this kind of inferential reasoning doesn’t seem to be present 
when we introspect.5
I will argue that a theory of the nature of desire that claims that desire is a kind 
of belief cannot take account of these features of desire introspection, because it 
does not accurately account for our actual introspective judgments and so must 
claim that our introspective judgments about our desires are systematically 
mistaken. Neither could desire consist only in appearances of value; such an 
account would have the consequence that we often introspect our desires 
indirectly, by looking to something distinct from desire: our feelings of 
motivation.
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To account for our actual introspective judgments, we need an account of 
introspection that includes attention to motivation. Thus if introspection is 
privileged because of its directness, then desire at least partially consists of a 
motivational component. I should note, however, that I am not arguing for this 
account of epistemic privilege in introspection. And so while I do think that 
desires are themselves motivational—it is not just that desires produce
motivation, although they do produce motivated action—I am not arguing 
directly for this here. My purpose instead is to highlight a tension between the 
separation of motivation from desire and a popular view of the privileged nature 
of introspection. I aim to call attention to the way in which awareness of 
motivation figures in introspection and also to possible relationships between 
the epistemology and metaphysics of desire.
The Distinctive Nature of Introspection
Discussions of introspection usually start by pointing to the special features of 
introspection: its epistemic distinctiveness, privilege, and especially first-
personal nature. Whatever knowledge others have of your mental states, it 
seems to be through a quite different method. Furthermore, your knowledge of 
your own mental states is thought to be better than others’ knowledge of these 
states, and it is also thought that you can be more certain of the deliverances of 
introspection than of your senses. Moreover you, and only you, can introspect 
your own mental states.
Following Alex Byrne (2005), we can distinguish the claim that introspection 
involves an epistemically distinctive method6 and the claim that introspection is 
particularly epistemically privileged. One way in which first-personal 
introspective knowledge seems to involve an epistemically distinctive method, 
relative to our third-personal knowledge of others’ mental states, is that such 
third-personal knowledge involves reasoning from  (p.328) evidence for the 
existence of those mental states, whereas first-personal introspective knowledge 
seems not to. When I form the belief that you are angry, in the usual case, it is 
because I see how you act—perhaps because I see your clenched jaw and hear 
your raised voice—and from that I work out that you’re angry. Such inference 
may, of course, be very swift (it may have to be, depending on the degree of your 
anger and how it is directed). And although on rare occasions I might use similar 
reasoning in my own case (Goodness, I’m clenching my fist and yelling—I must 
be angry. Calm down), I usually know I’m angry in quite a different way, which 
doesn’t seem to rely on this sort of evidence. Introspective knowledge is thought 
to have immediate justification, in the sense that the justification for an 
introspective belief doesn’t depend on the justification for any other belief.7 On 
the other hand, the justification of beliefs reached by reasoning from evidence 
depends in part on how justified your evidential beliefs are.
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The privileged nature of introspection is generally taken to be a desideratum for 
a theory of introspection.8 If your account of how introspection works isn’t able 
to explain why introspective knowledge is so privileged, then so much the worse 
for your account. For example, one historically popular explanation of the 
difference between introspective and non-introspective knowledge was that we 
each have a special mechanism for finding out about our own mental states; 
perhaps we use something like an inner eye, or a kind of internal scanner, to 
introspect.9 But this kind of account fails to explain privilege; a mechanism like 
an inner eye or internal scanner can be more or less reliable, so it does not 
explain why your introspective knowledge of your own mind is epistemically 
better off than your knowledge of other minds and the rest of the external world. 
If your “inner eye” is blind, or even just shortsighted, or if your internal scanner 
is malfunctioning, then introspection would not be privileged relative to other 
kinds of knowledge.10
If we assume that introspection is highly privileged, we can also note that if a 
theory of the nature of an introspectable mental state would have the 
consequence that our introspective judgments about that state are 
systematically mistaken, so much the worse for that theory. In the following 
section, I will argue that this assumption of privilege means that desire cannot 
be belief-like.
Desires as Beliefs
One common version of the view that desires are beliefs holds that desires are 
evaluative beliefs. We might motivate such a view as follows: If,  (p.329) for 
example, Jo wants to live in Philadelphia, it would be very odd if Jo doesn’t see 
anything good about living in Philadelphia. So, in desiring to live there, Jo must 
believe that there is something good about living in Philadelphia. Moreover, 
desires are states that rationalize intentional action. What could make Jo’s 
moving to Philadelphia understandable as a rational action? Well, a belief that 
moving there would be good or valuable.11 So, desires are evaluative beliefs. 
Alternatively, we might hold the view that desire is a normative belief—perhaps a 
belief that the content of the desire ought to be the case, or that you have a 
reason to bring about the content of the desire.12
However, it is not news that our beliefs about goodness, reasons, and value 
appear to fail to match up with our desires. This experience of weakness of will 
is all too commonplace. We can believe that something would be good, or 
valuable, or that there is good reason to do it, but in the same breath say “But I 
don’t want to.” I might judge that exercising is a good thing to do, that it is 
valuable, or that I have reason to do it, yet recognize that I do not want to do it. 
Moreover, we can usually tell from the first-person perspective that we’re being 
weak-willed. In these kinds of cases, there is a mismatch between our judgments 
of value, or normative reasons, or goodness, and our introspective judgments 
about our desires.13
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Given the ubiquity of this kind of experience, these kinds of cases are no 
surprise to the desire-as-belief theorist. But they do need to be explained away. 
Perhaps when I judge that exercising is something I have reason to do but also 
judge that I don’t want to do it, I really do have the desire—I simply lack the 
corresponding motivation.14 Now, it is plausible that the reason I judge in cases 
of weak will that I don’t have a corresponding desire is that I just don’t feel the 
right kind of motivation. This lack of motivation is something that is apparent to 
me from the first-person perspective; I can tell through introspection that I’m 
not motivated to get up off the couch. I don’t have to wait to observe myself 
failing to go and lace up my running shoes to know that I don’t want to exercise. 
Detecting motivation, or lack thereof, is at least sometimes part of making a 
first-personal judgment about whether or not you want something.
While this kind of explanation allows that desires are evaluative or normative 
beliefs even though we have these apparent cases of weakness of will, it does so 
at the cost of the directness and privilege of desire introspection. If desires 
really are just beliefs about value, or goodness, or reasons for action, then we 
must be systematically mistaken in judging in these cases of apparent weakness 
of will that we don’t have the relevant desire.15
 (p.330) Not only can you believe that something is valuable and yet judge 
introspectively that you don’t want it; you can also believe that something is not 
particularly valuable, yet introspectively judge that you strongly desire it.16 I 
might really, really want to stay in bed all morning; however, I get out of bed, 
despite this desire, because I judge that it really isn’t a good idea to laze around 
for several more hours. Similar things can be said for any of the versions of the 
desire-as-belief theory. The reasons I have for staying in bed are much weaker 
than the desire to stay in bed feels, and I have to fight against this strong desire 
to be lazy. Now, the desire-as-belief theorist might claim that, despite 
appearances, this is not a case where I have a strong desire to stay in bed; what 
is strong is only the motivation to stay in bed. In putting forward this 
explanation, the desire-as-belief theorist can reject the idea that the judgment of 
strength of reasons comes apart from the strength of the desire in this kind of 
case. Yet once again, this move has the consequence that introspection cannot 
be privileged in the way often assumed. My introspective experience would then 
misrepresent the state of my desires. I judge, through introspection, that I have 
a strong desire to stay in bed, but if desires are these types of belief, I am just 
wrong: my desire is weak, and I am only fighting against my motivation, not my 
desire.
So desire cannot be a belief about goodness, or value, or reasons for action, if 
we are to hold on to the direct, privileged nature of introspection. The desire-as-
belief theorist must claim that we are systematically mistaken about our desires 
and, moreover, that we make judgments about our desires on the basis of 
motivational states that are distinct from the desires themselves.
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Desires as Appearances
Once we notice that desire appears not to line up with our evaluative or 
normative beliefs, we might be tempted to shift to a view on which desires are 
evaluative appearances.17 In cases of weak will, you judge something to be 
valuable although it does not appear to you to be valuable or good. So you can 
judge that something is valuable or good but fail to desire it. Such a view allows 
that your introspective judgments in cases of weakness of will are correct: you 
correctly attribute a lack of desire. While you might believe that exercise, for 
example, is valuable, it does not appear to you to be so. This view also allows for 
space between our evaluative beliefs and our introspective judgments about 
desire in the other direction. You can  (p.331) take your value appearances to 
be value illusions; something might appear to you to be valuable although you do 
not judge it to be. Another glass of wine might appear to you to be a very good 
idea, while at the same time you might believe that it would not be such a good 
idea at all.
However, while this view fares better than the various desire-as-belief views in 
terms of matching up with our actual introspective judgments,18 note again that 
in self-attributing desire we often pay attention to feelings of motivation. When I 
judge that I really want another glass of wine even though I believe doing so 
would be a terrible idea, having another glass of wine might appear to me to be 
a good. But my introspective judgments aren’t based just on such appearances; I 
also feel drawn to the wine, and I might feel that I’m about to begin to initiate 
the action of reaching for the bottle, even if, in the end, I stop myself from doing 
so. Such feelings are feelings of motivation rather than just evaluative 
appearances.19
If desires are value appearances, then even if our introspective judgments 
concerning desire are always in fact correct, they are still misleading in another 
sense: the method by which we come to these beliefs involves attending to 
something assumed to be distinct from the desire itself. But yet in feeling 
motivated—in feeling drawn to action—it seems like we are experiencing the 
desire itself, and not just mere effects of the desire. The action, of course, is an 
effect of the desire; what we experience in feeling motivation is not the 
performance of the appropriate action.20 Instead, it is the disposition we have 
toward acting, whether or not we in fact end up acting on it.
But Is Desire Introspection Really Privileged in This Way?
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Given my arguments, we have a choice to make: either desire introspection is 
systematically mistaken, or desires are neither evaluative beliefs, nor normative 
beliefs, nor appearances of value. I have argued that we ought to conclude that 
desires are not identical to these beliefs or appearances. But perhaps we ought 
to take the other option. Perhaps the assumption that we began with was 
mistaken; maybe introspection, when applied to desire, isn’t all that 
epistemically privileged. After all, don’t we also find cases where we think at 
some time that we want something, only to realize later that we don’t, or that we 
don’t want it as much as we originally thought we did? We might also think that 
we really don’t want something, only to realize later that we wanted it all along; 
many romantic comedies are built on the plausibility of just this kind of  (p.332)
case. Maybe, even if the assumption of privilege is plausible for belief 
introspection (where those beliefs are not of the kind that desire consists in), it 
just doesn’t hold for introspection of desire. When writing about introspection, 
philosophers have a habit of disregarding desire—as they often do when writing 
about the mind. The most influential arguments in this literature tend to 
consider just belief, with a secondary focus on pain or perceptual experience, as 
the central example of an introspectable mental state. Only recently has desire 
introspection started to gain some attention in its own right.21 Because of this, 
we might wonder whether these general claims made about introspection really 
carry over to desire. Perhaps we have direct epistemic access to our beliefs, but 
not to our desires.
My discussion here is complicated somewhat by the fact that I do not think a 
complete story about self-knowledge should involve the assumption that desire 
introspection is as highly privileged as is usually claimed; I am also not 
unsympathetic to views of self-knowledge that have a place for inference from 
evidence in introspection. Unfortunately, I am arguing to a claim that I take to 
be true—that desire is not separate from motivation—from a premise that I 
suspect might be false, at least as an account of how desire introspection works 
in general. So it remains that those who want to hold desire and motivation as 
separate may simply reject the premise that desire introspection is direct in 
these cases.
However, note that the kind of mistakes that might motivate a rejection of 
privilege for desire introspection are quite different from the ones that are 
required for a doxastic theory of desire to address my arguments, as these aren’t 
like the cases of weakness of will considered earlier. When we are weak-willed it 
seems all too obvious that we know what we want and that it doesn’t line up 
with our judgments about value or reasons. The kinds of cases that call into 
question the privileged nature of desire introspection are ones where we judge 
that our desires do line up with our judgments of value or reasons, but where we 
act in ways that suggest our self-attributions of desire are incorrect, either 
through direct action or through later retraction of that self-attribution.
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When the romantic comedy’s heroine realizes that she has wanted to be with her 
love interest all along, although she fervently denied that before, it isn’t that she 
realizes that she always believed this person was the one for her. If desires are
beliefs like this, then we will have to say that not only did she fail realize at the 
time that she desired her love interest but that she was also mistaken about her 
beliefs. She did in fact believe that this potential relationship was good for her, 
despite her protestations to the contrary.
 (p.333) In order to not attribute contradictory beliefs here, the desire-as-belief 
theorist will have to claim that the heroine believes that her love interest is not 
right for her (he is so infuriating, and her family wouldn’t approve), but also 
believes that he is right for her for other reasons. She is aware of the first belief 
and not the second, which is why she denies that she desires to be with her love 
interest. However, a better account of what is going on here is that this heroine 
has good introspective access to her evaluative beliefs but not to her desires. 
When she asks herself if getting together with her supposed love interest is a 
good idea, she thinks she is introspecting but is not. The deliverances of 
introspection are drowned out by her beliefs about value. When we theorize 
about our own mind, we often rely on an assumption that we are much more 
rational than we in fact are, so that we use our beliefs about what is good or 
what we have reason to do as a way to figure out what we want. We can also use 
these beliefs to try to control and strengthen recalcitrant desires to get them in 
line with our evaluative and normative beliefs, by focusing on these beliefs.
This kind of case shows, at the very least, that our folk-psychological theory 
about desire does not equate desire with normative or evaluative belief. 
Certainly, beliefs about value or reasons are not motivations, though they can 
motivate us. But they are also not desires.
Notes
(1.) Of course, not all one’s beliefs about one’s own mental states are formed 
through introspection; you might work out, for example, that you really want to 
become an accountant by noticing that taxation and finances are all you ever 
talk about. Such a method is third-personal—it is a method that someone else 
could use to work out what you want—while introspection seems to be 
distinctively first-personal.
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(2.) This kind of thought has a long philosophical tradition. See Alston (1971) for 
historical examples. Here are some more recent statements of this claim of 
epistemic privilege: “Philosophical tradition has it that one’s own mental life 
enjoys a privileged epistemic standing. I know my own states of mind 
immediately and with confidence. You may discover what I am thinking, of 
course, but you are liable to err in your assessment of my thoughts in ways that I 
cannot” (Heil 1988: 238). “At least sometimes, while you reflect on an occurrent 
thought, you know what it is that you are thinking with more certainty than 
anyone else could have regarding your thought. Moreover, at times you know 
this without using evidence about the so-called external world; and your 
knowledge does not depend on contingent fact about that world” (Gertler 2000: 
125). “Subjects have the ability to acquire beliefs about their own mental states 
in a way that makes them especially justified in holding those 
beliefs” (Fernández 2003: 352).
(3.) Hume, for example, seems to be claiming that introspection must reveal the 
nature of mental states when he says, “For since all actions and sensations of the 
mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every 
particular what they are, and be what they appear. Everything that enters the 
mind, being in reality as the perception, tis impossible anything should to feeling 
appear different” (quoted in Alston 1971: 224).
(4.) “[Independent of a Cartesian picture of self-awareness] there remains a set 
of basic asymmetries between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others… . 
The type of access we ordinary take ourselves to have [to our own mental states] 
is special in at least two basic ways. First, a person can know of his belief or 
feeling without observing his behavior, or indeed without appealing to evidence 
of any kind at all. And second, rather than this nonreliance on evidence casting 
doubt on the reliability of such reports, judgments made in this way seem to 
enjoy a particular epistemic privilege not accorded corresponding third-person 
judgments that do base themselves on evidence” (Moran 2001: 9–10).
(5.) See Carruthers (2011) and Lawlor (2009), however, for recent statements of 
views on which introspection involves reasoning from evidence. Carruthers 
argues that knowledge of mental states generally involves reasoning from 
evidence; Lawlor argues this particularly for some cases of desire, although she 
allows that perhaps not all first-personal knowledge of desire is like this. Byrne 
(2005, 2012) argues that introspection involves something akin to inference, but 
still quite distinct from reasoning from evidence.
(6.) Byrne (2005, 2012) calls this being epistemically “peculiar.”
(7.) Note that privilege isn’t explained simply by introspective knowledge being 
immediately justified; a belief could be immediately justified but not highly 
justified, or particularly secure.
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(8.) Introspection’s privileged nature is generally agreed upon, although it isn’t 
clear that everyone in the debate means the same thing in attributing this 
privilege. Sometimes this is taken to mean that beliefs formed by introspection 
are more likely to be true than other beliefs, or that they can’t be rationally 
doubted, or that they can’t be false, among other things. For a discussion of 
some of the different things that have been meant by “privilege” in these 
debates, see Alston (1971).
(9.) For more recent versions of this kind of view, see Armstrong 1968; Nichols 
and Stitch 2003.
(10.) This is not the only objection to inner-eye or inner-scanner views; for 
example, Brie Gertler (2000) argues that this kind of view can’t account for the 
essentially first-personal nature of introspection. This objection, and the 
objection discussed above, however, may simply mean that reliability is not the 
way to understand privilege. This is a problem for causal theories of 
introspection if reliability is the only way to understand the epistemic quality of 
the process.
(11.) Although see Döring and Eker this volume. They argue that beliefs about 
goodness or value don’t rationalize in the way they are assumed to, so a key 
motivation for the view that desires are beliefs does not hold. See Oddie, 
Friedrich, Schroeder (this volume) for other concerns about the thesis that 
desires are beliefs.
(12.) See Gregory this volume.
(13.) See Ashwell (2013) for arguments that these kinds of mismatch cause 
problems for so-called transparency accounts of desire introspection: that we 
introspect our desires by making evaluative judgments.
(14.) See Gregory’s contribution to this volume for this kind of explanation.
(15.) Moreover, if you’re particularly weak-willed, and vocal about it, then 
someone who is versed in this kind of theory of the nature of desire could have 
more reliable knowledge of your desires than you do. While it is not clear that 
introspection’s epistemic privilege involves such relative reliability, it would be 
odd for us to be less reliable than others in this way. Alternatively, we might be 
wrong that we believe that we have the relevant belief, but again this would 
have to be counted as an introspective mistake.
(16.) I think, in fact, that you can also believe that something is not valuable at 
all, while judging that you desire it. However, here I only need a less 
controversial case where the judged strength of your desire is out of line with 
how valuable you judge the object of desire to be.
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(17.) See, for example, Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005, this volume.
(18.) See Ashwell 2013.
(19.) I have not here considered the view that the relevant appearances are 
instead normative appearances (see Lauria, Massin this volume). If appearances 
of reasons for action do not involve motivations, then the same objection applies 
to these views. However, I find it plausible that appearances of reason for action 
do consist, at least in part, in feelings of motivation. Since, however, motivations 
seem to be dispositions toward action (see Ashwell forthcoming), this would be, 
in effect, a partially dispositional view of the nature of desire.
(20.) If this was the case, then we would not feel motivated to take the last 
cookie on the plate when we refrain from acting on this desire.
(21.) See Ashwell (2013), Byrne (2012), Fernández (2007), Lawlor (2009), and 
Moran (2001) for recent discussions of the introspection of desire.
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Notes:
(1.) Of course, not all one’s beliefs about one’s own mental states are formed 
through introspection; you might work out, for example, that you really want to 
become an accountant by noticing that taxation and finances are all you ever 
talk about. Such a method is third-personal—it is a method that someone else 
could use to work out what you want—while introspection seems to be 
distinctively first-personal.
(2.) This kind of thought has a long philosophical tradition. See Alston (1971) for 
historical examples. Here are some more recent statements of this claim of 
epistemic privilege: “Philosophical tradition has it that one’s own mental life 
enjoys a privileged epistemic standing. I know my own states of mind 
immediately and with confidence. You may discover what I am thinking, of 
course, but you are liable to err in your assessment of my thoughts in ways that I 
cannot” (Heil 1988: 238). “At least sometimes, while you reflect on an occurrent 
thought, you know what it is that you are thinking with more certainty than 
anyone else could have regarding your thought. Moreover, at times you know 
this without using evidence about the so-called external world; and your 
knowledge does not depend on contingent fact about that world” (Gertler 2000: 
125). “Subjects have the ability to acquire beliefs about their own mental states 
in a way that makes them especially justified in holding those 
beliefs” (Fernández 2003: 352).
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(3.) Hume, for example, seems to be claiming that introspection must reveal the 
nature of mental states when he says, “For since all actions and sensations of the 
mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every 
particular what they are, and be what they appear. Everything that enters the 
mind, being in reality as the perception, tis impossible anything should to feeling 
appear different” (quoted in Alston 1971: 224).
(4.) “[Independent of a Cartesian picture of self-awareness] there remains a set 
of basic asymmetries between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others… . 
The type of access we ordinary take ourselves to have [to our own mental states] 
is special in at least two basic ways. First, a person can know of his belief or 
feeling without observing his behavior, or indeed without appealing to evidence 
of any kind at all. And second, rather than this nonreliance on evidence casting 
doubt on the reliability of such reports, judgments made in this way seem to 
enjoy a particular epistemic privilege not accorded corresponding third-person 
judgments that do base themselves on evidence” (Moran 2001: 9–10).
(5.) See Carruthers (2011) and Lawlor (2009), however, for recent statements of 
views on which introspection involves reasoning from evidence. Carruthers 
argues that knowledge of mental states generally involves reasoning from 
evidence; Lawlor argues this particularly for some cases of desire, although she 
allows that perhaps not all first-personal knowledge of desire is like this. Byrne 
(2005, 2012) argues that introspection involves something akin to inference, but 
still quite distinct from reasoning from evidence.
(6.) Byrne (2005, 2012) calls this being epistemically “peculiar.”
(7.) Note that privilege isn’t explained simply by introspective knowledge being 
immediately justified; a belief could be immediately justified but not highly 
justified, or particularly secure.
(8.) Introspection’s privileged nature is generally agreed upon, although it isn’t 
clear that everyone in the debate means the same thing in attributing this 
privilege. Sometimes this is taken to mean that beliefs formed by introspection 
are more likely to be true than other beliefs, or that they can’t be rationally 
doubted, or that they can’t be false, among other things. For a discussion of 
some of the different things that have been meant by “privilege” in these 
debates, see Alston (1971).
(9.) For more recent versions of this kind of view, see Armstrong 1968; Nichols 
and Stitch 2003.
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(10.) This is not the only objection to inner-eye or inner-scanner views; for 
example, Brie Gertler (2000) argues that this kind of view can’t account for the 
essentially first-personal nature of introspection. This objection, and the 
objection discussed above, however, may simply mean that reliability is not the 
way to understand privilege. This is a problem for causal theories of 
introspection if reliability is the only way to understand the epistemic quality of 
the process.
(11.) Although see Döring and Eker this volume. They argue that beliefs about 
goodness or value don’t rationalize in the way they are assumed to, so a key 
motivation for the view that desires are beliefs does not hold. See Oddie, 
Friedrich, Schroeder (this volume) for other concerns about the thesis that 
desires are beliefs.
(12.) See Gregory this volume.
(13.) See Ashwell (2013) for arguments that these kinds of mismatch cause 
problems for so-called transparency accounts of desire introspection: that we 
introspect our desires by making evaluative judgments.
(14.) See Gregory’s contribution to this volume for this kind of explanation.
(15.) Moreover, if you’re particularly weak-willed, and vocal about it, then 
someone who is versed in this kind of theory of the nature of desire could have 
more reliable knowledge of your desires than you do. While it is not clear that 
introspection’s epistemic privilege involves such relative reliability, it would be 
odd for us to be less reliable than others in this way. Alternatively, we might be 
wrong that we believe that we have the relevant belief, but again this would 
have to be counted as an introspective mistake.
(16.) I think, in fact, that you can also believe that something is not valuable at 
all, while judging that you desire it. However, here I only need a less 
controversial case where the judged strength of your desire is out of line with 
how valuable you judge the object of desire to be.
(17.) See, for example, Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005, this volume.
(18.) See Ashwell 2013.
(19.) I have not here considered the view that the relevant appearances are 
instead normative appearances (see Lauria, Massin this volume). If appearances 
of reasons for action do not involve motivations, then the same objection applies 
to these views. However, I find it plausible that appearances of reason for action 
do consist, at least in part, in feelings of motivation. Since, however, motivations 
seem to be dispositions toward action (see Ashwell forthcoming), this would be, 
in effect, a partially dispositional view of the nature of desire.
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(20.) If this was the case, then we would not feel motivated to take the last 
cookie on the plate when we refrain from acting on this desire.
(21.) See Ashwell (2013), Byrne (2012), Fernández (2007), Lawlor (2009), and 
Moran (2001) for recent discussions of the introspection of desire.
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and the functional/motivational view 11, 147, 148–9, 267–70, 297–8, 299
and learning 15–16, 250–1, 267–70
and constitutive norms 292–3, 297–8
disappointment 47, 49, 50, 123, 125, 133n., 259, 263, 279, 300n.
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as evaluations 32, 36, 38–40, 43–5, 72n., 165–167, 171–2, 181–5, 187–8, 195
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perceptual model 7, 14, 20, 29–56, 32–7, 45–6, 59, 95–100, 142, 212–4, 330–1
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objections to 8–9, 11–12, 12–13, 14, 16, 19–20, 46–7, 50–1, 97–100, 143–6, 152–3, 
153, 183–189, 234–43, 328–331
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162n., 165–195, 196n., 201, 209, 212, 274n., 335n.
Meinong, Alexius von 11, 154–5, 156–7, 160n., 161n., 162n., 165–6, 167–9, 170, 176, 
187, 190, 194, 195n., 196n., 197n.
Millikan, Ruth 2, 161n.
mistake, see desire: correctness conditions of; direction of fit
mode (intentional) 7–8, 11, 51–2, 59–62, 62–5, 65–6, 67–9, 72n., 74n., 140, 142–143, 
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